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Abstract 
 
The taxation-accountability theory broadly states that if governments are dependent on 
taxation, they will become less corrupt and more accountable to citizens. The need to 
raise tax revenue is said to spark incentives that lead to mutually beneficial bargaining 
between government and citizens. Citizens agree to make tax payments in return for 
more accountable governance and increased influence in government decision-making. 
Several scholars have shown empirical evidence in support of this taxation-
accountability theory at the national level, yet few have studied it at the local 
government level.  
 
This paper explores this theory in the context of Mexican municipal governments using 
a mixed methods research approach. It first surveys the relationship between taxation 
and accountability using econometric analysis and then employs a comparative case 
study of six urban municipalities that are under considerable pressure to raise their tax 
revenue. The latter is based on several months of field research conducted in the states 
of Guerrero, Tabasco, Baja California Sur, Aguascalientes, Yucatán and Coahuila. It 
reveals the processes that evolve from revenue pressure, whether they lead to tax 
bargaining, and the extent to which greater accountability can be expected as a result.  
 
The findings provide some evidence of tax bargaining and positive correlations between 
the importance of taxation in a government’s budget and accountability. However, the 
causal link to greater accountability is not straightforward and is greatly hindered by 
the institutional framework surrounding local government. While implicit agreements 
between government and citizens showed that equilibrium between taxation and 
accountability was consistently maintained, restrictions on local power and other 
institutional factors stood in the way of increased local taxation sparking greater local 
accountability. These factors may be remedied by reform.   
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Chapter 1: Introducing taxation-
accountability linkages  
 
The notion of a fiscal social contract, which views taxation as the basis of a social 
contract between the government and citizens, has recently gained ground in the field 
of international development. It regards taxation as a key bargaining chip around which 
citizens can demand a representative and democratic government that rules in its 
interest. Taxation is also the principal driver that motivates governments to cooperate 
with citizens and respond to their demands. It is now widely assumed that if 
governments rely more on taxation as a revenue source, they will become more 
accountable to citizens, they will be less likely to waste and embezzle public funds, and 
more likely to govern efficiently and effectively, cooperating with and responding to the 
needs of the broad public. This idea of a (causal) link leading from taxation to 
accountability1  is found repeatedly, explicitly or implicitly, in various strands of 
contemporary literature.  
 
Upon closer examination of the evidence, it becomes clear that the empirical basis to 
support the application of this notion in modern-day developing countries is 
surprisingly thin. Our understanding of how the linkages between taxation and 
accountability are expected to work and in which contexts it does or does not remains 
especially under-researched and under-specified (Moore, forthcoming; Prichard, 2010). 
 
A recent strand of the literature is revisiting the validity of claims about the linkages 
between taxation and accountability and in how far they may apply in contemporary 
developing country contexts  (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, & Moore, 2008; Moore, 2007; 
Prichard, 2010b; Ross, 2004). It notes that is not clear that these ideas can readily be 
translated to modern-day developing countries. Instead, they show that taxation-
accountability linkages are complex and not in fact automatic but highly contingent on 
the context (Prichard, 2009).  
                                                             
1The definition of the term “accountability” is further developed in Sections 1.1 and 1.2.  
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Both the theoretical and empirical scholarship that has emerged in response to this gap 
has largely focused on the national government level. There has been little research on 
how (if at all) such linkages may work at the local government level. If a local 
government receives more of its revenues through taxation, will this lead to greater 
local government accountability? If true, this would have powerful implications for 
development policy. In particular, it would constitute a strong argument in favour of 
recommending greater tax autonomy for local governments as it could be seen as a 
solution to problems of corruption, inefficiency and a lack of investment in development 
and consideration for the collective interest at the local level.  Rapid urbanisation and 
the decentralisation processes that are underway throughout the developing world 
have made local governments increasingly important as agents of development. Given 
the increasing importance of local governance, I argue for a closer examination of these 
relationships at the local level. Compared to the national level, the local level presents 
its own unique challenges and dynamics. For instance, intergovernmental arrangements 
come into play and different types of taxes are collected. Such differences merit a 
separate framework for analysis. At the same time, subnational analysis is a superior 
context in which to analyse taxation-accountability linkages, as one can explore the 
relationship while controlling for variables that vary systematically across countries 
which cross-country studies cannot account for.  
 
This thesis assesses these ideas by exploring the linkages between taxation and 
governance in Mexican municipalities. It employs mixed methods research, combining 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis, to reach three main objectives. The first is to 
show to what extent there are any linkages between local taxation on one hand and 
local accountability on the other in the Mexican local government context. The second is 
to show through which causal channels the linkages precisely work. The third is to 
identify the contextual factors that encourage or limit the linkages from taking hold. 
From the Mexican local government context, I draw implications about how taxation 
affects governance at the local level more generally. In doing so, I bring in key insights 
from the fiscal federalism literature, integrating the ideas of this strand of literature 
more fully into the international development and political science literature that deals 
more directly with taxation-accountability linkages.  
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I argue that while taxation sparks processes leading to greater accountability at the 
local government level in Mexico, the linkages usually tend to take a nuanced form and 
they are often broken by factors specific to the local level. Explicit bargaining between 
local residents and the local government around taxation mostly involved individual 
persons or firms negotiating down their tax obligation with no wider benefits to the 
population. Only where taxpayers formed a narrow interest group was it likely for the 
government to initiate negotiations for mutually beneficial agreements involving 
promises of greater local government accountability. More common were implicit 
agreements between the local government and the taxpayers: if the government was 
perceived as accountable, it collected more taxes and the residents were more willing to 
pay. If the government disappointed the residents, tax collection efforts were dropped 
and tax evasion increased. Local government officials were conscious of this link, yet it 
was difficult to show that their awareness of it alone would motivate them to take steps 
to increase accountability. They may have seen increased tax intake as just a positive 
externality of taking those steps, when those steps would have been taken anyway for 
other (usually political) reasons. The obstacles preventing taxation-accountability 
linkages from taking hold at the local level in spite of considerable tax revenue-raising 
pressure are likely to include limited tax revenue and expenditure autonomy at the local 
level, interference from higher levels of government or other third parties, short time 
horizons due to brief term limits and the prohibition of consecutive re-election, as well 
as a lack of transparent accounting.   
The remainder of this introductory chapter aims to locate my research within the 
various strands of literature that have studied taxation-accountability linkages, 
introduce the main propositions made and review the existing evidence to support 
them. I then identify the limitations of the literature as it stands and show where I aim 
to make a contribution.  
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1.1 Location in the development debate 
 
Claims about the existence of intimate linkages between how a government is financed 
and governance outcomes have been around for some time. Austrian economist Joseph 
Schumpeter is widely cited for his recognition at the beginning of the last century that 
fiscal systems shape social and political outcomes, within his and Rudolf Goldscheid’s 
conception of the study of fiscal sociology. In 1918 Schumpeter noted his intuitions 
about how the fiscal system not only drives a society’s evolution, determining how 
society is ruled and organised, but also shapes the policy choices that may be expected 
from decision-makers within it:  
 
“In some periods [fiscal measures] explain practically all major events, and 
in most periods they explain a great deal … But even greater than the causal 
is the symptomatic significance of fiscal history. The spirit of a people, its 
cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare – all this 
and more is written in its fiscal history […] Our people have become what 
they are under the fiscal pressure of the state” (Schumpeter [1918] 1978:7). 
 
The notion that taxation played a central role in the consolidation of democratic 
institutions in Europe and the United States is widely accepted and appears in 
numerous historical accounts. Conflicts between rulers and their subjects over taxation 
are said to have led to an exchange or fiscal contract: rulers granted concessions and 
made way for the emergence of institutionalised representation of the citizens in return 
for tax payments. For instance, between the 14th and 16th centuries, the Austrian 
princes negotiated new taxes with wealthy landlords in order to be able to finance their 
wars: the landlords agreed to pay in return for greater influence over how the princes 
spent their tax money (Schumpeter, 1918 [1976]). In 17th Century England conflicts 
over taxation are said to have led to the evolution and strengthening of Parliament 
alongside the Crown following the Glorious Revolution (Brewer, 1990; North & 
Weingast, 1989; Tilly, 1992). The well-known revolutionary phrase “No taxation 
without representation” made prominent during the American Revolution against 
British colonial rule has also popularised the notion of an intimate link between 
taxation and representative government in Western thought (Moore, 2004). Charles 
Tilly’s book Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1992 (Tilly, 1992) has also 
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been influential in highlighting the importance of bargaining around taxation in 
furthering the development of democratic institutions and illustrating this with 
historical cases set in Europe.  Each of these shows that agreements around taxation 
between rulers and capitalists to raise funds for wars brought about or strengthened 
democratic states. 
 
The theory that taxation causes or contributes to greater accountability was picked up 
by scholars and policymakers in the field of international development from around the 
1980’s. In the following paragraphs, I argue that it has found great resonance because, 
first, it presents a very plausible and intuitive explanation for the failure of developing 
countries to evolve politically or economically into equitable, growing democracies. It 
provides an explanation for why resource rich countries have not developed as 
expected, why aid has not been as effective as hoped, why state-building efforts have 
not worked, and why decentralisation reforms have not led to promised results. Second, 
it also conforms to general recent trends in international development theory. 
 
The argument that the absence of taxation has impeded democratic development has 
been evoked most often in literature on the “natural resource curse”. It was first used to 
explain the Arab oil states’ resistance to democracy (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987; Mahdavy, 
1970). Beblawi and Luciani  (1987: 73) maintain that rentier states, which depended on 
natural resource rents for their revenues, as opposed to tax states that depend on 
extracting revenues from their domestic populations, did not have the incentives that 
lead to the evolution of democratic institutions elsewhere. They write that a state which 
is dependent on taxation “must give credibility to the notion that it represents the 
common good”, whereas states whose external rent liberates them from the need to 
extract income from the domestic economy, do not. Larry Diamond (2010:98) claims 
about Arab oil states, “Most are so awash in cash that they do not need to tax their own 
citizens. And that is part of the problem— they fail to develop the organic expectations 
of accountability that emerge when states make citizens pay taxes.” These ideas have 
since been used to justify poor governance in an upsurge of literature on various other 
resource rich states in Africa and Latin America (Di John, 2010; Karl, 1997). Yates  
(1996:34) in his book The Rentier State in Africa contrasts a resource rich state with a 
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“normal state that needs to extract revenue from its society, which in turn makes 
demands on the state for its legitimate right to collect taxes”. 
 
The same notion has also been used to explain failures of foreign aid. Bräutigam and 
Knack (2004), for instance, write that foreign aid has reduced the incentives for 
democratic accountability because it decreases government dependence on taxation, 
thus also reducing the bargaining power of citizens in collective action problems. As 
governments that receive substantial transfers of aid do not depend on taxes from 
citizens and businesses, this weakens the development of local pressures for 
accountability and democratic reform.  
 
In the state-building literature, it has been argued that “an effective state requires a 
political settlement among elites to collect revenues. This agreement then enables a 
social contract between the state and its population to pay taxes in return for the 
delivery of basic freedoms and essential public goods” (Everest-Phillips, 2010). In his 
paper “Taxation, developmental state capacity and poverty reduction”, Di John 
(2011:270) writes “taxation is the main nexus that binds state officials with interest 
groups and citizens. Not only can taxation enhance government accountability, it also 
provides a focal point around which interest groups (such as producer groups, labor 
unions and consumer groups) can mobilise to support, resist and even propose tax 
policies”. Besley and Persson (2011:100) note that, “increasingly this taxation is seen as 
part of a broader state-building agenda”.  
 
Most importantly for the context of this thesis, it has also been invoked in literature on 
decentralisation and fiscal federalism. Decentralization reforms, often encouraged and 
supported by the donor community, have shifted power and responsibilities to local 
governments throughout the developing world (T. Campbell, 2003; de la Cruz, 2011; de 
la Cruz, Pineda Mannheim, & Pöschl, 2011; Faguet, 2012; Faguet & Pöschl, forthcoming). 
Such reforms have held promises of improved governance and accountability for a 
number of reasons  but these promises have not always been met in practice (Faguet, 
2012, 2013; Faguet & Sánchez, 2008, 2009; Treisman, 2007). Some scholars have 
blamed some of the failures on the fact that decentralisation on the expenditure side has 
not gone hand in hand with decentralisation on the revenue side, resulting in a “fiscal 
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imbalance” (Tanzi, 2002). The lack of tax powers at the local level are seen to obstruct 
accountability mechanisms from taking hold (Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998). The public 
finance literature on fiscal federalism, which deals with "understanding which functions 
and instruments are best centralized and which are best placed in the sphere of 
decentralized levels of government" (Oates, 1999) has often argued that insufficient tax 
autonomy is what stands in the way of local government fiscal accountability and its 
responsiveness to residents in terms of expenditure decisions (Bahl & Bird, 2008b; Bird, 
1993; Oates, 2005; Seabright, 1996). 
 
These claims, in attributing failures of development to the lack of reliance on taxation, 
imply a statement about a counterfactual: if modern-day developing country 
governments (and some also include local governments) would be more tax reliant, they 
would become more accountable to citizens, more likely to provide market-enhancing 
public goods, and less corrupt than governments that do not (Careaga & Weingast, 
2003; Rodden, Eskeland, & Litvack, 2003; Singh & Srinivasan, 2006).  
 
The taxation-accountability paradigm has not only gained ground because it is 
internally intuitive but it also fits into other trends of thinking in development theory 
and development economics. One trend is the increasing emphasis placed on improving 
good governance and accountability. Until the 1990’s, international development 
institutions shied away from mentioning corruption or other governance issues, as this 
was perceived as an infringement upon the sovereignty of foreign nations. During the 
past two decades, however, there has been a diametric shift in attitude. Economists and 
political scientists alike have become increasingly vocal about emphasising the 
importance of institutional quality and ‘good governance’ for development (Brinkerhoff 
& Goldsmith, 2005). As Grindle (2004:525) emphasises, “For many reform-minded 
citizens in developing countries as well as for academics and practitioners in the 
international development community, good governance has become as imperative to 
poverty reduction as it has become to development more generally”. Although the list of 
objectives surrounding ‘good governance’ is ever-expanding and many sectors in the 
development industry have been quick to slip their specific priorities into this umbrella 
concept, there is widespread agreement on its core features (Grindle, 2010). What it 
generally refers to is governing in a way that is responsive to the needs of the 
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population, providing public services efficiently and effectively, and adhering to the rule 
of law. It contrasts with governance that is corrupt, embezzles funds, spends wastefully, 
ignores the needs of the poor and fails to adequately deliver public services to the 
general population (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2005; Grindle, 2010; Kaufmann, 2003; 
Rodrik, 2008).  
 
A frequently mentioned cornerstone of good governance is ‘accountability’. What is 
meant by accountability? Accountability is an elusive concept that is used in the 
literature to imply a variety of different ideas and thus merits further clarification. In its 
most limited notion it refers to answerability or being called to account (Jones, 1992). 
However, the scope of the term has been extended in a number of directions (Mulgan, 
2000), and a variety of types and sub-types have evolved in the literature (Schedler, 
1999).  
 
In this thesis, unless otherwise indicated, and for ease of expression, ‘accountability’ 
refers to what Keohane (2003:13) terms ‘democratic accountability’: “a relationship 
between power-wielders and the broad public”, as opposed to hierarchical 
accountability (in which subordinates are accountable to superiors), or horizontal 
accountability (in which different branches of government are accountable to one 
another) (O'Donnell, 1998). I use the term “accountability” to describe a form of 
governing in which the needs and requests of the broad public are taken into account 
and responded to and public goods and services are general geared towards improving 
the lives of the general public, rather than embezzled, wasted or reserved to a minority 
group. This encompasses three main dimensions: (1) the use of public funds in an 
efficient and transparent manner (implying limited corruption or embezzlement), (2) 
the effective delivery of public goods geared towards the broad public, and (3) some 
degree of citizen influence in decision-making. Rather than being either existent or 
absent, I view accountability as something that exists as a matter of degrees, with some 
governments being more accountable than others. 
 
How can accountability be achieved? As Paul (1992:1047) notes, “The traditional public 
accountability mechanisms, such as expenditure audits and legislative reviews seem 
unequal to the task of ensuring accountability for public services”. Creating anti-
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corruption bodies and ever more anti-corruption laws and internal oversight rules has 
also met little success (Kaufman 2003). Instead, two particular approaches to increasing 
accountability have gained ground.  
 
For one thing, reforms should drive incentives, as institutions and individuals ultimately 
respond to incentives more than to ethical guidelines, organizational manuals and rules, 
or even laws (Kaufmann, 2003; North & Weingast, 1989). The idea is to implement 
reforms that affect incentives of policy makers, which in turn affect their policy choices 
and, consequently, development outcomes. Recent scholarship in fiscal federalism, the 
so-called “Second generation fiscal federalism,” has also been at the forefront of the 
trend of trying to change government behaviour by creating appropriate incentives. 
While “first-generation fiscal federalism” analysed intergovernmental arrangements 
from the perspective of a benevolent dictator, second generation fiscal federalism 
analyses decisions by subnational government officials based on the incentives they face 
(Oates, 2005; Pöschl & Weingast, forthcoming; Weingast, 2009). 
 
Second, rather than relying solely on the government to control itself, through 
horizontal checks and balances or through monitoring by superiors within government, 
efforts should be made to bring citizens into the accountability relationship, thereby 
stirring governments to hear and respond to the needs of their citizens, the ultimate 
beneficiaries of public goods and services (Faguet, 2012; Paul, 1992). As noted by 
Blackburn, Chambers, Gaventa (2000:1), “we have discovered that participation holds 
promise […] for encouraging good—and often local—governance”.    
 
The idea that taxation can change institutions by creating incentives for more 
accountable governance (particularly by bringing citizens into the accountability 
relationship), and the idea that institutions of taxation can affect development 
trajectories thus fits into these trends of thought in development theory and were easily 
embraced.  
 
In sum, the taxation-accountability paradigm provides an intuitive explanation for 
failures of development and it squares with other recent trends of thought in 
development theory. Plus it is substantiated by historical accounts of early modern 
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European history. But is this enough to assume that increased taxation will also spark 
increased accountability in other contexts, especially ones that are quite different from 
historical Europe?  
 
A recent strand of research started to revisit the validity of these alleged linkages 
between taxation and accountable governance in developing country contexts with a 
more critical eye (Bräutigam et al., 2008; Moore, 2007; Prichard, 2010b; Ross, 2004). 
Scholars of this strand note that precise propositions linking taxation to a mutually 
beneficial exchange and improved governance outcomes remain to be proven in the 
vastly different circumstances of today’s developing world. As Moore (2004:304) 
writes, “One possible conclusion from all this is that fiscal contract theories derived 
from European history score more highly on inherent appeal and plausibility than they 
do on rigorous specification or testing”.   
 
They point out good reasons to be sceptical. First of all, the context of the historical 
events in Europe that they are largely based on was very particular. To subsume that 
similar outcomes will occur in response to greater taxation  in contemporary 
developing countries is not straightforward (Bräutigam et al., 2008; Moore, 2004). The 
most widely cited work in showing the importance of taxation in historical cases is 
Charles Tilly’s book Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1992 (Tilly, 1992). Yet 
Tilly himself explicitly warns against drawing conclusions about his theory for 
contemporary developing countries (Moore, forthcoming). He stresses the particularity 
of the situation in Europe in which competition and wars between various groups 
played a central role in the formation of states, and eventually of democratic states, over 
the course of centuries after various possible alternative structures failed.  
 
Moore (2004) also revisits the historical accounts of the link in 17th Century England 
and points out several particularities, warning that possibly decisive preconditions are 
not present in developing countries. These include (a) a continuous foreign military 
threat that brought about an urgent need among governments for additional resources, 
(b) lack of alternative revenue sources beyond tax revenues, (c) the mobile character of 
assets that could not be easily taxed without taxpayers’ consent, and (d) the fact that 
there were clear positive sum gains for both parties to be reaped from an agreement in 
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those cases. In developing countries, by contrast, he notes a relative powerlessness of 
citizens vis-à-vis the state in terms of military power and a relative autonomy of the 
government from its citizens, especially through the availability of alternative sources of 
revenue beyond tax revenue. Bräutigam (2008) also argues that the prevalence in 
developing countries of several factors may complicate the link. She lists, among these, a 
large informal sector that does not pay taxes, a history of colonial coercion, high levels 
of inequality, and international influence in fiscal reforms.  
 
Given these theoretical uncertainties, it is useful to review what empirical evidence can 
be found for the existence of taxation-accountability linkages in developing countries. 
This is the topic of Section 1.3. Yet before reviewing the empirical evidence, it makes 
sense to further analyse the theoretical arguments linking taxation and accountability 
so that it can be better identified which exact propositions have been empirically tested 
and which have not. 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical arguments linking taxation and 
accountability in the literature 
In this section I present an overview of the main theoretical arguments found in the 
literature linking taxation to some governance outcomes. As Moore (forthcoming) 
points out, in the literature that links taxation to governance outcome, there is not one 
accepted theory but a variety of arguments and overlapping propositions. While several 
authors refer to similar ideas, they often in fact imply (1) different causal variables, (2) 
different outcomes, as well as (3) different causal mechanisms that link the two, often 
involving a row of consecutive steps or one process or event leading to the next. The 
objectives are to summarize the most important propositions found in the literature 
and delineate those that I aim to contribute to. It is also important to clarify the different 
propositions in order to be able to show, in the following section, which specific claims 
are supported by evidence and which are not. 
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Different causal variables 
 
The causal (independent) variable “taxation” can refer to different things conceptually 
and can be measured in different ways. Moore (forthcoming) distinguishes (1) revenue 
needs (2) sources, and (3) levels. The historical accounts on which much of this 
literature is based takes as catalyst (urgent) revenue needs (Prichard, 2009, 2010b). 
This is difficult to identify and especially difficult to measure or code quantitatively.  
 
The majority of the empirical literature on taxation-accountability linkages regards 
sources of revenues as causal and this may refer to the importance of tax revenues 
compared to other sources of revenues in a government’s overall budget (the ratio of 
tax revenue to total government revenue) or in the overall economy (the ratio of tax 
revenue to GDP). Others use the inverse of the ratio: the importance of income from 
sources other than taxation (natural resources, foreign aid or, at the subnational 
government level, national government transfers) to show their negative relationship to 
accountability.  Finally, others still consider the tax level to be causal. This may refer to 
the absolute levels of taxes that citizens are required to pay, (abrupt) changes in those 
levels, the imposition of new types of taxes or a new tax system (Gloppen & Rakner, 
2002), or tax levels compared to benefits received (Ross, 2004).  
 
The more subtle theoretical literature considers further characteristics and conditions 
that need to be fulfilled in order for taxation to be causal. For instance, visible and direct 
taxes are believed to have an effect on accountability while trivial and non-salient taxes 
do not. These are further discussed below in the conditions required for the linkages to 
hold.  
 
My focus is on the effects of increased tax autonomy, implying a greater need to raise 
tax revenue and greater reliance on taxation as a source of revenue at the local 
government level.  
 
25 
 
Different outcomes  
 
There are also different ideas in the literature about what outcomes the taxation-
accountability paradigm is expected to lead to. These can be grouped into six broad 
(though partly overlapping) categories:  
1. One of the expected outcomes is that taxation will simply lead to increased 
engagement between the government and citizens, which provides 
opportunities for positive externalities to arise (such as increased information 
flows and cooperation).  
2. Another set of outcomes deals with increased monitoring of the government. 
This may include transparency and regulated procedures, reducing restrictions 
on the media, closer scrutiny of how tax money is spent, or some other form of 
citizen oversight of the government (Ross, 2004). 
3. A third goes further and involves increased citizen influence in government 
decision-making through institutionalised representation. Samuel Huntington 
for instance, states this negatively: “The lower the level of taxation, the less 
reason for publics to demand representation” (Huntington, 1993:65). 
4. Some go as far as testing for political change or liberalisation from oppressive 
autocratic regimes to more democratic ones.  
5. Another large set of outcomes involve government expenditures. Some expect 
expenditure decisions to respond to the needs of the general public. Auty (2001) 
and Auty and Gelb (2001) imply this when they argue that low taxes and 
abundance of rents creates a relatively high tolerance by the poor majority for 
inequitable asset distribution and predatory rent extraction. Others expect it 
will lead the government to target expenditures to the needs of the taxpayers 
(Timmons, 2005).    
6. Finally, prudent fiscal management is regarded as an outcome. This is 
particularly the case in the public finance literature, where a major concern is 
with achieving efficiency in public spending and preventing overspending. 
Efficient spending is also often equated with responsiveness to local needs and 
decisions, in line with the principle of fiscal equivalence (Olson, 1969) and the 
benefit principle  (E. Ahmad et al., 2015). Prudent and efficient fiscal 
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management thus implies transparency and use of public funds in the interest of 
the general public as opposed to wasteful spending or divergence.  
 
Recognising accountability as a wide, multi-faceted concept, I look for each of these 
outcomes in the present analysis. I focus in particular on its three dimensions: 
transparency, effective service delivery, and citizen influence in decision-making. As will 
be explained in further chapters, when exploring the taxation-accountability linkages 
quantitatively, I use three proxies for accountability: transparency; an outcome 
indicator of one of the main public services that local governments in Mexico are 
responsible for; and electoral competition. In the qualitative analysis I am able to take a 
broader and more nuanced approach in searching for outcomes of increased 
accountability.  
 
Different causal explanations 
 
Upon closer examination of the literature, one finds not only numerous different causal 
variables and different outcomes, but also many different explanations connecting the 
two (Moore, forthcoming; Prichard, 2010a). I distinguish three main arguments found in 
the literature: 
 
1. Taxation increases administrative capacity of government 
2. Taxation motivates interest in economic prosperity to increase taxable wealth 
3. Citizens don’t like to pay taxes and governments need to seek compliance 
 
One causal explanation is that taxation increases accountability by increasing the 
administrative capacity of government. Collecting taxes usually requires collecting 
information about the population, registering taxpayers, building a bureaucracy to 
regulate and administer payments, as well as a degree of government presence 
throughout the jurisdiction (Chaudhry, 1997). This in turn may lead to greater 
accountability because the government is more engaged with citizens, and its greater 
organisation and administrative capacity also carries over to its ability to respond to 
citizen demands more efficiently and effectively. This argument is often mentioned in 
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the state-building literature, which argues that taxation may be important for state 
formation more generally (Besley & Persson, 2011; Di John, 2011). Enhanced capacity 
will improve the government’s ability to respond to its people. While this argument 
does not claim that taxation directly sparks incentives for government to rule in the 
interest of its people, it predicts that it will have the capability of being more responsive 
to needs. 
 
A second explanation states that if a government is dependent on taxation of businesses 
or citizens in its domestic economy, this gives it an economic interest to increase 
productivity in its territory in order to secure or raise future earnings (Oates, 1972; 
Olson, 2002). Having a stake in the prosperity of its population in turn provides the 
government with incentives to engage with the population, collect information about it, 
and to respond to its needs, at least to the productive needs of those whom it sees as 
potential producers of taxable wealth.  
 
Adam Smith (1776 [1904]: V.1.87; quoted in Pöschl and Weingast, forthcoming) in his 
seminal work Wealth of Nations recognised that dependence on taxation motivates the 
government to govern in the interest of its people and to invest in market-enhancing 
public goods, explaining that countries where: 
 
“the revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether from a land-tax or 
land-rent, which rises or falls with the rise or fall of the annual produce of 
the land […] the great interest of the sovereign […] is in such countries 
necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the land, 
with the greatness of its produce and with the value of its produce. But in 
order to render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it is 
necessary to procure to it an extensive a market as possible, and 
consequently the freest, the easiest and the least expensive communication 
between all the different parts of the country; which can be done only by 
means of the best roads and the best navigable canals.  
 
[Where this is not the case], the sovereign does not feel himself so directly 
called upon to promote the increase, both in quantity and value, of the 
produce of the land, or, by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide 
the most extensive market for that produce”. 
 
The third and perhaps most prominent explanation is that citizens don’t like to pay taxes 
and governments need to motivate them to comply. Taxation inherently contains an 
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element of coercion but also heavily relies on a degree of compliance by the taxpayer, 
what Levi (1988) has termed “quasi-voluntary compliance”. Citizens can resist tax 
payments through evasion. They can also revolt or protest in response to taxation. The 
government will try to motivate the taxpayers to pay through some action in return. 
How this leads to accountability has been argued from several angles.  
 
When citizens do pay taxes, they will be incentivised to scrutinise the government more, 
hold it to a higher standard and ensure that it uses the money effectively and in its 
interest. Paying taxes thus incentivises citizens to engage with the government and 
demand accountability. Yates (1996:34) suggests this in his book The Rentier State in 
Africa when he contrasts a resource rich state with a “normal state that needs to extract 
revenue from its society, which in turn makes demands on the state for its legitimate 
right to collect taxes”.  
 
The idea is that citizens are more concerned about what the government does with the 
money they have paid it directly through taxes than what it does with funds from other 
sources. With regard to the local level, Bird (2010:20) writes, “People care much more 
about how their ‘own money’ is spent than they do about the efficiency with which 
‘other people's money’ -- such as transfers -- is used”. Thus, “local residents are more 
likely to hold officials accountable if local public services are financed to a significant 
extent from locally imposed taxes and charges as opposed to central government 
transfers” (Bird, 2011:20). By contrast, as Ambrosio and Bordignon (2008: 316) write, 
“If everything were financed with money coming from outside the jurisdiction, citizens 
living in that jurisdiction would have very little incentive to check how that money was 
spent.”  
 
The same logic can be found in Smith (1776 [1904]: V.1.76) where he suggests that only 
when public services are directly paid for through user taxes, is it possible to avoid 
wasteful spending because it will motivate residents to keep a check on government 
spending:  
 
“A great bridge cannot be thrown over a river at a place where nobody 
passes, or merely to embellish the view from the windows of a 
neighbouring palace: things which sometimes happen in countries where 
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works of this kind are carried on by any other revenue than that which they 
[the users] themselves are capable of affording”.   
 
This brings us to the idea of tax bargaining, which follows from the above arguments. 
Because of the incentives that taxation sparks with the government (to increase 
economic prosperity and to ensure compliance) and with the citizens (to resist taxation 
and to demand accountability), many predict that what will ensue is bargaining around 
taxation in order to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome or a “fiscal social contract” in 
which the citizens pay taxes in return for greater accountability (Moore, 2007). 
 
This is also argued from the angle of the transaction costs that ensuring compliance 
involves for the government. Since citizens resist taxation, securing compliance is linked 
with transaction costs and governments spend tax money more efficiently and 
prudently and less wastefully than money that is not linked with such transaction costs. 
In the local government context, where non-tax revenue largely consists of transfers 
from the national government, Tanzi (2010:324) writes: 
 
“Local administrators will be more wasteful in the use of resources received 
from the national government because, presumably, these resources do not 
represent a direct local effort or sacrifice”.  
 
Bahl and Linn (1992:428), in their authoritative study of urban public finance in 
developing countries, also imply this: 
 
“Grants can make local governments less accountable for their fiscal 
decisions (they may now increase spending without increasing taxes); 
hence there will be less incentive to improve the efficiency of local 
government operations and develop innovative methods of delivering 
public services”. 
 
In this thesis the primary interest is with tax bargaining: to what extent can we expect 
that taxation sparks incentives that lead to a mutually beneficial bargain in which the 
government grants some sort of concessions in return for tax payments? I look at 
whether taxation sparks coercive taxation, tax bargaining or neither. I look at what form 
tax bargaining takes (implicit or explicit) and whether any outcomes result that amount 
to increased local government accountability.  In the quantitative analysis of this thesis 
(Chapters 4 and 5), I am restricted to testing for outcomes that may be indicative of 
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such processes occurring but it is difficult to show which causal mechanism is at work. 
This is largely left to the qualitative analysis in Chapters 6-8.  
 
One final distinction between propositions merits attention here. Different scholars 
envision different time horizons for the processes and outcomes to occur. Some take a 
very long-term view, showing how historical institutions of taxation have influenced the 
development trajectories of certain states (Berger, 2009; Grabowski, 2008). Several 
authors have even insinuated that there is path dependence to taxation-accountability 
linkages. Joshi and Ayee (Joshi & Ayee, 2008) for instance, purport that widening 
taxation “will spark off a virtuous cycle of taxation and accountability”. This suggests a 
possible interdependence between taxation and accountability that includes reverse 
causality in the taxation-accountability relationship: more taxation leads to more 
accountability but more accountability also leads to greater tax compliance. The two 
then feed into one another creating positive feedback loops. 
 
Others take a far shorter term view, predicting effects to take hold after decades or 
years, if not immediately. In the quantitative analysis, I examine immediate effects and 
effects after 3 years. In the qualitative analysis, I also analyse whether revenue needs 
spark short-term processes (in the course of 1-3 years) that are consistent with the 
theory (even if the full effects may only be expected to materialise afterwards). The 
analysis is therefore restricted to observing results in a shorter timeframe than some of 
the theoretical literature puts forward.     
 
The theoretical literature contains many theories about how taxation and accountability 
may be linked. Yet what evidence do we have from developing countries that this causal 
link works and that it works through any of the causal mechanisms discussed above? 
This is the subject of the next two sections, which review the large-N and small-N 
empirical studies on the topic.  
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1.3 The large-N evidence 
 
In this section I review the quantitative literature that is responding to the need to 
substantiate the taxation-accountability paradigm with empirical evidence in 
contemporary developing country contexts. I first look at quantitative studies. As it 
turns out, robust evidence to show that there are any linkages, let alone causal linkages, 
between taxation and accountability is surprisingly scarce. Several studies use highly 
imprecise indicators to measure the variables, either because of data limitations or 
because of a different theoretical focus. Further studies, while showing relationships, 
fail to establish causality. Within-country studies that examine these relationships at the 
local level are both methodologically more reliable and also more relevant for our 
purposes, but there are surprisingly few of them. 
 
Large-N cross-national econometric studies are widely cited as evidence for the 
existence of a link between taxation and accountability in developing countries. These 
regress some measure of taxation as the independent variable on some measure of 
accountability as the dependent variable. Ross (2004) uses time series cross national 
data from 113 countries from 1971 to 1997 and finds that an increase in taxes relative 
to total expenditure is a significant predictor of regime change from authoritarian to 
democratic. Baskaran and Bigsten (2012) use panel data of 23 sub-Saharan African 
states from 1990 to 2005 to show that higher taxation is associated with higher quality 
political institutions. Baskaran (2014) uses panel data of 122 countries from 1981 to 
2008 and finds that taxation has a causal effect on democracy and corruption. He uses 
the year of adoption of the value added tax for taxation as quasi-exogenous instruments 
to overcome problems of endogeneity and reverse causality that the other studies 
struggle with. However, because of its availability for more observations, he uses a very 
imprecise independent variable: general government revenue over GDP (rather than tax 
revenues to total government revenues).  
 
Timmons (2005) tests the effect of taxation on government responsiveness using a 
different approach: he tests whether governments are more likely to target their public 
expenditures to those groups of taxpayers that pay a greater share of the revenues. 
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Using cross-sectional data from around 90 countries and panel data from 18 OECD 
countries from 1975 to 1995, he shows that higher taxation on the poor brings about 
proportionately more government services addressing the needs of the poor (basic 
services) while higher taxation on the rich leads to more government programs targeted 
at the rich (property rights protection). He concludes that the costs of enforcing tax 
compliance provide governments with pecuniary incentives to cater to its specific 
taxpayers.  
 
There is also a substantial body of cross-national econometric literature linking non-tax 
revenues (especially natural resource rents and foreign aid) to different governance 
outcomes. Tax dependence may be regarded as the proportion of tax revenues over 
total government revenues. Tax revenues thus comprise one part of a ratio and non-tax 
revenues the other. Changes in the ratio can thus result from either a change in tax 
revenues or a change in non-tax revenues.  
 
Among the myriad studies on the effects of natural resource abundance on different 
outcomes, ranging from conflict to economic growth, several of these focus on the 
effects on governance outcomes such as democracy, public goods provision and 
corruption (See Rosser, 2006 for a review). While some studies find a negative 
relationship (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Prichard, Salardi, & Segal, 2014; Ross, 2001), 
others do not (Haber & Menaldo, 2011; Herb, 2005). Ultimately it has been broadly 
concluded that the results depend on the institutional context but without further 
specifying in what ways (Ahmadov, 2013; Andersen & Ross, 2013).  
 
However, the dependent variable in these studies tends to be measured solely in terms 
of natural resource exports to GDP or natural resource exports over total exports. As 
Herb (2005) points out, a more useful measure to test the effects of the composition of 
revenue sources for sparking government incentives would be the amount of rent 
income over total government income. Only Herb (2005) uses this measure to test 
political outcomes and results are inconclusive. 
 
Besides the imprecision of the indicators, it is also important to distinguish the effects of 
taxation (or an absence thereof) from the negative effects of specific non-tax revenues 
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conceptually as these are not entirely two sides of the same coin. Some non-tax 
revenues might have specific characteristics, which are different from other non-tax 
revenues or a simple absence of taxation, that are in fact driving the results. 
 
In fact, lack of taxation is only one of many competing causal pathways through which 
the link between natural resource abundance and negative governance outcomes is 
explained in the literature. For instance, Beblawi and Luciani (1987) point out that in 
‘rentier states’ very few people are involved in generating the oil wealth and rents are 
typically paid by foreign countries directly to the government without the citizens’ 
knowledge. This may make them less transparent and more vulnerable to waste and 
embezzlement. Various scholars emphasise that natural resource rents often comprise 
abrupt ‘windfalls’. This is what may encourage rent-seeking and conflict, as it represents 
a large prize worthy of fighting over, with detrimental effects on governance (Torvik, 
2002). Furthermore, governments may not have the capacity to immediately channel 
such windfalls into well-founded development projects in a transparent manner. It has 
also been argued that the overwhelming size of such windfalls compared to the size of 
the economy may allow the government to strengthen its internal security and repress 
opposition and popular movements, thereby limiting regime change, democratization 
and accountability (Ross, 2001).  
  
Similar arguments apply for the literature showing links between dependence on 
foreign aid, another non-tax revenue, and governance outcomes (Bräutigam & Knack, 
2004; Busse & Gröning, 2009; Rajan & Subramanian, 2007). Bräutigam and Knack 
(2004) for instance write that foreign aid can reduce the incentives for democratic 
accountability because it reduces the bargaining power of citizens in collective action 
problems. As governments that receive substantial transfers of aid do not depend on 
taxes raised from citizens and businesses, this weakens the development of local 
pressures for accountability and democratic reform. Some of these studies suffer from 
omitted variable bias since more aid is simply targeted at countries where governance 
is poor. And again, the results they obtain may be driven by the negative effects of the 
specific non-tax revenues (foreign aid) such as rent-seeking over a windfall. While this 
may constitute evidence that taxation as a source of revenues is more likely to bring 
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about positive governance outcomes than other sources, it does not directly provide 
evidence for bargaining over taxation as a causal factor for increased accountability.  
 
The usefulness of such cross-country statistical comparisons as evidence has often been 
called into question. They involve comparing dissimilar countries, cultures, and 
institutions, bringing about a large potential for producing confounded relationships. 
Critically, data is collected differently in different countries, using varied definitions and 
categories, and it is often absent or unreliable for many developing countries. Scholars 
have also struggled with data availability problems for larger panel datasets. Moore 
(1998) warns in particular of a strong correlation between levels of income and the 
quality (and availability) of fiscal data that could affect results. The variables used are 
also often imprecise in measuring the concepts due to data constraints. Furthermore, 
while many find evidence of associations, most struggle to establish causality.  
Within-country econometric studies have the advantage of circumventing some of the 
challenges of cross-national ones by holding various institutional, cultural and policy 
variables constant across units (Caselli & Michaels, 2013). They are also more precise as 
they reveal important differences within countries, which aggregated national level data 
hides (Beer, 2003). Beyond the methodological advantages, they are also more relevant 
for the purposes of this thesis as they examine these effects at a subnational level (the 
focus here), rather than at the national level. 
 
Again, data availability has been a challenge to researchers: municipal level data 
(especially historical data for panel analysis) is rare to come across in most developing 
countries and has left the number of such studies correspondingly scarce. To my 
knowledge they consist of only four studies. First, Hoffman and Gibson (2005) analyse 
the relationship between taxation and government responsiveness in Tanzania and 
Zambia. In this paper a cross-section of local fiscal data is used to show that local 
governments spend proportionately more on public services when they receive more 
revenues from taxation. Conversely a largely proportion of revenues derived from 
outside sources, such as transfers from central government or foreign aid, is associated 
with greater local government spending on salaries and administrative costs. Using only 
cross-sections, however, they fail to convince of any causality in these relationships.  
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A second study is by Gervasoni (2010), who examines the effect of different sources of 
revenue on regime type in Argentine provincial governments. While he finds that fiscal 
transfers are negatively related to levels of democratization, he finds no association 
when testing specifically for the effects of taxation. This study does not, however, 
provide evidence of the link at the local level but at the intermediate, provincial level of 
government in Argentina.  
 
Third, Berger (2009) shows that different colonial tax institutions in Nigeria have led to 
contemporary differences in the quality of governance. In particular, in areas where 
broad local taxes were imposed by colonial Britain, better bureaucratic capacity is 
observed than where this was absent. It is not entirely clear that it is taxation and not 
some other factor that was causal over the long trajectory leading to differences in the 
quality of government today between these areas.  
 
Finally, Gadenne (2013) uses local governments in Brazil as her unit of analysis and 
finds that increases in the proportion of tax revenues lead to a larger increase in local 
public health and education services than correspondingly large increases in transfers. 
She also finds that extra transfers lead to more corruption. She tries to overcome 
problems of causality by using regression discontinuity.   
 
Several studies have further emerged that attempt to test the effects of natural resource 
windfalls on political outcomes at the local level, including corruption and political 
contestation. Again, their relevance is limited for reasons stated above but they 
nonetheless provide suggestive evidence. The focus is again on the effect of windfall 
profits from natural resources rather than on the effects of taxation per se, which as 
mentioned above may be regarded as a special form of non-tax revenues with separate 
effects. Brollo et al. (2010) find a positive correlation between the amount of oil 
revenues and local government corruption charges, indicating that the greater the 
importance of this non-tax revenue, the more likely local governments are to be corrupt. 
Caselli and Michaels (2013) also test the effects of oil windfalls on corruption, 
measuring the latter as the gap between local public expenditures and service delivery 
outcomes. They find that excess revenues from natural resources bring about a larger 
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“missing gap” between budgeted expenditures and service delivery outcomes, which 
they interpret as evidence of corruption.   
 
Collectively, the statistical evidence is suggestive that taxation acts as a catalyst for 
improved governance outcomes in some circumstances. However, it suffers from a host 
of methodological challenges. It compares highly different contexts and countries with 
only loosely analogous data that is defined and collected differently in different 
countries.  
 
The most relevant evidence to the question in this thesis: whether taxation affects 
accountability at the local level, are within-country studies. So far they make up only a 
very small body of evidence. Of these, one shows a relationship between differences in 
current local government outcomes in Nigeria with differences in the tax system 
existent several decades earlier yet fails to show causality. Only two directly attempt to 
provide evidence for the link between changes in the levels of taxation and governance 
at the local government level: one in Zambia and Tanzania that uses only cross-sectional 
data, and one in Brazil. And even with these, the causal mechanism is impossible to 
identify and the effects of taxation are difficult to separate from other possible causal 
variables.   
 
Although these quantitative studies have the advantage of a large number of 
observations for greater reliability of the results, we need to look to qualitative studies 
for discerning the precise causal mechanisms involved and identifying conditions and 
contextual factors that affect the link.  That is the subject of the next section of this 
chapter. 
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1.4 Small-N evidence and related literature 
 
In this section, I first review the qualitative literature that studies the linkages between 
taxation and accountability, both those case studies that look at the national level and 
those that deal with the local level. I then review other related strands of literature and 
show how the topic of this thesis corresponds with them. 
 
Several country case studies provide empirical evidence on how changes in the 
composition of revenue sources that national governments in the Middle East depend 
on have led to changes in governance. The most cited of these is Chaudhry (1997) 
whose detailed historical analysis follows the changes in the composition of government 
revenues (through fluctuations in oil income in Saudi Arabia and fluctuations in inflows 
of remittances in Yemen) and traces the effect of these changes on public administration 
and governance. Her analysis shows that democratic accountability repeatedly dropped 
in times when revenue sources other than taxation were abundant. More specifically, in 
times of oil wealth, citizens had little influence over the government’s policies. The 
government could buy loyalty and became increasingly centralised and independent 
from the wealthy elite or other tribes in the kingdom. Crystal (1995) similarly observes 
a decline in political power of the merchant classes after oil was discovered and taxation 
eliminated in Kuwait and Qatar. Brand (1992) analogously shows that when 
remittances were reduced in Jordan, political liberalisation increased as the government 
became more reliant on taxpayers and granted concessions in terms of liberalisation in 
return for their taxes. 
 
Some recent single country studies have also traced the importance of taxation in 
sparking processes leading to improvements in democratic accountability in Africa. 
Bräutigam (2008a) sketches out the history of taxation in Mauritius and concludes that 
export taxation there improved governance by bringing businesses to the bargaining 
table with the government. This encouraged future public-private trust and 
cooperation. Eubank (2012) argues that bargaining around taxation explains why 
Somaliland, not being a recipient of development aid and not having mineral wealth that 
can be easily captured, formed a democratic government. In need of revenues, the 
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government fought to take control of a port (Berbera) for its potential tax revenues, 
which was at the time controlled by a particular clan. This motivated the outbreak of a 
wider conflict. The ensuing peace negotiations allowed for government control of the 
port yet in return for the creation of political institutions with inclusive representation 
of clans different from that of the governing elite. He thereby emphasises that inner-
state conflict, and not only inter-state warfare, as in the historical narratives of early 
modern Europe, can lead to revenue bargaining and presumes that such bargaining 
would have been unlikely in the presence of foreign aid or natural resource revenues.  
 
Comparative African case studies have also shed light on taxation-accountability 
linkages. Gloppen and Rakner (Gloppen & Rakner, 2002; Rakner & Gloppen, 2003) 
explore the relationship between taxation and accountability through an evaluation of 
tax reforms in Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia. They assume that accountability or a 
closer link between the government and its citizens could only be reached to a limited 
degree, obstructed by the fact that the tax reforms did not focus on direct taxes (which 
are highly visible to and felt by the taxpayers), saying “a tax system that primarily is 
based on indirect taxes cannot be expected to yield a so called ‘governance bonus’ or a 
democratic accountability effect” (Gloppen & Rakner, 2002:3-4). In Uganda, there was 
resistance to the introduction of the VAT. This first led to arrests and then to a number 
of exemptions that took many firms out of the tax net. They assume that since it hardly 
broadened the tax base, as large parts of the economy remained outside the tax net, 
democratic accountability would not be achieved. Nonetheless, the authors do predict a 
stronger link in the long term, as resistance to the tax reforms created more organised 
bodies representing taxpayer groups. Tax issues were beginning to be treated through 
formal, public organisations rather than through bribery and individual deal-making. 
They write that, “Business is now acting as a voice” (Gloppen & Rakner, 2002:15).  
 
Prichard (2010b) traces central government tax systems in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Ghana 
over an extensive historical period and finds evidence that having to raise tax revenue 
forced the government into implicit and explicit bargaining with society. Popular 
resistance against taxes had the effect that subsequent governments would only pass 
new taxes if these were earmarked to public spending programmes. Furthermore, 
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conflict over taxes caused business associations to strengthen to a point where they 
were able to influence political change.  
 
We have seen that there is evidence of taxation playing a causal role in democratisation 
and accountability processes at the national level of government. Through different 
processes and mechanisms and in several different contexts, tax dependence has 
brought governments to be more accountable to citizens. But is there evidence of any 
link at the local level? Three recent qualitative case studies exist that address this 
question.  
 
Fjeldstad and Therkildsen (2008) study local governments in Tanzania and Uganda and 
examine the effects of the local poll tax there on accountability. They show that the poll 
tax in Tanzania and Uganda did not lead to revenue bargaining between taxpayers and 
the state. The governments enforced the tax through coercion: tax collectors forcefully, 
arbitrarily and sometimes violently extracted funds from the local population, created 
great resentment against the tax and sparking revolt. This led rural populations to 
mobilise politically, but not to engage in any mutually beneficial bargains; instead, they 
brought the government to abolish local taxation altogether.  
 
Bernstein and Lü (2003, 2008) note similar experiences with local taxation in rural 
China, where locally elected village governments were granted significant tax powers. 
According to their findings, tax collection was also coercive rather than consensual: 
local residents quickly felt overburdened with a constant addition of new, sometimes 
arbitrary taxes, causing great resentment. Yet instead of protesting or engaging with the 
local government, taxpayers approached the central government and demanded it 
constrain the taxing powers of the local government. The central government 
subsequently tightened its internal controls of the local government and reduced local 
taxing powers. No direct dialogue resulted between the local government and local 
residents and no increase in local accountability ensued.  
 
Juul (2006) observes the effects of transferring the poll tax in Senegal in 1996 from the 
state agent (the sous-préfets) to locally elected councillors. This resulted, above all, in a 
steady drop in tax intake. She focuses on the case of Barkedji Arrondissement and argues 
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that the shift did not lead to demands for political representation, increased 
accountability or enhanced feelings of citizenry. The loss of power of the hegemonic 
Socialist Party and the expansion of multiparty political competition at all levels of 
government created electoral competition and made the locally elected councillors 
reluctant to as much as publicly mention taxation, let alone enforce it, particularly during 
an election year. “From fear of not being re-elected, local leaders seldom raise the issue 
of tax policy and often depend on indirect taxes for a large proportion of state revenue — 
with the unfortunate result that there are no discussions of how revenues are collected 
and used and no taxpayers to hold officials accountable” (Juul 2006:844). She adds that 
the local governments performed poorly in the delivery of public services (largely due to 
a corresponding decline of local funds), further discouraging any tax contributions, and 
therefore also extinguishing any ensuing demands for democratic accountability. 
 
This thesis also draws from and contributes to two further strands of literature. One is 
the literature on the effects of accountability on tax intake. This literature largely argues 
that increased accountability increases tax intake because it reduces the transaction 
costs of taxing. This is because it makes taxpayers comply on a ‘quasi-voluntary’ basis 
(Levi, 1988) and it builds so-called ‘tax morale’ (Torgler, 2007). That literature is 
relevant in two ways. First, it shows that residents perceive a link between government 
accountability (in terms of service delivery) and taxation. However, it doesn’t say much 
about the further steps: does this, then, lead citizens to prompt governments to improve 
services and respond to their needs? Is the government aware of this and does it adjust 
its behaviour accordingly? It may nonetheless be regarded as partially indicative of one 
of the intermediate steps between revenue bargaining and increased accountability. 
 
Second, it is relevant because it is indicative of reverse causality in the causal puzzle: 
more accountable governments may be more successful at raising tax revenues so 
accountability may cause greater tax revenue. Most of this literature is based on 
behavioural and survey research (Bergman, 2002; Levi & Sacks, 2005; Torgler, 2005). 
Most prominently, Lieberman’s (2003) survey data from South Africa and Brazil show 
that people self-report higher willingness to pay taxes where governments are perceived 
to have a better performance record in terms of public service delivery. Cummings et al. 
(2009) and, more recently, Paler (2013) use an experimental research design to show 
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that in Indonesia local residents are more likely to monitor the local government when 
they believe that their tax money is financing local government rather than windfall 
rents. Bird, Martinez-Vasquez, and Torgler (2008) show in a cross-section that variations 
in the quality of governance are correlated with variations in tax revenues to GDP, 
essentially showing the same effect as the cross-national statistical studies discussed 
above, but assuming a different causal direction. Cross-country regression analysis has 
also been conducted to test the effect of regime type on tax intake. Here the evidence is 
less clear. Cheibub (1998) concludes that there is no difference between (presumably 
more accountable) democracies and (less accountable) autocracies in their ability to 
raise tax revenue. Thies (2004) finds that democracies tax more, Fauvelle-Aymer (1999) 
finds that autocracies tax more and Boix (2001, 2003) shows that democracies have a 
higher tax intake but only above a certain income level. While the authors have a 
different causal direction in mind than the one of interest in this thesis, their evidence 
may be indicative of either. One of the aims of this thesis is to clarify the causal direction 
and mechanisms that lead to such results in quantitative analysis. 
 
I also draw from the political science literature on democratisation and political change. 
Explaining political change and variation between levels of democratisation has long 
been the focus of political science. The late 20th century has seen transitions from 
authoritarian towards democratic rule in a number of developing countries (Stepan & 
Linz, 1996). At the same time, the term “democracy” has increasingly been qualified and 
countries are categorized according to varying degrees of democratization and 
authoritarianism “with adjectives” (hybrid, mixed, transitional, semi-democracy, 
illiberal democracy, competitive authoritarianism, to name but a few).  
 
While the bulk of these studies have tended to focus on the national level, classifying a 
country as a whole, recently more attention has been paid to differences within regions 
of the same country. According to Gibson (2005), the unevenness of territorial 
distribution of practices and institutions of democracy within countries has largely been 
neglected. Yet a growing body of literature is responding to this gap. Several case 
studies describe subnational authoritarian enclaves within national level democracies 
have brought attention to this phenomenon (Snyder (1999), Lawson (2000) on 
subnational authoritarian regimes in Mexico; Chavez (2004) on the provinces of San 
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Luis and Mendoza in Argentina; Gibson (2005) on the state of Oaxaca in Mexico and the 
province of Santiago del Estero in Argentina; McMann (2006) studies two provinces in 
southern Russia –Samara and Ul’ianowvsk, and two in Kyrgyzstan – Osh and Naryn).  
 
There is also a growing range of large-N literature seeking to explain differences in 
levels of democracy across subnational government units of the same country. The 
factors explored include structural socioeconomic characteristics, such as the levels of 
per capita income, the level of urbanisation and rate of economic growth (O'Donnell, 
1998; Przeworski, 2004). Another explanation is the diffusion of ideas: Kopstein and 
Reilly (2000) studied this in the context of former communist countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, highlighting proximity to the west and isolation in the east to 
show spatial diffusion of ideas. Gel’man and Lankina (2007) also use diffusion theory to 
explain the geographically uneven nature of democratisation in Russia, examining how 
both spatial proximity and contact between model-propagating and model-emulating 
regions and actors account for variation in democratic institution-building. Others use 
cultural theories to explain regional differences in democratic accountability. These 
include different civic traditions (Putnam, 1993), customary laws that provide more 
channels for citizen participation in decision-making (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, & Ruiz-
Euler, 2014), and colonial and religious traditions. Political variables have also been 
evoked as predictors: Benitez-Iturbe (Benitez-Iturbe, 2008)  shows how political 
competition and the characteristics of parties’ main constituencies in specific regions 
influence the type (public vs .particularistic) and concentration of goods distribution in 
three Mexican states. Agency, in the form of relations between national and subnational 
actors and differing degrees of benevolence, ambition and effectiveness of specific local 
leaders has been posited as further explanations for regional variation in democratic 
accountability (Gibson, 2005; Snyder, 1999). This thesis contributes to the explanations 
by assessing the effect of taxation as one of several competing causal factors that affect 
the levels of democratic accountability across local governments.  
 
This section has reviewed the small-N qualitative literature on taxation-accountability 
linkages. Several case studies have studied taxation-accountability at the national level in 
the Middle East and Africa. These provide evidence for taxation-accountability linkages 
in certain contexts but not in others and also shed some light on the different causal 
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mechanisms through which such linkages work. Very few studies have examined 
taxation-accountability linkages at the local level. These include studies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa that deal with the local poll tax and one study on local governments in China, all of 
which are set in poor, rural areas. None of these find evidence for taxation-accountability 
linkages. They predominantly conclude that in poor agrarian settings, taxation is more 
likely to lead to coercive, rather than consensual taxation, and often brutally violent 
collection methods, which ended in the abolition of the tax rather than in any mutually 
beneficial bargain in which government accountability was enhanced. The only study 
where no coercive taxation was observed is Juul’s (2006) study on Senegal. Rather than 
collecting the poll tax coercively, the locally elected councillors did not collect it at all out 
of fear of not being re-elected. This section has also shown how this thesis relates to 
behavioural and survey research on tax compliance and to the political science literature 
on democratisation and political change. 
 
 
Conclusion and structure of the thesis 
 
This chapter has shown that the validity of the taxation-accountability paradigm in 
developing country contexts remains under-researched and under-specified. This is 
true generally but even more so with regard to local government level analysis. There is 
no comprehensive framework for analysis of this paradigm in the local context. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence to support the validity of the propositions 
surrounding such linkages or to reveal the mechanisms through which they work, and 
obstacles that may be preventing them, is scarce.  
The small-N case studies on taxation-accountability linkages at the local level show little 
evidence of tax bargaining; instead, they show that revenue needs have often led to 
coercive taxation or no taxation rather than to consensual tax bargaining. While having 
the virtues of illustrating causal mechanisms and showing in which context and under 
which conditions the paradigm holds, these small-N studies lack breadth for making 
generalizable claims about the relationship compared to systematic statistical studies. 
However, to date there appear to be only a handful of within-country statistical studies 
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that test the effects of taxation on accountability (or a measure that can be interpreted 
as a proxy for accountability) in developing countries, to my knowledge, even though 
within-country analysis provides a far superior context in which to test this relationship 
compared to cross-country analyses.  
Of these within-country quantitative studies, most claim to show support for a link 
between taxation and accountability. Hoffman and Gibson’s (2005) cross-sectional 
regression establishes correlation but makes no attempt at establishing causality as it 
uses only cross-sectional data from a single time period (given lack of data availability). 
Berger (2009) shows a positive correlation between tax systems of colonial era Nigeria 
and current levels of local government quality, but also fails to establish causality. 
Gervasoni’s (2010) panel regression focuses on the provincial government level (rather 
than the local government level) in Argentina. He finds that greater dependence on 
central government transfers has a negative effect on democratisation, though he 
observes no significant effect of taxation directly. Gadenne (2013) finds that greater 
proportions of tax revenue positively affect governance at the municipal level in Brazil. 
Empirical evidence through large-N studies is thus scarce. 
This thesis aims to respond to both the scarcity of evidence for or against the existence 
of a link at the local government level through a series of within-country regression 
analyses in a country in which, to my knowledge, this has not yet been tested: Mexico. 
As opposed to Hoffman and Gibson’s cross-section, the regression analyses in this 
dissertation will make use of panel data, which allows analysis of variation across both 
space and time and eliminates much potential omitted variable bias through fixed entity 
and fixed time effects. Compared to Gervasoni’s 26 provinces, over a thousand 
municipalities will be analysed, amounting to far more observations and more reliable 
results. Only Gadenne’s study of Brazilian municipalities competes in terms of method 
for quantitative analysis.  
The methods used in this dissertation surpass previous studies in two additional 
respects. First, it uses multiple measures of accountability, rather than just testing one 
aspect of a multidimensional concept. This will allow for a more complete capturing of 
accountability and an improved ability to draw credible inferences about the 
relationship between taxation and accountability. Second, the linkages are illustrated 
and further analysed through in-depth qualitative field research, permitting a more 
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nuanced understanding of the mechanisms at work and a cross-check of the 
quantitative results. Third, the proposed study explains the effects both of all local taxes 
and fees pooled together and of a specific tax type (property tax). As Morrison (2009) 
points out, most statistical studies on the issue have focused on aggregated taxation at 
most, despite obvious dissimilarities between different types of taxes and forms of 
collection. 
Beyond these methodological points, the present research aims to push the theory 
beyond its current frontiers in two ways. First, it presents empirical evidence revealing 
the causal pathways and conditions involved in taxation-accountability linkages in a 
new context: that of urban municipalities with electoral competition. Second, this thesis 
provides a framework for analysing taxation-accountability linkages at the local level of 
government, integrating ideas from public finance and decentralisation into the political 
science literature that focuses more directly on taxation-accountability linkages.  
 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 develops the theoretical 
framework of the thesis and lays out the hypotheses and main research questions. It 
begins by presenting the general analytical framework through which I view linkages 
between local taxation and local accountability. It lays out the model generally used for 
national level analysis: a binary model involving rulers and their subjects. I then 
elaborate on the key actors involved and their choices in local tier analysis. 
 
Chapter 3 sets the background on the Mexican case, the reasons for its selection for 
study, and what can be expected in terms of taxation-accountability linkages given its 
specific context.  It first shows how Mexican municipalities fit into a three-tiered federal 
system and how its powers have changed over time. It then reviews the structure and 
evolution of Mexican municipalities’ tax revenues. This includes a synopsis of Mexico’s 
intergovernmental tax and transfer system and a more detailed background on the most 
important municipal taxes: the property tax and water charges. It then expound on the 
untapped revenue potential of Mexican municipalities and how recent events have 
incentivised intensified tax effort. Finally, it discusses Mexico’s democratic transition 
and how it occurred differentially across municipalities.    
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Chapters 4 and 5 present new empirical evidence through quantitative analysis of the 
effect of taxation on accountability. While Chapter 4 sets up the methodology, discussing 
challenges, explaining the indicators, and presenting the general models, Chapter 5 
presents the results of the econometric (panel and cross-sectional) regressions 
conducted to test those models. It uses data from Mexico’s over 2000 municipalities. 
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present evidence from a qualitative comparative case study based 
on field research in six Mexican municipalities. Chapter 6 clarifies the methodology and 
case selection criteria. It explains how the mixed methods approach is used to 
complement and supplement analysis of the quantitative section. It also introduces the 
research strategy for the case studies and discusses the type of data and variables to be 
examined to answer the research questions for this part. Chapter 7 analyses the results 
of field research in three municipalities: Acapulco, Centro, and La Paz. For each case, it 
sets out what strategy the municipal government has taken in the face of considerable 
pressure to raise tax revenue. Next, it analyses the outcomes of that strategy and 
assesses the extent to which pressure to increase tax revenues has sparked bargaining 
processes that could lead to increases in local government accountability. It also 
compares the cases, analyses obstacles and addresses questions about the specific 
context and tax types involved. Chapter 8 does the same for three further 
municipalities: Aguascalientes, Mérida, and Saltillo.  
 
Finally, chapter 9 summarises the results, combining the evidence from both the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses to answer the research questions laid out in 
chapter 2. It then draws more general conclusions about taxation-accountability 
linkages at the local government level, both to further the theory and to offer 
recommendations for development policy. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
for analysing taxation-
accountability linkages 
 
A review of the literature in Chapter 1 highlighted two areas in the theory on taxation-
accountability linkages that require further research. The first deals with the causal 
mechanisms that link taxation to accountability and the second is any generalizable 
framework regarding the context and contingent factors that the link depends on at the 
local level. While claims about taxation-accountability linkages are made for the local 
level, few of the political science studies consider the idiosyncrasies of this level of 
government specifically. Instead, they merely adopt theories about the national level 
and apply them to the local level.   
 
The local level, however, constitutes a very different context with particularities that 
should not be handled on par with the national level. For one thing, local government 
obligations and responsibilities are shared with other levels of government. Taxation 
and expenditure decisions usually form part of an intricate intergovernmental system of 
(shared) powers and responsibilities. Secondly, the other local power wielders such as 
organised crime or business leaders have relatively more power vis-à-vis the local 
government than vis-à-vis the central government and can more easily dominate these. 
Third, certain tax types are more prevalent at the local level and there is reason to 
believe that the type of tax involved is important for its effect on accountability. Fourth, 
there is a closer physical proximity of citizens to their local government than to the 
central government. Fifth, local taxes exist alongside other taxes (state, national level or 
even unofficial ‘informal’ taxes) so the link between tax and government may not be as 
clearly distinguishable. All of these points may have an effect on how causal linkages 
between taxation and accountability play out, yet they are left out in the theoretical 
analysis of the taxation-accountability paradigm. A new analytical framework is 
therefore needed that identifies the key parameters that affect taxation-accountability 
linkages at the local level. 
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This chapter aims to address this gap. In section 2.1 I present the general model of 
taxation-accountability linkages on which this thesis builds and of the key actors 
involved. In section 2.2 I discuss the causal pathways that link taxation and 
accountability. I distinguish two different pathways and discuss the causal sequence of 
the processes involved. It is here where I begin to land the theory and translate it into 
concrete testable hypotheses that I aim to address in this thesis.  In section 2.3, I review 
the contingent factors that the literature has pinpointed as determinant for revenue 
needs to lead to consensual tax bargaining. In section 2.4, I introduce a framework to 
analyse taxation-accountability linkages at the local level. The conclusion summarises 
the hypotheses and research questions. 
 
 
2.1 General approach and key actors 
 
In this section, I present the general analytical framework through which I view linkages 
between local taxation and local accountability. I begin by laying out the model 
generally used for national level analysis: a binary model involving rulers and their 
subjects. I then elaborate on the key actors and their choices in local tier analysis.   
A rationalist approach 
 
The theoretical literature on the taxation-accountability paradigm can be divided into 
two main bodies: first, descriptive historical accounts and political sociology (or 
structuralist literature) and, second, rational choice literature (Levi, 1999). As Levi 
points out, the first is useful in that it provides a breadth of descriptive cases that show 
how taxation was key in bringing about processes of political change and greater 
accountability in differing contexts; however, it falls short of explaining why the 
observed results occurred in any generalizable way. The rationalists, on the other hand, 
build models with generalisable, testable hypotheses. It takes the perspective of 
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rational, self-interested wealth maximizing rulers, makes assumptions about their 
preferences and theorises about their strategic choices within a set of constraints. The 
“second generation” theorists of the tangent fiscal federalism literature also take this 
approach (Oates, 2005; Weingast, 2009).  
 
Margaret Levi’s Of Rule and Revenue (Levi, 1988) has been particularly influential in 
advancing the rational choice approach in the taxation-accountability school. Levi 
predominantly considers the incentives and strategic choices of the “rulers”, using an 
individual level analysis that assumes policymakers to be rational, self-interested 
wealth and revenue maximisers. Rulers seek to maximise revenues, but subject to 
constraints. She lists three sets of constraints. The first is their relative bargaining 
power or control over coercive, economic and political resources. The second is the 
transaction cost of negotiating agreements and implementing policies. The third is the 
discount rate: rulers with low discount rates will limit revenue extraction at the point 
where “further extractions would put future output at risk” (Levi, 1988:32-33). 
Importantly, she notes that “rulers are not always choosing the policy that produces the 
most revenue, and the reason lies in one additional factor that affects all rulers: the 
requirement of maintaining power” (Levi, 1988:18). While Levi sets up this framework 
as part of an encompassing theory to show how revenue production policies are 
determined, it has also served as a framework used by various scholars after her to 
analyse taxation-accountability linkages.  
 
Scholars analysing taxation-accountability relationships generally assume a binary 
model between the head of the executive (ruler) and taxpayers/citizens (the subjects). 
Taxation affects the incentives of both the ruler and the subjects to engage with one 
another and to strike a bargain. The ruler has incentives to maximise revenues and to 
ensure compliance. The subjects have incentives to revolt, scrutinise where their money 
is going, and/or ask for something in return. The outcome is increased engagement and 
a mutually beneficial bargain that benefits both the ruler and the subjects. The strategic 
choices of the ruler and subjects are usually made within a series of constraints, yet 
these constraints are usually taken as given without further attention.  The historical 
narratives also use this binary model, yet more strongly emphasise their view of the 
relationship between rulers and their subjects as a power balance. The need for taxation 
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can shift the power balance from the ruler to the subjects, as the ruler wants something 
that the ruled control. Contingent factors may boost or hinder this shift. 
 
The binary model, used by both bodies of literature, while a good starting point for 
analysis, glosses over some potentially important factors that may make or break the 
linkages. For one thing, it leaves out other actors with potentially key roles involved in 
taxation-accountability relationships. Moore (forthcoming) points to two further key 
actors in the relationship: tax intermediaries (including tax lawyers, accountants, 
clearing agents, forwarding agents, brokers, among others) and revenue collection 
organisations. The incentives and actions of these actors also have an important effect 
on the taxation-accountability relationship. He also argues that greater attention should 
be paid to the tax collection process, especially logistical and organisational constraints, 
as well as discrepancies between tax policy and practice, all of which influence how 
taxes are collected and how the relationship between taxation and accountability will 
play out.  
 
This thesis follows the rationalist approach: I theorise the strategic choices of key actors 
(local government actors and individual local residents) in the taxation-accountability 
relationship, who are assumed to be rational, self-interested actors subject to 
constraints and responsive to incentives (Section 2.2). However, I focus in particular on 
the processes that follow from these incentives and what constraints there are in 
different contexts. I also consider the role of intermediaries in this relationship: further 
actors that stand between the ruler and the subjects in the tax collection process that 
affect accountability relations with the local government, as these have often been 
ignored but are potentially influential.  
The key actors 
 
In an analysis of taxation-accountability linkages at the local government level, who is 
the ruler and who are the subjects? In its simplest form, the relationship is between the 
local government and the residents in the local jurisdiction. However, it is important to 
note that neither the local government nor the residents make up a homogenous group. 
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The circle of those who pay taxes is not usually congruent with the entire local 
population, nor with the circle of residents that receive the benefits. The local executive 
is never completely autonomous: other levels of government are involved in decision-
making and in the tax collection process. Finally, further actors are involved in the 
taxpaying process: there may in fact be little direct contact or engagement between the 
local executive and the general population.   
 
Who are the subjects?  
 
First, let us clarify who “the subjects” actually comprise. As Prichard (2009) shrewdly 
points out, many scholars speak of “the citizens”, “the polity”, “taxpayers” or “society” as 
though they were a homogenous group. Yet even in the historical narrative of the 
taxation-accountability relationship in the formation of democratic states in early 
modern Europe, those negotiating with the state were usually not a representative 
group but an elite who demanded powers that perhaps only by chance coincided with 
benefits for the larger population. Who is to say that in the contemporary developing 
world a group of residents will push for government concessions that are in the general 
interest of all residents in that jurisdiction?  
 
Tax bargaining may instead be dominated by small groups of rent-seeking elites 
(Prichard, 2010a). Handley (2008) observed situations in Ghana and Zambia in which it 
is a small group of powerful business managers who negotiate tax policy to pursue 
narrow benefits for themselves rather than encouraging tax bargaining that benefits the 
broad public as a whole. Best (1976) similarly finds a strong relationship between the 
incidence of taxation and response to preferences of the powerful in Central America. 
Timmons (2005) in his quantitative study of the tax-accountability relationship 
separates taxpayers-citizens into rich and poor. He then analyses whether there is a 
relationship between the group which predominantly pays the taxes and the group that 
receives more of the benefits. He assumes that rich citizens are more likely to want the 
protection of property rights and poor citizens are more likely to want basic services. 
He finds that when wealthier taxpayers are paying proportionally more, the 
government spends more on property rights protection and vice versa.  
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Mahon (2004) on the other hand, who focuses on Latin America, notices that the groups 
within society who are represented in fiscal matters are not always the same as those 
who pay the most taxes, but the ones that provide resources at acute critical moments 
(especially in the run up to elections), implying no relationship between tax incidence 
and influence in government policy or beneficiaries of government services. There is 
also a widespread belief among social scientists that government resources are 
frequently captured by local elites, generally defined as an economically or politically 
powerful group in society, independent of whether or not they pay taxes. This concern 
is often cited by opponents of decentralisation (Faguet & Sánchez, 2008; Grindle, 2007). 
It appears in the Federalist papers (Hamilton, Madison, Jay, & Fairfield, 1787 [1966]) 
and, in a developing country context, in a variety of case studies, notably by Wade  
(1982) and Dreze and Sen (1989)(1989), and has been recently shown empirically by a 
number of authors (Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2013; J. K. Ahmad, Devarajan, 
Khemani, & Shah, 2005; Alatas et al., 2013; Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 
2006; Khemani, 2010).  
 
It thus becomes clear that those who pay taxes, those who benefit from government 
concessions and the total local population should be viewed as distinct groups that may 
only partially overlap, as illustrated in the Venn diagram in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 Lack of congruence between taxpayers and beneficiaries 
 
 
 
Local residents 
 
 
Taxpayers Beneficiaries 
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In order to answer the research question of whether taxation has an effect on 
“accountability”, defined in Chapter 1 as accountability vis-à-vis the local population as 
a whole, including the poor, as opposed to a minority group of powerful elites, I 
distinguish, for the purposes of this thesis, three categories of “taxpayers/citizens” who 
may benefit from a bargain with the local government, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
The first is the general public or the majority of residents in the local jurisdiction. This 
follows the mainstream interpretation of the taxation-accountability paradigm as 
benefiting the society as a whole, even if those who strike the bargain are in fact only a 
small group of citizens. Yet I also leave open the alternative possibilities of two further 
groups benefiting. The second is a smaller interest group of residents; that is, a bargain 
around taxation may lead the government to grant concessions to specific taxpayer 
groups, such as those of a certain industry. Brautigam (2008a) for instance describes 
how farmers associations in Mauritius benefitted from tax bargaining with the 
government. Finally, the local government may make a deal with specific individuals, 
granting tax amnesties or special privileges to single taxpayers on a one-to-one basis. 
This conceptual division into three circles of residents is important so as not to assume 
that taxation benefits all citizens when it may benefit only individuals or specific groups.  
 
Figure 2 Three beneficiaries of government action 
 
 
Who is the ruler? 
 
The ruler in local level analysis is broadly the local government. However, an important 
difference to the central government is that local governments are usually significantly 
restricted in their powers and autonomy. Local governments are tied into 
Benefit 
1. General public 
2. Interest group 
3. Individuals 
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intergovernmental systems of taxes, transfers, expenditure powers, and other rights 
and obligations. They tend to be bound into dependency and accountability 
relationships with these as well as with third party actors. 
 
In the same way that the residents are not one homogenous group, neither is the local 
government. Like at the national level, local executive action may be restricted by the 
local legislative. Even within the local executive, there may be different actors with 
different motives: members of the local tax directorate of the local government, for 
instance, may have a different agenda than directly elected councillors or mayors. While 
the first may be striving to reach revenue goals, the latter are likely to be more 
concerned with winning elections. Local governments may also have less clout than the 
central government in the face of further non-governmental actors such as religious 
leaders, business leaders or criminal organisations within the local jurisdiction. 
 
It is important to take note of (a) the power balance within the local government; (b) 
the power balance between different levels of government in a multi-tiered system; and 
(c) the role of further non-governmental actors. These factors may either limit or 
enhance the ability of linking taxation and accountability for a variety of reasons. This is 
further elaborated in Section 2.3 on the context and constraints of local tier taxation-
accountability linkages.  
 
2.2 Causal pathways 
 
I now turn to the causal mechanisms through which taxation is expected to increase 
accountability. I start by showing how taxation fits in with other factors that influence 
accountability. I model the expected outcomes of increased taxation and then 
distinguish two causal pathways. Finally, I distinguish two different forms that a tax 
bargain may take.  
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Causal factors for accountability 
 
Taxation is but one of many competing causal variables that affect local government 
accountability. As discussed in Chapter 1, the literature that seeks to explain differences 
in levels of democracy across subnational government units is a useful starting point to 
finding causal variables that affect accountability. This literature points to factors 
including the geographic proximity to more democratic areas (Gel’man & Lankina, 
2007; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000), structural factors such as income levels and degree of 
urbanization (O'Donnell, 1998; Przeworski, 2000; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999), 
and a priori civic traditions (Putnam, 1993; Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2011) as having 
a significant effect on variation in democratic institution building across subnational 
units.  
 
What other factors affect the local government’s choice to be accountable? While I focus 
on taxation as a determinant of local accountability, this is examined in the context of 
other factors. It is thus necessary to try to isolate the effects of taxation from the effects 
of other causal variables. The decision of a local leader to be accountable is likely to be a 
function of the following variables besides tax revenue:   
a. Intra-governmental control: If higher levels of government can control the local 
government (through conditional funds, laws and regulations, monitoring, etc.) 
and require the local government to be accountable to the local residents, this 
can be a channel for accountability (Litvack et al., 1998; WB, 1997). Similarly, 
the legislative or judiciary may control the local executive (horizontal 
accountability or external control) through formal rules and oversight 
arrangements. However, poor information and monitoring systems may make 
this ineffective and central government priorities may not be aligned with those 
of the local population (Faguet, 2004; Tiebout, 1956).  
b. Electoral competition: if local residents can remove or reward the local leader 
through the vote, the local leader is more likely to be accountable to (potential) 
voters given his or her desire to remain in power (Blair, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 
1999; Stepan & Linz, 1996). Many also doubt that electoral competition can 
produce accountability because of biased electoral rules, (Arrow, 1963; Riker, 
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1982), principal-agent problems (Barro, 1973; Myerson, 1993), and clientelism 
(Cleary, 2010).  
c. Obligations towards third parties: If the local leader feels required to adhere to 
the demands of other individuals or groups different from the general public 
(such as private individuals or companies that contributed campaign funds), he 
or she is less likely to be accountable to the general public. 
d. Resources: improving accountability may require resources and if the local 
leader lacks these, it may be less willing to spend precious resources to increase 
accountable to the general public. 
e. History and existent norms: if past leaders have been accountable or if there are 
institutionalised processes with high standards of accountability in 
neighbouring areas, the local leader is more likely to be accountable. 
f. Pressure from citizens: The more and better channels for participation, 
organised collective action, and a politically interested civil society, the greater 
this pressure is likely to be to make the government more accountable (Faguet & 
Ali, 2009). 
 
To complicate matters, some of these additional causal factors will be influenced by 
taxation and vice versa. Tax extraction for instance, may motivate greater pressure from 
citizens for the government to be accountable. The amount of control by the 
government may weaken if the local government is less dependent on central 
government transfers and more on taxation. Several further factors have to do with the 
context, in particular the institutional constraints surrounding local governments in 
developing countries. The context and contingent factors are further elaborated in 
Section 2.3. In sum, isolating taxation from other factors that influence accountability 
poses a challenge.  
Three outcomes of increased taxation 
 
The theoretical literature on the causal relationship between taxation and 
accountability predominantly uses a narrow set of historical accounts as a basis for its 
models, both of causality and for the contingent factors that determine outcomes, 
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drawing its premises “only in light of English and French experiences or, at best, early 
modern Europe”, according to Levi (1999:117).  
 
The main problem with its causal models is that they commence with the assumption of 
the ruler as an autocratic monarch with the ability to exert coercive power over his 
subjects. The starting point is a domain state with customary or arbitrary taxation, 
(Kiser & Barzel, 1991; Schumpeter, 1918 [1976]; Tilly, 1992) and the question of 
interest of these authors is whether urgent revenue needs will lead to one of only two 
options: that the ruler resort to (a) (an expansion of) coercive taxation or (b) 
consensual taxation. However, the setting in contemporary developing countries is not 
one of customary or arbitrary taxation but often one of a lack of taxation. The tax 
revenue to GDP ratio is typically much smaller in developing countries than in 
developed countries and tax evasion is pervasive (Alm & Martinez-Vazquez, 2003). 
Many developing states have not consolidated power in order to exert authority over 
the entire population in their jurisdictions. Instead, a large informal sector and a lack of 
coercive power of the state over the entire population are prevalent features (Englebert, 
2000; Herbst, 2001; Jackson & Rosberg, 1986). I therefore add a third outcome: no 
taxation. This can be because the local government is either unable or unwilling to 
collect taxes despite having de jure tax autonomy and de facto tax revenue needs.  
 
The question asked here is thus whether tax revenue needs will result in (a) a rise in 
accountability (consensual taxation), (b) a rise in the tax intake without a rise in 
accountability (coercive taxation), or (c) no rise in either as shown in the graphs in 
Figure 3 below. Only the first option results in a rise in accountability.  
 
Assuming that the outcome is (a) and a rise in taxation effectively increases 
accountability, three further theoretical issues are to be clarified with respect to the 
causal pathways. These are the subject of the next subsections. The first deals with 
whether the causal pathway is more likely to take a short route with a minimal role for 
the residents or a long route in which residents play a key part. The second deals with 
the form of tax bargaining that takes place at the local level: is it implicit or explicit? 
Finally, the third deals with the causal sequence and possible feedback loops in the 
taxation-accountability relationship.  
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Figure 3 Expected outcomes 
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Short or long path?  
 
As discussed in chapter 1, taxation is believed to link to accountability through tax 
bargaining, but this involves multiple steps. Taxation may have incentive effects on the 
ruler and different incentive effects on the subjects. Either or both of these may then 
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provide incentives for further processes which may lead to tax bargaining. In a final 
step, tax bargaining may result in increased accountability. There are thus a series of 
processes linked together in a chain. Identifying the chain (or casual pathway) with all 
of its links useful for pinpointing where the relationship between taxation and 
accountability may be broken and where it can be fixed or strengthened.  
 
In Chapter 1, I showed that different scholars have different theoretical pathways in 
mind when explaining possible causal linkages from taxation to accountability. Some 
scholars emphasise the incentive effects on the rulers: these will be incentivised to 
bargain with the subjects over taxation in order to elicit compliance and, possibly, in 
anticipation of some unfavourable reaction by the subjects if they do not. Others stress 
the incentive effects that extractive demands by the ruler have on the subjects. This 
assumes that it is the reaction that taxing sparks with the subjects that brings about 
opportunities for bargaining and for greater accountability.  
 
It is therefore useful to differentiate two broad sets of causal pathways. One is the short 
path: when local governments want to raise revenues, they immediately take steps to 
increase accountability.  Taxation affects a local government’s behaviour directly 
because it forces it to be concerned with tax compliance in its jurisdiction. It may be 
anticipating protest or revolt or tax evasion. In order to uphold tax compliance among 
residents, it will thus simultaneously take steps to show that it is transparent, effective 
and responsive to demands of the broad majority of local residents. This brings it to be 
more transparent, to respond to the residents’ demands in programmes and projects, 
and to facilitate citizen participation in policymaking (or at least to create the 
perception of doing these things).  
 
Government raises tax  simultaneously becomes more accountable 
 
The second is the long path: when local governments (try to) raise taxes, the local 
residents react, and only through this reaction of the local residents does the 
government make concessions. While the first is immediate, the second is a slower 
process that implies a strengthening of citizen ties, social learning, citizen interest in 
local government and citizen participation.  
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To be more specific, in this causal pathway taxation affects the ruler’s behaviour by first 
affecting its subjects’ behaviour. If the subjects are made to pay (more) taxes, they will 
take steps to (more carefully) monitor, control and scrutinize the government to assure 
that public funds are used with prudence and that public services are provided 
efficiently and effectively. They will approach the ruler to make demands. Citizens may 
also organise and protest if they don’t trust the government with their tax money, feel 
that the government is not using tax money appropriately or if they feel that the tax 
obligations present unwarranted exploitation. Whichever way chosen, it is the 
enhanced citizen engagement in local government that will, in turn, change the 
behaviour of local governments. Having increased citizen participation in decision-
making or increased contact and communication with local residents, local government 
decisions will be more informed of the needs of the majority. They will also feel more 
pressure to adhere to those needs to prevent protest by local residents. Thus, taxation 
will give rise to accountable local governments indirectly by motivating citizen 
engagement with the local government. Prichard (Prichard, 2009) and (Gloppen & 
Rakner, 2002), for instance shows how taxation has led to a strengthened civil society 
and enhanced organisation of civilian interest groups.   
 
Government raises tax  Citizens react   Gov’t becomes more accountable 
 
To be sure, these two sets of incentive effects may work in tandem. While this can be a 
two way process, it is important to understand how and to what extent these two 
distinct pathways are at work. At the local government level, which steps are taken by 
the residents, which steps are taken by the local government? If both pathways are 
working, who initiates the processes and which predominates? How important is the 
role of the subjects in “pushing” for a bargain?  If they are not both at work, where are 
the bottlenecks?  
 
Finally, I make a distinction regarding the form that tax bargaining takes. As seen in the 
empirical literature, tax bargaining can take a variety of forms. According to Moore 
(2008:37-38) the many variants range from “direct and explicit haggling and 
agreement” to more subtle, indirect “strategic interactions and mutual behavioural 
61 
 
adjustments without direct negotiation”. I delineate two forms: explicit tax bargaining 
and implicit agreements, with first falling closer to the beginning and the second 
falling closer to the end of this range.  
Choices of the local residents 
 
While my focus is on the incentives of the local government, these incentives are also 
constrained by the actions of the local residents. In this subsection I briefly review the 
choices that local residents have when faced with the obligation to pay taxes. What 
determines whether they will pay, whether they will evade, and whether they take 
collective or other action against the tax obligation and demand concessions that benefit 
the general public?  
 
For the determinants of the decision to pay taxes, it is useful to turn to the literature on 
tax compliance. The main determinants of tax compliance found in this strand of the 
literature can be summarised as such:  
a) Ability to pay: when an individual is poor or experiences economic difficulties, 
he/she is more likely to opt out of paying taxes (Fjeldstad, 2004).  
b) Tax enforcement and administration: if sanctions are severe and the likelihood 
of being caught are high, people will be more likely to pay their taxes. Also, the 
more simple and convenient a tax, the more willing people will be to pay.  
c) Perception of accountability: Many authors mention trust  in and satisfaction 
with the government (Ayee, 2007). Fjeldstad (2004:541) for instance lists “trust 
in the local government to use revenues to provide expected services” as a key 
determinant.  At the local level, one may add that the perception of other levels 
of government is also a determinant. Particularly if there is no clear division of 
responsibilities or if there is a strong perceived connection between local and 
national leaders or institutions (such as if they belong to the same political 
party, actions by the party or may affect the perception of accountability of the 
local government. As covered in Chapter 1, several studies have shown an 
increased willingness by taxpayers to pay taxes if they are satisfied with services 
(Bergman, 2002).  
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d) Perception of fairness of the tax: This refers to fair procedures of tax collection, 
including that other citizens are also made to pay their share (Fjeldstad, 2004).  
e) Tax-paying culture: Many scholars also write of a culture or “a set of rules, 
values and relationships” within a society that determines tax compliance. For 
instance, exposure of non-payment is a source of shame in some places but not 
in others (Friedman, 2003:8). It may also relate to habit: people continue to do 
and do not question norms that have been in place over a long stretch of time. 
 
When will the individual have the incentive to take collective or other action against the 
tax obligation and demand concessions that benefit the general public in a tax bargain? 
These points are further elaborated in section 2.3 when considering the context that is 
conducive for tax bargaining to occur. 
 
 
2.3 Conditions and Context 
 
The taxation-accountability literature has acknowledged that whether tax revenue 
needs will lead to accountability in contemporary developing countries highly depends 
on the context and on certain contingent factors. However, there is little research as of 
yet on what this context needs to entail and what the factors precisely need to consist 
in. A few scholars have listed potentially key conditions, usually based on a reflection of 
the specific case under examination. I first consider this literature, drawing from both 
the structuralists and rationalists. The contingent factors predominantly deal with the a 
priori power balance between the ruler and the subjects. They address the debate of 
whether increased tax revenue needs are more likely to lead rulers to coercive taxation 
or to a consensual tax bargain and what conditions make it more likely for subjects to 
engage with the ruler collectively for a successful tax bargain. Finally, I discuss more 
technical conditions that deal with the details and logistics of tax collection, drawing 
largely from the fiscal federalism literature. These concern the type of tax involved, how 
tax functions are distributed, and how the tax is imposed.  
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When a bargain is likely to arise  
 
Several scholars have argued that taxation is more likely to lead to a bargain when the 
bargaining power is in the favour of the subjects. This may depend on several factors, 
which I have summarised in the following.  
1. The first set of contingent factors deals with the power of the ruler. Several 
arguments in effect deal with the urgency of tax revenue needs. For example, 
some authors have noted that in the narrative of taxation-accountability 
linkages in early modern Europe, there is a recurrent context of interstate 
warfare (Moore, 1998, 2004). The constant threat of war is a consistent theme 
in Tilly’s (1992) accounts of the formation of democratic states in various 
European countries for example. These authors have indicated their scepticism 
that the same urgency for revenues that motivated rulers in Europe to strike a 
bargain with citizens could occur in the contemporary world where interstate 
conflict is less prevalent. However, Eubank (2012) in his paper on tax bargaining 
in Somaliland shows that intra-state conflict can equally spark similar 
bargaining processes.  
2. Urgent revenue needs should be coupled with another factor: the degree of 
dependence on taxes for revenues compared to other sources of revenues. When 
alternative revenue sources are readily available, such as natural resource rents 
and foreign aid, which are usually also associated with lower administrative and 
political costs than taxation, then the government is less dependent on the 
taxpayers and less likely to enter into a bargain (Bräutigam et al., 2008).   
Other contingent factors deal with the power of the subjects vis-à-vis the ruler in the 
power balance. The logic is that where there is a strong, politically powerful and 
wealthy capitalist class that can act as a counterforce to the government, bargaining is 
more likely. This is Tilly’s (1992) main premise in his book Coercion, Capital and 
European States, AD 990-1992.  
3. Among these, several scholars have listed a mobile tax base as a factor that 
makes tax bargaining more likely (Bates and Lien, 1985; Tilly 1992; Moore 
2004; Moore 2008). Mobile assets are relatively easy to transfer or hide and 
more difficult for the government to tax. The argument is that when owners of 
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capital have mobile assets, they are able to hide or move them, making coercive 
taxation difficult and leaving the government with no option but to enter into a 
tax bargain that relies on the quasi-voluntary compliance of the asset holders in 
order to access these revenues. To the contrary, where assets are not mobile, 
such as in agrarian societies where land forms the tax base, taxpayers cannot 
easily move or hide their assets, and coercive taxation is said to be more likely 
(Moore, 2007, 2008).   
4. Several others have also argued that the a priori existence of institutions of 
representation is a condition that will make tax bargaining a more likely 
outcome (Levi, 1988; North & Weingast, 1989). The assumption is that when 
channels for citizen participation are already in existence and there is a strong 
civil society or as Tilly (1992:101) writes, where, “the people touched by state 
action were already connected by durable social ties, then collective action is 
less costly and a bargain is more likely to be sought”.  
5. Some authors further list conditions under which collective action among 
subjects is more likely. According to Levi (1999) and Tilly (1992) a key 
condition is the perceived fairness of the tax system. Tilly (1992:101) contends 
that where, “the state’s demands and actions offended citizens’ standards of 
justice or attacked their primary collective identities”, for example, resistance 
would be more likely to compound into mass rebellion.  
 
Barzel and Kiser take a distinct view to the ones listed above, which imply that power is 
the decisive role that determines coercive vs consensual extraction (Barzel & Kiser, 
1997, 2002; Kiser & Barzel, 1991). Basing their research on medieval England and 
France, they observe that tax payments were linked to specific projects and the rich 
imposed taxes on themselves as a voluntary investment. Voting was used to make 
decisions. Rather than seeing it as a zero sum or negative sum game where power is the 
decisive factor, they see rulers and subjects as “wealth-maximizing business partners” 
(2002:480).  “Mutual benefit was often more important than power” (Barzel and Kiser, 
1997:7). 
 
Barzel and Kiser (2002) argue that rather than more powerful rulers, it is more secure 
rulers that are more likely to tax consensually, i.e. those that are not facing an external 
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or internal threat. They explain that insecurity shortens the ruler’s time horizon and 
leads him to gain from breaking agreements (particularly with those whom they 
perceive as a threat) and confiscating through arbitrary taxation:  “As long as the ruler is 
secure in his throne, he has no reason to renege” (Barzel & Kiser, 2002:480). Olson 
(1993) similarly contrasts a secure autocrat that has an encompassing interest to 
provide peaceful order and public goods that increase productivity of his domain with 
an autocrat that is only concerned with getting through the next year, whose incentives 
“are those of a roving bandit and that is what he becomes” (Olson, 1993:571).  
 
I now turn to authors who have focused their analysis on contemporary developing 
countries for further determinants concerning the necessary context and conditions for 
the likelihood of taxation leading to increased accountability. Bräutigam et al (2008b) 
mention that the prevalence of inequality and a large informal sector in many 
developing countries as possible impediments to any taxation-accountability linkages 
taking hold there. But what is it about these features that make it difficult for the 
relationship to hold? It may mean that the majority of citizens is not involved in the 
ruler-subject relationship so the general public will be unlikely to gain from a bargain.  
It may also mean that there are greater differences in preferences between the 
taxpayers (or citizens), making collective action around any issues more difficult and 
impeding the benefit principle, which will be discussed below. Finally, it may also mean 
that the tax is more easily regarded as unfair. 
 
With regard to local governments in developing countries, Moore (2008) has concluded 
that coercive taxation is more likely than consensual taxation in poor agrarian societies. 
Prichard (2009) lists that the strength of civil society (in particular the influence of 
elites and the importance of parliament) were important contingent factors for 
taxation-accountability linkages in Ghana. This echoes the need for powerful subjects 
discussed above. He also lists the tax type in question, which will be further expanded 
below.  
 
Others again mention the fairness/abuse argument. Moore (forthcoming) points out 
that a key factor is in determining how the tax is perceived is how it is collected. He 
posits that when direct, face-to-face interaction between tax assessors/collectors and 
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the taxpayers is more frequent, this gives the former greater discretionary power over 
the latter, facilitating corruption and extortion. 
The importance of tax type 
 
While many scholars treat taxes as one homogenous item, those on firmer ground have 
recognised that different types of taxes work very differently in the taxation-
accountability relationship (Gloppen & Rakner, 2002). What type of taxes are more 
conducive to causing linkages and why? Scholars have pointed out several 
characteristics that taxes may have which determine their effect on accountability. 
 
First, the tax needs to be visible to the taxpayer (Bird & Vaillancourt, 1998). More 
visible taxes are more likely to evoke a reaction by the taxpayer than ones that are 
siphoned off indirectly. If the tax is visible to the taxpayer, it is more salient and more 
likely to cause resistance by those who are meant to pay. For instance, a sales tax that is 
internalised in the sales price may go unnoticed to buyers just as indirect social security 
contributions that are automatically deducted by an employer from a worker’s wage. To 
be sure, it is not the tax type alone but the way it is typically collected that can affect its 
visibility and salience. The property tax is usually a highly visible tax given that it is 
usually collected as an annual lump-sum. Cabral and Hoxby (2012) show that when 
property taxes are instead mixed in with other items in a mortgage bill (tax escrow), 
taxpayers are less likely to notice the tax or any increase in the tax and therefore less 
likely to hold a grudge and revolt against the local government as a result. 
 
Second, the tax must amount to a burden for the taxpayer or, as Gloppen and Rakner 
write, the tax needs to be “felt” by the taxpayer. Bahl and Bird (2008a:4-5) similarly 
stress that the tax must be “large enough”, meaning that “minor levies and nuisance fees 
don’t measure up”.  
 
Third, the tax needs to be broad-based and ‘earned’. Grabowski (2008:31), for instance, 
argues that different taxes (resulting from different agricultural models) influenced a 
divergence in long-run development paths between Latin America and East Asia. In 
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Japan, Taiwan and Korea, the government relied on a broad based, ‘earned’, (as well as 
direct and visible) land tax that penetrated the countryside while in Latin America 
governments have relied heavily on export taxes with a narrow tax net. Export taxes, 
unlike the land tax, are also easy to collect and do not involve the same effort or 
outreach to the broad population. Given these differences in the characteristics of the 
taxes applied, East Asia has developed into a place with more equitable growth and 
broad-based services to the general public while Latin America saw comparably greater 
inequality and a lack of accountability towards the majority of the population. 
 
Fourth, taxes should adhere as much as possible to the benefit principle (Lindahl, 1919; 
Wicksell, 1896 [1958]). The benefit principle generally states that tax payments should 
be guided by the benefits that accrue to taxpayers. More specifically, for an optimal 
provision of public goods, the greater the overlap between those on who the incidence 
of the tax falls and those who receive the benefits, the better (E. Ahmad et al., 2015; 
Bird, 2013). Taxes may be earmarked for specific purposes that benefit a specific 
portion of the population. Yet most taxes go into a common pool and may even be 
shared between government levels for various purposes or spill over to other 
jurisdictions entirely. The more of an overlap between taxpayers and beneficiaries of 
the tax money, the more efficient the tax (or price for the public good) and the greater 
accountability will be. This is closely related to the principle of fiscal equivalence (Olson, 
1969), which states that the circle of buyers should equate exactly the circle of sellers to 
determine the optimal price of the public good.  
 
Following the same logic, accountability diminishes if a tax can be “exported” to non-
residents (Bahl & Bird, 2008a:11). For example, business taxes could target non-
resident businesses or property transaction taxes could be designed to fall on non-
resident foreign investors. For maximum accountability, a tax should thus not be 
exportable to non-residents.  
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Assignment of tax functions 
 
The fiscal federalism literature assesses which tax powers are best assigned to which 
level of government.  While the chief concern is with finding which tax is best collected 
at each level following goals of efficiency and equity, recent scholars of fiscal federalism 
have paid increasing attention to the effects of different tax assignments on subnational 
government accountability. While, again, “accountability” often refers to financial 
accountability and a check on spending or overspending, many of the concepts and 
ideas overlap with a wider definition of the term used here as defined in Chapter 1.  
 
Several authors note that while devolving tax powers to local governments has the 
potential to make local governments more accountable, this is conditional on the tax 
powers and functions assigned to the local government (E. Ahmad et al., 2015; Bahl & 
Bird, 2008b; de la Cruz et al., 2011). In particular, “All the accountability virtues of 
subnational taxation depend on local governments both having the authority to decide 
how much revenue they raise and being openly responsible to their own citizens for 
doing so” (Bahl & Bird, 2008a:8). They go on to say that what is needed is responsibility 
at the margin for financing the expenditures for which they are politically responsible. 
The most important function is being able to decide the tax rate. Bahl and Bird (2008) 
also more generally emphasise the importance of local autonomy in order to make tax 
decentralisation effective for enhancing accountability. “Unless subnational 
governments are given some degree of freedom with respect to local revenues, 
including the freedom to make mistakes (for which they are accountable to their 
citizens), the development of responsible and responsive subnational governments is 
likely to remain an unattainable mirage” (Bahl and Bird, 2008: 10). 
 
Another factor often mentioned in the fiscal federalism literature is that the tax and 
transfer system and fiscal policy cannot allow for soft budget constraints. Several 
authors in particular stress the negative effects of bailouts by the central government 
(Rodden et al., 2003; Ter-Minassian, 2015, 1997), incentivising waste and splurging on 
expenditures that do not link to the common good. 
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A final point is the need for clarity of responsibilities between levels of government (E. 
Ahmad, 2010; Cornelius, Eisenstadt, & Hindley, 1999). If the subjects are unsure about 
which of the rulers (i.e. levels of government) are responsible for what, it is difficult for 
them to judge or respond in a way that taxation and accountability can be linked. 
 
 
2.4 Research questions and key considerations 
for the local context 
 
So far in this chapter, I have taken apart the taxation-accountability relationship, 
discussing the approach taken, the key actors involved, and several more of its pieces 
regarding the causal pathway and context. I now bring these pieces together and 
present the research questions to be addressed in this dissertation, as well as the 
hypotheses that I aim to test. I also briefly introduce the methods used to do so. 
The principle research questions 
 
The main research question is whether or not there is a positive relationship between 
taxation and accountability at the local government level in Mexico, and in particular 
how far one can make causal claims about taxation (fiscal autonomy and tax revenue 
needs) leading to increased accountability.  
 
Second, what is the causal pathway? This entails a variety of sub-questions about the 
mechanism through which taxation might lead to accountability. Following the 
distinctions made in Section 2.1, I ask whether tax revenue needs spark the local 
government to tax coercively, to enter into consensual tax bargaining, or to drop 
taxation altogether. If tax bargaining occurs, what form does it take: explicit or implicit 
agreements? Next, is taxation more likely to lead to greater accountability through the 
short path (simultaneously with a minimal role for residents) or the long path (with a 
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time delay between taxation and accountability and a greater involvement of 
residents)?  
 
Third, what obstacles stand in the way of the link from occurring? Here it is important 
to examine the context. I consider the intergovernmental framework surrounding local 
governments. How do its powers, compared to those of other levels of government, 
impede the relationship? How does the role of other actors involved (intermediaries or 
third party actors) affect the relationship? I then explore the claim that a context of 
democracy is required for the taxation-accountability relationship to work. This has 
been put forth in the fiscal federalism literature, as mentioned in Section 2.3. Finally, I 
consider the tax type. This involves finding which the most important taxes are at the 
local government level and what their properties are. In particular, is the tax visible and 
salient? Does it adhere to the benefit principle? Does it tax mobile assets? Also, how are 
tax functions distributed between different levels of government? 
 
The empirical work in this dissertation is separated into two parts: a quantitative part 
(Chapters 4 and 5) and a qualitative part (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). Quantitative regression 
analysis is the method used to explore correlations and look for evidence of possible 
causation leading from taxation to accountability. I also use quantitative tools to make 
attempts at answering questions about the pathway, context of democracy and tax type. 
While a large-N analysis is useful for finding broad correlations, I rely on qualitative 
field research to get closer to more nuanced answers about the causal mechanisms, 
processes and contextual factors. Each of the two parts begins with a more detailed 
discussion of the methodology and research strategy taken.  
Key considerations for local level analysis 
 
In this subsection, I present a more general framework for local level analysis of 
taxation-accountability linkages and what it needs to entail. I argue that the key 
considerations to look at in asking if taxation leads to accountability are the degree of 
revenue dependence, the degree of tax powers local governments have, and the degree 
of their power to benefit residents and to carry out their part of mutually beneficial tax 
agreements. 
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Degree of revenue dependence in an intergovernmental tax and transfer system 
 
The taxation-accountability linkages require that local governments be dependent on 
tax revenues. It is this dependence that sparks incentives to engage in a bargain with 
(potential) taxpayers. However, strong dependence on taxation may be more difficult to 
attain at the local government level than at the national level. Just as national level 
governments in developing countries have alternative sources of revenues to tax 
revenues, notably natural resource rents, foreign aid, or foreign loans etc., that hamper 
dependence on taxation, local governments also have other revenue alternatives. Local 
governments are usually financed to an even greater extent through sources other than 
taxation.  
 
Given that tax revenues and other “own revenues” do not usually suffice to pay for all 
the services that local governments are responsible for, they tend to be financed 
through some combination of fiscal transfers from the central government and own 
revenues. In so many developing countries, decentralization processes have expanded 
spending powers to subnational governments without a corresponding expansion of 
own revenue raising powers, the so-called vertical imbalance between expenditures and 
revenues (Bahl and Bird, 2008: 11). Transfer dependence is high and local tax-to-GDP 
ratios are notoriously low in almost all developing countries. The Philippines, Colombia 
and Brazil are notable exceptions where the ratio of taxes to local government revenue 
is over 30% (Bahl and Bird, 2008: 5).  
 
Raising revenues through taxation is also associated with political costs for subnational 
governments. While own revenues give local governments independence from the 
centre, they are more costly to collect, both economically (because of the administrative 
costs they imply) and politically (imposing taxes is unpopular among the electorate), 
the latter particularly if the local leaders are popularly elected in a context of electoral 
competition. Local taxation may also drive out residents or business or discourage 
settlement in the specific jurisdiction. It is argued that tax competition is more likely at 
the local level because it is easier for residents to move from one local jurisdiction to 
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another, “voting with their feet”, than it is to move between countries (Tiebout, 1956; 
Salmon 1986).  
 
Between receiving transfers from the central government and raising taxes, subnational 
governments may thus prefer receiving transfers as a source of revenue than bothering 
with tax revenues. In receiving transfers, subnational governments draw from the 
common pool and can free ride on the tax effort of others. Several authors have shown 
empirically how transfers “crowd out” taxation (Cabrero Mendoza, 1995; Raich 
Portman, 2004). Central governments have also done their part to keep taxes 
centralised. Maintaining power over revenue sources and giving out (often earmarked) 
transfers allows the central government to maintain control over subnational 
governments (E. Ahmad & Brosio, 2008a, 2008b).  
 
However, the extent to which tax dependence is created is largely influenced by the 
exact tax and transfer system. Transfers to subnational governments are typically set by 
a formula that comprises a series of weights for different criteria, including economic 
and demographic characteristics, such as income and population. The transfer formula 
can encourage or discourage tax dependence. When transfer formulas include tax effort 
as a criterion, allowing local governments to retain a bonus for the revenues they collect 
at the margin in the form of additional transfers, this encourages local tax effort and tax 
dependence, as the more they increase their tax collection, the more transfers they will 
receive. However, central governments often attempt to correct horizontal imbalances 
by allocating more transfers to poorer regions who are unable to raise as many own 
revenues. This may produce the opposite effect, destroying any dependence by the local 
government on own revenues. 
 
Revenue dependence is also hampered when local governments can pass their debts on 
to the next administration, or when they can expect bailouts from the central 
government or borrow easily from the market (Burki, Perry, & Dillinger, 1999; Haggard 
& Webb, 2004; Rodden et al., 2003). It is thus important to view the tax and transfer 
system as a whole. 
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Degree of power to tax 
 
The binary model outlined above assumes that taxpayers pay taxes directly to the ruler. 
Yet raising tax revenues requires a row of different functions and the rights and 
obligations for each can be (and with regard to local taxes usually are) split between 
different levels of government and sometimes third party actors (Bahl and Bird 2008a: 
7). These rights and obligations include introducing new taxes, determining and 
administering the tax base, deciding on the tax rate, assessing the tax imposed on the 
taxpayers, enforcing the tax, and keeping the revenues. Even when a tax is considered a 
“local tax”, the functions of the local government tend to be shared or split between 
levels of government and can be further split with one level making the decision but 
requiring the approval of another level. Freedom of the local government to determine, 
for instance, the base and rate may also be limited in bands or set by guidelines (E. 
Ahmad & Brosio, 2008a).  
 
This is a limitation because if the local government is not seen to be the one who is 
politically responsible for any changes in the tax obligations imposed on the residents, it 
becomes more difficult to establish a link between taxation and accountability. Clarity of 
responsibilities and adequate information are also needed to establish that link (E. 
Ahmad, 2010). 
 
Which functions are most important for allowing taxation-accountability linkages to 
take hold and why? According to Bahl and Bird (2008:10), “unless local governments 
have some significant degree of freedom to alter the level and composition of their 
revenues, neither local autonomy nor local accountability is meaningful”. They expand 
saying that “some degree of rate flexibility with respect to a significant component of 
the local revenues seems essential if a tax is to be both adequately responsive to local 
needs and decisions and an instrument to make local leaders more accountable to their 
citizens.”  
 
Who collects the tax, and who therefore is in direct contact with the taxpayers, is also 
important (Moore, forthcoming). While tax intermediaries are more rare at the local 
level than at the national level (Moore, forthcoming), tax farming is common: 
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governments assign a private third party the task of collection in return for retaining a 
part of the revenues. Tax collection organisations may “enjoy considerable legal 
coercive power over citizens” (Moore forthcoming). When there are third party tax 
collection agencies, local residents may strike deals with the agencies but not with the 
local government. For example, Fjeldstad (2001b) explains how overly enthusiastic tax 
enforcement through an independent tax collection agency, separate from the local 
government, led to brutally violent, coercive collection in Tanzania.  
 
Degree of power to negotiate in tax bargaining process  
 
For the taxation-accountability relationship to take hold, local governments need to be 
able to have some degree of power to respond to demands of the residents, affect 
expenditures, or otherwise credibly follow through on a tax agreement with its 
residents. However, in a multi-tiered context, local governments are usually limited in 
their decision-making powers by higher levels of government. Roles and responsibilities 
also vary greatly between countries (King, 2007). While some have a substantial degree 
of autonomy over specific sectors, others are mere agents of higher levels of 
government. This means that local governments may have little power to affect large 
projects that make a difference to people’s lives.  
 
Furthermore, local governments do not tend to have exclusive decision-making power 
even over their own “subnational expenditures”. Rights and responsibilities over 
different functions and sectors are divided between different levels of government. The 
use of the revenues may also be earmarked for specific purposes. This again limits the 
manoeuvrability by the local government to respond to needs and demands of its 
residents (Díaz-Cayeros & Martínez-Uriarte, 1997). 
 
Beyond constitutional or contractual division of functions and responsibilities, local 
governments may also be constrained in their decision-making powers because of their 
dependence on others (both higher tiers of government and non-governmental third 
party actors) for re-election, future career trajectories, and funding. In a context of 
popularly elected local leaders, for instance, aspiring and incumbent mayors may be 
dependent on the residents of the local jurisdiction to be elected. Yet they may also be 
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dependent on their (local or national) political party to be selected onto party lists for 
positions in the local executive as well as for future career opportunities. Candidates 
and incumbents may also receive funds from their party (which may be organised at the 
local or national level), from special interest groups (such as business elites, property 
owners, construction companies, criminal organisations or other third parties), both in 
the run-up to the election and during their administration. These funds may be tied to 
favours or predetermined policies. The local executive may feel pressure to cater to the 
demands of either of these. All of this limits the scope of decisions and the ability to 
offer concessions to residents in a tax agreement.     
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have provided a framework through which to view the linkages 
between taxation and accountability at the local government level. Following the 
literature, I model the linkages as involving two primary actors: rulers and their 
subjects. However, I highlight that it is important to specify who exactly these key actors 
are and how other actors influence the relationship. 
 
Expanding on the causal mechanisms that link taxation and accountability, I emphasised 
that taxation as a causal variable needs to be regarded in a wider context of other 
variables that affect the incentives of the local government to be accountable.  Having 
considered various explanations that link taxation to accountability in Chapter 1, I have 
made a distinction in Section 2.2 between two specific causal mechanisms: a short and a 
long path towards greater accountability.  Both involve tax bargaining as an 
intermediate step in a multi-stage process. I distinguished two forms of tax bargaining: 
direct explicit tax bargaining and more subtle, implicit tax agreements between the local 
government and local residents.   
 
However, these incentive effects may not lead to a rise in accountability but instead to a 
rise in tax intake with no corresponding rise in accountability or in a failure to increase 
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the tax intake altogether. The outcomes depend on several contextual factors including 
the autonomy of the local government, the context of democracy, the distribution of tax 
functions, and the tax type.  
 
The most important difference to the national level is that analysis of taxation-
accountability relationships at the local level are complicated by intergovernmental 
relations. It is necessary to assess how the local government fits into a wider 
arrangement of powers and functions in order to be able to predict the strength of 
taxation-accountability linkages. By modelling accountability relations as being 
determined largely by the design of intergovernmental relations, I drew largely on the 
literature on fiscal federalism in an attempt to reconcile this strand of literature with 
the political science literature on taxation-accountability linkages. 
 
I have also presented the research questions, which can be summarised as follows: 
1. Is there a (causal) relationship between taxation and accountability? 
2. What is the causal pathway? 
a. Does pressure to raise revenues lead to coercive taxation, consensual 
taxation or no taxation? 
b. What form does the tax agreement take (explicit or implicit)? 
c. What pathway is followed (the short or long path)? 
3. What contextual factors affect the relationship? 
a. Obstacles: what obstacles might prevent the relationship from working? 
b. Context of democracy: is the link stronger in a context of democracy? 
c. Tax type: in how far are typical local taxes conducive to the relationship? 
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Chapter 3: The context around local 
governments in Mexico  
 
This chapter has three main purposes. The first is to give an overview of the 
institutional structure of Mexican municipalities and the intergovernmental framework 
in which they operate. This institutional context surrounding the municipalities, the 
extent of their local autonomy, revenue dependence, and tax handles available to them 
should give a preliminary sense of what can be expected from local taxation-
accountability linkages in Mexico. The second purpose is to show the evolution of tax 
revenues and accountability over the time period under study in the quantitative part of 
this thesis (1989-2009): there has been significant variation in both tax revenues and 
accountability over time and there is great heterogeneity among municipalities, making 
the Mexican case particularly interesting for studying taxation-accountability linkages. 
The third purpose is to set the context for the fieldwork, the results of which are 
presented in the qualitative analysis in Chapters 6-8. Fieldwork was conducted in 2012-
2013 during a time in which municipalities were under significant pressure to increase 
their tax revenue. This is because their main other source of revenue, central 
government transfers, had steadily diminished in the wake of a global financial crisis 
and dropping oil production, while debt was consistently on the rise.  
 
This chapter is organised into four sections. In Section 3.1 I show how Mexican 
municipalities fit into a three-tiered federal system and how its powers have changed 
over time. I review Mexico’s processes of decentralisation and discuss the degree of 
local autonomy. In Section 3.2 I review the structure and evolution of Mexican 
municipalities’ tax revenues. This includes a synopsis of Mexico’s intergovernmental tax 
and transfer system and a more detailed background on the most important municipal 
taxes: the property tax and water charges. In the third section I expound on the 
untapped revenue potential of Mexican municipalities and how recent events have 
incentivised intensified tax effort. Section 3.4 paints a picture of Mexico’s democratic 
transition during the last few decades. This gives an idea about the changes in 
accountable governance in the country as a whole, both through demands from citizens 
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and mandates from above. I also review some of the theories that account for 
differences in accountability across municipalities.    
 
Throughout this chapter I try to show how the Mexican case is typical in the universe of 
cases and highlight where it is unique. I also show how the particular context of the 
Mexican case fits into the theoretical framework. That is, I lay out the extent to which 
the Mexican context is conducive for sparking taxation-accountability linkages 
subsuming Mexico’s institutional context under the principles laid out in the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 2. The data for this chapter is based on secondary literature, 
documentary evidence such as fiscal data and legal documents, and key-informant field 
interviews. 
 
 
3.1 Municipalities: the third tier of Government 
 
In this section, I review the institutional framework of local government 
(municipalities) 2 in Mexico. I begin with an illustration of the diverse panorama of 
Mexican municipalities and their structure. I then show how constitutional amendments 
have moved Mexican municipalities from being agents of higher levels of government 
into a level of government in its own right.  This involves an overview of municipal 
powers and functions and of the processes of decentralisation over the past few 
decades. I end with an assessment of local government autonomy and 
intergovernmental relationships.  
 
Municipalities in Mexico are a construct of the Spanish colonists first introduced by the 
conquistador Hernán Cortés in 1519. Their importance, however, was greatly reduced 
during most of the 20th century as the Mexican state was increasingly consolidated and 
centralised. The Constitution of 1917, which followed the Mexican Revolution and is still 
                                                             
2 While “local” in Mexico refers to the state level, this text uses “local” interchangeably with “municipal”, the 
third tier of government. “Subnational” refers to both state and municipal tiers of government.  
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in force today in an amended form, separated the government into two legal orders: the 
federation and the states. The states in turn were to use municipalities as mere 
organisational and administrative agents. For most of the century, municipal mayors 
“belonged” to state governors (Grindle, 2007:25). Only in the 1980s and 1990s did 
decentralisation reforms bring increasing powers and responsibilities to the municipal 
level, eventually raising their status to a third legal order of government. Mexico is now 
considered a federal country with three tiers of government: federal, state and 
municipal. There are 32 federal entities (31 states and one federal district) as shown in 
Figure 4 and approximately 2450 municipalities as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 4 Mexico’s federal entities 
 
Source: http://www.mapasparacolorear.com/mexico/mapa-mexico.php 
 
The municipalities are highly heterogeneous in size and level of development.  On 
average one municipality has around 40,000 inhabitants but there is great variation in 
their populations, ranging from 102 inhabitants to 1.8 million (INEGI; Gonzalez Anaya 
and Revilla, 2012). Geographically, their size varies from a municipality in Tlaxcala of 
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only 4.3 square kilometres to one in Baja California that spans 52,000 square kilometres 
(Grindle, 2007:37). Some municipalities have a human development index (HDI) 
comparable to that of Sierra Leone and others to that of Portugal (Gonazelz Anaya & 
Revilla, 2012; interview 89; PNUD, 2014; UNDP, 2014). Mexico in general, while a 
middle income country in terms of its aggregate GDP has tremendous regional 
disparities and its GINI coefficient is high at 47.2 (WB, 2014). The histogram in Figure 6 
below shows how average annual per capita income in a municipality varies from under 
1500 to over 33,800 pesos according to UNDP data for 2005.   
 
Figure 5 Mexico’s municipalities 
 
Source: http://www.mapasparacolorear.com/mexico/mapa-mexico.php 
 
Municipal budgets range from approximately $4.2 million to $4.1 billion, a ratio of 
1:1000 (Gonazelz Anaya & Revilla, 2012). On one side of the spectrum are large cities or 
municipalities that are part of even larger megacities. On the other side of the spectrum 
are small and poorly equipped rural municipalities. While over 75% of the population 
live in urban areas (WB, 2014), the vast majority of municipalities are rural (Rowland, 
2007). The former revenue director of the Federal Ministry of Finance was exaggerating 
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when he said that some of the smaller local governments consisted of nothing more 
than “a couple of guys and a telephone” (interview 90), but the description is not far off. 
The President of the Association of Local Authorities in Mexico (AALMAC) claims that 
over half of municipalities can hardly cover the basics let alone invest in public works 
(Quezada Contreras, 2013). Many of the small municipalities were created for reasons 
of self-determination more than representing any agglomeration of people or economic 
activity.  
 
Figure 6 Histogram of average per capita income by municipality 
 
Source: PNUD, 2005 
 
The structure of the local government is defined in Article 115 of the Constitution of 
1917. The local council or cabildo is the highest authority of the municipal government 
or ayuntamiento. It is led by the mayor (presidente municipal) and councillors 
(comprising comptrollers (síndacos) and other councillors (regidores)). Local residents 
elect the mayor and councillors in popular elections from party lists in single-
constituency elections. Their term periods are typically three years and consecutive re-
election is prohibited. The composition of the cabildo is usually determined by 
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proportional representation but the mayor and members of her running team/party 
normally occupy over half of the seats in the local council, granting minimal presence of 
opposition parties. This institutional construct gives the mayor considerable power as it 
is difficult to overturn any of the ruling party’s decisions: it is regarded a “strong-
mayor” system (Moreno Jaimes, 2007, 2008; Rowland, 2007). In practice, the mayor 
tends to have particularly strong executive powers within municipal management.  
 
The mayor appoints department directors within the local government (such as for 
treasury, public works, policing, transparency, etc.) who report directly to her 
(Rowland, 2007:202). While there is a professionalised career civil service at the 
national level (Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera), there is none at the municipal 
level. The existence of a professionalised bureaucracy that remains across 
administrations is therefore rare. When the mayor changes, there is a tendency for her 
to re-staff the administration even beyond the department directors. There is a high 
turn-over of municipal employees often implying an inability to accumulate expertise. 
 
The municipal government tends to be the only and most powerful local body at the 
local level. Only in some instances do shared landholding structures (ejidos) in rural and 
semi-rural areas, or agencies or committees sporadically established by national or 
state programs compete with the local government in terms of influence over local 
issues and governmental powers (Rowland 2007).  
 
An exception to the general structure laid out above is found in a minority of mostly 
small, rural municipalities in the south of Mexico with predominantly indigenous 
populations in which local governments apply a different governing system involving 
community councils or councils of elders, shared responsibility for service delivery 
among members of the community, and a different method of electing leaders through 
the so-called uses and customs system (usos y costumbres) (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014).   
 
Decentralisation 
 
A Constitutional Amendment that entered into force in 1983 on the initiative of 
President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) gave municipalities greater budgeting and 
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spending autonomy. Prior to decentralisation reforms, most public revenues and 
expenditures were centralised. The amendment passed the control of all property 
related taxes (the property tax as well as other taxes and fees based on changes in land 
valuation including fractioning, division, merging, transfer of ownership, and 
improvements) to the municipalities. Prior to 1983, property taxes had been divided 
between all three levels of government: federal government taxed the acquisition of 
property, states collected the property tax (predial), and municipalities were left with 
fees and licences for construction (Loza, 2006). Granting all property based taxes to the 
municipalities gave them an own revenue source of potentially great significance for 
further local autonomy.  
 
The amendment also gave municipalities regulatory power and allowed them to freely 
administer their own revenues and to prepare their own budgets (although they 
required approval by the states). The constitutional amendment also granted 
municipalities authority over public services including water, sewage, public lighting, 
cemeteries, public markets, slaughterhouses, garbage collection, parks and gardens, 
public security, transit, street cleaning, roads, environment, zoning, urban development, 
and land use planning, and granting construction permits and licenses.  
 
Additional amendments in the late 1980’s and 1990’s further clarified expenditure 
powers and expanded municipal responsibilities, deleting references to states and 
emphasising municipalities’ exclusive access to fees and taxes for the services they 
provide. Faculties and responsibilities not explicitly assigned to the municipalities by 
law are the domain of the state or federal government.  However, the Constitution 
stipulates shared responsibility over other tasks between municipalities and other 
levels of government including in primary education and public security. For instance, 
while states are principally responsible for health and education, municipalities are 
responsible for overseeing primary education and school building construction. All 
three levels of government are responsible for poverty alleviation and the 
implementation of social programmes. Responsibilities for spending on infrastructure 
and transportation also overlap across all three layers of government (Sánchez, 2013).  
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The division of responsibilities between levels of government is not always 
straightforward, as is common in multi-tiered federal systems. Even the division of 
responsibilities explicitly assigned to municipalities is not always clear (such as what is 
covered by “environment”) and shared responsibilities across the three levels of 
government provide even greater scope for duplication of effort, turf wars, and 
avoidance of responsibility by all levels. In fact, state governments have often usurped 
municipal domains (Rowland, 2007). With a lack of clarity of responsibilities, local 
residents may therefore have difficulty in distinguishing which level of government has 
performed its duties well or poorly (E. Ahmad, 2010). For the Mexican case, while 
Cleary (2010) argues that local residents are very well aware of the main functions of 
local government in Mexico, Chong et al. (2010) use evidence from surveys conducted in 
three states (Jalisco, Morelos and Tabasco) to show that only about half of respondents 
correctly identified municipalities as responsible for such key functions as provision of 
clean water, sewage, and public lighting and many instead marked the state governor or 
president as primarily responsible.    
 
It should be noted that the Constitution does not differentiate rural and urban 
municipalities or separate them by size: the Constitution grants all municipalities the 
same faculties and responsibilities. It does, however, make special provisions for the 
Federal District, which is neither a state nor a municipality, but no longer covers even 
half of the population of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area that has spilled across its 
boundaries into other states and municipalities (Rowland 2007).  
 
To fulfil their newly defined responsibilities, local governments received increasing 
federal transfers since the 1980’s. The average amount of revenue controlled by the 55 
largest municipalities more than doubled in real terms between 1976 and 1994 
(Rowland, 1998). Total municipal expenditures then grew by 115% in real terms 
between 2000-2009 (Gonzalez Anaya and Revilla, 2012). In all municipalities the 
transfer amounts have held an upward trajectory, constituting an increasing part of 
total local revenues. More on the evolution of local transfers and other revenues will 
follow in the next section (Section 3.2).  
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Several programs and policies were put in place to strengthen local governments. Under 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), an organisation was set up to 
strengthen the administrative capacity of local governments (what is now called the 
Instituto Nacional para el Federalismo - INAFED). President Ernesto Zedillo’s (1994-
2000) strong push for decentralisation in his “New Federalism” agenda also included 
initiatives to strengthen local government. Capacity-building initiatives were again 
maintained by President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderon (2006-2012).   
 
Autonomy with limitations at the local government level 
 
Local governments in Mexico, labelled “free” (libres) in the Constitution of 1917, have 
become a third legal order of government and experienced a great expansion in their 
importance for the lives of Mexicans. Yet municipalities in Mexico remain limited in 
their autonomy to make independent decisions and to affect the development of their 
jurisdictions.  
 
Combined expenditures of all municipalities are only 25% that of states and about 10% 
that of the federal government. Only a small proportion of the tax revenue paid by 
Mexicans are local taxes. The most important taxes (value-added and income taxes) are 
collected by the federal level. Tax revenues of states and municipalities combined 
accounted for about 3% of total tax revenues and only 0.7% of GDP in 2009 (Revilla, 
2013; Sánchez, 2013).  
 
An increase in transfers does not necessarily increase the local governments’ decision-
making power.  As Rowland (2007)writes, “the rise in federal government transfers 
means a larger proportion of funds with political and policy strings attached”. Ear-
marked transfers in particular, which began to rise in the second half of the 1990’s limit 
local governments’ ability to make decisions about how it uses the funds and how it 
responds to local preferences rather than to central government mandates. However, 
while in theory the specific-purpose transfers are to be spent on government mandated 
items, the former vice minister of revenues and his deputy write that in practice 
conditionality is weak and “it is generally known that subnationals have leeway in using 
these transfers” (Gonzalez Anaya and Revilla, 2012:26). Also, given that public 
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accounting is not homogenised with different local governments using different 
methodologies and classifications, expenditures are opaque, enabling additional 
discretion in the use of transferred funds. 
 
According to Snyder (1999:300), “municipal presidents, although formally elected, were 
virtually ‘employees’ of the governor, chosen by him and removable at his discretion” 
and pinpoints the early 1980’s as when this structure began to crack. However, states 
still maintained considerable power over municipalities. The constitution also stipulates 
that state congresses can dissolve municipal governments (though this has rarely 
occurred in practice), that they must approve municipalities’ budget proposals, and that 
they can step in and take over municipal functions if a municipality is unable to handle 
them on their own (Rolwand, 2007).    
 
The tax powers are also not absolute. While the municipal governments can propose 
new taxes and tax rates, these changes require the approval of the state congress. This 
limits the local government’s political responsibility for the tax obligations it imposes. 
The short term limits and prohibition of consecutive re-election also limit the power of 
municipalities. They are unlikely to invest in and complete projects with long-term 
gains. Furthermore, the federal government strongly regulates the capacity of 
municipalities to borrow money (more on this in the next section). 
 
The short term periods of three years (compared to the state governors’ terms of six 
years) and the prohibition of consecutive re-election don’t leave a lot of time to plan and 
follow through with projects and programs. It creates a high discount rate that 
discourages investment in the future. It is also difficult to learn the skills of the job in 
such a short time: the learning process takes time.  
 
In fact, the deliberate intention of limiting local governments’ power may be what has 
kept local term periods so short. The previous government’s assistant to the Vice 
Minister (Revenues) of the Federal Ministry of Finance considered it impassable to 
revoke the prohibition of re-election of mayors, stating as his reason that the state 
congresses (who would have to approve any constitutional amendment by a two-thirds 
majority) would never agree to it. He explained that the states are quite content to keep 
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mayors’ powers in check so that they don’t threaten their own power (interview 89). 
With more time in power, mayors would be able to accumulate political capital through 
policy-making accomplishments and patronage (Montero & Samuels, 2004). It was only 
under the PRI government that came to power again in 2012 that this was attempted 
and passed as they had a larger majority and bigger political clout. The change is due to 
enter into force in 2018. 
 
Yet the reluctance on the part of higher levels of government to expand local 
government autonomy stems from a number of considerations beyond political 
competition. A prerogative of the federal ministry is to prevent overspending at the 
local level to lead to a fiscal crisis and subsequent macroeconomic problems. There has 
been a lingering fear of fiscal deficits, particularly after the Tequila Crisis in 1994-95, 
leading the federal government to impose tightened regulations on local governments’ 
borrowing and hold tight reigns in terms of their financial decision-making (E. Ahmad & 
Brosio, 2008b; Revilla, 2013).  
 
When subnational governments are unable to meet their debt payment obligations, this 
can create negative spill overs for the federal government and other subnational 
governments. Even if it is not responsible, the federal government may face the political 
consequences of the local government having to cut local services or increase taxes 
(Trillo, Cayeros, & González, 2002). If the local government defaults on its debt, this 
could affect access to credit for other municipalities and it could affect the financial 
system. There is also a distrust of local governments to use public funds appropriately 
and effectively, given many instances of poor capacity and misuse of funds (further 
discussed in Section 3.4) which again has made higher levels of government wary of 
releasing too much power and control to local governments.  
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3.2 Overview and evolution of municipal level 
revenues in Mexico 
 
I now turn to a more in-depth discussion on local revenues and the inter-governmental 
tax and transfers system. Municipal governments use three broad sources of funding to 
finance their activities: (1) transfers, (2) own source revenues and (3) debt. The current 
system of intergovernmental tax and transfers arrangements was introduced in 1980 
through the creation of the National Fiscal Coordination System (SNCF) which emerged 
as a pact between the states and the federal government. States voluntarily ceded their 
taxing powers to the federal government, which then introduced a centralised value-
added tax and income tax, in exchange for a fraction of revenue-sharing federal grants 
(Gonzalez Anaya and Revilla, 2012).  Transfers were increased to both states and 
municipalities and municipalities were also given increased tax powers. 
 
Sources of Revenue 
 
1. Transfers 
 
Transfers, the greatest source of municipal revenues, are usually directed from the 
central government to the states. The states then distribute them on to the 
municipalities in their respective jurisdictions. While federal laws decide on the 
formulas that divide shared funds between states, it is the state congresses that 
generally decide how funds for their respective municipalities are distributed. They 
tend to create their own respective formulas which are usually codified in state laws but 
federal provisions demand that states must share revenues with municipalities, 
sometimes under specific guidelines (Courchene & Diaz-Cayeros, 2000).  
 
The transfers can be divided into revenue sharing participaciones, and earmarked 
aportaciones, which are reserved for special purposes. Paricipaciones are non-
earmarked and formula-based. They consist of various funds itemized in line item 
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(ramo) 28 of the federal budget. The allocation formula for participaciones (from the 
general fund of shares or Fondo General de Participaciones) has been adjusted over the 
years but broadly around 45% of the fund is to be divided between the states on an 
equal per capita basis and another 45% is based on the initial amounts that were 
transferred before the SNCF was introduced. Oil rich states traditionally received larger 
funds. The remainder is “compensation”, inversely related to the first two (Courchene & 
Diaz-Cayeros, 2000).  
 
The aportaciones (consisting of ramos 26 and 33) are conditional special purpose 
grants. Ramo 26 funds (once known as PRONASOL) are “social development funds”. 
They played an important role in the poverty alleviation program Solidaridad during 
President Salinas’ administration (1988-94) and according to Bruhn (1996) were highly 
discretionary and manipulated for electoral purposes (Courchene & Diaz-Cayeros, 2000; 
Harvey, 1999). In 1996 Ramo 26 was increased for decentralisation and citizen 
participation programs but from 1998 most of the funds from Ramo 26 were then 
shifted to Ramo 33, termed “federal grants for federal entities and municipalities” (Sour, 
2004). It has been said that Ramo 33 was introduced in 1998 by the PRI party to 
alleviate fiscal pressure on its constituents as it was losing its grip on power towards 
the end of the 1990’s (Moreno, 2003). 
 
Ramo 33 funds are targeted (to states) to finance education and health and (to 
municipalities) to finance basic local infrastructure programs of local choosing. The 
main funds for municipalities are FAISM and FAFM. FAISM (Fund for contributions to 
municipal social infrastructure or Fondo de aportaciones para la infraestructura social 
municipal) is earmarked for basic social infrastructure. The fund is allocated to states 
using a formula based on poverty levels and other factors. States are required to pass 
funds on to municipalities based on similar criteria. FAFM (Fund for contributions to 
strengthen municipalities and the Federal District or Fondo de aportaciones para el 
fortalecimiento de los Municipalidades y el DF)  is earmarked mainly to strengthen public 
security and repay debts (E. Ahmad & Brosio, 2008c).  
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2. Own revenue 
 
Municipal own source revenues are those of most interest here. They predominantly 
comprise taxes and fees, but also include revenues from fines, sanctions, letting, leasing 
and renting.  
 
Municipalities have limited decision-making power in terms of which taxes to levy. They 
may propose changes to rates or bases or the introduction of new taxes but this 
requires approval by the state congress (Castañeda & Pardinas, 2012). The two most 
important sources of municipal own revenues are the property tax (impuesto predial) 
and water charges (derechos de agua). These are discussed in greater detail below.  
 
There is much variation over time in the importance of taxes and fees as a source of 
local government revenues as seen in Figure 7 further below. Before 1983, taxes and 
fees were the most important source of total municipal revenues. After that, federal 
transfers (participaciones) became increasingly important, leaving own revenues to 
make up only around half of local government revenues on average. From 1991 to 1994 
this trend was reversed and powerful efforts were made by municipal governments to 
increase taxation; however, following the subnational financial crisis of 1995 these 
efforts were dropped and the federal government started a massive program of special 
purpose grants (aportaciones) to the lower tiers of government (Giugale & Webb, 2000). 
Federal transfers steadily increased with a change to the Fiscal Coordination Law in 
1998 and the proportion of own revenues shrunk from almost 80% in the beginning of 
the 1990’s to just over 30% in the 2000’s (SHCP, 2008). Figure 7 shows the evolution of 
municipal revenues from 1989 to 2009.  
 
Several scholars have shown that the rise in transfers has had a negative causal effect on 
municipal tax effort. Sour (2004) uses data from 155 Mexican urban municipalities and 
finds this negative effect especially in the largest municipalities of 1 million or more 
inhabitants. Raich-Portman (2004) and Canavire-Bacarreza and Zúñiga Espinoza (2010) 
also finds evidence of diminished tax effort following increased government transfers 
among municipalities in the states of Puebla and Sinaloa respectively. In an attempt to 
remedy this, in 2008 the federal government introduced economic efficiency criteria in 
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the revenue sharing formula that reward municipal tax effort (specifically intake of 
property taxes and water utility fees) with a greater share of participaciones.  
 
While such incentives were introduced in a number of states,  in only 6 states (40% of 
municipalities) does the tax effort criterion predominate in a way that it provides a real 
incentive to municipal leaders. In other states, it is rendered void or cancelled out by 
other criteria (Peña Ahumada & Wence Partida, 2011).  The Federal District, for 
example, made notable strides in improving property tax revenues, experiencing an 
18.7% increase between 2010 and 2011 (and also in improving revenues from water 
fees). However, it has experienced a decline in population over the same period as 
residents have moved outwards into surrounding municipalities outside of the limits of 
the Federal District (while often still commuting in for work), its reward in transfers 
was miniscule given that population has a greater weight in the transfer formula  
(interview 91). 
 
Figure 7 Evolution of municipal revenue 
 
Source: INEGI/SIMBAD 
 
There is also great variation across municipalities in terms of tax revenues. As Moreno 
(2003:7) explains, this is explained to a great extent by the size of the economies of the 
respective municipalities but not entirely. Quintana Roo and Campeche, for example, are 
of a similar size and population but vary tremendously in terms of tax collection. 
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Campeche and Tamaulipas collect the same per capita revenues but Campeche’s GDP is 
twice the size of Tamaulipas’. The ratio of tax revenues to total revenues in Mexico also 
varies enormously from 0.001% to 91% across municipalities and the range of average 
annual tax revenues per capita varies from 0.01 to 5206 pesos (SIMBAD, 2012). This is 
shown in Table 7 in Chapter 4. 
 
 
3. Debt 
 
The third source of finance is debt. Municipalities have been granted but limited access 
to credit and participaciones are generally used as collateral to securitise debt.  Such 
prudential rules to prevent national fiscal crises have kept municipal debt low (E. 
Ahmad & Brosio, 2008c:10; Trillo et al., 2002), never exceeding 10%, until very recently 
in 2012-13 (Castañeda & Pardinas, 2012). However they also limit greater investments 
by the municipal governments through borrowing. More on the recent debt crisis is 
found in the section 2.4.  
The main tax types 
 
The most important municipal level own revenues in Mexico are the property tax 
(impuesto predial) and water charges (derechos de agua).  I therefore give some 
background on these taxes, how the tax functions are distributed and their variation 
across municipalities. The effects of property tax will also be tested separately in the 
quantitative analysis. 
 
1. The property tax 
The property tax is applied on residential and commercial land and improvements 
(including buildings) through ad-valorem rates, with a few exceptions, notably Mexicali 
where only the land is taxed (site value taxation). It comprises around 60% of municipal 
tax revenues and 30% of own revenues on average (SIMBAD, 2012).   
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There is much variation among Mexico’s approximately 2,400 municipalities in terms of 
property tax intake as seen in Figure 8. Table 1 also shows this with data by state. The 
Federal District, for example, collects MX$ 1,023 per person annually in property tax, 
while Tlaxcala, Chiapas and Oaxaca collect between MX$ 45 and MX$ 47 per person 
(SIMBAD, 2012). Over 520 of the municipalities (at least 22%) did not collect any 
property tax revenues at all (or at least did not report any) during 2011. In contrast, 
around 80% of the total property tax in Mexico is collected by just 100 municipalities 
(4%). The rest is spread out in between these extremes (SHCP, 2008).  
 
Figure 8 Histogram of property tax per capita by municipality, 2000 
 
Source: INEGI SIMBAD, 2005 
 
 
The property tax assessment processes usually start with classifying land according to 
its location, amenities, use, and sometimes a comparative sales analysis.  The valuation 
of each land plot and improvements is enshrined in the cadastre or property registry. 
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obligations connected to the plots, among other data (E. Ahmad et al., 2015). The 
cadastral values assigned to land plots and buildings are used to determine the property 
tax, the tax on acquisitions of property, construction fees and licenses, tax on works 
contracts, on improvements of property, etc., all of which correspond to municipality tax 
powers, according to Article 115 of the Constitution. 
 
Municipalities can suggest property tax rates and value tables of land and 
improvements but the state congress then needs to approve these through State 
Revenue Acts and State Tax Codes. How the property valuation is determined and who 
has the authority to assess the tax varies between municipalities (Gonzalez Analaya and 
Revilla, 2012). According to the Constitution, the municipalities are in charge of 
administering the cadastre, collecting the tax, monitoring compliance and imposing 
sanctions. However, the Constitution also allows municipalities to enter into 
agreements with the States whereby the latter take charge of some of the functions 
related to property tax administration. In practice, many municipalities have opted to 
allow states to maintain control of the cadastre (E. Ahmad & Brosio, 2008b). Others, 
beginning with the largest municipalities, have taken over all functions themselves 
(Rowland, 1998). In around 10 states decentralized “autonomous” cadastral institutes 
have been created, though few if any of these operate under complete (administrative, 
technical, legal and financial) autonomy separate from the state government (Interview 
9, Mexico City, February 2013). Also, a few municipalities have experimented with 
outsourcing collection to private firms in return for a commission (tax farming) 
(Interview 92). 
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Table 1 Property tax data by state, 2011 
 
 
Property tax revenues 
(pesos) 
Number of 
properties 
Property tax 
revenue to 
properties 
Population Property tax 
revenue to 
population 
TOTAL 30,339,350,523 27,578 1,100,129 76,939,189 394 
Aguascalientes 197,749,319 322 614,128 1,243,865 159 
Baja California 937,195,243 856 1,094,854 3,320,259 282 
Baja California Sur 301,744,468 176 1,714,457 697,611 433 
Campeche 122,138,120 196 623,154 852,719 143 
Coahuila 549,125,249 753 729,250 2,852,479 193 
Colima 226,823,323 198 1,145,572 675,589 336 
Chiapas 224,199,670 855 262,222 5,004,853 45 
Chihuahua 1,151,427,620 917 1,255,646 3,478,181 331 
Durango 195,372,024 388 503,536 1,671,288 117 
Federal District 9,067,908,555 2,703 3,354,757 8,865,660 1023 
Guanajuato 1,271,011,117 1,281 992,202 5,672,299 224 
Guerrero 455,067,616 608 748,466 3,448,766 132 
Hidalgo 275,830,241 612 450,703 2,763,875 100 
Jalisco 2,130,990,553 1,960 1,087,240 7,578,608 281 
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Mexico 3,990,657,795 3,784 1,054,614 15,633,788 255 
Michoacán 586,590,666 1,067 549,757 4,419,787 133 
Morelos 349,934,845 485 721,515 1,824,843 192 
Nayarit 156,432,701 295 530,280 1,122,323 139 
Nuevo Leon 1,683,058,212 1,250 1,346,447 4,846,552 347 
Oaxaca 173,837,826 693 250,848 3,873,609 45 
Puebla 565,877,853 1,293 437,647 5,929,562 95 
Queretaro 693,845,865 450 1,541,880 1,935,393 359 
Quintana Roo 989,628,217 356 2,779,855 1,454,603 680 
San Luis Potosi 326,989,246 547 597,787 2,644,781 124 
Sinaloa 887,905,132 707 1,255,877 2,811,088 316 
Sonora 739,656,208 697 1,061,200 2,766,046 267 
Tabasco 197,176,956 494 399,144 2,317,554 85 
Tamaulipas 580,219,250 845 686,650 3,386,493 171 
Tlaxcala 57,470,833 301 190,933 1,218,843 47 
Veracruz 729,433,229 1,645 443,424 7,788,294 94 
Yucatán 253,448,032 478 530,226 2,022,956 125 
Zacatecas 270,604,539 368 735,338 1,517,348 178 
Sources: Population and GDP: Revenue Laws of the Federal Entities, 2013; Revenue data as presented by Federal Entities in 2012. 
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Given that real property is immovable, it is considered a tax that is low in mobility; that 
is, it allows different municipalities to set their own rates without leading to the 
magnitude of tax competition or relocation effects of other taxes such as the income tax 
or the VAT. Furthermore, it is considered a benefit tax as its value is (at least in part) a 
reflection of municipal services, such as street cleaning, garbage collection, road 
maintenance, and public lighting. This tax may be exportable to non-residents in cases 
where non-residents own much of the property in the jurisdiction. Given its large 
tourism sector, accounting for an estimated 7-8% of GDP since 1993, foreign owners 
and the tourism industry may own large amounts of properties in certain municipalities 
in Mexico. In fact, among the municipalities that account for the largest tax income are 
Los Cabos and Cancun, paid largely by foreign firms in the tourism sector (Gonzalez 
Anaya & Revilla, 2012).  
 
Like elsewhere with the property tax, it requires payment independent of a property 
transaction and may thus hit those particularly hard who do not have steady income 
flows. Given widespread tax evasion and informal land occupation, it is possible that 
only few are burdened with paying a large amount of the municipalities’ total tax intake. 
Given the lack of universality, this may affect the perception of equity of the tax. 
 
2. Water charges 
For the purposes of this thesis, I follow Moore (forthcoming) in using a political 
definition of taxes incorporating all payments from the subjects to the ruler, thus 
including water charges. Water charges make up the second most important revenue 
source over the observed time period. In 2009 36 billion pesos were collected in 
revenues from this source. Overall, the revenue from water charges do not suffice to 
cover the costs of supplying water (Sánchez, 2013:21). Yet, like property taxes, 
revenues from water charges also show great variation over time and among 
municipalities. The histogram in Figure 9 shows the variation among municipalities in 
average water user fees per person. Water charges rose significantly after the Tequila 
Crisis in 1994-5 until 2005, surpassing property tax revenues in importance. Nine states 
saw increases of over 200% in water revenues over that period (Hidalgo, Puebla, 
Zacatecas Tabasco, Yucatán, Michoacán, Queretaro, Tamaulipas, and Aguascalientes), 
while the municipalities in another ten states consistently performed well below the 
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national average (Tlaxcala, Nueva Leon, Sinaloa, Chiapas, Morelos, Jalisco, Nayarit, 
Chihuahua, Colima and Baja California). Only four states (Baja California, Jalisco, Mexico 
and Nuevo Leon) and the Federal District are responsible for half of the total water 
charges collected (SHCP, 2008). 
 
Figure 9 Histogram of per capita water user fees by municipality, 2000 
 
Source: INEGI, SIMBAD 
 
How are functions distributed with regard to water charges?  As part of decentralization 
reforms, water management was reformed through the National Water Law adopted in 
1992 (Ley de Aguas Nacionales 1992). Together with subsequent laws and amendments, 
it decentralised water management from the federal government to the states and 
municipalities and opened the way for private sector management of water services via 
municipal government concessions (Wilder, 2008). The decentralization of the water 
system was unevenly implemented and resulted in various different arrangements 
(Wilder & Romero Lankao, 2006:1986). It can be directly administered through the 
municipality, through a decentralised organism, through concessions to the private 
sector or any mixture of these three (ARegional, 2013). In some states (such as Estado 
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de Mexico) municipalities have entered into agreements allowing the state government 
to collect water charges (Sánchez Gavito Portilo, 2011). Those have tended to be the 
best managed while many of the decentralised water supply companies have gone 
bankrupt (Gonzalez Anaya and Revilla, 2012). 
 
The north contributes 30% of charges and enjoys the most water service coverage 
despite that it receives only 10% of Mexico’s rainfall, suffering water scarcity and 
periodic droughts (while covering 20% of land surface area). The south, by contrast, 
contributes only 10% of water charges despite that it receives over 50% of rainfall (and 
covers 30% of the land surface area) (Wilder & Romero Lankao, 2006:1981). This 
suggests that the benefit principle does apply, i.e. there is somewhat of a rough match 
between users and payers of the service in practice as well as in theory. However, all 
over Mexico, water fees are well below the costs required to deliver the service 
(Sánchez, 2013; interview 6)(Sanchez, 2013; Interview 6). Plus over 80% of water is 
used by the agricultural sector, which is exempted from water charges. These facts in 
turn limit the application of the benefit principle in practice.  
 
 
3.3 Tax revenue potential and sudden revenue 
needs 
 
Having tax powers devolved to them does not mean that subnational governments will 
make any use of these (E. Ahmad et al., 2015). In this section I show that municipalities 
have great unexploited revenue potential and that the 2008-2009 global financial crisis 
and other recent events has created pressures for them to make greater use of their tax 
handles, particularly the property tax. This sets the context for the qualitative case 
comparison in Chapters 6-8 which looks at urban local governments with urgent tax 
revenue needs.  
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Revenue potential 
 
The property tax is a revenue source with particular potential but has remained 
notoriously low throughout the past twenty years, averaging approximately 0.1% of 
GDP until 1999 and 0.2% since then (SIMBAD, 2012). Not only does this place Mexico at 
the bottom of the list among OECD countries; it is also low in comparison to other Latin 
American countries: Argentina collects 0.4%, Brazil 0.5%, and Chile 0.7% of GDP in 
property taxes (Peña Ahumada & Wence Partida, 2011:90).  
 
Figure 10 Property Tax Revenues as a Percentage of GDP, 1991-2011 
 
 
Source: INDETEC, 2012 
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Figure 11 Taxes on property in the federal OECD countries as percentage of GDP, 
2010 
 
Note: The data include all taxes on property, not only the property tax. 
Source: OECD Statistics 
 
 
Why have property tax revenues remained so far below their potential? Many local 
governments have failed to update their land registries. A major obstacle to property 
tax intake is outdated or flawed cadastral information. There are numerous “hidden” or 
omitted land plots and constructions that do not show up in the cadastre, largely due to 
a lack of updating. This is particularly relevant for sprawling urban municipalities that 
have experienced high levels of immigration and construction. For example, a recent 
cadastral modernization program led by BANOBRAS, the Mexican development bank, in 
Carmen, Campeche resulted in a rise of 54% in the number of land plots (from 53,713 to 
82,890 plots). Taxing these additional land plots that were formerly left out of the tax 
base is part of the reason for a rise of 120 % in tax revenues from 25.8 million pesos in 
2008 to 67.0 million pesos in 2011 (BANOBRAS, 2012). Very few municipalities have 
undergone such cadastral modernization programs to date.  
 
Furthermore, cadastral valuation is far below market values, despite the fact that the 
Constitution requires that they be comparable (Article 115 of the Constitution and 
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Transitory Article V). Rough estimates of the discrepancy between cadastral values and 
market values have been made in 12 states. These vary greatly among states and among 
municipalities within the same state, with urban municipalities usually faring 
considerably better. On the high end, the equalization has purportedly reached up to 
100% in Nayarit, 87% in the capital municipality of Aguascalientes (70% in the other 
municipalities of the state of Aguascalientes), 80-85% in Estado de Mexico, and 80% in 
Guanajuato, while in others, the figure is estimated to be far lower. It is at 50% in 
Morelos and Tamaulipas, 40% in Colima, 30% in Oaxaca, and 10-20% in Tabasco. San 
Luis Potosi, Puebla and Guerrero fall into a middle range at approximately 65% among 
the states that have produced such estimates. The Federal Mortgage Society (SHF) 
estimates cadastral values to be approximately 60% below market values (INDETEC, 
2012). 
 
Another issue is that pending payments had not been pursued and non-compliance is 
not sanctioned. Estimates of the difference between registered property accounts and 
paid accounts have been conducted by a number of states, showing an average self-
compliance rate of 71% (see Table 2.6 below). However, the reliability of these 
estimates appears suspect, particularly for those that presume 100% compliance. Such 
data has been hard to come by and largely kept secret as municipalities allegedly fear 
that if the extent of non-compliance is made public, even fewer people will pay their tax 
obligations. Experts at the Institute for the Technical Development of Public Finances 
(INDETEC, 2012) believe compliance to be closer to 50%. Using their estimates, there is 
revenue potential of almost $8 billion pesos just from pursuing tax arrears (without 
updating cadastral information and values) (see columns in blue in Table 2.6). 
 
Tax rates vary from one state to the next and from municipality to municipality. For 
example, a rate of 0.9 mills (0.09%) is applied on land and improvements in San Luis 
Potosi, 1.1% in Aguascalientes, 1.8% in Puebla, and 5% mills in Baja California. Most are 
below international standards (of around 2%) suggesting some potential in raising the 
tax intake by raising rates.   
 
The causes for these problems are to some extent administrative and financial. 
Managing a cadastre efficiently requires relatively sophisticated tools, technology, and 
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know-how. It requires a capable staff with regular and specialized training and 
processes that promote administrative efficiency and innovation. There are numerous 
municipalities (particularly the small and rural) that do not have the technical or human 
capacity, nor the financial resources available for efficient cadastral management or 
collection. They are neither equipped to manage and update cadastral information nor 
to administer and pursue property tax payments.  
 
However, the reason for the low property tax intake is largely considered as having to 
do with tax effort on the part of the local government. Municipal governments in Mexico 
have made little effort to raise taxes in the past as this is politically unpopular and more 
difficult than the alternative revenue sources of receiving federal and state transfers or 
borrowing money (Morones Hernández, 2012:84). 
 
The property tax is politically unpopular because it is more visible than other taxes. It is 
a direct tax that is usually paid in the form of an annual lump-sum payment. While it 
represents a potentially large revenue source, there are far fewer political costs 
implicated in simply receiving federal or state transfers.  
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Table 2 Level of compliance with the property tax as estimated by states, 2010 
Federal Entity Number of 
registered 
accounts 
Number of 
accounts paid 
Difference (Paid 
minus unpaid 
accounts) 
Level of 
compliance 
(number of 
accounts) 
Level of 
compliance- 
INDETEC 
estimates 
Level of lost revenues 
– INDETEC estimates 
Aguascalientes  464,333   349,701   114,632  75% 55%  56,075,858  
Baja California 1,214,145   713,893        500,252  59% 19% 510,313,273  
Baja California Sur  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA   NA  
Campeche  259,135   125,446    133,689  48%  NA   NA  
Coahuila 1,122,259   1,061,473   60,786  95% 38% 231,541,190  
Colima   289,350    234,814   54,536  81% 28% 100,953,628  
Chiapas  675,110   465,431   209,679  69% 52%   77,561,494  
Chihuahua 1,260,756       743,984        516,772  59% 30% 600,936,411  
Durango     767,012       378,652        388,360  49% 40%   82,318,123  
Federal District 2,082,105   1,413,868       668,237  68% 69% 1,978,590,737  
Guanajuato 1,609,442   1,474,426        135,016  92% 62% 329,125,733  
Guerrero  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA   NA  
Hidalgo 1,120,360       561,801        558,559  50% 37% 127,624,897  
Jalisco 2,818,471   2,015,211        803,260  72% 35% 1,011,770,015  
Mexico  NA   NA   NA  NA 72%                  NA  
Michoacán 1,416,107   1,176,049        240,058  83% 46% 227,682,765  
Morelos     530,844       530,844                      -    100% 51% 120,314,631  
Nayarit  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA   NA  
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Nuevo Leon 1,786,241       989,673        796,568  55% 30% 800,963,142  
Oaxaca     914,439       885,262          29,177  97% 49%   67,154,449  
Puebla 1,852,186       616,312    1,235,874  33% 32% 261,823,961  
Queretaro     568,852       443,035        125,817  78% 30% 323,339,551  
Quintana Roo     456,258       396,620          59,638  87% 45% 427,281,033  
San Luis Potosi     880,773       880,773                      -    100% 31% 146,342,159  
Sinaloa        947,861         947,861                      -    100% 61% 249,343,736  
Sonora    1,143,299         600,502        542,797  53% 77%  97,257,516  
Tabasco  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA   NA  
Tamaulipas  NA   NA   NA  NA  NA   NA  
Tlaxcala        523,251         226,231        297,020  43% 91%  4,036,600  
Veracruz 2,127,899   1,523,757        604,142  72%  NA   NA  
Yucatán     634,128       512,177        121,951  81% 57%  88,712,431  
Zacatecas     874,070       828,983          45,087  95% 67%  66,128,020  
TOTAL 28,338,686  20,096,779   8,241,907  71% 48% 7,987,191,355  
Source: Figures in black: Estimates reported by states; figures in blue: INDETEC, 2012. 
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There is also considerable potential for increasing revenues from fees, particularly for 
water services. An OECD (2012) study reports that, according to the National Water 
Commission of Mexico (CONAGUA), 25% of water supply is not being paid for. Public 
institutions are exempted from paying water charges and evasion is high. There are also 
many illegal water connections. The OECD study finds that there is also considerable 
room to increase tariffs. Water tariffs are the lowest among OECD countries and 
contribute to overexploitation of water. The study also emphasises that greater bill 
collection would make an enormous difference. Like with the property tax, municipal 
leaders have not wanted to make the unpopular move of raising the tariff on a basic 
service for their residents. Changing this situation, however, is particularly difficult as 
federal subsidies are provided with conditional use to make up for cost shortcomings in 
water provision, making it unlikely that municipalities will raise tariffs or scale up their 
collection efforts (Sánchez, 2013:22).  
 
Sudden revenue needs 
 
These alternatives have been greatly limited and pressure has risen for municipalities to 
begin making use of their previously unexploited tax instruments. The federal 
government has been particularly vocal in urging larger urban municipalities with great 
revenue potential to make use of their property tax powers and that they shall not be 
bailed out (García, 2013). The municipalities have been further motivated to increase 
tax revenues because of recent adjustments to the transfer formulas that reward tax 
effort with greater federal and state transfers (Peña Ahumada & Wence Partida, 
2011:90).  
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2009, many municipalities are now attempting 
to step up their tax effort and abruptly increase their tax revenues. Several have 
recently found themselves (or continue to find themselves) in dire financial 
circumstances. While municipal debt has been consistently growing, fiscal transfers 
from the federal government, their main source of revenues, have not (interview 3; 
interview 5;SIMBAD, 2012). This came as a result of stagnating oil revenues (to which 
federal transfers are tied) and a general economic downturn in recent years, following 
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recession of its main trading partners and a slowdown in tourism, exacerbated by 
reports of drug violence and swine flu. Poor municipal financial management magnified 
what became a chronic debt problem as many outgoing municipal administrations left 
high debts for their successors to grapple with (Martinez, 2013; Rea, 2012; Tzuc, 2012).   
 
Many municipalities expected to be bailed out by the federal government; however, a 
stricter bailout policy was effectuated, subsequent to national outrage at 
mismanagement of local funds and to prevent spillovers of financial difficulties 
(Reforma, 2012). Making matters worse, credit agencies such as Moody’s and Standard 
& Poor’s heavily downgraded their qualifications for most municipalities they rate, 
complicating their access to long-term credit, raising borrowing costs, and diminishing 
the interest of investors in financing their projects (Arteaga, 2013; interview 3; 
interview 4; Soto, 2013). Growing short-term debt, compounded by a lack of alternative 
revenues, has placed great pressure on many municipal governments to ramp up their 
tax revenues.  
 
This acute situation provides a unique opportunity to study the processes occurring 
following a determination of local governments to raise tax revenues. This is exploited 
in the qualitative case comparison of six municipal governments who are under 
pressure to raise their tax intake in Chapters 6-8. 
 
   
3.4 Transitions resulting in a patchwork 
democracy 
 
In this section I give an overview of the democratic transition that occurred over the 
time period studied in the quantitative analysis of taxation-accountability linkages 
(1989-2009) in Chapters 4-5. This is an important part of the backdrop as one might 
expect that the major transitions in democratic governance have contributed to changes 
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in accountability over time. I also review the literature on different explanations for 
variation in accountability between local governments.  
 
At the beginning of the period under analysis, Mexico was still dominated by a single 
hegemonic party, the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) of the time. The PRI ruled 
Mexico since 1929 and its power is considered to have peaked in the 1980’s. Termed a 
“perfect dictatorship” by Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa, the regime upheld a 
façade of a liberal democracy, holding regular elections, but monopolising access to 
elected office. It used elections to obtain information about dissidents, smother 
opposition, gain legitimacy and further consolidate power (Magaloni, 2005, 2006). The 
party controlled the leading sectoral, professional, and civic groups of the country 
(Lawson, 2000:268). Oil rents from the state-owned oil company PEMEX and import-
substitution industrialisation further meant an extensive and powerful government 
with a key role in industrialisation, economic development, and in the provision of 
welfare programs. Throughout, corruption was a key feature as access to public 
positions and opportunities for personal benefits were used to maintain loyalty and 
support. The media was also largely monopolised and neglected to actively scrutinise 
government activities (Bailey & Paras, 2006).  
 
This situation changed substantially over the years thereafter. Opposition to the PRI 
regime mounted and led to an increasingly organised civil society and increased citizen 
demand-making (Cleary, 2007). This was egged on by several events. First, the 
aftermath of the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City showed that local communities and 
citizen groups proved to respond faster and in a more organised manner than the 
government, prompting further citizen activism. Anger mounted at government 
corruption and incapacity to deal with issues like pollution and public safety (Tavera-
Fenollosa, 1999). The media became a stronger voice in keeping a check on the 
government. Federal programs to enhance citizen participation were introduced to 
ensure greater accountability. An economic opening also occurred, starting with 
Mexico’s participation in the GATT in 1986 and continuing with the adoption of the 
North American Free Trade agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and various other bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements, along with a boost in privatisations. There has also been 
ongoing urbanisation as rural populations migrated to cities. Various international 
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organisations, such as Transparency International and the Organization of American 
States, and the literary and arts world also did their part in bringing attention to 
corruption and promoting democratic governance in Mexico. All of this led to increasing 
sensitivity to the issue of corruption and demand for accountable governance among 
the population. Prolonged negotiations over the years between the government and 
oppositions resulted in reforms that opened space for opposition parties, culminating in 
a turnover of power when Vicente Fox of the opposition PAN party was elected 
president in 2000.  
 
Although the old single party regime broke down, the process of democratisation 
remained far from complete (J. T. Hiskey & Bowler, 2005). As Bailey and Paras 
(2006:62) write, “Corrupt practices persist into the new democracy”.  Even the 
legitimacy of the 2006 presidential elections was highly contested and believed to be a 
return of “electoral ‘alchemy’. […The] size of electoral vulnerability to clientelism and 
vote-buying remained larger than the margin of victory” (Fox, 2007:3). Beyond national 
elections, as Lawson (Lawson, 2000:267-8) writes, “democratization has not proceeded 
at the same pace across all regions or spheres of government. As a result, Mexico’s 
political order comprises a series of authoritarian enclaves in which the old rules of the 
game still operate” and includes local fiefdoms among the “autocratic residue”. Hiskey 
and Bowler (J. T. Hiskey & Bowler, 2005:57) similarly write along similar lines: 
“Somewhat subsumed by these national-level changes, however, were significant 
subnational differences in the extent to which democracy had indeed arrived in Mexico. 
In some areas of the country, the democratization process was well underway long 
before the election of Fox, while in others it had barely begun”.   
 
The new government passed a federal transparency law in 2002 (La Ley Federal de 
Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental 2002). The law 
required states to draft their own transparency legislation, which should also cover 
obligations for municipal governments, and set up state transparency institutes. Each 
state eventually did so, some sooner than others.  
 
At the municipal level, although local leaders have been popularly elected since as far 
back as the beginning of the 1900’s, elections were not considered free and fair for most 
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of this time period (Cleary, 2010; O’Donnell, 1999). In fact, it was not until the 1980’s 
that actual electoral competition came about at the municipal level and parties besides 
that of the national ruling PRI stood any chance of winning (Beer, 2003; J. Hiskey & 
Canache, 2005; Magaloni, 2006). In 1979, reforms increased the ability of opposition 
parties to be represented in local government and introduced proportional 
representation in elections for municipal councils. Still, between 1979 and 1987, 
opposition parties won only 135 municipal elections of over 5000 held during those 
years (Cleary, 2010). Only from the end of the 1980s onwards did opposition parties 
become an effective threat to the dominating party at the local government level and 
many scholars tend to regard this as the onset of democratization in Mexico (Cleary, 
2010; O’Donnell, 1999). This transition at the municipal level was faster than at the 
state and federal levels. The first opposition state governor was elected in 1989 (one 
PAN candidate in Baja California) and the first opposition president was only elected in 
2000, as mentioned above. 
 
The experiences of different municipalities, however, vary tremendously: while some 
have been lauded as models for accountable governance (especially Aguascalientes and 
Monterrey), others are accused of corruption, malfeasance, and a general lack of 
accountability and responsiveness to local needs (Grindle, 2007:1-2). There is well 
documented evidence of great variation in possible proxies for accountability of the 
local government. For instance, while most municipalities entered the 1980s with low 
coverage of local public services such as water and sanitation, many achieved 
momentous improvements at addressing the basic service needs of their residents 
while others did not (Cleary, 2010). According to Fox (2007:2), “Mexicans’ widely 
documented lack of trust in government reflects their actual experiences—which in 
turn indicate their limited capacity to hold those in power accountable” and he observes 
particularly scarce accountability in rural municipalities.  Much has been written on the 
persistence of local authoritarian enclaves and caciques (Gibson, 2005; Lawson, 2000; 
Snyder, 1999). In fact, Fox (2007) considers the term “enclaves” inexact considering 
their substantial geographic scope.  
 
Decentralization reforms that occurred alongside democratisation were also expected 
to have an effect on municipal government accountability (Grindle, 2007). Since the 
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beginning of the 1980’s, municipalities have received a row of new resources and 
responsibilities in terms of urban infrastructure and public service delivery. Yet, again, 
results in terms of accountability and responsiveness have been mixed. Rowland, in a 
case study of six Mexican municipalities similarly finds mixed experiences of exercising 
larger budgets to benefit local citizens, concluding that, “Larger municipal funds do not 
necessarily translate into better service provision.” Grindle (2007) in a study of 30 
municipalities also finds that decentralization reforms have produced cases of both well 
and poorly performing municipalities.  
 
What explains this variation? Grindle (2007) hypothesises the variation of municipal 
performance in terms of four key factors: (1) the degree of political competition ; (2) 
state entrepreneurship or the ideas and strategic choices of agents in public positions; 
(3) public sector modernisation through incentives from above, trainings, the 
introduction of new technology, etc.; and (4) citizen activism or the extent to which 
citizens are mobilised to participate and demand accountability.  
 
While the emergence of competitive politics has been heralded as pushing 
accountability and being effective in bringing citizen needs to the attention of the 
government in Mexico, others have contested this view. Moreno-Jaimes (2007), for 
instance, uses empirical evidence from 1990 to 2000 to show that competitive elections 
in Mexico do not produce more responsive governments. Cleary (2007), using data from 
1989 to 2000, similarly shows that electoral competition has no effect on municipal 
government performance.  
 
What obstacles to accountability have been identified? First, vote buying and election 
rigging have been noted to continue to be obstacles (Fox, 2007).  Arroyo and Sanchez 
Bernal  (1996) similarly identify clientelist political promises made in the run up to 
elections. Second, accountability relationships may be stronger to the mayor’s party 
than to the voters. Many municipal leaders see their job as a show case of their 
management and leadership capabilities vis-à-vis party bosses who nominate 
candidates for future positions, and as a way to attain popularity for their future career. 
As Rowland  (1998) writes, “In Mexico, municipalities have traditionally been the 
jumping-off points for those wishing to move to higher office, but these posts were seen 
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as part of a career strategy (principally to prove loyalty to one’s political team) and a 
temporary assignment at most”.  Third, limited information has also been identified as 
an obstacle: data on the use of municipal resources is paltry and monitoring is sporadic. 
This makes it difficult for local residents to evaluate municipal performance. Fourth, 
many municipalities lack the basic administrative infrastructure to respond to citizen 
demands (Grindle, 2007).  
 
Fifth, the non-consecutive re-election of mayors combined with short term limits has 
been claimed to lead to a situation in which the  “day-to-day governance in 
municipalities is in the hands of short-lived political representatives rather than a 
professional civil service” (Cleary, 2007:285).  Denying citizens the ability to sanction or 
reward local leaders through the vote, the prohibition on consecutive re-election is also 
considered to stifle accountability (Grindle, 2007). However, mayors may be re-elected 
after three years have gone by and their party may be re-elected immediately and there 
often tends to be much pressure on the mayor to ensure the party is re-elected. 
 
The prohibition of re-election among mayors is not widespread (to my knowledge the 
only countries where mayors are prohibited from re-election are Colombia (La Semana, 
2010, 2012) and El Salvador and it is being debated in Peru (La Republica.pe, 2013). 
Yet, although it is particular, in other countries where immediate re-election is allowed, 
local mayors faced with electoral competition often have similarly high discount rates 
and a time horizon that usually does not surpass the next elections. As Bahl and Linn 
(1992:118) write in discussing the high discount rates of local government officials, “It 
is important to note in this connection that fiscal planners the world over are 
notoriously short-sighted”.  
 
In effect, over the time period studied in the quantitative analysis (Chapters 4 and 5), a 
democratic transition occurred in which some municipalities presumably became more 
accountable to citizens, while others have remained autocratic enclaves. The variables 
used as proxies for accountability, the disparities between municipalities and their 
varied evolution over time will be shown in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
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Conclusion 
 
Having experienced an increase in resources and responsibilities, local governments in 
Mexico are responsible for services that are immediate to the needs of society, including 
water, drainage and public security.  As Fernández-Fernández (2012) of UNAM writes, 
“the work of the municipal government is the first thing that people see”. Yet while 
some municipalities are lauded for their good work, others are corrupt, mismanaged, 
and neglect the needs of their local residents. The variation in local government 
accountability in Mexico has been explained by a number of factors in the literature. 
What is the effect of taxation among these factors? What might we expect of taxation-
accountability linkages given the Mexican context?  
 
Subsuming the Mexican context presented in this chapter from the theoretical points 
laid out in Chapter 2, we have the following situation. 
 
1. First in terms of the degree of revenue dependence: local governments have 
relatively substantial own revenue sources available to them. However, as 
typical for local governments all over the world, they also have access to 
alternative revenue sources, particularly federal transfers. Bailouts have 
likewise been frequent and borrowing has been made possible, though within 
limits. However, incentives for tax effort introduced in transfer formulas around 
2008 are believed to have motivated tax revenue dependence. 
 
2. In terms of degree of power over taxation: local governments have potentially 
significant tax handles including the property tax and charges for service 
provision. While they generally have the ability to decide on the base and rate 
and they assess the tax, changes to these and the introduction of new taxes 
needs to be approved by the state congress. Regarding the property tax, the 
Mexican Constitution stipulates that all tax functions surrounding the property 
tax pertain to municipalities; yet in practice, several (particularly small 
municipalities) have shifted administration of the cadastre and/or collection to 
other institutions. However, the most important function, setting the tax rate, is 
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generally done by municipalities but, again, needs to be approved by the state 
congress.  
 
3. In terms of their degree of power to negotiate a bargain: Mexican municipalities 
are limited in their scope of decision-making and in their ability to make 
concessions in a bargaining process. State and federal government spending is 
far greater and more capable of changing the lives of the local residents than 
that of the municipal government. Plus their short term periods do not provide a 
great scope for new projects and long term investments. 
 
4. Whether there is clarity of responsibilities is also debatable: like in any multi-
tiered government system, there is some overlap or confusion between 
constitutionally assigned functions. However, there is also evidence that local 
residents are relatively well aware of the most important areas of responsibility 
of the local government.  
 
5. Regarding the most important two tax types, they are (a) highly visible, 
especially the property tax; (b) the tax intake may be low in international 
comparability but the tax may in some circumstances mean a considerable 
burden for compliant taxpayers, particularly to low-income residents; (c) the 
property tax is earned as it requires considerable effort on the part of the 
administration to collect. This is perhaps less so for water charges depending on 
whether or not the municipality collects them directly or via a decentralised 
agency or private firm; (d) both are relatively broad-based: the property tax 
targets residents but the tax may also be passed down to renters. However, 
there is also large informal land ownership not covered in the cadastre. 
Regarding water charges, they are more broad-based, if collected; (e) both 
generally adhere to the benefit principle in theory though with some 
inconsistencies in practice; (f) the tax bases are immobile and not easily 
exportable to non-residents except where foreign ownership of properties is 
high. 
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6. Regarding an “enabling environment” of democracy, there is evidence of much 
variation in electoral competition, responsiveness to needs and other 
performance indicators both over time and across municipalities. 
We thus have some factors that, at the outset, would limit taxation-accountability 
linkages and others that would promote them. 
 
Mexico provides an interesting case for analysing taxation-accountability linkages for a 
number of reasons. For one thing, as shown in this chapter, there is traceable cross-
sectional and time variation in terms of the independent variable (taxation). The 
distribution of total municipal revenue sources has evolved as has the importance of the 
main municipal tax revenues, both across time and space. The variation in tax intake 
between municipalities and in tax dependence between and across municipalities has 
been shown in the previous sections (see especially Figure 7). At any point in time over 
a 20 year period, we see that some municipalities are more reliant on taxation than 
others.  
 
We would also expect great cross-sectional variation in the dependent variable 
(accountability) given the uneven democratic transition reported on in the secondary 
literature. The precise variation in the variables will be shown in the next chapter 
(Chapter 4). A political and economic opening occurred since the 1980’s, in which some 
municipalities became more democratically accountable, while others did not. Much has 
been written on the persistence of local authoritarian enclaves and caciques and there is 
also well documented evidence of great variation in service provision over the observed 
years (again shown in Chapter 4). This also promises great variation in accountability 
variables.  While most municipalities entered the 1980s with low coverage of local 
public services such as water and sanitation, many local governments achieved 
momentous improvements at addressing the basic service needs of their citizens while 
others did not. This evolution, coupled with the fact that Mexico is one of the few 
developing countries that publicises comprehensive fiscal data at the municipal level of 
government from 1989 onwards for most of its over 2400 municipalities, provides 
opportunities for analysing the evolution of accountability and responsiveness of 
municipalities based on their tax dependence across a large number of municipalities. I 
take this on through quantitative panel regression analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.  
116 
 
 
Mexico also results particularly interesting for comparative case analysis as the field 
research could be conducted over a time period in which many municipalities were 
attempting to abruptly increase their tax revenues. The reasons for this stem from a 
sudden cut-off of alternative revenue sources due to a global financial crisis and changes 
in national government policy among other events.  Given the large unexploited local 
revenue potential, this allows observing at first hand the strategies pursued by local 
governments attempting to substantially raise their tax intake by making use of 
previously neglected tax handles, which is done in the case comparison in Chapters 6-8. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology for nation-
wide quantitative analysis 
 
While the previous chapter assessed what can be expected of the linkages between 
taxation and accountability at the local level given the Mexican context, this chapter and 
the following chapters explore the relationship through novel empirical research. This 
chapter and the next explore the relationship quantitatively through large-N 
econometric regression analysis, presenting new econometric tests of within-country 
relationships between taxation and accountability. While this chapter sets up the 
methodology and estimation strategy, the following chapter presents the results and 
discusses the findings. The chapters thereafter will then use qualitative analysis to 
further explore the relationship and to delve more deeply into some of the research 
questions that could not be answered using quantitative methodology. 
 
Statistical and econometric methods can show whether predicted relationships hold, on 
average, across a wide range of units. They can tell us about the existence of patterns or 
regularities while mitigating the difficulties of external validity and bias of small-n case 
studies. They have been particularly influential in pushing the recent academic 
discussion around the relationship between taxation and accountability. However, while 
seemingly straightforward in testing simple deterministic relationships between 
variables, more caution is needed when applying such methods to more complex causal 
processes and relationships that are contingent on a variety of different interdependent 
factors as those linking taxation to different governance outcomes. 
 
The existing quantitative scholarship claims to show evidence of a positive causal 
relationship between taxation and accountability. However, much of this work suffers 
from several methodological and data problems which may call the validity of the 
conclusions into question. Furthermore, some of the results of those focusing on local 
taxation, which claim to show a positive causal relationship between some measure of 
taxation and some proxy for accountability, just like at the national level, contradict 
results from qualitative case studies which do not find such a relationship. This may be 
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the result of imperfect methods and data and/or of the context of the countries in which 
the tests were conducted, as they differ from those selected for case study analyses. 
These points merit both reviewing previous quantitative literature, particularly the data 
and methods used, as well as testing the relationship anew in a different context.  
 
In this chapter, the first section (4.1) presents the methodological challenges of testing 
the relationship between taxation and accountability quantitatively. It includes a review 
of methodologies used in existing quantitative literature on the relationship. It then 
explains the methodology that I use to explore the relationship quantitatively myself, 
taking Mexican municipalities as the unit of analysis. In sections 4.2 and 4.3 I 
operationalise the key variables that I will use in my regression models, some of which I 
construct. Section 4.4 contains the estimation strategy and discusses how I have aimed 
to overcome some of the risks that could threaten the internal validity of the results. 
The final section concludes.  
 
 
4.1 Methodological challenges of testing the 
relationship quantitatively  
 
Econometric studies are widely cited as evidence for the existence of a link between 
taxation and accountability in developing countries. These regress some measure of 
taxation as the independent variable on some measure of accountability as the 
dependent variable. The most prominent are cross-national time series cross section 
regressions that find positive relationships across countries between measures of 
taxation and democracy (Baskaran, 2014; J. Mahon, 2005; Ross, 2004), the quality of 
political institutions (Baskaran & Bigsten, 2012) and corruption (Baskaran, 2014). At 
the subnational level, Hoffman and Gibson (2005) use data from Tanzania and Zambia 
to find that local governments spend proportionately more on public services when 
they receive more revenues from taxation. They also find that a larger proportion of 
revenues derived from outside sources, such as transfers from the central government 
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or foreign aid, is associated with greater local government spending on salaries and 
administrative costs. Gervasoni (2010) finds a negative relationship between fiscal 
transfers (the flip side of tax revenues in the budgets) and the degree of 
democratisation among Argentine provinces (though no relationship when testing for 
the effects of provincial tax revenues specifically). Finally, Gadenne (2013) uses local 
governments in Brazil as her unit of analysis and finds that increases in the proportion 
of tax revenues in the government’s overall budget lead to a larger increase in spending 
on local public health and education services than correspondingly large increases in 
transfers. She also finds that extra transfers lead to more corruption.  
 
However, as Prichard (2010b) notes, as there are strong reasons to be sceptical about 
the validity of these conclusions due to various problems with data and methods 
employed. Measuring this relationship entails a variety of challenges. Scholars have 
needed to grapple with a lack of comparable data and challenges of operationalising 
elusive variables. They have struggled to resolve endogeneity problems in their models 
and to establish causality. They have also needed to make considerable compromises 
between theoretical and methodological soundness in their decisions on which 
regression analysis techniques to employ. This section details these issues in light of the 
existing quantitative work on this topic.  
Problems with data and datasets 
 
Empirical work testing taxation-accountability relationships have largely suffered from 
data problems, largely due to a scarcity of availability of required data.  Cross-national 
econometric studies in particular are plagued by poor data quality and inconsistency of 
data sources (Prichard, 2010a:657). Critically, fiscal data and other variables used in the 
model specifications are collected and recorded differently across countries, using 
varied definitions, categories, and measurement techniques (Kittel, 2006; Prichard & 
Leonard, 2010). For instance, what counts as tax revenues and what does not varies 
considerably between accounting practices across countries. Ross (2004), Mahon 
(2004), Baskaran (Baskaran, 2014) and Baskaran and Bigsten (Baskaran & Bigsten, 
2012) rely on fiscal data from sources including the OECD, the International Monetary 
Fund’s Government Finance Statistics and the World Bank’s World Development 
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Indicators. Especially the last two datasets have a large number of missing variables so 
scholars therefore merge not only data between the datasets but also from before and 
after changes in the methodology used to construct the variables (Prichard, 2010b). In 
an effort to construct panel datasets with a greater number of observations, these 
studies have compromised heavily on the comparability of the data, undermining data 
quality to an extent that it can seriously affect the interpretability of results (Kittel, 
2006:651).  
 
One is more likely to find greater homogeneity between methods of collecting and 
definitions of variables used in within-country studies. Moreover, within country 
studies are more precise than cross-country data as the latter is highly aggregated, 
hiding important differences within countries (Beer, 2003).  
 
Large datasets are required in order for the estimators to be efficient and unbiased, 
particularly to run panel regressions. At the cross-country level, Ross (2004) uses time 
series cross national data from 113 countries from 1971 to 1997. Baskaran and Bigsten 
(2012) use panel data of 23 sub-Saharan African states from 1990 to 2005 and run the 
tests for 31 countries but for only two years (2001 and 2002) using a different dataset. 
Subnational level analysis holds potential for a far greater number of observations as 
subnational entities can massively outnumber the world’s sovereign countries, many of 
which do not provide quality data. However, subnational level historical data over many 
years for time series analysis is also difficult to come across in most developing 
countries and has left the number of such studies limited. One of the three relevant 
studies at the national level, Hoffman and Gibson’s (2005) analysis of the relationship 
between taxation and government responsiveness at the local level in Tanzania and 
Zambia, uses data from district expenditure frameworks and local budget data for only 
one year because of data scarcity, amounting to a mere cross section of 45-50 
observations. The second of the three subnational studies is that by Gervasoni (2010) 
which studies the relationship using data on 22 Argentine provinces between 1983 and 
2003, yielding regressions with only 102 observations. Only Gadenne (2013) uses a 
very large dataset. Her data on Brazil’s over 5000 local governments from 1997 to 2007 
enable regressions using over 50,000 observations. Thus, when countries do provide 
local level data over many years, and the country has many municipalities, the number 
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of observations in subnational studies can greatly exceed that used by cross-national 
analyses, yielding more reliable results.  
 
A problem that remains even in large longitudinal datasets is that they may still contain 
many missing observations. The units for which data are missing are likely to be non-
random, causing sample selection bias. Moore (1998) warns in particular of a strong 
correlation between levels of income and the quality (and availability) of fiscal data that 
could affect results. It is likely that less accountable governments may be more likely to 
have missing data than more transparent and accountable ones. 
 
Difficulties operationalising the variables 
 
A further problem with the data is that the variables used are imprecise in measuring 
the concepts they try to capture. The first challenge is how to measure the independent 
variable, taxation. Most of the qualitative historic accounts on taxation-accountability 
linkages refer to tax revenue needs as sparking accountability but these are difficult to 
measure. Taxation is therefore usually operationalised in terms of tax intake levels or 
the proportion of tax intake compared to the revenue intake of other sources such as, in 
the subnational context, transfers from the central government. Several scholars use the 
proportion of tax revenues to GDP, with the long pathway in mind as the causal 
mechanisms, in which taxation affects accountability by affecting the incentives of the 
residents.  
 
However, taxpayers may be affected not only through level of taxation or changes in the 
level of taxation, but these levels in comparison to the services provided by the 
government or the quality and performance of the government. If the quality of 
government drops, but tax levels remain the same, theory suggests that this may spark 
resistance from residents just as much as when the quality of government remains the 
same but taxes rise. Ross uses both tax/GDP and taxation/expenditures to try to capture 
this cost-benefit hypothesis: that it is not just about the level of taxation but the level of 
taxation compared to benefits received that catalyses a reaction by taxpayers, which 
leads to accountability. Yet the quantity of expenditures says little about the quality of 
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the government or the services provided. A more precise measure for observing the 
effects of tax dependence on the incentives of governments would be through a measure 
of its share of tax revenues compared to other sources of government revenues.  
 
At least as challenging is how to measure accountability. Problems defining this broad 
and elusive term are accompanied by equally great problems in measuring it. Scholars 
have therefore used different proxies that only loosely indicate different aspects of the 
concept, such as some measure of constraints on power and electoral contestation to 
indicate the level of subnational democracy (Gervasoni, 2010), the proportion of 
expenditures targeted towards investment or public services (Gadenne, 2013; Hoffman 
& Gibson, 2005), and some measure of corruption (Gadenne, 2013).  
 
Endogeneity problems: spurious and simultaneous causality 
 
Beyond data problems and the problems of operationalising the variables, there are 
endogeneity problems in testing the relationship between taxation and accountability. 
As with any analysis of observational data, endogeniety bias may affect results if either 
spurious or simultaneous causality are present.  
 
The most pressing problem is that of simultaneous causality. While taxation and 
accountability may be correlated, does causality run backwards as well as forwards? 
Does taxation lead to accountability or does accountability lead to taxation? Theory in 
fact explicitly states that both should be true. Because greater government 
accountability is expected to lead to greater tax compliance (and thus tax intake), 
government leaders are incentivised to be more accountable. This is further buttressed 
by studies showing that citizens are more willing to pay taxes if they perceive their 
government as accountable (Bergman, 2002; Levi & Sacks, 2005; Torgler, 2005). 
 
Spuriousness would be present if an omitted variable (or confounding factor) explains 
both taxation and accountability. The usefulness of cross-country statistical 
comparisons as evidence has often been called into question because they involve 
comparing dissimilar countries, cultures, and institutions, bringing about a large 
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potential for producing confounded relationships. Within-country econometric studies 
have the advantage of limiting this problem to some extent by holding various 
institutional, cultural and policy variables constant across units (Caselli & Michaels, 
2013), yet the risk remains.  
 
Another issue is that testing this relationship requires making assumptions about the 
temporal relationship between taxation and accountability. In Chapter 2, I identified 
two main pathways through which the causal relationship is expected to work (the long 
and short path). Through the long path, the government raises taxes (either gradually or 
abruptly). This leads to a reaction by the residents, and a subsequent bargain with the 
government in which the latter makes concessions to be more accountable. This implies 
a rise in taxation that precedes a rise in accountability. Yet the theory provides little 
guidance as to how long the lag should take and the lag may differ from one entity to the 
next. Ross (2004), who acknowledges these ambiguities, settles on using 3-year, 5-year, 
and 10-year time lags, expecting taxation to precede accountability by some years.  
 
Through the short path, a rise in accountability occurs simultaneously with a rise in 
taxes as the government may feel it needs to make concessions and be more 
accountable in parallel (or even prior) to embarking on an increase in taxation.  This 
would imply a positive relationship with no lag.  
 
A final issue in trying to establish causality is that even if relationships are found, they 
are not necessarily evidence of the causal mechanisms that the authors presuppose. 
Only if, for example, we show that a rise in taxation leads to protest and protest leads to 
greater accountably, would we be closer to showing that the causal mechanism or 
theory is the one that the results are supporting. Yet the relationships are usually only 
looked for between the first event and the final outcome, ignoring the intermediate 
steps and processes in between.  
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Challenges of model specification 
 
Control variables are needed to hold constant factors that could lead the estimated 
causal effect of interest to suffer from omitted variable bias. Factors such as local 
government modernisation and human capacity of the local government may be 
correlated with both taxation and accountability. Yet this data is not always available. 
Plus, in the studies with small datasets, a trade-off needs to be made between additional 
controls and reducing the degrees of freedom by adding more variables.  
 
Analysing panel data or time series cross sectional data (that is, data on countries or 
subnational governments across several years) has come to be considered the superior 
method for testing this relationship. Panel regressions allow making inferences about 
the relationships from the different experiences of the many municipalities as well as 
from their evolution over time. It also allows controlling for a host of unobserved and 
possibly confounding variables: exogenous shocks common to all units at certain times 
or unit effects that persist across time. Panel data also usually contain more degrees of 
freedom and more sample variability than cross-sectional data, thereby improving the 
efficiency of the estimates. However, panel data also introduce several problems of their 
own. 
 
The problem with typical social science panel data is that repeated observations on the 
same unit or different units during the same time are seldom independent from one 
another (Beck, 2001; Beck & Katz, 1995, 1996, 2011). Instead, one tends to find the 
following properties that make the OLS errors wrong: 
 
1. Serial correlation of errors (this involves the temporal properties of the panel 
data: errors are not independent from one year to the next);  
2. Panel heteroscedasticity of errors (subpopulation of units consistently have 
errors with different variances from others). 
3. Contemporaneous correlation (correlations between units because of common 
exogenous shocks). 
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Serial correlation may occur in tax data as an overestimation in one year may 
conceivably carry over and lead to an overestimation in the next year. Panel 
heteroscedasticity of errors may occur as for instance governments with high tax intake 
may have consistently higher errors than governments with low tax intake. 
Contemporaneous correlation is also conceivable in the data used here: the errors may, 
for instance, be the same between local governments of the same state because of 
common accounting.  
 
The panel regression methods suggested by Beck and Katz (Beck, 2001; Beck & Katz, 
1995, 1996) had become the accepted econometric standard for testing relationships of 
this kind in comparative political economy (Plümper, Troeger, & Manow, 2005).  The 
suggested technique is to run OLS regression on panel data with a lagged dependent 
variable plus unit and time dummies on the right-hand side of the equations and to use 
panel corrected standard errors. These methods are hoped to mitigate the potential 
violations to OLS standard assumptions for panel regression that errors of the equation 
are homoscedastic with constant variances and are not correlated over time.  
 
However, since then others have pointed out the additional risks that these solutions 
create. Achen (2000) and Plümper et al. (2005) warn against the use of the dependent 
variable lag on the right-hand side of the equation as it suppresses the explanatory 
power of other independent variables in the regression. The choice of year for the time-
lag also greatly influences results. Kristensen and Wawro (2003) advise using fixed 
effects with robust standard errors instead of the lagged dependent variable for these 
reasons, especially when analysing relatively small-t datasets.  
 
The use of fixed effects has also not always been theoretically justified (Plümper et al., 
2005).  Kittel and Obiger (Kittel & Obinger, 2003:41) regard this as “ill-advised” since 
the main interest in most of the political science analyses that use it is precisely to 
analyse whether the institutional variables capture the cross-sectional variation in a 
way that makes the unit dummies superfluous. Unit dummies can suppress most of the 
theoretically interesting cross-sectional variance in the data while fixed time effects 
absorb most of the theoretically interesting time-series variance in the data (Huber & 
Stephens, 2001; Plümper et al., 2005:328). In particular, they “completely absorb 
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differences in the level of independent variables across units” (Plümper et al., 
2005:331). It therefore also precludes explaining any variance of the dependent 
variable that existed prior to the year the dataset begins. This is of great importance 
here as level effects are part of the theoretical explanation of the hypotheses tested. The 
pure reliance on changes in levels is theoretically problematic.  
 
With these methodological challenges in mind, the following three sections explain the 
variables and estimation strategy and model specifications used in this thesis to explore 
the relationship between tax reliance and accountability among Mexican municipalities.  
 
 
 
4.2 Operationalising the variables 1: 
Transparency and Drainage coverage 
 
Accountability, the dependent variable in the equation, will be measured by three 
different proxies: (a) the level of transparency (Transparency); (b) basic public service 
outcomes in terms of providing drainage services to the municipal population 
(Drainage coverage); and (c) whether or not elections are competitive (Electoral 
competition). By using several different proxies for accountability, I try to cover more 
of the multiple dimensions of this broad concept within the limits of available data 
rather than just one or two as in previous works. The first proxy (a) is an outcome 
measure that indicates effort on the part of the government to be open and render 
accounts to its residents. The second is an outcome measure of government 
performance and responsiveness to the residents. These proxies and how they are 
constructed are further elaborated in this section. The final proxy (c) will be detailed in 
section 4.3. A summary table of all three variables, their description and sources is 
found at the end of the chapter (Table 8).  
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Transparency 
 
The first proxy is Transparency, an indicator for allowing public access to government 
activities and financial accounts. A potential problem to keep in mind with this variable 
as proxy for accountability is that, even if the government does publish accounts, this 
information may be falsified or misrepresented. Nonetheless, it is assumed here that a 
government with relatively higher transparency compared to other municipalities is an 
indicator of a government with relatively higher accountability. 
 
To construct this transparency indicator, I examine five survey responses from the 
National Survey of Government, Public Security and Justice. 3  The survey was directed 
to municipal leaders and staff in 2400 municipalities from 19 October to 11 December 
2009. The fact that the responses come from the municipalities themselves and not 
from a third party may bring about doubts regarding their truthfulness. Other 
transparency surveys measure the municipalities’ compliance with financial reporting 
obligations to higher levels of government or to financial institutions. These have the 
advantage that it is not the municipality that evaluates itself but the disadvantages that, 
first, the proxies are more indicative of accountability towards the government or to 
financial institutions rather than to the populace and, second, only a small number of 
urban municipalities have been evaluated.4 I construct a transparency indicator based 
on survey questions that better capture transparency vis-à-vis the local residents and 
which covers far more municipalities. The survey questions selected are (a) which of six 
mechanisms are in place for citizens to access public information (“Mech” ranging from 
1 (none of them) to 7 (all of them)),5 (b) through which forms of diffusion is information 
                                                             
3 The 2009 National Survey of Municipal Government, Public Security and Justice (Encuesta Nacional de 
Gobierno, Seguridad Publica y Justicia Municipal 2009) was conducted by INEGI within the National 
Subsystem of Information on Government, Public Security and Justice (Subsistema Nacional de Información 
de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública e Impartición de Justicia (SNIGSPIJ)).  
4 These include indicators by the Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad S.A. (IMCO) and the Comision 
Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV). 
5 The mechanisms are (i) a legal framework that regulates access to public information, (ii) a public servant 
responsible for attending requests on public information, (iii) a system for receiving and attending to 
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made available to the public (“Avail” ranging from 1 (it is not made available) to 5 (it is 
made available through all listed forms of diffusion)),6 (c) how frequently is public 
information updated (“Frequ” spanning 1 (never updated) to 3 (updated on at least a 
monthly basis),7 (d) what information is publicized and freely accessible (“Info” ranging 
from 1-4),8 and (e) whether transparency and anti-corruption programs are in place 
(“Progr” ranging from 1-2). The distribution of responses to each of the items is shown 
in Table 3.  
 
Each of these variables measure transparency in a slightly different way and I want to 
extract what is common to all of them in order to get at the core of the concept, possibly 
replacing the four original indicators with one ‘transparency’ variable. To do this, I 
apply latent variable analysis. This allows me to investigate interrelationships between 
the observed responses in order to determine whether they can be explained by one 
construct, an unobserved latent variable. It then allows me to assign scores to each 
municipality for the latent variable depending on its responses (Bartholomew, Steele, 
Galbraith, & Moustaki, 2008:209). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
requests on public information, (iv) a system or process of organization, protection, and maintenance of 
public archives, (v) a training program to public servants on the rights and obligations of access to public 
information, (vi) others.  
6 The possible responses for methods of making information available are: (i) websites of the municipality, 
(ii) print media, (iii) electronic media, and (iv) other.   
7 The original questions have a choice of 10 responses: (1) weekly or more, (2) twice a month, (3) monthly, 
(4) every two months, (5) every three months, (6) every four months, (7) every half year, (8) annually, (9) 
do not update the information, and (10) do not know. I record the "do not know" responses as missing 
observations.   
8 The options for which information is publicized are (1) Municipal Development Plan, (2) Government 
reports and/or public accounts, (3) income information, (4) budget (original, modified, actual), (5) public 
debt, (6) organic structure and directory, (7) wages and salaries of the local council, (8) acquisitions 
(programs, contracts, providers), (9) public works (10) expenditures on accessories or donations, (11) 
concessions and permits, (12) beneficiaries of programs (13) audits (14)  (15) changes in ground use, (16) 
manual of processes and/or services, (17) other, (18) none, (19) don't know. I turned this into an indicator 
in which 1 means it publicizes four or less of these, 2 means it publicizes between 5 and 8, 3 between 9 and 
12, and 4 between 13 and 16. I left out "other" and again treat "don't know" as missing observations. 
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Table 3 Distribution of the item responses for transparency 
Item Number of responses for each number on the scale 
(a) How many 
mechanisms are 
in place for 
citizens to access 
public 
information 
(MECH) 
1= 347 
(16%) 
2= 98 
(5%) 
3= 539 
(25%) 
4= 312 
(15%) 
5=289 
(13%) 
6=257 
(12%) 
7=302 
(14%)  
(b) The what extent is 
public 
information made 
available (AVAIL) 
1=307   
(14%) 
2=114   
(5%) 
3=1022 
(48%) 
4= 437 
(20%) 
5= 264 
(12%) 
(c) How frequently is 
public 
information 
updated? 
(FREQU) 
1= 432 (20%) 2=564 (26%) 3=1148 (53%) 
(d) Which 
information is 
publicized? 
(INFO) 
1=551 (26%) 2=533  (25%) 3=549 (26%) 4=511 (24%) 
(e) Are transparency 
and anti-
corruption 
programs in 
place? (PROGR) 
1=904 (42%) 2=1240 (58%) 
 
 
The advantage of latent variable analysis over simply summing up the scores is that this 
method allows for measurement error by specifying a probabilistic rather than 
deterministic relationship between the item responses and the latent variable. This is a 
more valid method given that these items will be imperfect indicators of the latent 
construct. It also permits investigating in how far each of the item responses is 
diagnostic of the latent variable. I can then drop items or assign different weights to 
them depending on how revealing they are of the construct ‘transparency’.  
 
The most common method of latent variable analysis is to simply carry out factor 
analysis. However, this approach uses a linear factor model which assumes that the 
observed variables are continuous variables.  Given that in this case we are dealing with 
ordered categorical response variables, not continuous variables, this would give biased 
estimates of the factor coefficients (loadings) if applied to the categorical data. While 
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many researchers use regular factor analysis nonetheless, the more appropriate method 
is latent trait analysis, which is closer to the research frontier and requires more 
specialized software (Bartholomew et al., 2008:243). Latent trait models (a.k.a. Item 
Response Theory) use (multinomial) logistic regressions to specify the relationships 
between the categorical item responses and the continuous latent trait(s).   
 
The latent trait model’s parameter estimates can be used to determine the weights 
assigned to the different survey response items. The slope coefficient (or loading) 
reveals in how far the item enables us to discriminate between respondents on the 
latent trait. The higher the loading, the greater the discrimination; that is, the more 
information the item gives us about where on the scale the municipality lies, the greater 
the weight it should be given. If an item has very low discrimination, or has an opposite 
sign to that of the others, one may consider dropping it from the model. The constants 
or intercepts in latent trait models are difficulty parameters. The difficulty tells us the 
probability of the median municipality giving a response in that specific category. 
Ideally you would have items with a range of different difficulty levels in any one scale 
(Stares, 2012).  
 
I use two different types of software: R and MPlus. R allows me to plot category 
response functions in graphs in order to check that discrimination and difficulty merit 
keeping all of the categories. Once I am satisfied with the selection of response 
categories, I use MPlus software as this allows me to calculate factor scores for each 
municipality based on its response categories. Using R software, I plot the category 
response functions from fitted probabilities so that the suitability of the response items 
can be seen at a glance. These are shown in Figure 12 below. For each item, we can see 
the discrimination of the item by observing the angle of the slopes of its response curves 
(the steeper the slope, the greater the discrimination). We can see the difficulty by 
observing the location of the curve in the plot (the higher the curve rises in terms of the 
x-axis, the greater the difficulty). Essentially, what we don’t want to see are flat lines 
that are almost parallel to one another as this would mean low discrimination and low 
difficulty.  
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Figure 12 Item response functions 
(a) Mech      (b) Avail 
 
(b) Frequency    (d) Information 
 
(e) Program 
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Ideally, as the municipalities’ scores on the latent trait (‘transparency’) rises, the odds of 
their response to the specific question should also be higher and vice versa. This was 
not the case for INFO, as categories 1, which had only a small number of responses was 
higher than 2. In order to achieve this, I combined the responses from 1 and 2 into one 
category (1), reducing the numbers of the scale from 5 to 4. All the observable manifest 
variables now increase as the municipality’s score rises. 
 
Now that the model has been fitted, I can obtain predicted values for transparency for 
each of the municipalities (factor scores). These are basically weighted sums of the 
observed variables. This single indicator will then serve as the dependent variable 
proxy for accountability in the regression models that test for the effect of taxation. I use 
Mplus software to obtain factor scores for each municipality on the ‘transparency’ 
construct. The higher the score, the greater is the degree of transparency in the 
municipality. These factor scores can now be used as a single dependent variable for 
regression analysis to test the relationship between taxation and transparency. 
Municipalities with higher taxation are expected to have higher levels of transparency. 
As this survey data on transparency is only available for one year, no panel regression is 
possible.  
 
Table 4 Summary of Transparency variable, 2008 
Time Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2008 cross-section 
 
Transparency 
 
2127 
 
0.02 
 
0.88 
 
-1.973 
 
1.944 
 
 
 
Drainage coverage 
 
The second proxy for accountability is an outcome measure concerning local basic 
service provision.  In prior research on Mexico, Cleary (2010) uses improvements in 
water and drainage coverage as indicators of responsive local governments during the 
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1980’s and 1990’s. Water and drainage are among the prime responsibilities of local 
governments for which they are exclusively responsible and tend to feature as the 
central issues in local politics (Cabrero Mendoza & Nava Campos, 1999). These are 
services covering the basic needs of the broad public. Given that they are among the 
most basic services for any resident, I regard responding to these basic needs by trying 
to attain full coverage as responsiveness of the local government to the needs of its 
residents and an indicator of one of the key aspects of accountability: responsiveness 
(See Chapter 1.1). The variable Drainage coverage is used here for the percentage of 
the municipal population that receives drainage services. The data is taken from the 
national censuses on population and housing (CPV), which gives the percentage of 
households living in housing with drainage per municipality, available since 1990 at five 
points in time (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010). The reasons I don’t use water 
services are twofold. First, coverage has been much higher from the beginning of the 
period under observation, with almost all municipalities reaching over 80 percent of 
households with water services, thus yielding little variation in the data. Second, there 
was a change in the survey question terminology which creates an inconsistency 
between the 1990, 1995, and 2000 surveys on one hand and the 2005 and 2010 surveys 
on the other. Given that I have data only for   
 
Nationwide there is a general upward trend in households with drainage coverage (See   
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Figure 13). There is much variation in coverage between municipalities, such as in the 
provision of drainage services in Estado de Mexico shown in Figure 14. While some 
municipalities made remarkable progress, others have not. Municipalities that started 
the period under observation with high service coverage are left with little room for 
improvement over the period under observation. Keeping in mind that only changes 
and not levels are being considered in fixed effects models, I rerun the analysis using 
only municipalities that started off with less than 50% coverage and track their 
progress. 
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Figure 13 Percentage of the Mexican population receiving drainage services, 
1990-2010 
 
Source: Population and Housing Surveys (CPV) 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
 
Figure 14 Drainage service coverage in selected municipalities of Estado de 
Mexico, 1990-2010 
 
Source: Population and Housing Surveys (CPV) 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
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Table 5 Summary of Drainage coverage variable, 2005 
Time Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
2005 cross-section 
 
1866 
 
0.73 
 
0.23 
 
0 
 
0.995 
 
5 period panel  
(1990, 1995, 2000, 2010) 
9235 0.58 0.30 0 0.998 
 
 
 
4.3 Operationalising the variables 2: Electoral 
competition and Taxation  
 
In the previous section, I presented the first two proxies for accountability. In this 
section, I present a final indicator for accountability: electoral competition. I then show 
how I measure the main independent variable: taxation. 
 
Electoral competition: dependent and independent variable 
 
Viewed by much of the political science scholarship as the main tool for citizens to 
achieve accountability, electoral competition provides voters with a mechanism to 
constrain political power, to influence policy decisions and to increase government 
responsiveness to their needs. Voters can sanction representatives that abuse their 
power or are not sufficiently responsive and reward performance they deem 
satisfactory (Przeworski et al., 1999). They can choose between different campaign 
platforms and select parties or individuals that they believe will be most representative 
of their interests. Furthermore, within an electorally competitive environment, already 
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during the campaigning process, one can expect that the incumbent is more likely to be 
scrutinized and local residents approached to communicate their needs than in an 
environment with no serious opposition.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, while popular elections of municipal governments had been 
held in Mexico since the beginning of the 20th century, these have not always been 
competitive in the sense of allowing for an effective possibility of contest (Magaloni, 
2006). Instead, one sole party, the Institutional Revolution Party or PRI won at least 
95% of all municipal elections from the party’s inception until the late 1980’s. While 
celebrating the outward ritual of elections, the PRI did not allow a competitive electoral 
environment to flourish, crushing opposition through a range of tactics including 
electoral fraud, corruption, and, at times, violence (J. Hiskey & Canache, 2005). Thus, 
even though elections may have been held in each municipality throughout Mexico, only 
beginning in the 1980’s did some municipalities begin to see a transition to a situation 
of de facto electoral contest. While during the 1990’s many municipalities opened up to 
a democratic electoral process, others did not (Cornelius et al., 1999; Fox, 2007; J. T. 
Hiskey & Bowler, 2005; Lawson, 2000).  
 
The objective here is to exploit the evolution over time and the variance between 
municipalities of electoral competition in order to test whether municipalities with 
higher taxation are also more likely to have electoral competition (sooner) compared to 
those where municipal taxes were relatively less important. The assumption takes two 
angles. On the one hand, in municipalities in which residents pay more taxes, residents 
are more likely to demand accountability in the form of electoral competition. On the 
other hand, a municipal government that is more accountable (or at least wants to 
appear as such, even if it may end up rigging results), will be more likely to allow for 
electoral competition in order to show that it is accountable to its residents, thereby 
eliciting compliance with tax payments. In other words, like the proxies presented in 
section 4.2, it may be an indicator of the short or the long path to accountability, if the 
relationship to taxation is positive. Yet I also assume that if there is no relationship 
between taxation and electoral accountability, it would be doubtful that the link works 
through the long path given that this proxy is also an indicator of engagement between 
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the residents and the government through a relatively promising instrument of citizen 
influence on local government accountability. 
 
I use this proxy not only for an indicator of accountability but also one of citizen 
influence (an indicator that the long pathway to accountability may be at work) and, in 
further model specifications, I use it as a control variable as a proxy for a context of 
democratisation. This will be further explained in the estimation strategies in Section 
4.4.   
 
Electoral competition has been measured in a variety of ways in the scholarship. 
Gervasoni (2010) calculates 1 minus the proportion of votes won by the incumbent for 
the case of Argentine provinces. Alternatively, party alternation may be used as an 
indicator (Przeworski, 2000). Laakso and Taagepera (1979) count the number of 
parties competing in the electoral race. For Mexican municipalities, Broid Krauze (2010) 
calculates the difference of votes between the winner and the runner-up to measure 
electoral competition, while Hiskey and Canache (2005) use the first PRI loss in a 
municipality as indicating the onset of electoral competition, as it shows rather 
conclusively and perceptibly that one-party rule has come to an end. Hiskey and 
Canache’s is a highly conservative indicator in terms of accepting a municipality as 
having electoral competition (and suitable for their spatial diffusion model that looks 
for a more perceivable, symbolic turn-over event) yet ignores lack of competition 
through domination of other political parties. Finally, Cleary (2010) uses a dichotomous 
measure, coding a municipality as electorally competitive if opposite parties receive 
more than 20% of the vote.  
 
Here Cleary’s indicator will be used, denoted as Electoral Competition, as what I intend 
to measure is more the competition in itself as a sign of an effort at obtaining or 
showing accountability, rather than an end to the incumbent's grip on power. 
Furthermore, it is a clear and unequivocal measure and easier to interpret than 
Gervasoni’s or Broid’s continuous variable. The threshold of 80% victory margin is 
extreme enough to leave little doubt about a lack of a serious electoral opposition and it 
is empirically suitable to a case of a dominating autocratic party system which over time 
begins to democratise.  
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There are several potential problems regarding the ability of this variable to measure 
accountability. First, some interpret a lack of electoral competition as satisfaction with 
the incumbent. Similarly, in the market, when one firm dominates a large market share, 
this may be regarded as satisfaction with the producer and its products and not 
necessarily as evidence of a monopoly or oligopoly. However, in the Mexican context, 
keeping in mind that prior to the 1980’s the party in power at the national level won 
almost every single election in each of over 2400 municipalities, scholars view 
municipalities in which opposition parties are not competing as a situation of continued 
authoritarianism and lack of a serious opposition; that is, a lack of electoral competition 
rather than as satisfaction with the status quo (Beer, 2003; Cleary, 2010; Fox, 2007).  
 
A second potential problem with using electoral competition as a proxy for 
accountability is that, even if elections are competitive, they may not function as an 
effective instrument for enhancing accountability. They are held infrequently and often 
decided by factors that have little to do with the politician’s performance. In Mexico, the 
ability of electoral competition to function as a mechanism for accountability is 
weakened as Mexico’s constitution bars the consecutive re-election of municipal 
presidents (Grindle, 2007). This limits the residents’ ability to express approval or 
disproval of the incumbent and gives municipal presidents less incentive to maintain 
the support of the public once elected (although there may be pressure to ensure the 
party is re-elected). It should be noted, however, that the municipal president may be 
re-elected after the following term, there is high pressure for their party to be re-
elected, and seeking higher office in the party is often made dependent on this. 
 
Finally, there is always the possibility that citizens demand more accountability in 
response to taxation, but instead of succeeding to form political opposition, any 
attempts are repressed by the government. The data will not show such failed efforts. 
However, the objective here is not so much to detect demand for accountability but 
actual improvements in accountability.   
 
While electoral competition may not guarantee accountability, my assumption is that it 
is still far more likely to create pressure on a local government to perform, to generate 
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information about voter preferences, and to present the residents with a choice of 
policy options, than if there were no competing parties to scrutinize it or threaten its 
power. Thus, even if the government doesn't act on promises or demands, this is still a 
suitable indicator to differentiate municipalities in which people demand accountability 
or the government tries to show that it is accountable, from municipalities in which no 
such effort is made.  
 
Municipal level electoral data is available since 1989 until the present from the think 
tank CIDAC (Centro de Investigacion de Desarrollo, A.C.). It specifies the number of votes 
attained by each party in the elections, votes cast and registered voters. Local elections 
are held every three years in almost all municipalities (in some they have been held 
every four years). This yields five time periods with great variance from 1988-1990 to 
2000-2002, before almost 100% of municipalities enjoyed electoral competition or 
electoral democracy.  
 
Figure 15  Percentage of municipalities with electoral competition, 1988-2002 
 
Source: CIDAC/IFE 
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Table 6 Summary of Electoral competition variable 
Time Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All time periods (1, 2, 3, 4, and 
5) 
9204 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Time period 1 1236 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Time period 2 2253 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Time period 3 1957 0.89 0.31 0 1 
Time period 4 1782 0.94 0.24 0 1 
Time period 5 1976 0.99 0.10 0 1 
 
 
Taxation: the main independent variable 
 
My measure of taxation is local tax revenues over total local government revenues 
(Tax/Total). It aims to measure the importance of and/or reliance on taxation 
compared to other revenue sources in the local government budget.  
 
The numerator in the measure, “Tax”, combines local tax revenues (impuestos) and 
revenues from local fees and charges (derechos) into a single variable, following Moore’s 
(forthcoming) definition of taxes as a transfer of revenues from the subjects to the ruler. 
Like taxes, fees are a monetary contribution by local residents to the local government 
for providing municipal services. The data used are municipal income data from 
SIMBAD (2012), spanning from 1989 to 2009.  
 
In a further expansion, I compare the strength of the effect of the property taxes versus 
other own revenues. I test this separately given that the property tax given that it has 
particular characteristics compared to other tax types (it is a highly visible tax paid 
directly to the local government) and it is the most common tax instrument that is found 
at the local level, worldwide.  
 
There are several caveats that merit discussion. For one thing, Tax/Total does not 
precisely capture the extent of actual tax revenue needs and dependence. A local 
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government may need tax revenues but find itself unable to collect them: this won’t 
show up in the data. The indicator is instead a measure of the importance of taxation in 
the overall budget. That is what is being tested here.  
 
I had considered using a measure of taxes per capita to capture the tax paid by a 
resident in the municipality on average. This measure would be more targeted in 
capturing the effect that taxation has in sparking residents’ incentives. One problem 
with this is that it ignores any benefits that the municipal residents are obtaining in 
return for tax payments. Any change in tax payments would need to be seen in 
congruence with other taxes paid and benefits received by the taxpayer. For example, if 
a rise in taxes is accompanied by the introduction of targeted social transfers from the 
central government directly to residents, such as through Oportunidades, the incentives 
to demand accountability may not be as strong as when it is accompanied by nothing. 
One way to try to compensate would be a variation of this measure: tax revenues per 
capita over the proportion of payments by the government on investment expenditures, 
following Ross’s (2001) cost-benefit hypothesis. 
 
Yet the main problem with either of these is that it is impossible to differentiate who or 
how many people are paying taxes and how much. They are both average measures that 
hide differences between residents in the municipality. A municipality in which a 
handful of large businesses pay the bulk of the tax while everyone else evades could 
have the same average per capita tax revenue and the same proportion of tax to total 
revenue as a municipality in which every resident pays a relatively high amount 
compared to their own income.  We also don’t see rises in tax rates but only actual tax 
intake.  
 
The measure of tax importance used here (Tax/total) is therefore more adequate in 
measuring the incentive effects on the local government (and on the local residents only 
by extension following a response to those incentives by the local government). The 
variable is summarised below in   
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Table 7. Table 9 at the end of this chapter also summarises the variables and data 
sources. 
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Table 7 Summary of taxation variables 
Time Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1989-2009 
Tax/total 
 
41807 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.99 
2003 
Tax/total 
 
2021 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.59 
 
Data problems 
 
Besides the difficulties of the data capturing the concepts that they are meant to, there 
are further potential problems with the variables used. First, it is possible that there is 
misrepresentation of data through fiscal gimmickry and creative accounting (Alt, 
Lassen, & Wehner, 2014). Some accounting definitions are ambiguous or have been 
misunderstood or manipulated to mark the same information in different items. For 
instance, it is known that many municipalities hide payroll expenditures in other items 
of the budget. Debts are also hidden in a way that they appear off-budget altogether and 
I thus do not make use of expenditure data. Furthermore, since 2008, transfers were to 
take into account tax effort. It is thus possible that municipalities may exaggerate their 
tax revenue data from 2008 onwards in order to receive more transfers.  
 
Second, there are many missing variables in the dataset. This may lead to sample 
selection bias as the less accountable municipalities and the municipalities least 
equipped to collect taxes will also be the ones with the most missing data. This means 
that results may be biased in a way that municipalities that have both poor taxation and 
poor accountability will not be taken into account, therefore possibly weakening the 
relationship between taxation and accountability.  
 
Now that I have established how the main variables of interest are to be operationalised 
and what data is used, in the next section I will discuss how I use them in different 
regression models in order to test the relationships of interest.    
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4.4 Estimation Strategy 
 
Having described the methodological challenges of testing the relation between taxation 
and accountability quantitatively in Section 4.1 and having shown how I operationalised 
the key variables of interest in sections 4.2 and 4.3, I now turn to the estimation 
strategies. This section first lays out five hypotheses that I aim to test and shows the 
models that will be used to test them in a general form. I then expand on the control 
variables to be included in the models. The model specifications will be presented in a 
more specific form in Chapter 5, together with the results.  
Five hypotheses and how they will be tested 
 
I aim to test five hypotheses: 
 
1. Correlation: Municipalities where Tax/total is higher also have higher 
accountability. 
2. Causation: Greater taxation leads to greater accountability.  
3. Pathway: Taxation leads to greater accountability through the long path (with a 
time lag) vs. the short path (simultaneously). 
4. Context of democracy: The relationship between taxation and accountability is 
stronger in a context of greater democratisation. 
5. Tax type: Property taxation leads to greater accountability. 
Hypothesis 1: Correlation 
The first hypothesis, in which I seek to establish whether municipalities in which 
Tax/total is higher also tend to be the more accountable ones, involves simple tests of 
association. I run simple tests of correlation as well as cross-sectional regressions that 
take the following general form: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (4.1) 
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where the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖  is accountability (or one of the three proxies for 
accountability explained in sections 4.2 and 4.3), 𝑋 is the main regressor 
(Tax/total), and 𝑢𝑖 is the error term, for each municipality i.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Causation 
 
I then proceed to explore whether a causal relationship can be observed: does taxation 
lead to accountability?  
 
How have other studies grappled with the endogeneity problems and establishing 
causality of taxation in the relationship? Of the three relevant studies at the subnational 
level, one uses only cross-sectional data (Hoffman & Gibson, 2005). This relies on 
controls to prevent spuriousness but otherwise fails to show causality. The other two 
use a time lag to represent the temporal differences and use panel regression with fixed 
effects. The cross-national studies with large time panels also use the controversial 
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equations (J. Mahon, 2005; 
Ross, 2001).  
 
Three studies (among both the subnational and cross-country studies) use instrumental 
variable (IV) regression to overcome endogeneity problems. Baskaran (2014) uses the 
year of adoption of value added tax for taxation as quasi-exogenous instruments to 
overcome problems of endogeneity and reverse causality in his cross-national 
regression. At the subnational level, Gadenne (2013) uses a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity approach (the discontinuity being the change of fiscal transfer rules) and 
instrumental variable (IV) regression (the instrument being the amount of transfers 
that municipalities should theoretically receive according to the fiscal rule). Gervasoni 
(2010) primarily tests transfers per capita and argues that in the Argentine case, 
academic accounts assure that they are not determined by lack of democracy or lack of 
tax capacity.  Yet he proceeds to use instrumental variable regression, using population 
as an instrumental variable which is correlated with transfers but not with 
accountability.  
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I attempt to eliminate endogeneity problems using control variables, panel data 
regression with fixed effects and IV regression, and by testing for reverse causality. 
Given the disagreement in the literature on the best methodology and the trade-offs 
between methodological soundness and theoretical usefulness, I use several all of the 
main models suggested. 
 
I want to make sure that the correlation is not spurious and driven by other variables 
that may be correlated to both taxation and accountability. This would lead to omitted 
variable bias, which makes the OLS estimator inconsistent even in large samples. I thus 
add a vector of control variables, indicated by C, to the equations. These control 
variables include Development, Budget, Rural, Governor, North, and State and will be 
further detailed below. As they are not all available over all years, the panel regressions 
include only Budget and Governor (but control for fixed effects as explained below).    
 
To further control for other intervening factors, I consider using fixed effects. In 
deciding whether to use fixed effects, I run F-tests and Hausman tests. When I do use 
them, I also use panel corrected standard errors.  Several of the control variables are 
only available for one year, meaning that they cannot be included in the panel 
regression models. However, these largely measure effects that do not vary over time 
and are thus controlled for using a fixed effects model. Combined entity and time fixed 
effects will eliminate omitted variable bias arising both from unobserved variables that 
are constant across municipalities and from unobserved variables that are constant 
over time. As mentioned above, it also precludes looking at the effect of levels of 
taxation, focusing only on changes in levels. The models will take the following form:  
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.2) 
 
where y is a proxy for accountability, X1  is the measure of taxation (Tax/total), C is a 
vector of control variables that includes Budget and Governor; α are entity 
(municipality) specific or unit fixed effects; λ are the time fixed effects, and u is the error 
term. 
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A further method of reducing the risk of omitted variable bias, errors in variables 
(measurement errors in the regressors) and simultaneous causality is to apply IV 
regression. A valid instrument must be relevant (in the sense that variation relates to 
variation in taxation) and exogenous (it must be associated with taxation yet not with 
accountability, therefore isolating that part of taxation that is uncorrelated with the 
error term. The coefficient is then estimated through two stage least squares, where the 
first stage decomposes taxation into two components: the component that is correlated 
with the regression error and the component that is uncorrelated with the error: 
 
 𝑋𝑖 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑍𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖  (4.3) 
 
where 𝜋0  is the intercept, 𝜋1 is the slope, and 𝑍𝑖  is the exogenous instrument (the 
uncorrelated component) and 𝑣𝑖 is the error term (the correlated component). OLS is 
applied and the predicted values are then used for the second stage of the regression:  
 
 𝑦𝑖 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐂𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  (4.4) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Pathway 
 
To establish causality following the long path, I follow Ross (2001) and scholars after 
him by using a lagged specification that assumes that taxation precedes accountability. I 
specify the models in an effort to mitigate the problems of omitted variable bias by 
adding control variables. For a 2-year time lag, I test the effect of taxation in year t-2 on 
accountability in year t. This strategy makes the assumption that tax dependence 
precedes accountability and that this order of events is evidence of taxation being causal 
to accountability. This is not unproblematic given the feedback loops in the relationship. 
It also requires making an assumption about the lag lengths for which there is little 
guidance in the theory. This length may in fact differ from municipality to municipality. I 
select 2 year lags for Transparency and Electoral competition, but a 3 year lag for 
Drainage coverage as I would expect that improved drainage would take slightly more 
time to implement than changes in transparency or electoral competition. 
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The models above are thus also tested including a time lag as such for the cross-
sectional and panel regressions respectively:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐂𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.5) 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.6) 
 
Hypothesis 4: Context of Democracy 
 
To test whether the relationship between taxation and accountability is stronger in a 
context of greater democracy, I control for the level of democracy. I construct the 
variable Democracy following Vanhanen’s (2004) democracy measure who bases his 
measure on the assumption that competition and participation are the two most 
important aspects of democracy, in line with Dahl (1971) who similarly considers public 
contestation and the right to participate to the two crucial theoretical dimensions.  
Vanhanen calculates ‘competition’ as the percentage of votes received from parties 
other than the winning party. For ‘participation’ he uses the percentage of the 
population which actually voted over the total population. These percentages are each 
multiplied by one hundred and then multiplied to one another to yield a democracy 
score. I follow Vanhanen in using the same calculation, except that for ‘participation’, I 
am able to use the percentage of voters of all eligible voters rather than the entire 
population (which was not used by Vanhanen as this data is not available for all 
countries in his country level analysis, but it is available for Mexican local elections). I 
call the variable Democracy. I interact this with the tax variable by multiplying 
Democracy by Tax/total to create Dem*Tax. The aim is to test whether the 
relationship between taxation and accountability is stronger in a context of greater 
democratisation. The model takes the following form: 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑋1𝑖𝑡 × 𝑋2𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.7) 
 
where X1 is Tax/total and X2 is Democracy and the β3 is the coefficient on the 
interaction term Dem*Tax.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Tax type 
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I replace the tax revenue variable Tax/total in the above models with a measure of 
property tax revenues over total local government revenues. That is, X1 in the previous 
formulas goes from being Tax/total (where the numerator comprises revenues of all 
the municipality’s revenues from taxes and fees) to Property tax/total.  
 
Control variables 
 
To mitigate omitted variable bias as far as possible, control variables are added to the 
regression models. While time invariant controls are not necessary in the panel 
regressions because fixed effects take care of these, they do need to be included in the 
cross-sectional regression models. In deciding which control variables to include, I 
consider factors that may affect both taxation and accountability. I largely follow the 
existing subnational quantitative literature (Gadenne, 2013; Gervasoni, 2010; Hoffman 
& Gibson, 2005) by including structural characteristics of the jurisdiction, political 
factors to account for partisan support from higher tiers of government, and cultural 
factors.   
 
Structural factors 
 
Modernization theorists have argued that structural socioeconomic characteristics, such 
as poverty, urbanization and economic growth serve as key predictors of democratic 
consolidation (O'Donnell, 1998; Przeworski, 2000), which is related to accountability. 
Remote, poor municipalities with less educated populations are expected to have less 
access to media and information about higher standards of electoral competition, 
transparency and basic services and there is likely to be more vulnerability to 
oppression by the government. In his case study on accountability in Mexico, Fox (2007) 
shows how accountability is particularly scarce in poor, rural, and underdeveloped 
municipalities.  
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Structural factors are also key predictors of tax revenue collection (Broid Krauze, 2010). 
More developed and wealthier municipalities are likely to have wealthier residents and 
a more sophisticated bureaucracy and tax administration than less developed 
municipalities. Wealthier residents would have a greater ability to pay higher fees and 
rates.  
 
In order to control for structural factors, I include three variables. The first control 
variable is the level of development, measured by the variable Development. This is 
operationalised through the UNDP’s municipal human development index for Mexico, 
available for the years 2000 and 2005. This index combines health indicators, such as 
the infant mortality rate, education indicators such as school enrolment, and poverty 
measures from a combination of census and income survey data (De la Torre & Moreno, 
2010) .  
 
I also include two further structural variables. One is Budget, which measures the total 
municipal government revenue available to the local government per capita. This is 
used as an indicator for administrative capacity of the municipality. To calculate it, the 
overall local government revenue is divided by the population for each municipality.  
 
Finally, the variable Rural measures the percentage of the population that lives in a 
rural locality. It uses data from the population and housing surveys, available every 5 
years from 1990 to 2010. Rural municipalities differ from urban ones in various ways 
that could affect both taxation and accountability. Rural municipalities tend to have less 
sophisticated bureaucracies and the unit costs of monitoring tax compliance tend to be 
higher as residents are more disbursed. Urban areas tend to have higher land values, 
which are the basis for the most important local government tax: the property tax. 
Salaries tend to be higher so the ability of people to pay taxes tends to be higher also. 
This indicator may be related to accountability because cities tend to attract a greater 
concentration of human capital and universities and therefore ideas surrounding 
accountability which are lacking in rural areas. Since urban areas may bring a higher 
concentration of votes, parties may be more likely to focus their electoral campaigns in 
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urban rather than rural areas. This may affect how parties campaign and mobilize 
voters (Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978), which in turn may affect electoral contest and 
organised opposition to corrupt or oppressive local government practices. Finally, it 
may also be easier to provide public services like drainage to urban households than to 
scattered rural ones.  
 
Political factors 
 
Whether the municipality belongs to the same political party as the state government 
may have an effect on both the degree of accountability and the level of taxation.  In a 
multi-tiered federal system, higher levels of government may strengthen their political 
allies or weaken opponents at lower tiers of government. They may undermine or help 
efforts to restrict or expand both accountability and taxation. Benitez-Iturbe (2008), for 
instance, shows that co-partisanship with the governor has significant effects on the 
distribution of public goods in Mexican municipalities. I construct the variable Gov, 
representing governor co-partisanship, as a dummy variable which is 1 when the 
governor of the state in which the municipality is located is of the same political party as 
that of the municipal president. I use electoral data from Mexico's Federal Electoral 
Institute (Instituto Federal de Elecciones, IFE), available through CIDAC (Centro de 
Investigación para el Desarrollo, AC). 
 
I also include a State dummy to control for state laws and norms that affect both 
taxation and accountability in the same state. State laws exist on transparency and there 
may also be state-specific norms governing space for electoral competition or initiatives 
of state institutions to cooperation in providing services. Likewise, there may be state 
specific tax rates and state administrative assistance with local taxation.  
 
Cultural factors 
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Differences in cultural values and practices have also been used to explain differences 
between regions both in accountability  (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014; Putnam, 1993) and 
tax intake (especially cultures of tax compliance) (Ayee, 2007; Torgler, 2005). Gervasoni 
(2010), for example, controls for the number of European-born Argentinians in a 
province as this population is assumed to self-regulate a different tax-paying culture 
and different standards of accountability.  
 
The north of Mexico, bordering the United States of America, may be more influenced by 
the culture around taxpaying and accountability of its northern neighbour. More 
frequent travel and interaction between citizens of the two countries in this part of 
Mexico may be more likely to make residents of the northern states more informed and 
demanding about higher standards of accountability, government performance, and 
service delivery. There is also said to be a greater taxpaying culture and culture of law 
abidance because of harsh dessert conditions that make reliance on one another more 
crucial than in other parts of the country (interview 88). I therefore construct the 
variable North: a dummy variable that is 1 if the municipality is located in a state which 
borders the United States and 0 otherwise.  
 
I considered two further factors. The first is Indigenous, based on population and 
housing census data showing the percentage of the population that is indigenous in the 
municipality. This variable may be associated with both levels of taxation and 
accountability. Municipalities that comprise mostly indigenous residents in Mexico are 
known to be more marginalised from any government influence and basic services 
(Hernández Navarro, 1999),  services are provided through community services rather 
than the government, and some have their own electoral rules (usos y costumbres). Also, 
tax payments are often made in kind through community service rather than in 
monetary form.   
 
Some of these control variables have much in common with one another. In selecting 
which ones to include in the model, I include them one by one, forwards and backwards, 
to find out which ones make the most significant difference while also preventing multi-
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colinearity. Table 10 at the end of this chapter summarises the control variables and 
data sources. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the methodological challenges involved in testing the 
taxation-accountability relationship quantitatively as well as some of the problems 
contained in the current literature on the topic. These include problems of data 
availability, dataset quality, missing data, operationalizing the variables, methodological 
problems that hinder internal validity of the results and problems of linking theory to 
method. 
 
To measure accountability, I try to mitigate the problem of capturing a broad, multi-
faceted concept through the use of three different proxies that measure its different 
dimensions. I use three proxies for accountability, namely (a) the degree of 
transparency constructed through survey response data using factor analysis; (b) an 
outcome indicator on the coverage of local drainage services; and (c) electoral 
competition. I try to counter endogeneity problems of spurious and simultaneous 
causality by using control variables (including structural socioeconomic, political, and 
cultural factors), fixed effects panel regression models, and IV regression. I also 
discussed problems of missing data and data quality.  
 
Having laid out the models and estimation strategies to test the various hypotheses set 
out in the theoretical chapter, the next chapter shows the precise model specifications 
in greater detail and discusses the results. 
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Table 8 Summary of dependent variables 
Name of Proxy Description Years  Source 
(a) Transparency  Constructed from five survey responses 2008 
ENGSPJM (La Encuesta Nacional de 
Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Justicia 
Municipal 2009) 
(b) Drainage coverage 
 
Percentage of households in the 
municipality that have drainage services 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 
Censos y conteos de Populacion y 
Vivienda (Population and Housing 
Censuses) 
(c) Electoral 
competition 
Winning party won by less 90% of the 
votes 
5 years from 1988-2009 
IFE/CIDAC (Centro de Investigación 
para el Desarrollo, A.C.) 
 
Table 9 Summary of main independent variable 
Name of proxy Description Years Source 
 
Tax/total 
 
Municipal tax revenues/Total municipal 
revenues 
Annual from 1989 to 
2009 
 
SIMBAD (Sistema Estatal y Municipal 
de Bases de Datos) 
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Table 10 Summary of control variables 
Name of proxy  Description Years Source 
    
Development Human Development Index 2000, 2005 UNDP (United Nations Development Program) 
Rural 
% of population living in rural areas 
1995, 2000, 2005, 
2010 
Censos y conteos de Populacion y Vivienda 
(Population and Housing Censuses) 
State 
= 1 for state respectively, 0 otherwise 
each year (time 
invariant) 
 
Budget 
Local government’s total revenue per 
capita 
Every  year 
SIMBAD (INEGI) for revenue amount and 
Population and Housing Censuses (extrapolated to 
all years) for population 
Indigenous = 1 if >50% of the population of the 
municipality is indigenous and 0 
otherwise 
2005 (relatively 
time invariant) 
Censos y conteos de Populacion y Vivienda 
(Population and Housing Censuses) 
Governor = 1 if the incumbent is of the same party as 
the governor, service delivery outcomes 
may be expected to be better: 1, 0 
otherwise  
Every 3 years CIDAC  
Democracy Competition (Percentage of votes for 
opposition) * Participation (Percentage of 
votes over eligible population) 
Every 3 years CIDAC 
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Chapter 5: Results of nation-wide 
quantitative analysis 
 
The last chapter set up the methodology used for the quantitative tests of the taxation-
accountability relationship. This chapter presents and interprets the results of those tests. 
I begin by showing how the dataset was prepared and then present the models and 
results of the regressions, transitioning from simple models towards increasingly 
complex ones. I then review the evidence in view of the five hypotheses laid out in 
Chapter 4.  
 
The chapter is organised into four sections. Section 5.1 presents the results of correlation 
matrices and multiple regression analysis using cross-sectional data to test for 
correlations and associations between the measure of taxation (Tax/total) and each of the 
three measures of accountability (Transparency, Drainage coverage, and Electoral 
competition). I test various model specification, from simple regressions, to multiple 
regressions using various control variables and lagged x-variables. With these results, I 
test Hypothesis 1: that municipalities which are more tax reliant are also more 
accountable. I also begin to address Hypothesis 2: that there is a causal relationship 
between tax reliance and the proxies for accountability. 
 
In Section 5.2, I aim to get closer to whether or not a causal argument can be found. To do 
this, I use panel regression analysis with fixed effects (which looks at whether changes in 
tax reliance are positively associated with changes in accountability).  
 
Section 3 has three objectives. First, I address Hypothesis 3 and try to understand 
whether the relationship between taxation and accountability works through the long 
path (which involves a time lag between the independent causal variables and the onset 
of the dependent variable) or the short path (involving no time lag). I do this by 
comparing the regression results of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 to new regressions in which no 
time lag was included in the models. The second objective is to answer questions about 
whether it is true that the relationship between tax dependence and accountability is 
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stronger in a context of democracy (Hypothesis 4). To do this, I add interactions between 
the taxation variable and a democracy variable and rerun the regressions. The third 
objective is to address Hypothesis 5: are the results different when the tax variable is the 
proportion of only property tax revenue among total revenue rather than proportion of 
all local taxes and fees among total revenue. I present a summary of results after 
rerunning the previous regressions but replacing the Tax/total variable with a Property 
tax/total variable. This should show how the relationship works with this particular tax 
type, which is not only the most important local tax in Mexico but also universally.  
 
The concluding section of the chapter reviews the results in view of the five hypotheses 
and draws conclusions about what the results show and what they do not show.  
 
 
5.1 Preparing the dataset and exploring 
associations 
 
In this section I first note some points about the data cleaning process. I then use 
correlation matrices to show some preliminary correlations between each of the 
accountability variables on one side and the taxation variable on the other. Next, I present 
the models and results of cross-sectional regressions for each of the three accountability 
variables. The final subsection summarises and interprets the results. 
Preparing the dataset  
 
In total, over all the 20 years and the over 2400 municipalities, there are about 54,000 
observations. However, not all data is available for all years. The units for which data are 
missing are not all random. There are many missing observations for municipalities in 
Oaxaca, the poorest of the Mexican states, which also contains the largest number of 
small, rural municipalities with a large proportion of indigenous inhabitants. This could 
produce sample selection bias.  
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However, many of these municipalities are in fact governed by “uses and customs“ which 
apply different electoral systems, forms of governance, and tax collection methods (taxes 
are often collected in kind and services are provided by community members) so I 
intended to leave them out of the analysis anyway because their comparability is 
problematic. I eliminated data on the Federal District as this is not a municipality and 
neither are the delegations that comprise it. Most importantly, taxes are collected by the 
Government of the Federal District, not by its individual delegations. The fiscal data is in 
pesos. I adjusted the values for inflation and multiplied them by 100 so that they could be 
interpreted as an increase of 100 pesos (roughly equivalent to US$1).    
 
The relationship between taxation and accountability from a 
correlation matrix 
 
I first test the hypothesis that levels of taxation and levels of accountability are positively 
correlated. Correlation matrices show positive associations between Tax/total (that is, 
the proportion of local tax revenues over total local revenues) and all of the measures of 
accountability (Transparency, Drainage Coverage, and Electoral Competition) as expected, 
as seen in Table 11. Column 1 in Table 11shows the correlations for one year (all 2005 
except Electoral Competition, which is 1988 in order to exploit the greater variation in 
that year as seen in Figure 15 in Chapter 4). Column 2 shows the correlations for all years 
in the dataset (1989-2009). 
  
Table 11 Correlation matrix between taxation and accountability variables 
  (1)  
Tax/total (1 year) 
(2) 
Tax/total (all years) 
 
Expected sign 
Transparency  0.217 (year: 2008) NA + 
Electoral Competition  0.141 (year: 1998) 0.098 + 
Drainage Coverage  0.524 (year: 2005) 0.438 + 
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The relationship between taxation and accountability using 
cross-sectional regressions  
 
In this subsection, I present the models and results for the cross-sectional regressions. 
Each table begins with models with no controls and then further adds controls, one after 
the other. The controls I use are Development, Budget, Rural, Governor, North, and State, as 
explained in Chapter 4. If State is included, I drop North in the same regression model as 
whether the state is located in the north or not is already captured by State. While North 
should be sufficient in controlling for cultural differences, State is more precise as these 
differences may vary from state to state. Yet including State takes away a lot of degrees of 
freedom, being dummy variables for each of Mexico’s 31 states. If the coefficient on State 
is not significant, this may be simply for mechanical reasons because of the increased 
number of parameters and the reduction in degrees of freedom. I thus believe that using 
North in the model specifications is preferred. I nonetheless ran the regression using 
both, present only those with North here. The tables with State can be found in the annex 
(see Annex Tables 1-3).  
 
With the controls, the models may begin to tell us something about causality too, as I am 
seeking to eliminate spurious causality caused by omitted variables. I also aim to get 
closer at possible causal relationships between taxation and accountability by creating a 
time difference between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Following 
the long path to accountability, as explained in the theory chapter (Chapter 4), I predict 
that taxation will affect accountability with about a 3 year time lag.  
 
I use OLS regression with robust standard errors for all regressions except for those on 
the binary dependent variable Electoral competition, logit regression is more appropriate. 
In the following, I present the models and results of cross-sectional regressions with 
lagged independent variables for (a) Transparency, (b) Drainage coverage, and (b) 
Electoral competition. 
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a. Transparency 
The transparency variable is only available for the year 2008, so, in order have a lagged 
predictor variable, the variables on the right hand side of the regression equations are 
from three years prior (2005). State and North are completely time invariant anyway. A 
linear model fit better than a quadratic or cubic model. The complete model thus looks 
like this: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡=2008
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡=2005 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2005
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡=2005 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2005 +  𝛽6𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡=2005
+ 𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ/𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.1) 
 
The results are shown in Table 12. The table presents six models as I add each control 
variable in one at a time, beginning with the three I deem most important (the structural 
variables: Development, Rural, and Budget), and further add Governor and North. There is 
a positive association between Transparency and the taxation measure and it is significant 
at the 99% significance level, even when all controls variables are included in the model 
(including State as can be seen in Annex Table 1). The results in Table 12, column 6, 
suggest that a 1 unit increase in Tax/total is associated with a 1.390 unit increase in the 
municipality’s transparency score (which ranges from -1.973 to 1.944, with the mean 
being 0.02), on average, controlling for Development, Budget, Rural, Governor and North. 
Rather than using a 1 unit increase, it makes more sense to look at an increase of .1 in 
Tax/total (or of 10% in the percentage of taxation revenue to total government revenue), 
so this would be associated with an increase in the transparency score of 0.139. So for 
instance, if a municipality has an average Tax/total value of .07 (or a tax revenue 
percentage of 7%), it’s transparency score would be 0.32, whereas if it had 40% tax 
revenue, it would have a transparency score of 1.24 (assuming it had mean values for all 
of the controls).  
 
Turning to the control variables, Development, Budget, and North are positively and 
significantly associated with the accountability measure and negatively with Rural, all as 
expected. State (in the annex) was significantly associated with approximately half of the 
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states for the taxation measure. Governor was not significantly associated with 
Transparency in these regressions. 
 
Table 12 Cross-Section, Effects of Tax/total on Transparency, time lag, 2008 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tax/total 3.195*** 1.856*** 1.385*** 1.435*** 1.416*** 1.390*** 
 
(.259) (.316) (.325) (.336) (.338) (.337) 
Development 
 
2.677*** 2.048*** 1.958*** 1.905*** 1.573** 
  
(.446) (.467) (.517) (.538) (.533) 
Rural 
  
-.031*** -.023** -.014 -.015 
   
(.007) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
Budget 
   
-.000* -.000** -.000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.008 .001 
     
(.044) (.044) 
North 
     
.203** 
      
(.064) 
       
Constant -.040 -1.990*** -1.264*** -1.134** -1.084* -.825 
 
(.026) (.327) (.370) (.410) (.427) (.423) 
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1511 1394 1394 
R-squared .088 .112 .122 .115 .098 .105 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
 
   
b. Drainage coverage 
In the set of regressions on Drainage coverage, the controls are the same as above, though 
I use the year 2005 for the drainage variable, as data for Drainage is only available every 
five years. I correspondingly used lagged variables measure on the right hand side of the 
equation from the year 2002. Since Development and Rural were not available for 2002, I 
used data from the closest year that it was available for these variables: 2000. I reproduce 
the table including State in the annex. I ran the model using a quadratic equation as this 
proved to be a better fit given that (a) when running a quadratic model, the coefficients 
on the squared taxation variable came out statistically significant, as seen in the 
regression output in Table 13 and (b) a likelihood ration test gave a probability of 0.000 
that the null hypothesis, that there is no difference between the linear and quadratic 
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models (or that the quadratic model adds nothing), can be rejected. These two properties 
indicate that the quadratic model is a better fit than a linear model for these regressions. 
The model looks as such: 
 
𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡=2005
= 𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡=2002 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
2
𝑖,𝑡=2002
+ 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2000 + 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡=2000 + 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2002
+ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡=2002 + 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇 
(5.2) 
 
The regression output in Table 13 shows positive and significant coefficients on the 
lagged Tax/total variable and negative and significant coefficients on the Tax/total 
squared coefficient.  Table 14 shows the estimate margins at specific values of Tax/total. 
As municipalities have between 0 and 45% tax revenue in their total revenue, I used 5% 
intervals running from 0 to 0.4.  
 
Both the figures under the column heading “Margin” in Table 14 and the concave curve in 
Figure 16 suggest that at low Tax/total values (below 0.20), Drainage coverage increases 
as the Tax/total value increases. The mean Tax/total value among the 2052 municipalities 
in this sample for 2005 was approximately 0.07, so just under the .1 mark on the x-axis in 
Figure 16 (or the third row in Table 14). Most municipalities are bundled between 0 and 
0.2 on the x-axis, and in this range of the graph, when Tax/total increases, so does 
Drainage coverage. For instance, moving from .0 to .15 in terms of Tax/total, moves the 
municipality from 75% to 80% coverage of drainage services, on average, holding the 
control variables constant. Only about 100 of the over 2400 municipalities have Tax/total 
values above 0.2. It is only for the approximately 100 municipalities whose Tax/total 
proportion is greater than 0.2 (or tax revenues comprising 20% of the total budget) that 
the slope becomes negative.  
 
This may mean that for municipalities with extremely high Tax/total values (which tend 
to be large urban municipalities), the relationship between Tax/total and Drainage 
coverage becomes negative. However, it is also likely that these results are driven by a 
few outliers. One can see both in Table 14 (under the column heading “Confidence 
intervals” and in the graph (by the length of the vertical lines intersecting the points) that 
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the confidence intervals are far larger. On the left hand side of the graph, as the concave 
line moves from 0 to .1, the confidence intervals are much smaller and do not even 
overlap. The model predictions for municipalities below 0.2 Tax/total values can 
therefore be reported with far greater confidence and these yield a clear positive 
relationship.  
 
Turning to the control variables, Development and Budget were positively and 
significantly associated with Drainage coverage as expected. Rural and Governor 
negatively, though not significantly, and North negatively and significantly. 
 
Table 13 Cross-Section, Effects of Tax/total on Drainage coverage, time lag, 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L3.taxtotal 3.191*** .909*** .916*** .937*** .942*** .946*** 
 
(.167) (.139) (.149) (.152) (.151) (.151) 
L3.taxsquared -6.163*** -2.351*** -2.361*** -2.439*** -2.439*** -2.418*** 
 
(.575) (.392) (.402) (.412) (.407) (.404) 
Development 
 
2.217*** 2.221*** 2.176*** 2.168*** 2.321*** 
  
(.078) (.083) (.087) (.088) (.091) 
Rural 
  
.000 -.001 -.001 -.000 
   
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
Budget 
   
.000* .000* .000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.014 -.012 
     
(.008) (.007) 
North 
     
-.093*** 
            (.011) 
Constant .594*** -.991*** -.996*** -.968*** -.956*** -1.077*** 
 
(.009) (.058) (.067) (.069) (.070) (.072) 
Observations 1726 1726 1726 1693 1693 1693 
R-squared .282 .502 .502 .500 .501 .520 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Table 14 Estimate margins at specified values of Tax/total 
   
Delta-method 
   
 
Tax/total Margin Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
1 0.00 0.708593 0.007607 93.15 0.000 0.693683 0.723503 
2 0.05 0.749502 0.003891 192.6 0.000 0.741875 0.757129 
3 0.10 0.778322 0.006361 122.36 0.000 0.765855 0.790789 
4 0.15 0.795053 0.009335 85.17 0.000 0.776757 0.813349 
5 0.20 0.799696 0.011586 69.02 0.000 0.776987 0.822405 
6 0.25 0.792251 0.01366 58 0.000 0.765478 0.819023 
7 0.30 0.772716 0.016575 46.62 0.000 0.74023 0.805202 
8 0.35 0.741094 0.02133 34.74 0.000 0.699288 0.782899 
9 0.40 0.697382 0.028449 24.51 0.000 0.641623 0.753141 
         
Figure 16 Margins plot for quadratic function 
 
 
c. Electoral Competition 
Given that Electoral Competition is a dichotomous dependent variable, I used logistic 
regression models for a better fit. The linear probability model would be a poor fit 
because the error terms are no longer even approximately normally distributed and 
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because expected values may be smaller than 0 or greater than 1, which become 
meaningless when what we are looking for is a probability. The binomial distribution is 
the more appropriate probability distribution for binary variables. Parameters are thus 
estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) rather than the method of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 
I separated the data into five time periods of three years each (T1 to T5), as elections 
were held every three years in each municipality but on different dates within those three 
years. One election thus falls somewhere into each time period for each municipality. This 
gives me an observation for each municipality for the year of interest. I run the cross-
sectional regression in time period 4 (1997-1999) as this still has more variation than 
time period 5 (2000 to 2003) but does not go back too far in time. After the fifth time 
period, there is no more variation at all; that is, there is electoral competition in 
practically all municipalities (as explained in Chapter 3). I use x-variables from the year 
1995, thereby creating an approximate three-year lag between these and the 
accountability variable. Once again, the closest year available for Development and Rural 
is 2000, so I use data of that year for these two variables. This model takes the following 
form:  
 
 log (
𝜋
1 − 𝜋
) = 𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡=1995 + 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡=2000 + 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡=2000
+ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡=1995+𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡=1995 + 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡=1995𝑖 
(5.3) 
 
where log (
𝜋
1−𝜋
)  are the log odds that a municipality has electoral competition (versus no 
electoral competition) in the year 1998.  
 
The results of the logistic regression display the odds rations of a municipality having 
electoral competition versus no electoral competition. The coefficients give us the results 
of y after a change in the Tax/total variable from 0 to 1 (or from 0 to 100%). We can thus 
calculate from column 1 (by plugging the coefficients in that column into the regression 
equation) that, without any controls, a 10% increase in Tax/total is associated with an 
increase of approximately 0.89 in the odds that the municipality has electoral 
competition, as shown in column 1 of Table 15. The odds are always greater than 1, 
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suggesting a positive relationship between Tax/total and Electoral Competition, and the 
results remain significant (at the 90% significance level) for all the model specifications, 
except when Governor is added. Governor is a political variable indicating that the 
municipal president (or mayor) is of the same party as the governor of the state that the 
municipality is located in. The results suggest that Electoral competition tends to be lower 
when there is co-partisanship between the mayor and governor.  
 
However, Governor, like Electoral Competition is a binary variable and the two are highly 
(negatively) correlated. This makes sense as the autocratic PRI tended to be in power at 
the state level and municipal level when a municipality lacked electoral competition. This 
high correlation takes much away from the variation we are trying to get at here. I thus 
remove it from the last model specification (column (6) in Table 15), which I consider the 
best specification. 
 
By plugging the coefficients in column 6 into the regression equation, we can calculate, for 
example, that a state in the south (North =0), with an average measure for Budget, 
Development, and Rural, at the average Tax/total value (of approximately 10% tax 
revenue) a 10% increase in Tax/total would increase the odds of having electoral 
accountability by 7.5; if it had a 1% Tax/total proportion, a 10% increase would increase 
the odds of a municipality being competitive by 5.7; and if it had a Tax/total value of 20%, 
a 10% increase in Tax/total would increase those odds by almost 10. 
 
I ran robustness checks for the other time periods. The relationship is strongest and most 
significant in time period 2 (1994 to 1996), which also has the most observations, and 
starts to lose in significance in time periods 4 (1997 to 1999) and 5 (2000-2003) when 
there is less variation (few municipalities’ elections are uncompetitive). The same trends 
are seen for other measures of electoral competition, namely when using a 70% rather 
than 80% victory margin to define a municipality as uncompetitive and when using the 
percentage of votes for the opposition as a measure for electoral competition.  
 
The control variables behaved more or less as expected: Development and Budget were 
positively and significantly associated with Electoral competition. Rural and Governor 
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were negatively and significantly, and North was not significantly associated with 
Electoral competition. 
 
Table 15 Cross-Section, Effects of Tax/total on Electoral competition, time lag, 1998 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tax/total 8.917*** 4.702*** 2.737* 3.768*** -.163 3.714** 
 
(1.030) (1.064) (1.075) (1.143) (1.221) (1.132) 
Development 
 
9.713*** 7.031*** 4.422*** 5.004** 4.128*** 
  
(1.062) (1.094) (1.243) (1.654) (1.254) 
Rural 
  
-.251*** -.284*** -.194*** -.287*** 
   
(.039) (.040) (.046) (.040) 
Budget 
   
.002*** -.000 .002*** 
    
(.001) (.000) (.001) 
Governor 
    
-.516* 
 
     
(.256) 
 North 
     
.549 
            (.321) 
Constant .939*** -5.443*** -1.294 .262 1.044 .506 
 
(.097) (.698) (.886) (.960) (1.293) (.972) 
Observations 1874 1858 1858 1858 1685 1858 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
   
  
5.2 Looking for causation 
 
In the last section, time lags and controls were used to try to show causation and mitigate 
omitted variable bias. This section further aims to rule out competing causal explanations 
through panel data analysis with fixed effects. Panel regression analysis should eliminate 
much of the risk of omitted variable bias as it allows controlling for time and unit fixed 
effects.  
 
The dataset is unbalanced: the taxation data runs annually from 1989 to 2009 but not all 
other variables are available for all years. I want to account for unit effects. To do so, I 
need to decide whether fixed effects or random effects should be applied. I therefore run 
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Hausman tests to see in how far the covariates are correlated with the unit effects 
(Bartels, 2008). This would bias the parameter estimates and if the bias is large, then 
fixed effects should be used instead (Clark & Linzer, 2012). The null hypothesis of the test 
is that the difference in coefficients between the fixed effects and random effects model 
do not differ significantly. With a chi2 of 0.000, the null hypothesis could be rejected for 
each regression so fixed effects should be used. I then also run a joint (Wald) test (using 
the command “testparm”) to decide whether or not to include year fixed effects in the 
model. If the dummies for all years are equal to 0, then this indicates that no time fixed 
effects are needed. The tests show that the probability the null hypothesis (that time fixed 
effects are not needed) is correct is less than 0.05 for each of the regressions, so the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. I thus include time fixed effects in all of the panel regression 
models.   
 
The rest of this section presents and discusses the results of panel regressions for the 
accountability variables Drainage coverage and Electoral competition. No panel regression 
is possible with Transparency as the transparency data is available for only one year. I 
also discuss attempts at finding an instrumental variable or a case for regression 
discontinuity. The final subsection summarises and interprets the results. 
The relationship between taxation and accountability using panel 
regressions  
 
I now move from cross-sectional analysis to panel regression analysis. I use unit and year 
fixed effects and also include the controls Budget and Governor, which vary over time. The 
only other control variable that was included in the cross-sectional regressions but is not 
included here and is not time invariant is Development. This data was not available over a 
time panel. However, I assume that the level of development of a municipality is largely 
proxied for both through Budget and through municipality fixed effects.  
 
a. Drainage coverage 
Beginning with Drainage coverage, I began by testing the effect of changes in Tax/total, 
controlling for municipality fixed effects, year effects, Budget and Governor, on changes in 
Drainage coverage three years later. The model takes the following form:  
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𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡−3 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−3
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡   
(5.4) 
 
 
Table 16 Panel, Effects of Tax/total on Drainage coverage, time lag 1995-2010 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax/total .061* .061* .055 .055 
 
(.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) 
year=1995 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
year=2000 .064*** .065*** .063*** .063*** 
 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
year=2005 .225*** .226*** .219*** .220*** 
 
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) 
year=2010 .283*** .283*** .273*** .274*** 
 
(.005) (.005) (.008) (.008) 
Governor 
 
.001 
 
.001 
  
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
Budget 
  
.000 .000 
      (.000) (.000) 
Constant .516*** .515*** .516*** .516*** 
 
(.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) 
Observations 6630 6611 6620 6602 
R-squared .676 .677 .677 .677 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
The linear model was the better fit according to a likelihood ratio test and observing the p 
values of the quadratic regression output. The results are shown in Table 16 above. 
Whenever Budget is included in the model specification, the coefficients on Tax/total lose 
significance. This suggests that the significant coefficients in models (1) and (2) may in 
fact be driven by omitted variable bias resulting from structural factors like 
administrative capacity, as captured by the variable Budget.  However, the lack of 
significance may also be the result of a bias: several municipalities started off with very 
high proportions of drainage coverage in 1995 and, given that the panel regressions look 
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at changes in variables, those municipalities have little room for improvement over the 
time period. Yet if the hypothesis is true, these should also be high tax collectors. This 
may be causing a bias that makes the coefficient less positive and significant. In order to 
get around this problem, I try two further sets of model specifications as explained below. 
 
The first method I use to get around this problem is by using a lagged Drainage coverage 
variable on the right hand side of the equation, thereby controlling for past levels of 
drainage coverage. The model takes the following form: 
 
𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−5
+ 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡−3
+ 𝛽3𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡   
 
(5.5) 
Table 17 Panel, Effects of Tax/total on Drainage coverage, time lag, 1993-2010 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax/total .040 .058 .077 .075 
 
(.028) (.031) (.031) (.031) 
Lagged drainage coverage .244*** .109*** -.010 -.008 
 
(.022) (.025) (.028) (.028) 
year=1995 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
year=2000 .030*** .049*** .061*** .060*** 
 
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
year=2005 .175*** .200*** .217*** .216*** 
 
(.006) (.007) (.009) (.009) 
year=2010 .197*** .258*** 
  
 
(.009) (.011) 
  Governor 
 
-.003 
 
-.001 
  
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
Budget 
  
.000 .000 
      (.000) (.000) 
Constant .425*** .474*** .520*** .520*** 
 
(.010) (.011) (.012) (.012) 
Observations 6604 5635 4938 4926 
R-squared .695 .666 .625 .625 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis,  
   * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  ***p<0.001 
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Given that I only have five time periods for the Drainage coverage data, however, adding a 
lagged dependent variable to the right hand side of the regression equation takes away a 
lot of the variation that I am trying to get at (as explained in Chapter 4) and the results are 
likely to yield insignificant results. The results are shown in Table 17 above. The 
coefficients on the lagged Tax/total variable are positive but not significant, suggesting 
that there is no association between Tax/total and Drainage coverage three years later, 
controlling for time effects and unit fixed effects, Budget and Governor. The lack of 
significance may be the result of mechanics due to the reduced degrees of freedom. 
 
The second method I used to around the problem was to run the regression with only 
municipalities where 50% or less of the population lived in a household with drainage 
services in 1995. This circumvents the problem of using a lagged Drainage coverage 
variable on the right hand side, but at the same time we lose observations, as many 
municipalities were dropped, bringing us to approximately 800 observations with all 
controls included, down from around 5000). The model is the following: 
 
𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡−3 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡−3
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
 
(5.6) 
where Drainage coverage* is a grouping of municipalities where 50% or less of the 
population lived in a household with drainage services. The panel regression results are 
presented in Table 18 below. None of the coefficients on the lagged Tax/total variable are 
significant. The results thus suggest that there is no significant relationship between the 
lagged tax variable and Drainage coverage*. I ran further tests using municipalities that 
had 60% drainage coverage in 1995, but this was not significant either. Again, this may be 
due to either a lack of causality or possibly the mechanics of the model as the fewer 
observations allow less variation.  
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  Table 18 Panel, Effects of Tax/total on Drainage coverage*, time lag, 1993-2010 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax/total .094 .088 .069 .062 
 
(.071) (.072) (.070) (.070) 
year=1995 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
year=2000 .081*** .082*** 
.075**
* 
.076**
* 
 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
year=2005 .171*** .173*** 
.144**
* 
.145**
* 
 
(.010) (.010) (.014) (.014) 
year=2010 .424*** .425*** 
.383**
* 
.385**
* 
 
(.010) (.011) (.019) (.020) 
Governor 
 
.004 
 
.006 
  
(.009) 
 
(.009) 
Budget 
  
.000* .000* 
      (.000) (.000) 
Constant .284*** .282*** 
.285**
* 
.281**
* 
 
(.011) (.013) (.011) (.013) 
Observations 2370 2362 2366 2358 
R-squared .857 .858 .860 .860 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** 
p<0.001 
   
 
b. Electoral competition 
For the panel regression on Electoral competition, I compare changes across the five 
three-year time periods created. I use a logit regression with fixed time effects and 
dummies for each time period. The model is the following: 
  
 log (
𝜋
1 − 𝜋
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
2
𝑖,𝑡−2
+ 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
(5.7) 
 
where  log (
𝜋
1−𝜋
) are the log odds that a municipality has electoral competition versus the 
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opposite and the year fixed effects are dummies for each of the five time periods. The 
results below (Table 19) show the odds ratios. The odds ratios on the lagged Tax/total 
variable are not significant, even without controls in the model. This suggests that 
changes in the lagged Tax/total variable are not associated with changes in electoral 
competition in a later time period. 
  
Table 19 Panel, Effects of Tax/total on Electoral competition, time lag, 1989-2003 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax/total .089 .119 -.557 -.531 
 
(.573) (.583) (.646) (.657) 
1989-1991 - - - - 
 - - - - 
1992-1994 -4.759*** -4.986*** -4.518*** -4.759*** 
 
(.109) (.121) (.171) (.180) 
1995-1997 -2.908*** -3.151*** -2.655*** -2.878*** 
 
(.098) (.110) (.145) (.153) 
1998-2000 -1.565*** -1.747*** -1.305*** -1.468*** 
 
(.098) (.105) (.139) (.145) 
2001-2003 .335** .258 .544*** .482** 
 
(.127) (.133) (.150) (.155) 
Governor 
 
.594*** 
 
.636*** 
  
(.094) 
 
(.100) 
Budget 
  
.000* .000** 
      (.000) (.000) 
Observations 12171 11721 10734 10499 
Standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
   
A note on instrumental variables and discontinuity analysis 
 
Attempts were made to apply an instrumental variable in the regression in order to 
further overcome endogeneity problems. No appropriate instrumental variable for 
Tax/total emerged that would work in this case. I considered variables that are correlated 
with tax revenues or transfers or the ratio between the two, but none could be found that 
are isolated from accountability. The transfer formula from the central government to 
states is determined by population, development indicators, and a historical figure, but 
the method of distributing transfers from the states to the municipalities has been far less 
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transparent, as explained in Chapter 3. Following Gervasoni (2010), I tried to use 
Population (total number of inhabitants in the municipality). The amount of central 
government transfers (the flip side of own revenues in the Tax/total ratio) largely 
depends on the population.  
 
However, I found that it was significantly and positively associated with both the taxation 
and accountability variables for Mexican municipalities (which is less likely to have been 
the case for Argentine provinces, though still likely). This makes sense because 
municipalities with greater populations tend to be urban and wealthier, and more likely 
to have universities and ideas from abroad about democracy, and citizen demands are 
more likely to circulate, all of which are associated with accountability. This discards 
Population as an adequate instrument. Determinant variables of tax collection are also 
associated with accountability. These include structural factors like income, level of 
development, level of urbanisation, and geographic factors like state or north, which I 
specifically controlled for in the regressions above because they are associated both with 
taxation and accountability.  
 
An attempt was also made to use regression discontinuity, following Gadenne (2013). 
Gadenne exploits an abrupt change in transfer formulas in Brazil. I was not, however, able 
to find this in the Mexican case. Another situation to look for would be if central 
government taxes were suddenly decentralised overnight to local governments, and even 
better if this change were applied in some municipalities but not in neighbouring ones.  
Changes to the local taxation and transfer formulas were implemented gradually over 
several years throughout Mexico. Cleaner instances may have occurred in other countries 
and should be exploited for further research on this topic.  
 
   
5.3 Pathway, context and tax type 
 
This section has three objectives. First, I try to ascertain whether the taxation-
accountability link is more likely to occur via the short or the long path, as distinguished 
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in Chapter 2. Second, I try to find out if the relationship between taxation and 
accountability may be stronger in a context of democracy. This responds to the 
proposition laid out in the fiscal federalism literature that a context of democracy is in 
fact a requirement for local taxation to lead to greater accountability. Third, this section 
examines how the link works using the property tax in the tax measure rather than all 
local taxes and fees. The property tax is not only the most important tax in Mexico (see 
Chapter 3), but is also universally a tax popularly assigned to the local level (Bahl & Linn, 
1992; Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Focus on this tax and how it fares in sparking 
greater local government accountability is thus of great practical relevance. This tax will 
also be the focus in the qualitative chapters that follow. 
 
Pathway 
 
I assume that if taxation leads to accountability through the long path, there is a time lag 
between the change in taxation, which comes first, and a later change in taxation, as 
explained in Chapter 4. This matches the specifications of the previous two sections (5.1 
and 5.2). It is also a better way of testing causality with X preceding Y. In this section, I 
repeat all of the above specifications, but without lagging the independent variables to 
test the relationship in accordance with the short path to accountability. I report the 
coefficients on Tax/total in a summary tables below, for (a) Transparency, (b) Drainage 
coverage, and (c) Electoral competition, first for cross-sectional and then for panel 
regressions where applicable. I use summary tables as the idea is simply to compare 
results in terms of size and significance, identifying major differences or general patterns, 
rather than to focus on the particulars of each individual result. Nonetheless, the full 
model results are presented in the Annex Tables 4 to 8. 
 
a. Transparency 
For Transparency, the results of the cross-sectional regressions with no time lags are 
shown in the first row of Table 20 in bold. The second row shows the results with the 
time lags, as already shown in section 5.1 above, by way of comparison. The coefficient 
without the lag remains positive and significant and is slightly larger than with the lag. 
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This could either support the proposition that the relationship works for both the long 
and short path (and more so via the short path). Yet it may also suggest that the 
associations are driven by reverse causality (i.e. that greater accountability is in fact 
leading to greater tax collection). 
 
Table 20 Cross-section, Transparency, no lag (in bold) versus lag, 1998 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Tax/total Development Rural Budget Governor North 
Tax/total 
3.708*** 
(.325) 
2.532*** 
(.408) 
2.532*** 
(.408) 
1.832*** 
(.407) 
1.850*** 
(.404) 
1.586*** 
(.405) 
Lagged 
tax/total 
3.195*** 
(.259) 
1.856***  
(.316) 
1.385***  
(.325) 
1.435*** 
(.336) 
1.416***  
(.338) 
1.390***  
(.337) 
 
b. Drainage coverage 
For Drainage coverage, when we compare the coefficients using no lag on the 
independent variables to those with the lag for the cross-sectional regressions in 
summary Table 21, we see that both are positive and significant at the 99% significance 
level. The coefficients are also very similar to those with the lag, though again slightly 
higher. For instance the coefficient on Tax/total is 1.01 compared to 0.95 in what I 
consider the best specification in column 6. We can therefore make the conclusion that 
the relationship may run via the short or long path. Alternatively, the results may be 
driven by reverse causality. 
 
 
Table 21 Cross-section, Drainage coverage, no lag (in bold) versus lag, 2005 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Tax/total 
Develop
ment Rural Budget Governor North 
Tax/total 
(no lag) 
2.996*** 
(.158) 
.911*** 
(.128) 
.901*** 
(.134) 
.921*** 
(.135) 
.915*** 
(.134) 
1.005*** 
(.129) 
Tax/total 
squared 
(no lag) 
-4.946*** 
(.509) 
-
1.898*** 
(.314) 
-1.886*** 
(.319) 
-1.939*** 
(.324) 
-1.922*** 
(.319) 
-2.094*** 
(.301) 
Tax/total 
(lag) 
3.191*** 
(.167) 
.909*** 
(.139) 
.916*** 
(.149) 
.937*** 
(.152) 
.942*** 
(.151) 
.946*** 
(.151) 
Tax 
squared 
 (lag) 
-6.163*** 
(.575) 
-2.351*** 
(.392) 
-2.361*** 
(.402) 
-2.439*** 
(.412) 
-2.439*** 
(.407) 
-2.418*** 
(.404) 
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      Turning to the panel regressions in Table 22, the regressions using the non-lagged 
Tax/total variable did not yield significant results even without Budget included. This 
suggests that the relationship works neither through the short path or the long path. 
 
Table 22 Panel, Drainage coverage, no lag (in bold) versus lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Time and year 
fixed effects 
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Governor 
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Budget  
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Budget 
and Governor 
Tax/total  
(no lag) 
.050 
(.030) 
.048 
(.030) 
.044 
(.030) 
.042 
(.030) 
Tax/total (lag) 
.043* 
(.021) 
.043* 
(.021) 
.038 
(.021) 
.038 
(.021) 
 
c. Electoral competition 
The cross-sectional regressions of the non-lagged Tax/total variable on Electoral 
competition yield considerably greater odds ratios compared to those with the lag, as 
seen in Table 23. For instance, looking at the best model specifications in column 6, an 
increase of 10% in Tax/total is associated with a change in the odds ratio of 
approximately 0.82 (compared to 0.37 with the time lags) of a municipality having 
electoral competition, holding the controls constant. This odds ratio is significant at 
the 99% level of significance, compared to only the 95% level using the lag. This 
suggests that the link is stronger for the short path than the long path, or that reverse 
causality is in fact at work. For the panel regression, the results were not significant, 
just as when lagged independent variables were used (see Table 24). This suggests 
that neither the short path nor the long path is at work.  
 
Table 23 Cross-section, Electoral competition, no lag (in bold) versus lag, 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Tax/Total Development Rural Budget Governor North 
Tax/total 
(no lag) 
20.036*** 
(1.822) 
13.035***  
(1.911) 
8.699*** 
(2.003) 
8.089*** 
(2.054) 
1.744 
(2.585) 
8.164*** 
(2.044) 
Tax/total  
(lag) 
8.917***  
(1.048) 
4.702***  
(1.111) 
2.737*  
(1.152) 
3.768***  
(1.219) 
-.163  
(1.732) 
3.714**  
(1.205) 
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      Table 24 Panel, Electoral competition, no lag (in bold) versus lag, panel 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Time and 
year fixed 
effects 
Time and Year 
fixed effects plus 
Governor 
Time and Year 
fixed effects plus 
Budget  
Time and Year fixed 
effects plus Budget 
and Governor 
Tax/total 
(no lag) 
-.479 
(.515) 
-.529 
(.521) 
-.117 
(.533) 
-.185 
(.535) 
Tax/total 
(lag) 
.089 
(.573) 
.119 
(.583) 
-.557 
(.646) 
-.531 
(.657) 
 
 
Context of Democracy 
 
In this sub-section I test the proposition that the relationship between taxation and 
accountability is stronger in a context of democracy.  I use the variable Democracy (see 
Chapter 4 for details on how this variable was constructed) and interact it with the 
taxation variable. I create an interaction term between Tax/Total and Democracy, yielding 
Dem*Tax to better understand the relationship between the variables. If the coefficient on 
the interaction term is statistically significant, then the effect of taxation on accountability 
is different depending on the level of democracy.   
  
For the cross-sectional regressions, I used data from 1998 and for the panel regressions, I 
used data from time periods 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (i.e. from 1989 until 2003) as it was during 
these that there was more variation in levels of democracy (as explained in Chapter 3). I 
do not test this for Transparency as that data is only available for 2008, which is too far 
away in time from those time periods. I also do not test this for Electoral Competition as 
the concepts are too closely related so it is tested only for Drainage coverage. 
 
The coefficient on the Dem*Tax variable is not significant for any of the regressions, 
neither cross-sectional nor panel. This indicates that a context of greater democratisation 
does not make the relationship between (lagged or non-lagged) Tax/total and Drainage 
coverage any stronger (or weaker). The results are displayed in the annex.  
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Tax type: Property tax 
 
This subsection presents the results of rerunning the regression of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 
results replacing Tax/total (constructed as revenues from all local taxes and fees over 
total local revenues) with Property tax/total (constructed as local property tax revenues 
over total local revenues). I here summarise the results, comparing the coefficients on 
Property/tax total to those found above on Tax/total in summary tables. The more 
detailed results of the regressions are presented in the annex (Annex Tables 9 to 20).  
 
a. Transparency 
Beginning with Transparency, we see that results do not differ greatly though the effect is 
always slightly stronger when using Property/tax total instead of Tax/total as seen in 
Table 25. For instance, in column (6), we see that the effect of a 10% increase of the 
lagged Property/tax total variable is associated with a rise of about 0.2 increase in the 
transparency score, holding Development, Rural, Budget, Governor and North constant, 
whereas the same increase in the lagged Tax/total variable is associated with a rise in 
Transparency of only about 0.14. It therefore appears that property taxes are more 
strongly associated with Transparency than other local taxes and fees. This is the same 
both using the time lag and without using the time lag. 
 
Table 25 Cross-section, Effects of Property tax/total on Transparency, with and 
without lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Tax/total 
Develop-
ment Rural Budget Governor North 
Property 
tax/total  
(with lag) 
4.767*** 
(.481) 
2.585*** 
(.502) 
1.945*** 
(.491) 
2.015*** 
(.515) 
2.168*** 
(.500) 
2.052*** 
(.496) 
Tax/total  
(with lag) 
3.195*** 
(.259) 
1.856*** 
(.316) 
1.385*** 
(.325) 
1.435*** 
(.336) 
1.416*** 
(.338) 
1.390*** 
(.337) 
Property 
tax/total 
(no lag) 
5.369*** 
(.542) 
3.474*** 
(.634) 
2.468*** 
(.613) 
2.548*** 
(.611) 
2.441*** 
(.614) 
2.203*** 
(.626) 
Tax/total 
(no lag) 
3.708*** 
(.325) 
2.532*** 
(.408) 
2.532*** 
(.408) 
1.832*** 
(.407) 
1.850*** 
(.404) 
1.586*** 
(.405) 
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b. Drainage coverage 
For Drainage coverage, the cross-sectional regression results in Table 26 show that the 
coefficients for property taxes are similar as for all local taxes and fees but slightly larger. 
Most interestingly, the panel regression results for the property tax yield positive and 
significant coefficients on Property tax/total (as seen in Table 27), whereas those on 
Tax/total in the previous panel regressions on Drainage coverage did not. This indicates a 
causal relationship between Property tax/total and Drainage coverage both using a time 
lag and no time lag. With no time lag, the relationship appears stronger (the coefficients 
are slightly higher and significant at a higher significance level), once the control variables 
are included in the models. In the best model specification with all the controls included, a 
10% rise in Property tax/total is associated with a 0.01 rise in Drainage coverage three 
years later and a 0.02 rise in Drainage coverage in the same year. The fact that it doesn’t 
rise more over time may be because either the short path or reverse causality are at work. 
 
Table 26 Cross-section, Effects of Property tax/total on Drainage coverage, with and 
without lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Tax/Total 
Develop-
ment 
Rural Budget Governor North 
Property  
tax/total 
(with lag) 
4.802*** 
(.307) 
1.105*** 
(.230) 
1.039*** 
(.243) 
1.058*** 
(.249) 
1.057*** 
(.249) 
1.229*** 
(.244) 
Property  
tax/total 
squared 
(with lag) 
-14.235*** 
(1.788) 
-4.805*** 
(1.053) 
-4.653*** 
(1.069) 
-4.806*** 
(1.113) 
-4.781*** 
(1.118) 
-5.293*** 
(1.074) 
Tax/total  
(with lag) 
2.996*** 
(.158) 
.911*** 
(.128) 
.901*** 
(.134) 
.921*** 
(.135) 
.915*** 
(.134) 
1.005*** 
(.129) 
Tax/total  
Squared  
(with lag) 
-4.946*** 
(.509) 
-1.898*** 
(.314) 
-1.886*** 
(.319) 
-1.939*** 
(.324) 
-1.922*** 
(.319) 
-2.094*** 
(.301) 
Property 
tax/total 
(no lag) 
4.138*** 
(.209) 
.950*** 
(.169) 
.866*** 
(.176) 
.883*** 
(.177) 
.877*** 
(.177) 
1.198*** 
(.191) 
Property  
tax/total 
squared 
(no lag) 
-9.798*** 
(.921) 
-3.173*** 
(.541) 
-3.016*** 
(.546) 
-3.095*** 
(.552) 
-3.062*** 
(.553) 
-3.778*** 
(.639) 
Tax/total 
(no  lag) 
2.996*** 
(.158) 
.911*** 
(.128) 
.901*** 
(.134) 
.921*** 
(.135) 
.915*** 
(.134) 
1.005*** 
(.129) 
Tax/total 
squared 
(no lag) 
-4.946*** 
(.509) 
-1.898*** 
(.314) 
-1.886*** 
(.319) 
-1.939*** 
(.324) 
-1.922*** 
(.319) 
-2.094*** 
(.301) 
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Table 27 Panel, Effects of Property tax/total on Drainage coverage, with and without 
lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Time and year 
fixed effects 
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Governor 
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Budget  
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Budget 
and Governor 
Property tax 
(with lag) 
.101* 
(.041) 
.103* 
(.042) 
.089* 
(.041) 
.092* 
(.042) 
Tax/total  
(with lag) 
.061* 
(.030) 
.061* 
(.030) 
.055 
(.030) 
.055 
(.030) 
Property/total 
(no lag) 
.022 
(.036) 
.177*** 
(.049) 
.160** 
(.049) 
.164*** 
(.049) 
Tax/total  
(no lag) 
.043* 
(.021) 
.043* 
(.021) 
.038 
(.021) 
.038 
(.021) 
 
c. Electoral competition 
For Electoral competition, we see in Table 28 for the cross-sectional models, that the 
coefficients on Property tax/total are positive and significant, just like they were on 
Tax/total. Turning to the panel regression in Table 29, unlike for Tax/total, we suddenly 
do have positive and statistically significant results, both when a lag is used and without 
the lag. These results suggest that a 10% rise in the property tax variable is associated 
with an increase in the odds of a municipality having electoral competition of 
approximately 0.34 three years later and 0.31 in the same year. This is suggestive of a 
causal relationship running from Property tax/total to Electoral competition, working 
through both the short and (especially) the long path.  
 
Table 28 Cross-section, Effects of Property tax/total on Electoral competition, with 
and without lag, 1998 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Tax/Total 
Develop-
ment 
Rural Budget Governor 
North 
(without 
Governor) 
Property 
tax/total 
 (with lag) 
26.680*** 
(2.546) 
13.683*** 
(2.588) 
8.084** 
(2.713) 
7.048** 
(2.720) 
-1.524 
(3.176) 
6.447* 
(2.730) 
Tax/total 
 (with lag) 
9.760*** 
(1.048) 
6.839*** 
(1.111) 
2.902* 
(1.152) 
3.191** 
(1.219) 
.814 
(1.732) 
2.963* 
(1.205) 
Property 
tax/total 
(no lag) 
31.686*** 
(3.019) 
17.865*** 
(3.106) 
11.087*** 
(3.237) 
9.673** 
(3.257) 
-1.189 
(3.830) 
9.032** 
(3.228) 
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Tax/total  
(no lag) 
20.036*** 
(1.822) 
16.985*** 
(1.939) 
11.864*** 
(2.037) 
12.524*** 
(2.093) 
1.623 
(2.586) 
12.149*** 
 (2.070) 
 
Table 29 Panel, Effects of Property tax/total on Electoral competition, with and 
without lag, 1989-2003 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Time and year 
fixed effects 
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Governor 
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Budget  
Time and Year 
fixed effects 
plus Budget 
and Governor 
Property tax 
(with lag) 
3.532*** 
(1.043) 
3.750*** 
(1.066) 
3.456** 
(1.184) 
3.395** 
(1.187) 
Tax/total  
(with lag) 
.089 
(.573) 
.119 
(.583) 
-.557 
(.646) 
-.531 
(.657) 
Property/total 
(no lag) 
2.349* 
(.964) 
2.696** 
(.979) 
2.808** 
(.997) 
3.149** 
(1.011) 
Tax/total 
(no lag) 
-.479 
(.515) 
-.529 
(.521) 
-.117 
(.533) 
-.185 
(.535) 
 
 
 
5.4 Summary and Interpretation in light of the Five 
Hypotheses 
 
In the first three sections of this chapter, I presented various regression results testing for 
the effect of Tax/total on the three measures of accountability. I moved from simple tests 
of correlations to multiple regression analysis and then panel regressions. I then looked 
at mechanisms through which X leads to Y as well as interaction effects. Finally, I reran 
some of the regressions using the property tax revenue in the tax variable rather than all 
taxes and fees. The aim was to find answers to the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 4. 
Recapping and interpreting the results presented in the first three sections of this 
chapter, I here subsume the evidence under the five hypotheses and discuss what this 
tells us about taxation-accountability linkages. 
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Correlation and causation 
 
Hypothesis 1 stated that there is a positive correlation between Tax/total and all of the 
accountability variables. The correlation matrix in Section 1 shows positive correlations 
between Tax/total and each of the accountability variables (Transparency, Drainage, and 
Electoral Competition). The simple regressions with time lags in section 5.1 and simple 
regressions without time lags in Section 5.3 (i.e. the models with no control variables) 
showed positive and significant associations.  
 
Hypothesis 2 stated that there is a causal relationship from Tax/total to the accountability 
variables. By including control variables for level of development, administrative capacity, 
politics and geography (with control variables Development, Rural, Budget, Governor and 
North) and a time lag between the independent and the dependent variables, I started to 
get closer to addressing the question of causation. There are differing views as to what 
constitutes causality (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). The goal here is not to find deterministic 
causation with necessity (if A occurs, then B must occur) and sufficiency (if B occurs, A 
must have occurred) (Granger, 1980). I am not assessing randomized controlled 
experimental data but instead trying to infer relationships from observational data. To 
draw conclusions about causal relationships, in line with Granger causality (A causes B if 
A forecasts B over the forecast of B without A)(Granger, 1980), or more specifically about 
the likelihood of my tax variable in helping to increase accountability (among multiple 
competing factors), I looked especially at three criteria: (1) there is correlation, (2) X 
precedes Y, and (3) other explanations can be ruled out. The cross-sectional regressions 
in Section 5.1 yielded positive and significant correlations between Tax/total and each of 
the three accountability variables, even when using a time lag so that the cause precedes 
the effect and ruling out other explanations with control variables for structural, cultural 
and political factors.   
 
For Transparency this relationship was relatively linear. Holding constant the level of 
Development, Rural, Budget, North and Governor, a rise in Tax/total of 10% is associated 
with an increase in the transparency score (ranging from about -1.97 to 1.94) of about 
0.14.   
 
185 
 
For Drainage a quadratic function was a better fit. This was concave, showing that the 
relationship was positive until municipalities had over 20% tax revenue and then became 
negative. This may suggest that for Drainage coverage the relationship is no longer 
positive for municipalities that are very tax autonomous. Large urban municipalities tend 
to have the highest Tax/total values. Yet it may also mean that a few outliers are driving 
these results of the comparatively few municipalities (approximately 100) whose 
Tax/total ratio is above 20%. The vast majority of municipalities (with average levels on 
the controls) have Tax/total values below 20% (with 11% being the mean value in 2005).  
The confidence intervals were very large with values possibly falling above the predicted 
values. 
 
Now turning to Electoral competition, the results of binary logistic regression show that 
increasing the Tax/total value increases the odds of a municipality having electoral 
competition and this was also statistically significant (at the 90% significance level) using 
the best model specification that controlled for Development, Rural, Budget, and North.  
 
Only for Transparency did the coefficient on Tax/total remain significant even when 
adding State, which consists of over 30 dummy variables. For Drainage and Electoral 
competition, the coefficient on Tax/total in the specifications that included State lost 
significance, but this was most likely for mechanical reasons as the large amount of 
dummy variables (for the 31 states) increases the parameters and greatly reduced the 
degrees of freedom. I thus drop State in the further regressions in this chapter. 
 
The results indicate that, even controlling for structural, political and cultural variables, 
the greater the Tax/total ratio of a municipality (or the greater its proportion of tax 
revenues in its overall revenues), the more likely it is to be transparent, have higher 
coverage of drainage services, and have electoral competition three years later.  
 
To be sure the risk of omitted variable bias remains and endogeneity problems from 
reverse causality remain, despite the efforts of mitigation through control variables and 
time lags. In section 5.2 I therefore went further in mitigating the risk of omitted variable 
bias and ruling out other explanatory factors by conducting panel regression analysis 
with fixed effects. Using panel regression, the effects of Tax/total on accountability three 
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years later mostly did not yield significant results, at least not when all controls of 
theoretical importance were added to the models.  
 
For Drainage coverage, the coefficient on the lagged Tax/Total variable were only 
significant in the models that did not include the control variable Budget and only at the 
90% significance level. I considered that for Drainage coverage, the lack of significance 
may have been due to bias, given that municipalities with close to 100% drainage 
coverage in the first time period of the dataset would not appear as making a positive 
increase. Two further methods were thus used to test the effects on drainage coverage. 
One, I added a lagged Drainage coverage variable to the right hand side of the equation (to 
account for previous levels of drainage coverage). Two, I reran the panel regression on a 
smaller set of municipalities in subsequent model specifications. This set consisted only of 
municipalities that began the time period with 50% or less drainage coverage (Drainage 
coverage*). Yet the same results were observed in both cases: no significance. Both 
methods involved mechanical problems: the first lost degrees of freedom and second lost 
many observations, which may be responsible for the lack of significance. However, if the 
results were very strong, it would have been likely to get significant results as the number 
of observations is still relatively large. I therefore conclude that these results suggest that 
there is no causal relationship leading from Tax/total to Drainage coverage. The panel 
results on Electoral competition also indicate that there is no causal relationship from 
Tax/total to Electoral competition as coefficients on Tax/total were not significant. 
 
The results of the panel regressions in Section 5.2 do not support the hypothesis that 
greater taxation using the Tax/total measure leads to greater accountability with a time 
lag (though it did using the Property tax/total measure as discussed further below). This 
contradicts what was found in the cross-sectional regressions presented in Section 5.1. It 
can be argued that the panel regression results are more trustworthy in finding causality 
than the cross-sectional results as they are able to control for all time and municipality 
invariant factors. The cross-sectional and panel regressions also test different things. 
While the cross-sectional regression compares levels, the panel regression compares 
changes in those levels. There is a possibility that changes take longer than three years to 
occur and that taxation affects long term development trajectories over several decades 
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rather than short-term effects as tested here. Yet the results here show that in a time span 
of three years, the predicted effects did not seem to occur. 
 
It may also be that the specific aspects of accountability are simply less driven by 
taxation. Due to data restraints, panel regression was not possible on Transparency but 
changes to transparency, for instance, might be more easily implemented by the local 
government than changes in drainage service coverage or electoral competition, which 
may require longer term planning or support from the state government. This is difficult 
to tell from the quantitative data and requires further qualitative analysis.  
 
Another explanation is that reverse causality may have driven the results of the cross-
sectional regressions. Even with the time lag, it is possible that high levels of 
accountability three years later could be associated with high levels of taxation previously 
because accountability causes higher tax revenues and thus higher tax revenue/total 
revenue proportions over many years. No instrumental variable was found to be 
appropriate, including that used by Gervasoni (2010) in the Argentine context.  
Causal pathway 
 
Hypothesis 3 stated that the link between taxation and accountability works through the 
long path. As elaborated in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2), I assume that the causal 
mechanism from taxation to accountability can take either of two paths: the short path or 
the long path. The long path assumes that a change in Tax/total is followed by a change in 
accountability with a two or three year delay. The short route assumes that there is no lag 
between a change in Tax/total and a change in accountability; that is, they set on 
somewhat simultaneously.  
 
To test this, I reran the regressions from Sections 5.1 and 5.2, only without using time lags 
between the independent and dependent variables. If associations were positive and 
significant for one but not for the other, this would tell us that one pathway dominates. 
The short path assumes that there is no lag in the relationship: taxation and 
accountability changes occur simultaneously. The long path assumes that changes in 
taxation are preceded by changes in accountability. However, we found evidence of 
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associations both with and without lags. The coefficients on the tax variable of the cross-
sectional regressions without time lags all yielded similar results to those with the time 
lags, except that the coefficients were consistently slightly larger. Running the panel 
regressions without the lag did not yield significant results, just like when the lag was 
included. 
 
Given that accountability proxies were sometimes associated with Tax/total without the 
lag, one may also conclude that there may be reverse causality in the relationship or they 
may create positive feedback loops. The long pathway certainly does not clearly dominate 
over the other: both could be at work. 
Context of Democracy 
 
Hypothesis 4 stated that the relationship between tax reliance and accountability is 
stronger in a context of democracy. This was tested by including an interaction between 
Tax/total and the accountability variables in the regressions (Dem*Tax). I ran this for only 
one of the three accountability variables: Drainage coverage. The 2008 data for which 
Transparency is available (2008) was too far away in time from the year for which the 
Democracy data had any variation (up until about 2001), so Transparency was left out and 
Electoral competition, contained in the Democracy variable (though as a continuous 
variable) is too close conceptually to use for this in a sensible way.   
 
The hypothesis was that there may be a partial effect of Tax/total, which in combination 
with high levels of democracy, would bring about increased accountability. Yet in none of 
the regressions was the interaction between democracy and taxation significant. From 
this, we conclude that a context of greater democracy does not make the relationship 
stronger, at least not in terms of the responsiveness aspect of accountability, 
operationalised through Drianage coverage. We may, however, also conclude that the 
degrees of freedom are smaller from adding democracy and the interaction term to the 
model, thus not yielding significant results. Either way, the evidence does not support 
hypothesis 4.  
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Property tax 
 
Hypothesis 5 stated that there is a causal relationship for the property tax variable (even 
if there is none for the Tax/total variable that includes all local taxes and fees in its 
construction). The results using Property tax/total were quite similar when running the 
cross-sectional regressions on Tax/total with positive and significant coefficients on the 
tax variable for Transparency, Drainage coverage and Electoral competition.  
 
Yet the regressions with the property tax measure yielded markedly different results to 
the Tax/total measure in the panel regressions: unlike Tax/total, associations using 
Property tax/total were positive and significant, indicating a possible causal relationship 
between the property tax measures and both Drainage coverage and Electoral competition 
(Transparency was not tested as no panel regression was available). No significant 
relationship had been found for Tax/total, suggesting that the property tax may be a 
better spark for accountability than other local taxes and fees. This is line with the 
expectation that the property tax is likely to be particularly conducive to sparking 
accountability as it is highly visible, salient and a broad-based tax, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. The panel regression results suggest that a 10% rise in the property tax 
variable is associated with an increase in the odds of a municipality having electoral 
competition of approximately 0.34 three years later and 0.31 in the same year. This is 
suggestive of a causal relationship running from Property tax/total to Electoral 
competition, working through both the short and the long path. It should be noted that 
caution is required as the regressions do not eliminate all risk of omitted variable bias if 
other variant factors play a role that are not captured by the controls or fixed effects used 
in these models. Also, reverse causality may still be driving the results and leading to 
endogeneity problems. Nonetheless, the results confirm, rather than contradict the theory 
that greater Property tax/total is likely to lead to greater local government accountability.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the results of quantitative regression analysis of taxation-
accountability linkages using nation-wide data of all municipalities in Mexico; that is, all 
for which data are available. It was organised from simple to increasingly complex 
regressions in an aim to find answers to the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 4.  
 
The first section presented the results of correlation matrices and cross-sectional 
regressions between Tax/total and each of the three measures of accountability 
(Transparency, Drainage coverage and Electoral competition). The second section 
presented the results of panel regressions, again to explore the relationship between the 
taxation and accountability measures. The third section compared results when 
rerunning the regressions (a) with no time lag, (b) with interaction terms, and (c) 
replacing Tax/total with Property tax/total.  
 
The results showed statistically significant correlations between taxation and 
accountability when running cross-sectional regressions (Hypothesis 1). However, the 
panel regressions which controlled for time and municipality fixed effects, did not yield 
significant results. I therefore concluded that the hypothesis stating a causal relationship 
running from taxation to accountability is not supported (Hypothesis 2). This did not 
change when dropping the time lag between cause and effect, in case the relationship may 
run through the short path (with cause and effect setting on simultaneously in time) 
rather than the long path (with a time lag). Neither pathway seemed to dominate 
(Hypothesis 3). A context of democracy also did not prove to make the relationship 
stronger (Hypothesis 4).  
 
Finally, both the cross-sectional and panel regressions did yield significant results for the 
property tax measure, supporting the idea that, unlike with all local taxes and fees, 
greater reliance on property taxation does spark greater accountability (Hypothesis 5). 
Caution is required, however, in interpreting these results as endogeneity problems from 
reverse causality and omitted variable bias through factors that have not been sufficiently 
controlled for may still be driving the results. 
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The following chapters will use qualitative case study methodology in order to further 
study the relationship between taxation and accountability in the Mexican context. It is 
hoped in particular that the questions that were left unanswered in this chapter will be 
better understood by complementary methods. These include in particular the questions 
about the causal pathway and how the relationship does (or doesn’t) work and why. 
  
192 
 
Chapter 6: Methodology for 
qualitative case study analysis 
 
The previous two chapters used quantitative research tools to explore taxation-
accountability linkages, especially economic regression analysis. This chapter and the 
following two use qualitative research tools based on case study evidence following field 
research in six Mexican municipalities to further delve into the linkages between taxation 
and accountability in the Mexican context.     
 
The focus of the qualitative analysis is on local governments that are under substantial 
pressure to increase their tax revenue. The setting is thus one where local governments 
are faced with a tax revenue imperative, the predictor variable in the dominating 
taxation-accountability theories. I investigated the effect on the response variable: 
accountability. More precisely, through process-tracing, the idea was to follow the 
strategy chosen and steps taken by the local governments in six cases and assess the 
results of their endeavours in a comparative case study. I observed what strategic choices 
were taken by local government officials in view of their revenue needs and tried to 
identify what motivated their decisions, what processes emerged, and how. The principal 
aim was to understand what measures are stimulated from short-term revenue needs at 
the local government level. As opposed to much of the existing literature on local taxation 
and accountability, which studies rural, agrarian settings, the context here is urban and 
one of electoral competition. The objective is to understand in how far pressure to raise 
tax revenue is activating bargaining processes that are consistent with (longer term) 
claims about the taxation-accountability relationship. 
 
The present chapter presents the methodology used in the qualitative analysis. It sets the 
stage for following two chapters in which the evidence is presented and analysed. Section 
6.1 explains how the mixed methods research approach is used to complement and 
supplement the quantitative analysis in the previous chapters. It shows how the 
qualitative analysis is used to offset the weaknesses of the quantitative approach and 
where it adds to the analysis. Section 6.2 introduces the research strategy including the 
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research questions, the type of data and variables used to answer the research questions 
and the research design.  Section 6.3 explains why the specific six cases were chosen (case 
selection), Section 6.4 provides further background information on the cases and the final 
section concludes. 
 
6.1 Complementary mixed methods 
This thesis employs mixed methods research. Mixed methods research (MMR) has been 
defined as “a type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines 
elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g. use of qualitative and 
quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad 
purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration” (Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007:123; cited in Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2011:285). Mixed 
methods research has more recently evolved in the social sciences as a separate, third 
tradition. It is regarded as pragmatic, making use of a variety of available data sources, 
both numeric data and narrative information, that best fit the research question, rather 
than self-limiting to one perspective alone. It allows combining the strengths and 
remedying the weaknesses of each individual approach (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).  
 
The strengths of quantitative research are well known (D. T. Campbell, Stanley, & Gage, 
1963; Cook & Reichardt, 1979). Compared to qualitative research, it has often been 
considered more objective and accurate as values are less likely to affect how research is 
conducted and results interpreted. There tends to be a greater distance between the 
researcher on one hand and the findings and subjects under study on the other. Results 
are presented in numerical form and often follow prescribed rules, standards and 
categories, such as pre-established rules for what is statistically significant. Also, research 
can more easily be replicated, thus limiting subjective interpretations. Quantitative 
analysis is also useful for studying a larger number of units, resulting in greater 
generalizability of results.  
 
However, it also involves several drawbacks and limitations.  There is often a lack of 
depth in numerical data: it is more narrow and superficial and less elaborate and nuanced 
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than detailed narrative descriptions. Findings may be too abstract or general and don’t 
truthfully reflect complex realities. For understanding causal processes, quantitative tools 
are valuable for answering questions about causal effects, but less able to reveal much 
about the causal mechanisms. Fitting regression models on complex social processes can 
be particularly misleading and result in spurious correlation, especially when the 
dynamics of the underlying relationships and why they exist are not thoroughly clear 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p.542). Gerring (2006:3) also lists identification problems, problems of 
extreme counterfactuals and extrapolating beyond observable data and accurately 
specifying models, “given a plethora of plausible models and associated problems of 
modelling interactions among these covariates”.   
 
Numerical data can contain mistakes as human errors and falsification occur in recording 
data or data input and in large-N studies, observations are less likely to be individually 
verified. Numerical indicators also tend to ignore the subjective perspectives of those 
involved. While this can be of advantage, it can also be an important lacuna in 
understanding complex realities or obtaining an accurate picture as pre-set categories 
used may not reflect what those involved perceive. Because quantitative analysis tends to 
be more distant to the studied phenomena, it may gloss over important variables and 
explanations as experienced by the subjects on the ground. Important additional 
variables and explanations may also be glossed over because of the distance. Quantitative 
research is better suited for testing existing hypotheses and less useful for generating 
theory (Gerring 2006:37).  
 
Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, has its own strengths and weaknesses. The main 
weaknesses include case selection bias, less objectivity in interpreting results and less 
replicability, as well as non-generalizability. Among its strengths are its greater potential 
in unravelling complex phenomena (Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2004; Lieberman, 2005) 
than quantitative tools. The complexities involved in causal processes, for instance, 
require more intensive, in-depth analysis (Collier et al., 2004; Lieberman, 2005). Given 
the smaller number of observations, it is possible to delve deeper into each, verifying its 
validity and corroborating findings through different sources including first-hand 
observation. On-the-ground investigation of specific cases and qualitative interviews also 
allow finding further variables of relevance that were not initially thought of as important 
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by the researcher. There thus tends to be a trade-off of breadth and simplicity versus 
depth and accurately reflecting complex realities.  Data accumulated from narratives can 
be highly valuable for better understanding behavioural patterns, individual decisions, 
and human interaction. The sources are actual participants involved in the phenomena 
under study. Teddlie and Tashakorri (2011:286) not only consider that “qualitatively 
oriented case studies […] express the complexities of behavioural patterns much more 
thoroughly than a statistical summary of numeric indicators”, they also argue that 
colourful narratives are “intrinsically more interesting (and often more enlightening) 
than numbers”.  
 
By combining quantitative with qualitative analysis, one can unite strengths and one 
approach can remedy the weaknesses of the other in a Q2 approach (Faguet, 2012:11). Yet 
merging the two in a juxtaposition of approaches has not gone without criticism. Some 
criticism is purely on grounds of logistics (as such research is likely to be costlier). Others 
have been disquieted by a tendency to subordinate qualitative methods within this strand 
of research, thereby unjustifiably demeaning and threatening an important research 
methodology (Teddlie and Tahakkori, 2011). Yet the main criticism has been about the 
incoherence of mixing the two approaches. The argument is that quantitative and 
qualitative methods are each “based on particular paradigms, a patterned set of 
assumptions concerning reality (ontology), knowledge of that reality (epistemology), and 
the particular ways of knowing that reality (methodology)” (Sale, Lohfeld, & Brazil, 
2002:44). The argument is that these two approaches are like different world views that 
are not compatible with one another. It has also been argued that, rather than being more 
than the sum of its parts, MMR has resulted in a bereft application of both methods. This 
criticism, however, may be more about how MMR is adopted than an outright rejection of 
MMR. If the two methods are applied uncritically without truly integrating, 
complementing or triangulating, but simply presented next to one another, then the 
analysis may gain nothing from the merge.  
 
Others believe that a multiplicity of paradigms, as offered through MMR, contributes to 
better understanding. Yet while the two approaches can be “compatible and can be 
fruitfully used in conjunction with one another” (Teddie and Tashakkori, 2011:285), they 
need to be sufficiently integrated in order to make it better than the sum of its parts and 
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to avoid awkward dissemblance. There should therefore be a conscious effort at fulfilling 
one or more of the potentially positive purposes of a synergy. Greene, Caracelli and 
Graham (1989) have argued that mixing methods has the potential of fulfilling the 
following five purposes: triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation, and 
expansion. 
 
How has mixed methods research been applied in this thesis? The rationale for using a 
mixed methods research approach is broadly to offset the weaknesses and combine the 
strengths of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches (Bryman, 2006:106)  as 
well as to gain a more encompassing perspective on the issue than is possible with one 
approach alone. How specifically has qualitative analysis been used to fill the gaps and 
remedy the problems of the quantitative analysis in the previous chapters and add depth 
to the analysis? 
 
In the previous section, the relationship between taxation and accountability was tested 
quantitatively through regression analysis. It appeared the most appropriate method for 
testing and validating existent theories on the taxation-accountability hypothesis using a 
large number of observations. Such a large-N analysis with thousands of observations 
over many years allowed for heightened generalizability. All Mexican municipalities were 
included in a nation-wide analysis (barring those for which data were missing) for a very 
broad analysis of the Mexican context, thus avoiding issues of case selection bias. 
 
Yet it also had many weaknesses. First, while showing associations, the regression results 
were not clear in showing causation. Most importantly, it was also not possible to 
adequately discern the precise causal chronology against the importance of reverse 
causality and possible feedback loops and endogeneity problems may have affected the 
results. It was also not possible to understand possible effects of interacting covariates, 
though an attempt was made to model interactions between taxation and degree of 
democracy.  
 
Through processes-tracing in a deeper analysis of specific cases, triangulation of evidence 
is sought in the qualitative analysis: if results from the different methods are mutually 
corroborative, this would enhance the strength of the findings (Bryman, 2006; 
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Eisenhardt, 1989:538). On the other hand, relationships found in the quantitative analysis 
may turn out to be spurious or superficial after closer examination of rival explanations 
through qualitative analysis (Lieberman, 2005). 
 
Beyond the causal effect, it was difficult in the quantitative analysis to understand which 
causal mechanisms were at work. Differences (and changes) in accountability are likely to 
stem from a complex variety of variables with possible interactions between them. While 
attempts were made to distinguish causal pathways and interactions between variables, 
they were very simplistic and insufficient. Also, the theory predicts that there is not one 
effect immediately following the cause, but that there are many steps in a complex chain 
of processes. The quantitative approach looks merely at the final effects of taxation on the 
accountability proxies, ignoring intermediate steps and making it impossible to identify 
where possible bottlenecks lie.  
 
Qualitative analysis holds greater promise for unravelling how exactly the relationship 
between taxation and accountability works in practice, what contextual factors are more 
likely to make it work, and what obstacles may have stood in the way. The complex 
phenomena involved in the causal processes of interest call for deeper analysis and 
qualitative research tools offer that depth (Collier et al., 2004; Lieberman, 2005). They 
answer descriptive research questions about what mechanism are at work as well as 
analytical research questions of how and why (Berg-Schlosser, De Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 
2009; Wagemann & Schneider, 2010). Qualitative tools fare better in illustrating the 
sequence of events as well as in understanding the interdependence between a 
multiplicity of variables and are open to a wider explanation for the dependent variable 
(Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009).  
 
Operationalizing the concepts of interest posed problems in the quantitative analysis. For 
instance, to measure the independent variable, taxation, a measure was used that proxied 
one of the common conceptualisations of the independent variable: the amount of tax 
revenue in a government’s overall revenues. Yet the conceptualisation of the most 
dominant theoretical literature on the topic refers to a need on the part of governments to 
raise revenues (Bräutigam et al., 2008; Joshi & Ayee, 2008; Levi, 1988; Prichard, 2010b).  
This need may not have resulted in an actual rise in taxation that is observable in revenue 
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data. Yet the qualitative analysis allows me to focus on situations where local 
governments were verifiably under considerable pressure to raise tax revenues.  
 
Operationalising the dependent variable, accountability, equally posed problems in the 
quantitative analysis as the concept may not have been well captured by the proxies. Also 
some variables were not all available over all years. In particular, I had no data on human 
capacity of local government officials or technical capacity of tax collection in each 
municipality. While this may have been partly proxied for by controls such as Rural, 
Development, and Budget, the proxies do not perfectly capture these potential influencing 
variables.  
 
Finally, data reliability was uncertain given a lack of harmonised accounting methods and 
incentives to misreport. It is likely that data may have been falsified or itemised 
differently in different municipalities. The qualitative interviews revealed that the 
budgetary data was not standardised and homogenised, so for instance, expenditures on 
salaries are sometimes filed under “transfers” in the expenditure items to hide the costs 
of their bureaucracies (Gonzalez Anaya and Revilla, 2012:28). The qualitative approach 
has the advantage of relying less on potentially faulty numerical data. 
 
The quantitative analysis left several questions unanswered, particularly those explaining 
how and why we saw the results that we did. How, or through which mechanisms, does 
the link work? Does it work through the short path or the long path? Who are the key 
actors? How do different causal factors interactions with one another? Why did we tend 
to observe statistically significant relationships between taxation and accountability 
using cross-sectional models but not using fixed effects models? Was it really due to a lack 
of causal effect or were there methodological or data problems? Why were the results 
different using the property tax compared to other taxes and fees? Also, the quantitative 
analysis failed to elucidate which obstacles may be preventing the relationship from 
taking hold.  
 
I use MMR to fill in gaps in the inquiry as one method is able to answer questions that the 
other cannot, thereby adding inferential leverage. While the quantitative methodology 
looked for whether relationships existed on a large scale, the qualitative section asks how 
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and in what context the relationships play out.  I also use mixed methods research to seek 
“elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clariﬁcation of the results from one method with 
the results from another”   (Greene et al., 1989:259). Focusing on specific cases in greater 
detail provides a better understanding of why we saw the results that we did in the 
quantitative section. For instance, by understanding sequences of events, I try to address 
the question of reverse causality in the taxation-accountability relationship and assess the 
importance of possible feedback loops that posed a challenge in the regression analysis.  
 
There was also a back and forth process between the two approaches. For example, the 
problem of reverse causality, showing to be significant in the quantitative analysis, 
prompted me to look into this issue in the qualitative analysis as well. The findings on the 
qualitative analysis similarly prompted me to adjust and expand the quantitative analysis: 
the context of democracy appeared to make a difference in the qualitative analysis so I 
ran interactions in the quantitative section to search for general trends to verify this. The 
quantitative analysis also assisted in case selection for the qualitative analysis: numerical 
indicators collected for the quantitative analysis were used to give a better picture of 
which municipalities were responsible for the greater part of tax revenue collection and 
which were structurally similar: criteria used for case selection.   
 
 
6.2 Research questions, design and data 
 
In this qualitative part of the analysis, I focus on the causal processes arising from tax 
revenue needs at the local government level in urban municipalities in Mexico. The 
context I am examining is one of urban local governments and electoral competition 
where the most important local tax handle is the property tax. I here detail the research 
questions for the qualitative analysis and how I aim to find the answers. 
200 
 
The research questions 
The main question asked is whether tax revenue needs lead to a bargaining process 
between the local residents and the local government in this context and, if so, what form 
does this tax bargaining take and what implications does it have for local government 
accountability?  
I use an X-centered approach for causal inference. I select cases in which we have a 
scenario of X (municipalities that are under pressure to raise tax revenues because of 
urgent revenue needs) and investigate the outcomes and see if they are likely to lead to Y 
(are processes stimulated that are likely to lead to increased accountability?). 
 
While X is straightforward and handled in the case selection process, which is detailed in 
Section 6.4 below, how do I identify the outcomes? In Chapter 2 three broad categories of 
outcomes were identified. The first aim here is to find out into which of these three 
categories the outcome falls. The three options were that tax revenue needs lead to: 
 
a) tax bargaining between two broad groups of actors: the local government and 
local residents,  
b) coercive tax collection, or  
c) neither of the above.  
As shown in Chapter 2, a major point of contention in the literature is whether the 
revenue imperative is more likely to lead to coercive taxation rather than to contractual 
tax bargaining. And as discussed in Chapter 1, case studies at the local government level 
in China (Bernstein & Lü, 2008), Tanzania (Fjeldstad, 2001b), and Senegal (Juul, 2006) 
have shown that increased revenue pressure in those cases has largely led to coercive tax 
collection methods, “often characterised by violent and extortive forms of taxation”, 
(Fjeldstad, 2001b, p.302)  (Moore, 2007, 2008). I also noted in Chapter 2 that the 
dichotomy of options between a and b may have been appropriate for the historical 
European context, a third option (c) was appropriate for contemporary developing 
country contexts in which the coercive power of the state may not be as strong as that 
found in early modern Europe, which much of the theory is largely based on.  
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If tax bargaining is attained (category a), I then look further to see what form this takes. I 
distinguish between “direct and explicit haggling and agreement” and “implicit strategic 
interactions and mutual behavioural adjustments without direct negotiation” (Moore, 
2008:37-38). I also try to identify which key actors are involved (who in the local 
government and which group of local residents) and whether further actors also play an 
intervening role.  
 
Once the type of bargaining has been identified, I also evaluate if it is likely to lead to 
increased accountability in one or more of its different forms identified in Chapter 1 
(enhanced transparency, strengthened government responsiveness, greater influence of 
local residents in local government decisions, public goods projects, enhanced 
communication between local government and local residents), and who the beneficiaries 
of increased accountability are likely to be (a narrow group of taxpayers, the majority of 
local residents, or a third group different from the taxpayers (see Chapter 2)). I also 
examine whether the mechanism from tax revenue needs to greater accountability took 
the long path (first involving a reaction by the residents) or the short path.  
 
If no tax bargaining is observed, I try to pinpoint which obstacles stood in the way. Why 
might coercive taxation be more likely or why did neither occur? I also investigate the 
role of further actors which may impede or aid tax bargaining (such as higher levels of 
government, and non-governmental actors such as private sector actors and criminal 
groups). 
 
Figure 17 Summary of investigation process: 
1. Tax bargain  What form? 
Implicit or explicit? 
 Leads to Y?  Short path or 
Long path? 
   Does NOT 
lead to Y? 
 Why not? 
Obstacles? 
2. Coercive 
taxation 
 Why? Obstacles?   
3. Other  Why? Obstacles?   
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In sum, the main question of interest involves the causal effect and mechanism and 
includes the following sub-questions as shown in Figure 17: 
 Do revenue pressures lead to coercive rather than consensual taxation or some other 
outcome? 
 If tax bargaining processes are stimulated, what form do they take? If they are linked 
to an increase in accountability, through which causal mechanism does this link 
work? Does the local government make unilateral concessions in order to encourage 
compliance? Does the local government engage with the residents and meet their 
demands? Do the residents protest and push for concessions?  
 If no bargaining process is stimulated, why not? What are the obstacles? 
My aim is to understand what processes are emerging from short-term revenue needs at 
the local government level and to what extent these efforts are activating processes of 
bargaining that are consistent with (longer-term claims about) the tax-accountability 
relationship.  
 
Alongside this main question of interest, answers to secondary questions are also sought:  
 Questions about the sequence of events: Is there reverse causality in the 
relationship? Does greater local government accountability also results in greater 
disposition on the part of local residents to pay local taxes? Are there positive 
feedback loops?  
 Questions about the context: if there was greater trust, democracy and/or a 
stronger state-society bondage beforehand (with greater accountability and 
transparency), are tax revenue needs more likely to lead to tax bargaining (and 
less likely to lead to coercive taxing)? 
 Questions about tax type: Can any differences be observed among collection and 
bargaining around different tax types? If so, why? 
To assist in answering this question, the evidence was collected and is presented in two 
parts. In the first (Chapter 7), I examine municipalities that rank particularly low in terms 
of transparency and accountability according to available rankings. In the second 
(Chapter 8), I examine municipalities that rank particularly high. This has a dual purpose. 
First, it may help to establish whether in municipalities in which trust, democracy, and 
state-society relations (proxied by those indicators) are generally weaker, we observe 
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different responses to revenue needs (such as coercive tax collection rather than 
consensual tax bargaining) from those where these are likely to already be stronger at the 
outset. The objective is to assess the proposition that when links for state-society 
relations are already in place, tax bargaining is a more likely outcome and coercion a less 
likely outcome.    
The second purpose is to clarify the importance of reverse causality or interdependence 
in the relationship between taxation and accountability. It asks whether municipal 
governments that are more accountable and transparent at the outset are also more 
successful at raising tax revenue and why.  
 
Data  
 
The qualitative research is framed as a comparative case study. Case analysis is 
particularly suitable for in-depth insights into causal processes (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case 
studies are considered particularly appropriate for research on contemporary events (as 
opposed to pure archival or documentary research) as it allows for both direct 
observation and systematic interviewing (Yin, 1994:8).  Through process-tracing, the 
sequences of independent (accountability), dependent (tax revenue dependence/needs), 
and intervening variables were observed in order to gain insights into causal processes. 
As Gerring (2006:45) explains, “when studying decisional behaviour, case study research 
may offer insight into the intentions, the reasoning capabilities, and the information-
processing procedures of the actors involved in a given setting.” Case study research 
therefore made it possible to better understand the decisional behaviour of the actors 
involved, particularly of the local governments.   
 
Field research was conducted in six municipalities located in six different states in Mexico 
and some additional interviews were held in Mexico City. In total, interviews were 
conducted with over 70 interviewees9. The interviewees in each municipality broadly 
comprised the following:   
                                                             
9 Interviews were conducted in Spanish and quotes have been translated to English. The interviews are 
referenced with a number corresponding to a list of interviews in the annex. 
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 Local council (cabildo) members (mayors, syndics, and councillors).  
 Municipal directors of finance, revenues, taxation, property tax 
 Directors of the cadastre 
 Municipal citizen participation offices  
 Municipal transparency offices 
 External, state level or independent transparency, accountability, auditing 
institutions 
 Civil society organisations, NGO’s 
 
Further informants of particular relevance were added to this standard list in each 
municipality, such as the representatives of hotel owners in Acapulco and the leaders of 
street vendors in Tabasco. For a broader contextual overview, the Mexican ministry of 
finance, state government finance secretaries, rating agencies, experts at international 
development organisations, and academics were consulted.  
 
Interviews were semi-structured, roughly following an aide-memoire of topics that I 
aimed to cover. Allowing the interviewee to give a chronological account was preferable 
to sticking to a rigid questionnaire as this allowed the interviewee to recount events as he 
or she saw them in his or her own order of importance. I generally refrained from 
mentioning my thesis hypotheses or that I was studying the relationship between 
taxation and accountability at the outset, revealing only that I was writing a thesis on 
local taxation and local government, so as to prevent leading the interviewees into telling 
me what they thought I wanted to hear. Instead, I tried to find out more indirectly about 
the relationship, gradually asking about it more directly towards the end of the interview. 
 
I faced several challenges during data gathering. It was not always possible to meet with 
all persons I had planned to interview. In particular mayors were not always available 
and the mayors I did manage to tie down only granted a maximum of 20 minutes of their 
time. The most obvious problem of elite interviewing is the reliability of the interviewees 
(Richards, 1996). I had particular difficulty gathering information from local councillors 
who often spoke in campaign slogans that only vaguely touched on the topic of my 
questions. The more technical staff (finance managers, tax directors, etc.), on the other 
hand, were excellent sources of information who generally had far more detailed 
knowledge and were more open and frank about what was going on in the municipality. 
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This is consistent with Seldon (1988:10) who considers (ex) politicians to be the least 
satisfactory interviewees as they, ‘often encounter pathological difficulties in 
distinguishing the truth, so set have their minds become by long experience of partisan 
thought’ whereas civil servants generally provide reliable sources of information.  
 
Still, extra effort was required to gain the trust of all interviewees and to distinguish the 
truth from other statements. During the first part of the interview, I generally received 
cautious, unrevealing answers. Only after much reassuring that I was not a journalist and 
that I was not sent from the central government to evaluate them, showing that I had 
been in the country for some time studying local governments (listing several with worse 
reputations) and understood the challenges they faced and their circumstances, and 
sometimes called them out on seeming contradictions, did discussions eventually become 
more frank and more likely to have revealed their profound attitudes and convictions.  As 
Chong (1993:868) writes about interviewing politicians, “While we cannot observe the 
underlying mental process that gives rise to their responses, we can witness many of its 
outward manifestations. The way subjects ramble, hesitate, stumble, and meander as they 
formulate their answers tips us off to how they are thinking and reasoning through 
political issues.”  
 
There was more reluctance on the part of interviewees in sharing data and 
documentation. The municipalities’ data sometimes did not square with the data that I 
had been given by the federal government. This was partly because of a lack of 
homogenised accounting but there are also strong incentives to over-report tax revenues 
to the Ministry of Finance as tax effort is rewarded with higher fiscal transfers and as 
higher levels of government, private lending institutions and rating agencies may review 
their reported budget information in view of decisions over loans and transfers. For these 
reason I kept the comparison of fiscal data across municipalities to a minimum and 
instead focused on differences over time in the same municipality. There was particular 
reluctance in sharing data on tax compliance. As I was told by municipal revenue experts 
in the Institute for the Technical Development of the Public Treasuries (INDETEC), “If it 
becomes known how few people actually comply with their tax payments, then nobody 
would pay” (interview 83), confirming the literature on tax compliance: “publication of 
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the extent to which free riding is taking place [has] the effect of increasing non-
compliance” (Levi, 1988:70).  
 
Security concerns also presented an obstacle. Particularly in the Municipality of Acapulco, 
which is also among the most crime-ridden in the world, I was warned against meeting 
with certain people and was told that some of the data I had obtained was not secure for 
me to possess. There was also always a fine line to tread between taking advantage of 
information gathering opportunities such as following local councillors around in their 
work and accepting invitations to meet in informal settings where they were more open 
with the information they shared, and not being stuck in uncomfortable or insecure 
situations.   
 
The short-term effects of ongoing current events are studied. This was viewed as 
necessary for several reasons: insights into the strategy and motivation of local 
government officials are easier to come by in real time. Particularly in the case of local 
governments in Mexico, any information about the administration is more difficult to 
attain once its term has ended. There is a large turn-over of staff, little institutional 
memory, and information is not passed on to the next administration. Direct real-time 
observation thus seemed the most viable and effective information-gathering method in 
this context for my purposes.  
 
Interviewees were selected purposively (targeting the decision-makers responsible for 
tax increase and citizen relations at the local government level) and through snowballing. 
For example, during the interviews, interviewees would reveal who else was involved in 
certain processes and share the contact information of those key informants. Elite 
interviews were conducted to, first, understand the events and their sequence in the 
municipality, to gather information that was not documented and to help explain or 
clarify data, and second, to understand the interviewees’ perceptions, beliefs and motives. 
With regard to the latter, information was gathered to gain an “insight into the mind-set 
of the actor/s” more than to establish the objective truth (Richards, 1996:200). 
 
Much of the information gathered through interviews was triangulated by analysis of 
fiscal data, legal codes, secondary literature, news articles, campaign platforms and other 
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documentary evidence. This was further supplemented by observation, for example of 
council meetings, and of the interaction of local authorities with residents (by following 
local councillors and revenue directors around as they worked). 
 
In sum, field research was conducted, mainly involving semi-structured interviews with 
key informants in local government, but corroborating evidence through interviews with 
further informants, documentary evidence and direct observation. 
 
 
6.3 Case selection 
 
Six urban Mexican municipalities were selected for field research: Acapulco in the state of 
Guerrero, Centro in the state of Tabasco, La Paz in the state of Baja California Sur, 
Aguascalientes in the state of Aguascalientes, Mérida in the state of Yucatán and Saltillo in 
the state of Coahuila. The main selection criteria were that a) the municipalities were 
among the high tax collectors of the country; b) they were structurally similar in terms of 
GDP, size, major urban centres, and containing an independent city rather than forming 
part of a larger metropolitan area; c) they were somewhat spread out geographically; d) 
half scored particularly high on accountability and transparency rankings and half 
particularly low; and e) they were under considerable pressure to increase their tax 
revenues. In the following I describe the reasoning behind each of these criteria in greater 
detail. All of these variables are constants that the municipalities have in common apart 
from d) where I looked to separate the cases into two groups of extremes.  
Among high tax collectors 
The municipalities chosen are all municipalities where revenue from taxes and fees 
comprises a relatively important proportion of total revenue (between 11 and 19%) 
compared to the average municipality in Mexico (See Table 30). This places them among 
the 4% of municipalities that are responsible for 90% of Mexico’s total local tax revenue 
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and where local taxes can be expected to make a real difference to the local government 
and local residents.  
 
Table 30 Municipal taxes and fees, Property taxes, 2011 
 Taxes and fees as a  
percentage of total revenues 
Property tax revenues as a  
percentage of total tax revenues 
Acapulco de 
Juárez 
19%  (low) 77% 
Centro 11%  (low) 99% 
La Paz 31%   (high) 74% 
Aguascalientes 18%  (low) 97% 
Mérida 24%   (high) 99% 
Saltillo 26%   (high) 99% 
Source: SIMBAD 2012 
Note: Here property tax revenues include the property tax (impuesto predial) as well as 
other taxes based on property values, such as the tax on acquisition or property transfer. 
 
Structurally similar municipalities 
Structurally similar municipalities were chosen: they are all urban municipalities that 
have comparable numbers of inhabitants, per capita GDP, and per capita budgets (see 
Table 31). They are all medium-sized cities with populations between 250,000 and 
800,000, a per capita GDP of between USD 8,800 and 11,600, and local government 
budgets of between 185 and 335 USD per capita.  I eliminated those municipalities that 
formed part of a large metropolitan area with other large municipalities. If they were part 
of cities with other major municipalities, it would be difficult to distinguish, for example, 
who was responsible for positive or negative city management and state-society relations. 
To prevent such complications of overlap, such municipalities were eliminated. Only 
municipalities with self-contained cities in which the municipality is solely responsible 
the city’s own local government goods and services were selected. The selected 
municipalities are also all state capitals, expect Acapulco, though this is the largest city 
and commercial capital in its state.  
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Using structurally similar municipalities allowed me to more easily address the questions 
of interest while controlling for more obvious structural factors that would make a 
difference in how X affected Y. Differences in tax collection effort or accountability should 
not be simply due to, say, lack of budget capacity or different population dimensions that 
they are providing services to, but more dependent on strategic choices of the local 
government, which is of interest here. For instance, it is likely that in smaller, poorer 
municipalities, local governments would not be as successful in raising much revenue as 
larger, richer ones because property values are far lower and the population less able to 
pay. Small rural municipalities also tend to be more poorly equipped to raise revenues, 
often lacking human and administrative capacity. They may thus embark on an entirely 
different revenue-raising strategy and the municipalities would simply not be comparable 
on those lines. 
 
Table 31 Structural characteristics of municipalities selected for case study 
 Municipality Population 1 GDP per 
capita 
 (US$)2 
Local budget per 
capita  
(US$)3 
Urban  
1 Acapulco,  
Guerrero 
673,000 8,864 334 Yes 
2 Centro,  
Tabasco 
665,000 
 
13,800 308 Yes 
3 La Paz,  
Baja California 
Sur 
252,000 10,545 234 Yes 
4 Aguascalientes,  
Aguascalientes 
750,000 12,000 272 Yes 
5 Mérida,  
Yucatán 
800,000 13,864 203 Yes 
6 Saltillo,  
Coahuila 
725,000 11,607 185 Yes 
Sources: 
1. CONAPO 2010 population census 
2. Standard and Poor’s Sub-Sovereign Division’s estimates 2011 
3. SIMBAD 2012 (data for 2010), divided by CONAPO population data 2010.  
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Geographical divergence 
Of the remaining municipalities, I chose cases that were geographically spread out 
(diversity sampling), rather than clustered in the same region, for greater 
representativeness and for a greater likelihood of variation in the findings. The northeast 
(Saltillo), northwest (La Paz), centre (Aguascalientes), southeast (Centro), southwest 
(Acapulco), and the peninsula (Mérida) are all represented (See Figure 18 below). 
 
Figure 18 Map of Mexico showing municipalities selected for case study 
 
 
 
 
Two groups of extremes within 
I chose six municipalities in a way that half were ones that ranked very highly in terms of 
accountability and transparency, according to available rankings, while the other half 
fared particularly poorly (See Figure 19 below). Selecting structurally similar 
municipalities that are polar opposites in terms of transparency and accountability had 
the aim of investigating to what extent local governments go about the process of raising 
revenues when accountability and transparency are relatively high versus the contrary.  
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Multiple (three) cases were selected in each category in order to increase the chance of 
finding patterns that repeat while at the same time diminishing the chance of studying 
complete outliers. This lends to wider resonance of the conclusions drawn (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
 
More specifically, I focused on the municipalities that had the best track records in terms 
of accountability and transparency on a ranking by a magazine that specialises on state 
and municipal economics, public finance and politics in Mexico called ARegional 
(ARegional, 2011). Their ranking was conducted in 2010 and covers 100 municipalities. 
Yet I eliminated those that did not consistently show up in a similar position in other 
rankings of “transparency” and “accountability”, including those by the Mexican Institute 
of Competitiveness (IMCO, 2012b) and by an NGO called Ciudadanos por Municipios 
Transparentes or Citizens for Transparent Municipalities (CIMTRA, 2008, 2012). 
 
Figure 19 Distance from average in terms of transparency and accountability 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on ARegional, 2011 ranking scores 
 (distance from average of the 100 municipalities rated). 
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Under pressure to raise tax revenues 
 
It was important that the selected municipalities were ones that were under pressure to 
raise their tax revenues. This is the independent variable in the causal puzzle. The 
municipalities each fell in this category as they made vocal efforts in the media that they 
were attempting to raise revenues from the beginning of their administration onwards 
(between 1 to 4 years prior to the time field research was conducted10). In this subsection 
I first discuss the reasons why they were generally under pressure to tax raise revenue as 
urban municipalities in Mexico in a time of restricted revenue alternatives. In the next 
section, I then highlight, for each individual case, additional reasons, further confirming 
the municipality’s propriety as one under pressure to raise tax revenues (the independent 
variable in the taxation-accountability relationship focused on here).  
 
As elaborated in Chapter 3, municipal governments in Mexico have made little effort to 
raise taxes in the past and instead relied on alternative revenue sources including federal 
and state transfers or borrowing money (Morones Hernández, 2012:84). However, these 
alternatives became greatly limited between 2011- 2012 when the field research was 
conducted. During this time, many Mexican municipal governments found themselves 
(and some continue to find themselves) in dire financial circumstances. While municipal 
debt had been consistently growing, fiscal transfers from the federal government, their 
main source of revenues, had not (interview 3; interview 5; SHCP, 2012; SIMBAD, 2012). 
This came as a result of stagnating oil revenues and a general economic downturn 
starting in 2010, following recession of its main trading partners and a slowdown in 
tourism because of reports of drug violence and swine flu. Given that transfers are tied 
both to oil revenues and the overall national budget, this meant that transfers saw a great 
decrease from one year to the next.  
 
Poor municipal financial management magnified what became a chronic debt problem as 
many outgoing municipal administrations left high debts for their successors to grapple 
with (Martínez, 2013; Rea 2012; Tzuc 2012).  Many municipalities expected to be bailed 
out by the federal government; however, a stricter bailout policy had been effectuated, 
                                                             
10 In the case of Aguascalientes, the same party that was in power began attempts as far as 6 years prior. 
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subsequent to national outrage at mismanagement of local funds (Reforma, 2012), so 
bailouts were largely rejected. Making matters worse, credit agencies such as Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s downgraded their qualifications for most municipalities they rate, 
complicating those municipalities’ access to credit, raising borrowing costs, and 
diminishing the interest of investors in financing their projects (Arteaga, 2013; Soto, 
2013; interview 3; interview 4). Growing debt service compounded by a lack of 
alternative revenues placed great pressure on municipal governments to ramp up their 
tax revenue collection. The central government was highly vocal in placing particularly 
high pressure on urban municipalities to increase their tax revenues, urging them to 
make use of their unexploited tax handles, particularly the property tax, and making it 
clear that bailouts and other alternative revenue sources were closed off (García, 2013).   
 
All urban municipalities thus faced great pressure from the central government to 
increase their tax intake and to make use of their largely unexploited tax revenue 
potential in the face of a lack of alternative revenue sources. They were also further 
motivated to increase tax revenues because of recent adjustments to the transfer 
formulas that reward tax effort with greater federal and state transfers (Peña Ahumada & 
Wence Partida, 2011:90).  
 
  
6.4 Further information on the cases 
 
The fact that urban Mexican municipalities were attempting, since about 2011 (and some 
for the first time) to abruptly increase their tax revenue makes the Mexican case 
particularly interesting as the focus of study. This acute situation provided an interesting 
opportunity to study local governments with a strong tax revenue imperative. In addition 
to these broad reasons, the municipalities chosen had further own specific revenue 
raising pressures. Some of the municipalities chosen had additional pressure to overhaul 
their budgets through their own efforts because of local financial crises following 
mismanagement of past administrations that left them with few funds to work with in 
order to fulfil their responsibilities, let alone carry out additional projects. This section 
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describes these further pressures. At the end of this section, I also provide additional 
background information on the cases.  
 
Revenue needs in Acapulco 
 
Revenue needs in Acapulco were particularly urgent because there was an immediate 
fiscal crisis in the municipality. According to a local councillor in the Municipality of 
Acapulco, the municipal government allegedly inherited a debt of MX$2.14 billion pesos 
from its predecessor’s government under Manuel Añorve Baños (interview 60). 
According to the PRD leader Jesús Zambrano, this was the result of “irresponsible action” 
and he has “no doubt that an important part of the resources went into private pockets” 
(Ponce, 2013). The former government denied this, saying the allegations of the missing 
debt left behind are exaggerated. Añorve defended himself saying the debt he passed on 
was less: 806 million pesos (Gómez, 2012).  Whether the new government exaggerated 
the figures or not, the current mayor requested financial assistance from the federal 
ministry of finance in order to be able to cover costs during the first months of coming to 
power, before receiving the central government transfers (which tend to be disbursed 
every February). This request, however, was denied, leaving Acapulco to look to raising 
its own resources (RedPolitica, 2013; interview 5). 
 
Revenue needs in Centro 
 
Centro is highly dependent on oil revenues, which greatly affect the transfers it receives 
from the central government. This is because central government transfers are tied to oil 
sales and municipalities where oil is extracted receive a greater proportion. Oil revenues 
have consistently decreased in recent years and this has thus hit Centro particularly hard 
(Sánchez, 2013; SHCP, 2012).  
 
Centro’s credit rating also dropped: Moody’s downgraded Centro to a negative outlook 
(Ba3 rating) in the summer of 2012 (Moody's, 2012), closing off further borrowing 
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options (interview 44). The municipal government thus has its hands tied without 
additional revenues. On top of this, the debt left behind by the previous administration at 
the end of 2012 amounted to $700 million pesos. 
 
Revenue needs in La Paz 
 
Several factors contribute to revenue raising needs for La Paz. The Municipality of La Paz 
receives relatively few transfers from the central government compared to other 
municipalities in Mexico. This is because one of the dominant criteria in the transfer 
formula that determines its share of transfers is population and La Paz’s population is 
relatively scarce. While the population is small, it is greatly disbursed over a large surface 
area (La Paz is the fourth-largest municipality in Mexico geographically, covering 20,275 
km2). This makes it expensive and logistically challenging to provide public services. The 
city must thus rely particularly heavily on own revenues; these amount to approximately 
48% of total revenues (31% of total revenues come from taxes and fees. According to the 
director of urban development of the Municipality of La Paz, urban migration to the 
municipality places further pressure on public services (interview 33).  
 
When the municipal administration came to power in July of 2011, it found a situation of 
deteriorating public finances. The reason was a rise in current expenditures in previous 
years (on average about 10% between 2009 and 2011) that consistently exceeded 
revenue growth (dropping around 3% during the same period). According to a study 
prepared for the IDB (GeoAdaptive, 2012), there have been few savings that would allow 
investment in infrastructure or services; the municipality had trouble merely covering its 
operational costs. Investment could only be undertaken with borrowing and 
extraordinary revenues provided by the state or federal government.  
 
Yet, as the revenue directory of the Municipality of La Paz laments, “since about one year, 
the federal government won’t bail anyone out anymore, including with extraordinary 
emergency schemes. Last year, for instance, the rains destroyed many streets. Now the 
federal government no longer helps in these situations. They are no longer rewarding 
those that manage their finances poorly. The banks are not lending anymore either” 
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(interview 29).  While conceding that this is correct of them, he emphasises that this puts 
the current municipal government under particularly great financial pressure. 
 
Finally, to add to La Paz’s troubles, the last administration took a lot of short-term high-
interest loans that the new government has been left to amortize. The fiscal balance has 
remained below zero since 2010 and Fitch Ratings and HR Ratings downgraded La Paz to 
a negative outlook in 2012 (with a BBB rating) (GeoAdaptive, 2012).  
 
Revenue needs in Aguascalientes 
 
The population is rising as the city attracts migrants, bringing with it infrastructure and 
housing needs. “There is great demand for more revenues just to maintain the current 
standard” (interview 21).  
 
The mayor had ambitious goals for her term in office from 2011 until the end of 2013 and 
needed more revenues to be able to carry them out. She made raising property tax 
revenues and water fees a priority in her administration, particularly because these are 
tied to transfers. “We get more central government transfers if we raise more revenues” 
(interview 22). The greater the percentage change in collection from one year to the next, 
the more central government transfers (in the form of unearmarked participaciones) they 
will receive. The government also wants to shed its dependency on the central 
government. In the finance directorate, staff complained that they are 70% dependent on 
federal transfers. “In places like Monterrey, the local government is not this dependent, 
although in places like Chiapas, they are complete leeches” (interview 25). 
 
Revenue needs in Mérida 
 
The municipal administration in Mérida began its term with a large debt that had been 
passed on to them from the previous  administration. It owed 600 million pesos to 
various providers upon taking office. In addition to this, the deputy revenue director soon 
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found, after a thorough revision of the books, that there were almost MX$ 100 million in 
debt that were completely unaccounted (interview 39).  
 
In addition to this, the mayor was young (at 33 years when he took office) and ambitious 
and very vocal in his campaign and in the media, repeating that, “There are projects that I 
would like to spark off, but I need the resources and basic public services covered before 
investing in those issues” (quoted in Ortega, 2012). After a previous administration that 
had mismanaged its finances, this one vowed to “restore the shine of the white city” and 
this required raising revenues (Ortega, 2012).   
 
Revenue needs in Saltillo 
 
In Centro, Tabasco, I had been told that when a state is in financial trouble, then its 
municipalities will suffer too. The State Government of Coahuila, where Saltillo is located, 
experienced a massive debt crisis towards the end of 2012. One would thus think that 
vocal calls from the municipality to increase tax revenues stemmed from a financial crisis 
also at the municipal level. However, it turned out that Saltillo’s revenue needs did not 
follow a financial crisis. Despite that the State of Coahuila suffered a financial crisis, 
Saltillo has maintained solid financial management throughout and still enjoyed a positive 
rating from the rating agencies Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s.  
 
Instead, the pressure to increase revenues was instead largely self-imposed. Given that 
own revenues comprise a larger proportion of the municipality’s total revenues, and the 
transfer formula is such that it receives relatively few central government transfers in 
relation to its size (due to the criterion in the transfer formula that is based on historical 
tax revenue levels), own revenues are used not only to cover the payroll but also for 
investment projects. Investments were also made with credit from private markets. Yet 
the Mayor publicly announced, repeatedly since he took office, that he wanted to end the 
administrative term with a zero deficit. At the time of interview in July 2013, Saltillo still 
had a debt of 156 million pesos (25 million in long-term, 131 in short-term loans) but the 
debt had already been decreased by 70% from 430 to 131 million pesos. While this was 
not entirely problematic debt, it would take a particularly strong collection effort to pay it 
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off; that is, considerably more would have to be collected each month than during the 
same months in previous years. According to the revenue director, the Mayor thus put 
constant pressure on the revenue office to reinforce revenue collection efforts (interview 
73). The finance director of the municipality also agreed that while the pressure had been 
on since the beginning of the administration in 2011, it was felt particularly strongly with 
just a few months left to balance the budget as the government term would end with the 
year 2013 (interview 75).  
 
Additional background information on the municipalities 
 
Development indicators on the municipalities are found in Table 32. We can see that all of 
the municipalities are above the Mexican average in terms of development. For example, 
while the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) shows an average score of 
0.75 for Mexican municipalities, those of the case study municipalities are all in a range 
between 0.82 and 0.90. We do see that that Acapulco’s figures are consistently less than 
the other municipalities in terms of development indicators. Mérida comes in second in 
terms of poverty but Centro and Saltillo come in second in terms of the HDI.  
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Table 32 Socioeconomic characteristics of case study municipalities 
 Acapulco Centro La 
Paz 
Aguas-
calientes 
Mérida Saltillo Average 
Households  
without 
drainage 
 
9.8 0.9 1.29 0.77 5.92 0.72 14.2 
Households 
without 
potable water 
 
18.1 4.82 5.71 0.54 1.7 2.11 13.4 
Households 
with  
mud floors 
 
15.23 3.97 4.7 1.7 0.69 1.47 10.3 
Percentage  
in poverty 
 
60 36.8 25.06 27.84 48.75 22.9 66.86 
Infant 
mortality rate 
 
 
13.8 11.43 10.46 9.96 8.8 8.93 23.13 
Literacy rate 
 
 
90.46 95.29 97.13 96.54 95.94 97.17 83.29 
Human 
Development 
Index 
0.82 0.86 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.75 
Sources: CONAPO, 2005 for household data; UNDP, 2005 for Percentage in poverty, infant 
mortality rate and literacy rate, and human development index. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the methodology for the qualitative analysis of this 
dissertation. The first section of this chapter has shown how the qualitative analysis is 
used in a mixed methods research approach. It aims to fill gaps and remedy shortcomings 
of the quantitative analysis in the previous sections and add to the understanding of 
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taxation-accountability linkages that would not have been possible with one approach 
alone.   
 
The second section presented the research questions specific to the qualitative analysis. 
The main question asked is when (if at all) do tax revenues needs lead to a bargaining 
process between the local residents and the local government in this context, what form does 
this take and what implications does this have for local government accountability? 
Secondary questions are also asked regarding reverse causality, a context of stronger 
state-society relations and the tax type. This section also outlined what constitutes 
evidence for the answers to those questions and presents the data sources and research 
design used. The qualitative research is framed as a comparative case study involving 
semi-structured interviews, triangulated by review of documentary evidence such as legal 
codes, secondary literature, news articles, campaign platforms, and direct observation. It 
also discussed what challenges faced in conducting the research. 
 
The third section explained the reasons for selecting the six municipalities as cases for 
field research. I chose structurally similar municipalities where tax collection is 
significant compared to the rest of the country. Of these I chose three that already had 
particularly strong established state-society relations and three at the other extreme.  The 
fourth section provides further information about the revenue needs in each of the six 
municipalities and some additional background information.  
 
The next two chapters will present the findings of the qualitative analysis. Chapter 7 will 
present the first three cases (Acapulco, Centro and La Paz) and Chapter 8 will present the 
last three cases studied (Aguascalientes, Mérida and Saltillo).  
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Chapter 7: Acapulco, Centro and La 
Paz 
 
In this chapter and the next, I present the evidence found by way of field research 
conducted in six municipalities, all of which were under considerable pressure to raise 
tax revenue (the independent variable). The evidence presented in this chapter and the 
chapter thereafter examines the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable, local government accountability, as well as all intermediate steps and obstacles 
between the two.  
 
This chapter begins with the first three municipalities. These three each rank low in terms 
of transparency and accountability. Section 7.1 presents evidence from Acapulco, 
Guerrero, 7.2 from Centro, Tabasco and 7.3 from La Paz, Baja California Sur. In each of 
these sections, I begin with a brief description of the context. Then, in the first subsection, 
I reveal the strategy taken by the local government to raise tax revenue. In the second 
subsection I discuss the outcomes of that strategy. In the final subsection section I draw 
conclusions about whether the municipal government chose coercive taxation, tax 
bargaining or some other strategy. If tax bargaining was observed, I assess which form 
this tax bargain takes (implicit or explicit?) and who was involved. I then evaluate if it was 
likely to lead to an increase in some form of local government accountability and, if not, 
what obstacles prevented this.  
 
Section 7.4 revisits the findings and adds further evidence addressing the causal link and 
mechanism, as well as on the secondary questions presented in Chapter 6. These 
secondary questions are fourfold, covering, first, whether the tax type influences the 
taxation – accountability link and why; second, which obstacles stand in the way of the 
relationship; third, to what extent reverse causality is present in the relationship; and 
fourth, whether a tax bargain is more likely in a context of more established state-society 
relations. In Section 7.4, the first, second and third of these are addressed. The fourth will 
be discussed in Chapter 8. The final section of this chapter concludes.  
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7.1 Acapulco: Murder by the sea 
 
Acapulco lies on the Pacific coast in the south-west of the country. It is located within the 
state of Guerrero, which ranks among Mexico’s five poorest states. Once known as a 
Hollywood star retreat with its majestic bay of beaches and dazzling high-rise hotels, the 
city is now famous for gang rape, decapitations, and drug cartel turf wars (Graham, 2011). 
With 1170 homicides in 2012, Acapulco landed second place among the world’s most 
dangerous cities (CCSPJP, 2013).  
 
The municipality of Acapulco was dominated by the PRI until 1996. Since then, power has 
vacillated between the PRI and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD).  The current 
mayor is Luis Walton-Aburto, a successful business tycoon and at the same time a former 
member of the left wing PRD party before running for office with his own independent 
party, the Movimiento Ciudadano. Walton-Aburto became mayor of Acapulco in October, 
2012.  
Figure 20 Map of Acapulco de Juarez Municipality in Guerrero 
 
Source: INAFED 2014 
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The findings show a case in which the local government projected to increase its property 
tax revenue by revamping the property tax registry and by facilitating the tax payment 
process for taxpayers through online banking. No coercive taxation was observed. 
Instead, alongside the tax raising efforts, the government made extensive efforts to 
improve its image and level of trust among the population, appearing consistent with the 
short path to accountability. The government simultaneously increased accountability 
when demanding more taxes in an implicit agreement. However, it is unclear whether 
municipal leaders did  to achieve tax compliance alone or to enhance their popularity 
more generally. Nevertheless, the local government officials did claim to see a connection 
between accountable governance and increased tax revenue. In the end, murder and 
threats by drug trafficking organisations prevented heightened tax raising efforts that 
may have incited further increases in accountability. 
 
Strategy to increase tax revenue 
According to the municipality’s councillors, the agreed strategy to raise revenue was to 
increase property tax revenue. The property tax is Acapulco’s most important local tax, 
comprising almost 80% of tax revenue. Yet revenues remain well below their potential. 
Around 60% of registered property accounts that owed property tax actually paid and 
this does not take into consideration the omitted and outdated base and values (interview 
69).  
 
Several steps were taken to increase property tax revenues. Cadastral values (the base of 
the property tax) were far below market values or missing altogether, exemptions 
abounded, and non-compliance with payments was not sanctioned. The main task was to 
update the cadastre in order to increase property valuation (interview 69). The director 
of the cadastre was appointed to put the out-dated land registry in order. He started a 
process of reassessing and up-dating information on properties that formed the basis of 
the property tax: the surface area of properties, construction on the property, ownership 
and other rights and obligations for each land plot in the municipality. Also, property 
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values were to be matched to their market values based on information from property 
acquisitions and other transactions.  
 
These intentions were announced in a media campaign. The local government claimed in 
the media that the cadastre was unreliable and needed to be renewed. “We will go house 
by house and update the registry” (Briseño, 2013). According to the director of the 
cadastre, “the registry was recognised as being in disarray and it was impossible even to 
determine how many land plots existed. The idea was to put the cadastre in order: update 
values, expand the base of taxpayers and ensure that all who owned property paid their 
due share” (interview 69). The residents were not consulted on this decision but the 
media campaign had the intention of informing the public more generally and helping 
them to understand that these were necessary steps to improve government finances 
(interview 62).    
 
The administration also tried to increase tax payments by simplifying the payment 
process for the taxpayer. For instance, a one-stop-shop was planned for all tax payments 
to replace numerous bureaucratic steps in different locations. The plan was also to allow 
payment via the internet. According to staff at the municipal cadastral institute, there 
were only six payment points in the municipality where property owners can go to make 
their payments (interview 70). Online property tax payments had been possible in the 
past, but in 2011 the server collapsed and the option was removed. The new government 
has entered into negotiations with two banks, Scotiabank and Bancomer, to reintroduce 
this system using better software. The idea was to have this set up and running within a 
few months from the start of the administration.  
 
One of the councillors stressed that the main strategy to increase taxes was to re-establish 
trust in the government. “People had lost trust. They didn’t know where their money was 
going so they refused to pay” (interview 60), indicating an awareness of the connection 
between local government accountability and residents’ willingness to pay.  
 
Other members of the local government also claimed to see this connection. In an 
interview, another member of the cabildo told me, “If people don’t receive anything for 
their money, they threaten not to pay anymore. Now the government is saying it will help 
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but if we don’t do a good job, people won’t pay their taxes […] If the government is 
corrupt, then people don’t want to pay” (interview 61).  He continued that some people 
don’t pay because they are unable to: perhaps they don’t have a job or simply cannot 
make ends meet as it is. If the government tries to collect taxes from them, they regard the 
government as oppressive. People stop paying for two reasons: first, if the economic 
situation is bad and second, when there is corruption, “but corruption is the main reason” 
(interview 61). The mayor of Acapulco also said to the press, “there are areas where 
people don’t pay. We have to give them services in order to demand a payment from 
them” (Briseño 2013). 
 
According to one of the local councillors, in order to motivate residents to regain trust in 
the local government, and, by extension, to increase tax intake, an immediate campaign 
for street cleaning and public lighting was initiated. These services had been neglected, 
needed urgent attention and, importantly, were also highly and immediately visible. “The 
mayor started with the most visible projects to make the population clearly see that this 
government is different from the last” (interview 60).  
 
In total, 21 actions were promised and advertised. In each action, the government 
branded itself with the slogan “Acapulco puede” (Acapulco can) and a colourful, easily 
recognisable logo, marking a visible break with the past administration, as seen in the 
photograph in Figure 21.   
 
Figure 21 Photograph of Municipal Palace with municipal government logo 
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During the previous administration, public lighting had been neglected, particularly along 
the beach, which caused security concerns. Within the first six months, 44,900 lamps 
were replaced, increasing coverage from 60% to 90% (interview 61; OptimaEnergia, 
2012). The previous administration had not paid the garbage company, so it ceased work 
and garbage piled up in several neighbourhoods. As the administration started in October 
and federal transfers were only due in February, there was no money to buy garbage 
trucks or pay collection companies during those first months. The councillor explained 
that the mayor took it upon himself to ask his friends for help. He managed to borrow 40 
trucks in order to dispose of 800 tons of garbage daily from October until federal funds 
arrived in February. After that beaches and other tourist points of interest were 
remodelled and beautified. Additionally, roads were repaired and pedestrian walkways 
were improved and made accessible for wheelchairs (interview 60).   
 
The mayor also began a programme of administrative transparency. Every three months 
he had the latest revenue and expenditure figures published in the newspapers. “No 
mayor had previously done this in Acapulco and it is not required by law. He goes beyond 
what is required. This gives people a lot of trust in his government” (interview 61). 
“During the previous government, for each bureaucratic step, government officials in the 
municipality would ask for a bribe. Now there is much less of this. The mayor is warning 
his people. One complaint and you’re fired. 200 people have been already fired in this 
administration” (interview 61).   
 
These claims were put into perspective by other informants: “We were more or less told, 
‘I know you’re going to steal, but please steal less’” (interview 62). The corruption 
appears to be a matter of degree. The game appears to be one of highly patrimonial 
politics, to a far more obvious extent than observed in the other municipalities visited. 
According to informants, on top of their official salary, local councillors received two to 
three times their salary for expenses; receipts were not generally asked for (interview 
83). To be sure, there were strings attached to the use of this money:  many of the 
expectations that came with it later became apparent. On Women’s Day, for instance, 
councillors were expected to purchase presents for the leaders of women’s organisations. 
When a councillor was visiting a poor community and an elderly man complained of going 
blind, the councillor was expected to pay for his eye surgery. These public resources were 
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spent arbitrarily and defined by personal power and loyalty to a discernibly greater 
degree than elsewhere. Yet, while there appeared to be less accountability than in other 
municipalities, there was a clear effort to show improvements in accountability than in 
the past.  
Outcomes 
What were the outcomes of the government of Acapulco’s revenue-raising strategy? As it 
turned out, the municipal government was not successful in its attempts to raise revenue. 
All motivation to renew and update the cadastre quickly withered when the director of 
the cadastre was murdered two months into the new administration, together with the 
data manager of the municipal treasury. Sources say that it was narcotics traffickers who 
killed them for trying to update the property registry. One of the directors in the local 
government explained, “he tried to put order into the system and the mafia didn’t like 
that” (interview 69). The drug traffickers had controlled the property registry up until 
then and did not want this to change. “They somehow got a hold of it and they have a 
strong interest in maintaining their control” (interview 69).  
 
It is difficult to keep up with which narcotics trafficking group dominates in Acapulco, the 
site of many turf wars between various “cartels”. There are many reasons why drug gangs 
take an interest in controlling the land registry. Information in the property registries 
helps them to collect protection money. They also have an interest in keeping property 
values low. The greater the discrepancy between the market value and the cadastral 
value, the greater the opportunity for money laundering: properties can officially be sold 
at a massive profit. 
 
The rest of the staff at the municipal secretariat of finance continued to live in fear. It had 
been impossible to find a willing replacement for the position of director of the cadastre. 
At the moment of the last interviews in June 2013, the head of finances was still wearing 
both hats: in the mornings he was in the finance office on the coast and after the lunch 
break he worked in the cadastre directorate behind the Zocalo (the main square). Since 
the murders it has taken the remaining staff some time to get everything together and 
understand where the two experts left off. Their motivation to make any changes that 
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would affect or increase property tax revenue was severely dampened and they were 
afraid to be seen to be making any changes. They kept a low profile and even the 
negotiations with the banks (Scotiabank and Bancomer) were abandoned.  
 
According to one local councillor, explicit bargains were struck with the hotelier industry 
concerning their tax obligations, as they pay a large share of property taxes. 
Unfortunately I was unable to gain further details on the extent or on the nature of this 
share or the negotiations. According to the president of the association of hotels and 
tourism, the government is particularly attentive to their needs and public services are 
targeted to them (interview 68). Yet what these deals included remains opaque and it was 
difficult to ascertain whether government leaders’ acquiescing to the hotel industry was 
primarily to motivate compliance with taxes. While the hotels pay larger property taxes 
than the general population, the concentration of ownership was not that stark to make it 
worthwhile to just go after these firms. What they would pay still does not compare to 
what the local government receives from the masses of property owners with smaller 
bills. They may have been simply trying to encourage tourism. It is generally accepted in 
Acapulco that if tourism is doing well, then the entire economy does well too. Or they may 
have been seeking personal benefits. Some former local public servants boasting that they 
owned entire floors of condominiums in hotel complexes along the bay sparked the 
suspicions that it may be the latter (interview 83). 
Concluding remarks 
In Acapulco, the strategy to raise revenue was not coercive taxation. Instead, the plan was 
to increase tax intake by facilitating tax payments for taxpayers through online payment 
options and by having all property owners pay the amount they actually owed according 
to facts that reflected reality in an updated and modernised property cadastre. In the end, 
organised crime got in the way of this strategy. The revenue-raising efforts were largely 
dropped as a result of fear of retaliation from the drug gangs.  
 
Explicit bargaining was carried out with representatives of the hotel industry. It was clear 
that they worked together for mutual gain: the local government took measures to 
improve services that would encourage tourism, such as implementing street lighting and 
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a clean boardwalk along the bay. However, I was unable to determine whether the local 
councillors were making concessions because they were after the hotel industry’s tax 
revenue or other advantages.  
 
The local administration took many steps at the beginning of its term period to gain trust 
and improve its image alongside motivating residents to pay taxes for a greater tax intake. 
This may be viewed as an attempt at implicit bargaining: local government leaders 
manifested their awareness that residents would not pay taxes if they distrusted the 
government. If they regained trust, perhaps more taxes could be demanded. However, 
despite what government officials claimed, the principal intention might have been 
primarily to make the government improve its image, particularly after a very unpopular 
earlier administration, for reasons beyond raising tax revenue. As the coordinator of 
public services of the municipal government said, “the change in image and the effort to 
gain trust from the residents does not only increase tax compliance: it makes the 
government more popular generally.” I then asked why the mayor wants to be popular if 
the Mexican Constitution does not allow for him to be re-elected. He replied that, “He may 
be elected for something else in future” (interview 61). Tax revenue may thus be a 
motivator for cultivating an image of accountable governance, but career aspirations are 
likely to be a stronger motivator for local politicians. 
 
 
7.2 Centro: Oil wealth and street vendors 
 
Centro is the most important municipality of the city of Villahermosa, which means 
‘beautiful town’ in Spanish – although this is not what awaits the visitor. The city 
experienced a petrol boom after the discovery of massive offshore oil deposits in the 
1970s. Oil money financed the rapid construction of bulky infrastructure projects and 
smoggy, congested highways now meander around the marshes and tropical parks of this 
hot, humid, mosquito-infested swampland. It is also a city of newly rich petro tycoons and 
has a noticeable obesity problem, reportedly well above the Mexican average (Hernández, 
2012). After Mérida, it is now the most important commercial centre between Mexico City 
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and Cancun. The oil-funded prosperity has also led to a bloated bureaucracy. In Tabasco, 
the principal employer is the government. Employees of the national oil company PEMEX 
are the highest paid in town. Yet at the same time there is poverty and streets in the city 
centre are lined with informal vendors working hard in the scorching heat and in the rain 
barely earning enough to get by. Oil money has made living costs soar and has crowded 
out other industries. All staple foods are imported from other states or from abroad. The 
current mayor is Humberto de los Santos Bertruy of the PRD (a former PRI member who 
moved to the PRD after his original party did not select him as a running candidate), in 
power since January 2013.  
 
Figure 22 Map of Municipality of Centro in Tabasco 
 
Source: INAFED, 2014 
 
In this case the municipality set out to increase property tax intake and to make use of a 
second previously unexploited tax: street vendor fees. No coercion was observed. 
Regarding the property tax, explicit bargaining was observed only between the local 
government and individual taxpayers with the outcome of reducing the latter’s individual 
tax obligation but with no beneficial outcomes for the wider local population. Regarding 
street vendor fees, there was an explicit bargaining process in which the local 
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government was already taking steps to be responsive to street vendors’ needs while 
negotiating taxation. There was also evidence of possible implicit bargaining as 
statements to the media were made in which the government pledged to improve 
accountability and transparency alongside collecting taxes. Also, the government is 
generally perceived as relatively more corrupt than in other municipalities and people 
may therefore pay correspondingly little property tax.  
 
Strategy to increase tax revenue 
The strategy of the local government, according to the local councillor of the municipality 
of Centro specialised on treasury affairs, was to increase tax revenue with priority placed 
on property taxation as this was viewed to have the greatest revenue potential (interview 
58). He added that increases in its tax take would bring in more transfers because of the 
intergovernmental transfer formula. He was thus aware of and appeared motivated by 
the incentive of the central government transfer formula which rewards increases in 
property tax revenue (and water user fees) with a higher amount of central government 
transfers (See Chapter 3 and Law of Fiscal Coordination, 2011).  
 
The municipal administration believed that a large increase in tax revenues could be 
attained through even just a little bit of tax effort as prior administrations had hardly 
made any (interview 44). The municipal governments in Centro have traditionally made 
little revenue raising effort because it would receive exceptionally large amounts of 
federal transfers as it is located in an oil extraction area and receives a bonus for this. Its 
proportion of tax revenues to total revenues at around 11% is thus far lower than in other 
municipalities of comparable size (see Table 30 in Chapter 6).  
 
Tax compliance was low, estimated at around 30% so the aim was simply to urge 
residents to pay. It is well remembered among the current leaders that a past 
administration in 2005 proposed to raise property valuation to adjust it to inflation. A 
gradual increase was proposed over three years: the rise would only be applied to 40% of 
the full amount in 2005, then a further 30% in 2006 and the final 30% in 2007. Yet the 
mayor who decided this, Floricel Medina Pérez Nieto, consequently “died politically [...] 
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Mayors don’t want to bother people for taxes. It doesn’t’ make them popular” (interview 
50). In view of its more urgent revenue needs, however, the current administration felt it 
should make an attempt.  
 
The internal policy set out by the directorate of finance of Centro, Tabasco at the start of 
the administration in January 2013 was “to support the compliant taxpayer and 
incentivise legalisation of the incompliant” (Finanzas, 2013). Specifically, discounts and 
partial amnesties were enforced and fees on late payments were scrapped in order to 
motivate residents to become compliant, but at the same time legal recourse would be 
threatened against those that had not paid their taxes for many years (Independiente, 
2013), including through foreclosures of properties (Hernández, 2012).   “To be perfectly 
clear, we are not raising the tax rate. But we are going after those who have not paid what 
they owe” (interview 44). The strategy was therefore not one of coercive taxation, but 
largely just positively motivating compliance and also reducing arrears, including through 
foreclosures.  Much care was taken not to appear overly harsh. 
 
A second unexploited revenue source which the revenue director regarded as having 
potential and wanted to target were street vendors fees. These are collected from the 
leaders of street vendors and market stands for the space they occupy for their sales. It’s a 
source of municipal revenue that previous administrations had been unconcerned with. 
According to one local councillor who had been a local councillor in previous 
administrations also, “if the street vendors didn’t pay, not much would happen in the 
past” (interview 58). The revenue director estimated that about 10 to 15% of the 
municipal population comprises informal vendors. “There are at least 20,000 that 
currently don’t pay even a single peso.  If each of these pays 36 pesos per month, then that 
would amount to about 8,640,000 million pesos” (interview 84). The plan was to 
negotiate with the leaders of the street vendors to see if they could strike a mutually 
beneficial arrangement. 
 
Alongside the plan to raise the tax intake, this administration also promised transparency 
and accountability at the start of the property tax paying season in January 2013. A press 
release of the Municipal Government of Centro in January reported that the local 
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councillors vowed to “guarantee transparency and austerity and to contribute to better 
services for the citizenry” (Centro, 2013). 
 
However, there was a limit to what the local government could do in terms of providing 
services to the residents. All of Centro’s un-earmarked transfers (participaciones) are 
directed towards personnel (salaries of the municipal workers). The municipal 
government in Centro employs 6800 people (compared to 3000 in Saltillo and 1200 in La 
Paz), 4000 of which are unionised and cannot be dismissed. “A great number of them are 
obsolete: there is no money for them to actually do anything” (interview 49). The 
remaining funds are earmarked, particularly for energy and public lighting.    
Outcomes 
A.  Property taxes 
 
During my interviews with the local councillors in their offices, a group of protesters 
congregated in the municipal palace. The protestors came to demand a delegate to 
represent their colony in the municipality. Each colony in the municipality has an elected 
delegate who serves as a representative who defends their interests. Tierra Amarilla is a 
colony slightly north of Centro that, according to the government, lies within the borders 
of the neighbouring municipality of Nacajuca. It is a rural colony with only 970 
inhabitants. The protesters, interestingly, shouted, “We pay property tax in Centro. Now 
give us representation!” One of the local councillors explained, “They are fulfilling 
obligations in order to get rights. They have no services, only water but it is not potable. 
They want to be connected to Centro’s network. They want their own delegate who will 
then get them connected to Centro’s municipal services” (interview 58). Whether this 
would be granted remained to be seen. 
 
The residents of Tierra Amarilla that organised a protest outside the offices of the local 
councillors also saw a link between taxation and accountability: they attempted to trade 
paying property taxes in exchange for receiving a delegate to represent them and access 
to public services. The residents voluntarily paid taxes in the hope that it would 
strengthen their bargaining power for receiving representation and municipal 
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government services. I was unable to find out if the municipal government finally 
conceded to their demands.  
 
However, besides this instance, I found no evidence of explicit bargains between the local 
government and a larger group of residents. Explicit bargains were only observed 
between the local government and individual taxpayers. Further discounts, pardons of 
late payment fees and other exceptions were negotiated retrospectively with taxpayers 
who came to the office to ask for them. A constant stream of residents walked into the 
revenue director’s office during my interviews asking for pardons of late payment fees or 
further discounts –including ad hoc discounts legitimised by the signature of the finance 
director-- and these were often granted. The largest exemption I witnessed involved a  
company with over 1000 land plots that owed over a million pesos in property tax. The 
mayor ordered a tax pardon for the company director of a certain percentage of his 
property tax payment since he had helped him with his campaign (interview 84). There 
was opposition to the discounts and exceptions in the revenue office: “They are a 
nightmare to administer and they create vices. Many think that because they voted for the 
mayor, they will get special tax treatment. But if we don’t grant these discounts then 
many people won’t pay anything at all” (interview 44). 
 
Why have they found it so difficult to increase property tax revenues? Did it have to do 
with the fact that they were perceived as unaccountable, therefore comprising an implicit 
agreement in which taxpayers adjust their behaviour of evading or paying given the level 
of accountability of the government? According to the revenue director, the main reason 
for the low tax compliance was the culture of not paying taxes that existed in Tabasco 
more generally, which he believed was due to a deep-rooted distrust in the government. 
This in turn may in part be due to Centro’s characteristic of an oil producing municipality. 
There is a sense among residents that the local government should have plenty of money 
already and shouldn’t need to pay taxes. The governments which natural resource wealth 
obtain less tax revenue and are more likely to be corrupt have both been argued in the 
literature on the natural resource curse (Ross 2001, 2004).  The revenue director 
estimated that Centro collects only a fraction of the potential. “Each year, half pay, half are 
late and the backlogs continue to accumulate. Over 400 million pesos is what we could get 
if everyone paid what they really owed” (interview 44). Yet a more realistic estimation for 
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2013 is 126.2 million pesos, which is what was budgeted (See Revenue Law of Centro, 
2012).  
 
But are people content with the services? One informant in the municipal government 
candidly answered, “No. There is a lot of dissatisfaction and we receive constant 
complaints” (interview 84). It was mentioned that water service coverage was poor and 
water was not clean (“chocolate water” is the term commonly used to describe it). There 
was garbage in the streets and public lighting had not expanded to cover all parts of the 
city. “The population wants to see the services first. Then they might pay. But the 
municipality doesn’t have the money to make the first step and improve things.  It’s a 
chicken and egg problem” (interview 44).  
 
Why is there such deep distrust of the government? The state of Tabasco was the very last 
one of 31 states to approve its State Transparency and Access to Information Law, which 
is to create a transparency institute that oversees and promotes both state and local 
government accountability. It entered into force in February of 2007, no less than five 
years after a federal transparency law required all states to approve theirs (Abdo Francis, 
2010; Maldonado Garcia & Gallegos Pérez, 2010; Salazar Ugarte, 2008). In 2010 the 
councillors of the state transparency institute (ITAIP) resigned in frustration, saying that 
the State Transparency Law was dead letter. The new leaders have been accused of 
covering up and legitimatising the governments’ corrupt activities, rather than 
uncovering or preventing them. They allegedly entered into an agreement with the last 
administration and revealed public information very selectively (interview 51).  
 
One members of an NGO in Tabasco claimed that, “Transparency and access to 
information may have improved but there is no accountability. Corruption has risen” 
(interview 51). Another purported that, “Immunity continues and government leaders 
leave [their term] rich” (interview 47).  Corruption scandals have certainly dominated the 
news headlines. In 2007 $3 million of a $4 million federal disaster fund granted to the 
state following heavy floods allegedly went missing  (Arias Rodríguez, 2009). Dubious 
financial management resulted in a hospital crisis in November and December 2012. The 
hospitals did not receive their share of government funds, leaving doctors unpaid, and 
patients unattended (Barboza, 2012, 2013; Pérez Marin, 2013). The estimated amount of 
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diverted funds that were supposed to reach healthcare totalled $1.5 billion pesos (Marí, 
2013). The arrest of the governor and former mayor Andrés Rafael Granier Melo in June 
2013 on charges of corruption and embezzlement of public funds may also be a sign that 
the time of impunity was coming to end (Zabludovsky, 2013). However, there is still a 
strong perception that the government is manipulating information and government 
institutions cover up each other’s illegal activities (interview 51). 
 
The municipal government did not suffer the same public scandals as the state 
administration The corrupt state governor Granier Melo, for instance, was highly 
regarded as a municipal mayor before he was elected governor. However, many suspect 
complicity between the state and municipality as the former audits the latter. “They cover 
for and protect one another. Additionally, the present [municipal] administration always 
covers for the former [municipal administration], saying that there is no evidence of 
wrongdoing and it is hoped that the future administration will do the same [for them]” 
(interview 52). The perception of a corrupt government that has been in the headlines 
because of issues at state level thus also affects the residents’ perception also of local 
government. And, according to both informants in the office of coordinator of 
transparency and access to public Information and the revenue director of the 
Municipality, the distrust sparked by the state government’s misuse of funds is making 
residents wary of trusting even local government with their tax money (interviews 47 
and 44). 
 
B. Street vendor fees 
 
Regarding the street vendor fees, the administration, through its coordinator of auditing, 
began to engage with the leaders of the street vendors and to mend relations that had 
previously been poor. There are 250 groups of street vendors around the historic centre’s 
market alone. Each group of 30 to 100 vendors has a leader who helps to protect them 
and their selling spot. The leaders fight for the spaces of their vendors and reserve them 
when they are vacant. They are also their representatives vis-à-vis the government.  
 
The municipal administration reached out to the leaders of the street vendors and at the 
time of interview, they were in the midst of negotiations to establish how much they 
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should pay in fees.  The leaders would collect these from their members and then take 
them to the municipal till. They considered the proposed tax/permit fee too expensive 
and wanted to bring it down by half.  
 
Negotiations continued during the time of interview and no agreement had been reached, 
but the extent to which the government responded to the street vendors and their needs 
had already changed considerably from the previous administration. In the previous 
administration, there was constant tension between the street vendors and the municipal 
government. The government continuously wanted the street vendors to stop clogging up 
the streets and sidewalks and to stop causing congestion. According to one of the leaders 
of the street vendors, “Pepe Canabal”, “they [the last administration] didn’t help us in 
anything. There were many violent confrontations between the vendors and the 
government. The new government is far more cooperative” (interview 53).  
 
A second leader of another part of the historic centre, Manuel “El Cacahuate”, told the 
same story: “Now there is good communication. There is a lot of dialogue. They are giving 
us respect and that is fundamental” (interview 54).  He added that “When the government 
shows us a benefit, we comply. If not, we get angry. […] The problem is when they don’t 
show a motive for why they are taking our money away from us. […]. We now see 
municipal government employees cleaning or remodelling the market” (interview 54).  
 
This stood in stark contrast to the way the coordinator of auditing of the previous 
administration dealt with the street vendors. “He would walk through the streets like a 
local boss with his men following behind him --like a mafia gang-- threatening people to 
leave or see their goods destroyed” (interview 55). He and his men removed the street 
vendor’s stands overnight and set up barriers on the sidewalks to prevent them from 
laying out their products and setting up shop. A third group leader, “La Doña Betty”, on 
the job for about 15 years, said “previously they would crush our stores, sometimes with 
no prior notice. […] There was no dialogue. There was no consensus” (interview 56). 
 
The new administration was actively cooperating with the street vendors and took steps 
to demonstrate that it was working with rather than against them. There is a chance that 
the changed attitude to the past administration may have been because of campaign 
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promises. The street vendors may have delivered bloc votes to the new administration 
and the greater respect and cooperation was for this reason. But even if this was the case, 
the new approach provided opportunities for further bargaining around taxation and 
continued mutually beneficial outcomes were being negotiated as the result of the 
municipality’s revenue needs.  
Concluding remarks 
The revenue director of the municipality certainly perceived a link between 
accountability and taxation, which he worded as such: “If I am dependent on you for 
taxes, I have to listen to you” (interview 44). And this was manifested in the government’s 
conciliatory approach to the street vendors. To collect higher taxes, instead of threatening 
them and destroying their stands like the previous government, the new government 
entered into a dialogue with the leaders, showed respect to all the vendors and 
cooperated to help them clean and upgrade their selling areas in what holds hope of 
becoming a mutually beneficial outcome to an explicit tax bargaining. The local 
government took steps to show its cooperation prior to agreeing on the level of street 
vendor fees. This is consistent with the short path towards accountability.   
 
The residents of Tierra Amarilla who organised a protest outside the councillors’ offices 
also perceived a link between taxation and accountability: they attempted to exchange 
property tax payments for receiving a delegate to represent them and gain access to 
public services for them. The residents voluntarily paid taxes in the hope that it would 
strengthen their bargaining power for representation and municipal government 
services. Whether the municipal government would grant them what they demanded, 
however, remains to be seen. 
 
Aside from this incident, explicit bargaining surrounding property taxation mainly 
involved individual taxpayers negotiating their personal tax obligation. The tax office 
received many complaints in this way. Yet it also shied away from raising the tax rate or 
raising values, remembering the political consequences this had for a previous mayor. 
Given the residents’ distrust of local government (which in fact largely stemmed from 
corruption at state level rather than local level), they were less willing to pay and the local 
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government knew it could not get away with higher demands. Instead, they felt that they 
needed to grant discounts and exceptions in order to receive any payment at all. This can 
be seen as an implicit agreement, but it cannot be said that it prompted greater 
accountability. Instead, the residents wanted to see greater responsive and better 
services before they considered paying higher taxes.   
 
 
7.3 La Paz: Intergovernmental rivalries 
 
La Paz lies in the state of Baja California Sur, on the eastern bay side of the peninsula, 
allowing its visitors to witness stunning sunsets from along its boardwalk. The nearby 
biosphere reserves (UNESCO World Heritage sites) draw tourists and it is a popular stop 
for trips between the beach resorts at Los Cabos in the south and whale watching spots 
further north. However, one need not venture far into the city from the boardwalk to note 
the many empty shops, abandoned land plots, and deteriorating roads. La Paz used to be 
in a booming special economic zone (the whole of Baja California Sur and Campeche was) 
until the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1994. La Paz saw 
its peak as a bustling centre of commerce in the 70’s and 80’s but has since deteriorated. 
The current municipal government has been in power since July 2011. It is headed by 
Mayor Esthela de Jesús Ponce Beltrán of the PRI, which ran in coalition with the Green 
Party in La Paz.  
 
The strategy to raise tax revenues involved tackling three different taxes: the property 
tax, local bus fees and garbage sales. In this case, again, no coercion was observed. 
Negotiations were started to make tax bargains around the local bus fees, but not with the 
other two tax handles. However, an implicit agreement may have been present as the 
local government simultaneously took steps to appear transparent when it urged 
property owners to pay their tax.   
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Figure 23 Map of La Paz in Baja California Sur 
 
Source: INAFED, 2014 
Strategy to increase tax revenues 
The municipal government in La Paz set out to raise tax revenues predominantly by 
increasing property tax revenue. The local council approved a law to modernize the 
cadastre in February of 2013 but were still awaiting approval by the state congress. 
Already starting in January 2013, they introduced efforts to detect omissions in the 
property registry through aerial photography.  Many property owners underwent 
construction on their property, which would increase the valuation of the property, but 
these constructions had not been declared to the revenue authorities. The municipality 
thus began to confront property owners who had neglected to declare new construction 
or other changes to their property that would increase the property valuation. The 
revenue director repeatedly emphasised that they are not raising the tax rate but only 
capturing omissions in order to increase tax revenue.  
 
Compliance was estimated to be as low as 20%: the aim was to increase compliance by 
making it easier for residents to make their municipal tax payments. Internet payments 
were made possible for paying the property tax (though it was not yet possible to pay in 
banks). Mobile paying stations were introduced that would drive around to suburban and 
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rural parts of the municipality so residents did not need to travel into the town centre to 
pay their taxes. According to one official in the treasury, “We know the Mexican. The 
easier it is for him to pay, the better. We publicise it on the radio and on television, we 
send teams to the houses. People like physical ease. We bring the till closer to them” 
(interview 29).  
 
Two further proposals to raise revenue were made. The first was to raise local bus fees. 
They negotiated with local transport industry in order to come to an agreement on this. 
The second was to sell garbage to private companies for recycling. As there was no legal 
basis for the municipal government to sell its garbage, a law was prepared and sent to the 
state congress for approval.  
 
Alongside trying to raise tax revenue, the municipality set out to reduce its payroll which 
was creating a lot of costs and preventing investment in public goods and services. Steps 
were also taken to assure better transparency and access to public information. “The best 
way to demand property tax is to show what we are doing with it.”, said the mayor 
(interview 34). 
 
Cutting payroll costs to release funds for investment proved difficult, however, as most 
employees of the municipality (1200) are unionized and “it is impossible to dismiss these 
workers” (interview 30). It was added that if only these trabajadores (workers) were 
really trabajadores (hard-working) (interview 30): many of the positions are unnecessary 
but given the rigid labour laws, the municipality could do little to reduce payroll costs 
beyond abstaining from hiring new workers.   
 
The current mayor also wanted to restore society’s confidence in the local government, 
which, according to the municipal auditor, had been lost: “The past government had been 
opaque and the mayor wanted to change this” (interview 32). Mayor Esthela de Jesús 
Ponse Beltrán introduced a “zero-corruption” plan as part of her campaign platform. This 
plan consisted of  four pillars: (1) transparency (2) accountability (3) citizen participation 
and (4) administrative reorganisation (interview 34). “She [the mayor] wanted to change 
the attitude and image of the government. [The zero-corruption plan] is what she was 
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elected for. More revenue may surely come as a consequence, but this was not the 
primary motivation” (interview 32).  
 
When the new government came into power, the mayor demanded external audits for 
certain transactions made by the previous government. Warnings were given to previous 
officials according to the Law of Responsibility of Public Servants. According to a local 
councillor, this broke a tradition of keeping quiet about irregular activities of the previous 
government in the hope that the next government would do the same (interview 36). This 
statement about the change in behaviour must be qualified, however, in that  the party in 
power had changed. The previous four administrations had all been PRD administrations 
and therefore were less likely to blame or bring legal charges against other 
administrations of their own party.   
 
Since coming to power, the administration adhered to transparency laws requiring them 
to maintain an online directory of officials with their telephone numbers and publish 
council acts online, and in the print media. Regarding the goal of increasing citizen 
participation, a three point framework was in place. First, to involve groups from civil 
society in pubic work projects, their approval would be required in the decision-making 
phase of the project cycle.  Second, the municipal audit office would respond to citizen 
requests. The office would also receive questions and complaints in person and there was 
an option of asking questions on the website, which links straight to the auditor’s 
computer. Third, suggestion boxes: one in the municipal government building, one by the 
potable water system, and one at the main transport terminal. The contents are collected 
and reviewed on a weekly basis.  
 
Given that records by the past administration had not been passed on, it was difficult to 
find out whether these measures had been newly introduced or had also existed during 
the previous administration. According to an advisor to the municipality’s treasury 
director, before an administration hands over power (especially to a new administration 
of a different political party) “they erase everything from the computers, if they even 
leave the computers” (interview 30). Either way, they were listed as part of the 
municipality’s steps to enhance accountability to the residents. Yet again, it was difficult 
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to determine if these steps would not have been taken even if the municipality was not 
trying to increase tax compliance, as it may have just wanted to enhance its popularity.  
Outcomes 
 
a. Property taxes 
There was no coercive taxation surrounding the property tax. Instead, immediate 
incentives and discounts and a longer term plan to capturing omissions through a 
cadastral modernization were the strategy (Rebolledo, 2013). These enhanced efforts 
were partly successful but not as much as the municipal treasury had hoped. Property tax 
revenue rose by 27% from 2011 to 2012 and was expected to increase further in the 
following years as the cadastre would be modernised and land values updated (mostly 
adjusted upwards to be closer to their market values), but projections had been higher. 
According to the municipal treasury director, the previous administrations neither made 
people pay taxes nor did it spend or invest very much. “Now the population has a poor 
habit of not paying” (interview 29). In other words, as government performance was low, 
there was also a correspondingly poor culture of compliance which was difficult to 
overcome. Property tax compliance (the amount received divided by the amount owed) 
was at 22.6 % in 2012 according to data by the Ministry of Finance (See Table 2 in 
Chapter 3 for a comparison of estimated compliance rates across Mexican states). The 
treasury director predicted that it would take some years for the culture of compliance to 
improve and it also required them to consistently witness solid municipal financial 
management and adequate service provision (interview 29).  
 
Explicit bargaining was only observed between the local government and residents when 
the latter challenged their tax obligation, though not to the extent witnessed in Centro. 
While no explicit bargaining was observed with any large groups of residents for broader 
gains, there were sustained efforts at local accountability in order to maintain people’s 
confidence in the government and how it managed its budget. Sustained efforts were 
made to bring down municipal debt, not only through investing in increased future 
revenues but also in renegotiating debt. This was done with a great effort at being 
transparent and providing services efficiently. This may be regarded as implicit 
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bargaining in which the municipality tried to show it was increasing accountability in 
order for the residents to be more willing to comply with their tax payments. This 
describes a causal pathway following the short path to accountability. Towards the end of 
its administration, the municipal treasury could boast that it had greatly reduced the six 
billion peso debt problem that it had inherited from the previous administration. At the 
same time, it made improvements to the local police service, expanded public lighting, 
invested in water treatment plants, and built 124km of road works, a Municipal Art 
Centre and a Women’s Centre (Puga Lizardi, 2014).  
 
b. Revenue from local transport fees and garbage sales 
No coercive taxation was observed surrounding the local transport fees or garbage sales 
either. The local government reached an explicit bargain with the local bus industry. The 
local bus industry agreed that it would charge higher fees and pass these on to the local 
government, in exchange for local government actions that would benefit them as a group 
in the form of upgraded bus services. I was told by one of the local councillors, “If we raise 
the fee, we must also raise the quality of transportation and we must reduce the fee if we 
don’t comply with our promises” (interview 37).   
 
However, the negotiations were abandoned and the administration was unable to reach 
its goal of increasing transport fees. A municipal budget law proposal to raise bus fees 
was brought to the state congress in September 2011 (as the state congress needs to 
approve all changes in municipal tax rates as well as the introduction of new taxes). The 
state congress never reviewed it, ignoring the timeframe laid out for decision-making. 
The municipal government thus withdrew the draft budget law in July 2012 and 
resubmitted it three months later. The state congress then finally did review it but 
rejected it, “for no good reason” according to informants in the municipal offices 
(interview 85).   
 
They were also unable to introduce the law that would enable them to sell their garbage 
for recycling. Although this would be an environmentally-friendly source of income with 
no burden on residents (instead a company willing to way to take the garbage), state 
congress rejected it. “Being from another party, they are killing all of our initiatives” 
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(interview 86). Legal remedies to bypass ungrounded decisions or undue delays exist 
“but these are costly and rarely utilised” (interview 86)”. 
 
Besides rejecting proposals to raise transport fees and introduce an environmentally 
friendly tax, the state government also made the municipality pay a large fee for 
publishing anything in the official bulletin to give legal validity to their laws. This had 
never been practice under the previous (PRD) state government. This was finally revoked 
through a decree of the current state governor at the end of 2012.  
 
“It is difficult if the municipal government and the governor are from different parties” 
(interview 31). The current governor is from the centre right National Action Party (PAN) 
(although he is a former mayor of the left wing Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD): the 
parties that dominate in the cabildo, however, are PRI and Verde (in coalition), as shown 
in Table 33. The obstacle in the way of a bargain was thus one of political party rivalry 
between the state and municipal government in this three tiered federal system. 
 
Table 33 Parties in power at state and municipal level in Centro, 2005-2012 
  Municipal level State level 
2005 PRD PRD 
2006 PRD PRD 
2007 PRD PRD 
2008 PRD PRD 
2009 PRD PRD 
2010 PRD PRD 
2011 PRI/Verde PAN 
2012 PRI/Verde PAN 
2013 PRI/Verde PAN 
 
Concluding remarks 
No coercion was observed. There were no explicit agreements around the property tax, 
apart from individuals challenging their personal tax obligation. There was, however, 
evidence consistent with an implicit agreement. The officials of the municipal government 
who were interviewed claimed that if the government spent its resources well, then 
people would pay taxes (interviews 29, 30). The municipality of La Paz made an effort to 
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cultivate a more accountable image than the previous administration. With a view to 
enhancing trust in the government and improving its image, the mayor set out on a zero-
corruption platform in her campaign and has followed through with her plans. However, 
it is unclear whether this was primarily done with the intention of improving tax 
compliance or simply to cultivate a positive image in order for the Mayor to gain political 
power. 
 
There was an explicit bargaining process surrounding local bus fees. However, the 
municipal government’s efforts to strike a tax deal were subverted by the state 
government. The state congress is required to approve municipal government proposals 
to change tax rates or introduce new laws. Conflict and competition between the different 
levels of government (or their political parties) in this federal system thus stifled the 
ability of the municipal government to raise revenues in order for processes leading to 
increased accountability to even begin.  
 
 
7.4 Case comparisons 
 
This section compares the evidence presented in Sections 7.1 to 7.3 above and draws 
conclusions about whether or not revenue pressure on the municipal governments led to 
explicit or implicit tax bargaining and if these may be leading to increased accountability. 
I first recount and compare the strategies taken in these cases to raise revenues. I look at 
whether pressure to raise tax revenue led to tax bargaining or coercive taxation. If there 
was tax bargaining, I look at which form this took. Were there explicit negotiations or 
implicit agreements? And did these lead to accountability following the short or long 
path? I also address the secondary questions about the tax type (whether different types 
of taxes had different effects in sparking the expected processes and why), and the 
obstacles that stood in the way of taxation leading to greater accountability. In doing so, I 
bring further evidence from the field research as well as from secondary sources into the 
discussion. 
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Revenue raising strategy: No coercive taxation 
 
In none of the cases did I observe any coercive taxation. The strategies of the local 
governments were to motivate residents to pay their taxes primarily through positive 
incentives (especially discounts on their tax obligation, raffles and prizes), not through 
fear, violence or any other form of coercion. While some threatened foreclosures to those 
in default of their payments, the municipal governments in no case wanted to appear too 
harsh. Given the context of electoral accountability and the elected municipal leaders 
having career aspirations also in their party, and a culture of low tax compliance in the 
municipalities, it was more important for the government to maintain a positive image. 
There was great fear of “political death” through overly enthusiastic taxation, as those in 
Centro recalled.  
 
There was also a clear preference to exhaust all possibilities before actually raising the 
tax rate or pursuing non-compliant taxpayers as this was deemed extremely unpopular. 
And there appeared to be substantial scope to raise the property tax intake through 
several methods short of actually raising the tax rate or the tax bills of property owners. 
Such methods focused on motivating people to pay who otherwise evaded, including 
economic incentives such as discounts and promises to pardon fines for past arrears 
(applied in each of the three municipalities) and facilitating the tax paying process, 
including by increasing payment points through online paying options (as in La Paz), 
paying in banks (as was attempted in Acapulco), and through mobile tills that drove 
around the municipality to meet the taxpayers closer to their homes (in La Paz).  
 
Evidence from the municipalities visited, as well as from secondary sources, indicated 
that municipal leaders in fact tried to exhaust all alternative sources of revenue intake 
before making use of the tax handles. These included both ordinary and extraordinary 
transfers from the federal government or loans from private banks and international 
institutions (interview 95). The mayor of Acapulco, for example, first tried to receive a 
rescue fund from the central government (Ponce, 2013). Only when this failed were other 
revenue options considered (interview 69). The unit in the federal finance ministry 
responsible for coordination with federal entities complains that subnational leaders are 
incessantly asking it for funds while leaving their tax powers unexploited (interview 95). 
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Many municipal governments simply cut down on spending, defaulted on their liabilities 
(including personnel payments) or dug themselves further into debt (Romero, 2012). 
Many municipalities managed to illegitimately pass debt and liabilities to their successors 
through crafty accounting methods. These are all ways to circumvent unpopular tax 
collection despite substantial revenue pressure. As one revenue director recounted, “If 
municipal governments don’t raise revenues, they run into debts. But in many places they 
don’t want to raise revenues anyway even if it means running high debts. In Tecoman [a 
municipality in Colima], for example, they have a budget of 280 million pesos and ran 
debts totalling 200 million pesos. This poor management is the negligence of the 
municipal president and the local councillors. All the other treasurers are crying in 
anguish of  the mismanagement happening there” (interview 73). 
 
Explicit tax bargains with individuals and special interest groups 
 
Regarding the property tax, explicit tax bargains predominantly occurred between the 
local government and individual (potential) taxpayers: individuals would come to the tax 
office of the municipal revenue directors in order to negotiate a lowering of their personal 
tax obligation. This was observed most blatantly in Centro, where a constant stream of 
taxpayers entered the tax office wanting to negotiate down their tax bill.  
 
Did these types of explicit bargains have any outcomes consistent with an increase in 
local government accountability? Generally they appeared only to benefit the individual 
in the form of a tax reduction. The only way that this could lead to a benefit to a wider 
group of people would conceivably be because it was a form of engagement in which the 
government learned about complaints. Yet for this to have positive outcomes for 
accountability, it would require that the local government also acted on these complaints, 
for which no evidence was found.  
 
In all three municipalities, there were also explicit tax bargains with specific groups of 
taxpayers with common interests. In La Paz, explicit bargains were initiated with the local 
transport sector regarding transport fees with negotiations to see how the transport 
service could be improved.  
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In Centro, explicit bargains were observed with two specific groups. The first was with 
the leaders of street vendors: the local government tried to get the street vendors to pay 
street vendor fees, a tax instrument which had rarely been utilised by local governments 
in the past, and offered services and concessions in return. Negotiations had not been 
concluded but outcomes consistent with accountability to a wider group looked 
promising. The government offered to provide specific services, such keeping the streets 
clean and bringing them unified stalls in return for tax payments. The leaders resisted the 
high price and tried to negotiate it down, asking for further concessions from the 
government including assurances of protection, assistance with keeping the markets 
clean and upgrading the market stands. 
 
Also in Centro, there was an explicit bargain between the local government and the 
residents of Tierra Amarilla. Residents from that colony (not officially located within the 
municipality) took collective action and came to protest in front of the municipal palace. 
The residents voluntarily paid taxes in the hope that it would strengthen their bargaining 
power for being considered part of the municipality, receiving representation and 
obtaining access to Centro’s local government services. Yet this bargaining was not 
sparked by the local government. Instead, it was initiated by residents of the colony who 
approached the local government, not in response to tax demands but voluntarily. They 
presumably made this attempt in view of the Centro’s tax revenue needs, which means 
that the revenue needs may be considered to have sparked the bargaining process. The 
municipal government had not yet conceded to those residents’ demands, (though the 
residents continued the campaign a year later), but the outcomes the residents were 
demanding would have been consistent with an increase in local government 
accountability. Besides this case in Centro, which was initiated by the residents, no 
negotiations were made with representatives of colonies or residential areas within the 
municipality.  
 
In Acapulco, there were explicit agreements between local government and  
representatives of another specific industry group: the representatives of the hoteliers. 
However, I was unable to obtain more information about the nature of these negotiations 
and what outcomes they may have had for local government accountability. The 
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municipality did provide services that focused on helping the tourism industry and, by 
extension, the hoteliers, such as providing lighting, street cleaning and security along the 
bay where the hotels are located and which tourists frequent. Yet I was unable to 
determine that they were catering to the demands of the hotel industry for the reason 
that they were after their property tax revenue or if they instead felt it was in the general 
interest of the local economy to help attract tourists, or if they were seeking personal 
benefits in return. 
Implicit tax agreements: Fewer tax payments to unaccountable 
governments 
 
In each case, the local government took pre-emptive actions to exert an image of 
transparency and accountability and to gain trust through responsive service delivery 
alongside its revenue raising efforts. In Acapulco, the Mayor vehemently warned against 
corruption among public workers and published revenue and expenditure data in the 
media every three months, which no Mayor had done in his city before him. In La Paz a 
“zero-corruption” agenda was enforced. In Centro, assurances were made to 
accountability and improved service provision.  
 
It is likely that they would have done more if they had more power to show 
responsiveness and accountability. Hands were tied to do more because of limited 
manoeuvring power due to lack of funds, fixed commitments to unionised workers, and 
earmarked transfers.  I discuss this further below in the subsection on the obstacles.  
 
In each case, it was unclear if the local leaders were taking these steps to be more 
accountable because of the revenue pressure in order to raise tax compliance, or if they 
would have done this anyway given other motivations, like maintaining popularity in 
order to be (re) elected (to some office) or to move up the career path within their 
political party. With more revenues (which are topped up by federal rewards in the form 
of federal transfers tied to tax effort), the mayor can do more, achieve more projects, 
improve services, improve the fiscal balance, etc. These motivations may thus be tied to 
one another, assuming the municipal government cannot obtain revenues through other 
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sources. The two explanations are thus observationally equivalent and difficult to 
distinguish.  
Tax type: collective action problems?  
 
The fact that the explicit bargains observed that promised benefits of government 
accountability to wider group of residents (i.e. not just individual taxpayers) may have to 
do with the characteristics of the tax type. The hotelier industry is a specific industry as 
are the local transport sector and the street vendors. They form groups with common 
interests and a common agenda. This is indicative of a classic collective action problem 
due to a diversity of actors, in line with the literature on this (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1982). 
Explicit tax bargains were observed when the tax incidence fell on a narrow group with 
specific interests and prior organisational strength. The street vendors and the transport 
union, for example, each had clearly defined needs and demands in common and leaders 
who represented them vis-à-vis the government.  
 
With regards to the property tax, the local government did approach the representatives 
of the hotelier industry as they pay a lot of the property taxes. But elsewhere large 
landowners do not necessarily form a group with common interests. The revenue director 
in Centro said that there was no particular engagement with large landowners as they 
don’t really form a group with common needs. Their properties were spread out 
geographically so that the municipal government could not, for instance, entice them with 
better service provision that would only benefit them. While I was unable to obtain exact 
figures, I was told by an informant at SEDESOL, the Mexican federal secretariat of social 
development, that the property tax and land ownership situation in larger municipalities 
was usually such that the local government receives far greater amounts from the masses, 
not from the few largest property owners (Interview 6). As opposed to in small, rural 
municipalities, where one may still find “el rico del pueblo” or a handful of families who 
own major proportions of property value of the entire municipality, this is generally not 
the case in the larger urban municipalities. He approximated that even if only 5% of land 
plots would be over half a million pesos, they would still represent at most 8% of the total 
potential revenues at best, and these would be spread out across different owners in 
different parts of the municipality (interview 6). As discussed in Section 7.1, this was even 
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confirmed in the case in Acapulco, which has the greatest amount of income inequality of 
all the municipalities studied.  
Obstacles: to tax bargaining and to accountability outcomes 
 
Several obstacles stood in the way of tax bargains occurring. First, third party interests 
interfered in efforts to increase tax demands. In Acapulco, violent intimidation and 
murder of the director of the cadastre by (allegedly) drug traffickers prevented the 
municipal government from modernizing the cadastre and ramping up its tax raising 
efforts. No tax bargains were thus initiated or provoked. In La Paz, the interfering third 
party was the state government. Intergovernmental rivalries were such that the state 
congress did not allow the municipality to increase tax demands by neglecting to approve 
its law proposals and making the process of proposing laws more costly.  
 
Even when there were bargains, there were obstacles in the way of these leading to 
outcomes of increased accountability. The local governments may not always have the 
power to noticeably respond to the demands of their residents or to use the tax revenues 
for new projects demanded in a bargain.  Many local governments have only few 
competencies and little decision-making power. In Mexico as elsewhere, a large 
proportion of local funds are earmarked to purposes decided on by the central 
government, and tax revenues may be used to cover previous liabilities passed on from 
the former administration, such as for a large payroll of unionised workers (as seen in 
Centro and La Paz). This leaves local governments little manoeuvring power to improve 
services or invest in new ideas in an effort to show residents that they are using their tax 
money effectively (Díaz-Cayeros & Martínez-Uriarte, 1997; Sánchez, 2013).  
 
As the revenue director in Centro said, the fact that residents would not pay taxes before 
they saw a greater amount of accountability, but the local government largely had its 
hands tied in its ability to respond to demands, amounted in a chicken and egg problem. 
No virtuous cycle between taxation and accountability could be achieved. The aspects of 
accountability that could be tackled were cheap and quick actions, such as improving 
transparency and access to public information, but not more expensive, long-term 
changes, such as improving the quality of service delivery or investing in public works.  
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Another obstacle found was a mismatch between local government accountability on one 
hand and the perception of local government accountability by taxpayers appeared to be 
an obstacle as it interfered with the residents’ ability to judge the level of accountability of 
the local government and adjust its behaviour accordingly. The decentralisation literature 
has emphasised that this can occur in particular where there is a lack of clarity with 
regard to which level has which competencies (Faguet, 2012; Garcia-Escribano & Ahmad, 
2006). The case of Centro showed that this confusion also occurs in terms of the 
perception of government corruption. In Centro, tax evasion at the local level was 
believed to have resulted largely from a poor perception of accountability of the 
government. Scandals at the state government level seemed to create a distrust of all 
levels of government generally. As elsewhere, municipal leaders are quick to blame 
higher levels of government (rightly as when State Congress blocked initiatives in La Paz 
or wrongly) for any short-comings and take credit for their achievements. This stands in 
the way of taxpayers being able to react to changes in accountability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented evidence collected in three municipalities: Acapulco, Centro 
and La Paz. In the last section I compared the evidence that the three cases provided in 
light of the main research questions (does tax revenue pressure cause increased 
accountability on the part of the local government and how?) and the secondary research 
questions (including about the characteristics of the tax type and the obstacles).  
 
No evidence of coercive taxation was found. The property tax in particular is tied to very 
high political costs given that it is a direct, visible tax usually paid as an annual lump sum.  
Thus, local governments tried to exhaust the scope of raising property tax intake that 
would elicit the most inconsequential reaction possible from the taxpayers. That is, they 
encouraged payments by offering prizes or making the payment process more 
convenient. There was far more reluctance to make more meaningful efforts such as 
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enhancing enforcement through stricter sanctioning of non-compliance, raising rates or 
raising assessed property valuations to their market values.  
Explicit bargaining was observed around taxes with a narrower interest group, such as 
street vendors or the local transport industry. Direct explicit tax bargaining surrounding 
the property tax predominantly took place only between local government and 
individuals or firms to negotiate a reduction of their tax obligation.  
 
Most common were indirect implicit tax bargains manifested in two ways.  First, when 
residents were dissatisfied with the local government’s performance or perceived it as 
corrupt or unresponsive, they withheld their tax payments. They deferred payments until 
a seemingly more trustworthy administration was in power. Second, when local 
government authorities sensed that they were unpopular and that residents were 
dissatisfied, they adjusted their behaviour by refraining from collecting taxes and issuing 
sanctions. When they sensed that they are popular, they did dare to ramp up their tax 
collection effort. The degree to which these linkages lead to a mutually beneficial bargain 
or increased accountability, however, is less clear. 
 
The local government initiated explicit bargains when the (potential) taxpayers 
comprised a narrow interest group, such as street vendors for street vendor fees and the 
local transport industry for local bus fees. Regarding the property tax, no group of 
property owners was approached except the representatives of the hotelier industry in 
Acapulco. Otherwise, the potential revenues from single property owners tended not to 
make as much of a difference as securing compliance of the masses. Instead, implicit 
agreements appeared more common surrounding the property tax. 
 
Several obstacles prevented tax bargains from occurring or from leading to increased 
accountability. These included interference from third parties (higher levels of 
government and criminal organisations) and general constraints of the local government 
in being able to make concessions and respond to residents’ demands, as well as a 
mismatch between perceived and actual local government accountability. 
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Chapter 8: Aguascalientes, Me rida 
and Saltillo 
 
The previous chapter presented evidence from the three municipalities that had poor 
track records in terms of state-society relations, proxied by their rankings on 
accountability and transparency scales. This chapter presents findings from fieldwork in 
three structurally similar municipalities with a relatively high track record in state-
society relations. The reasoning behind grouping the cases into two threesomes, as 
explained in the qualitative methodology chapter (Chapter 6) was to compare the two 
groups in order to see if stronger a priori state-society relations might affect the 
strategies taken by the local governments and the outcomes that follow.  
 
This chapter is structured like Chapter 7. The first three sections present the evidence 
collected in three municipalities: 8.1 covers Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, 8.2 covers 
Mérida, Yucatán, and 8.3 covers Saltillo, Coahuila. I first provide a brief introduction and 
overview of the case. In the first subsection, I discuss the strategy that was chosen by the 
municipal government to raise revenues. In the second subsection, I show the outcomes 
in terms of any bargaining processes and effects on local government accountability. The 
third subsection contains concluding remarks about whether revenue pressure led to any 
bargaining with increased accountability as an outcome and which pathway this involved. 
Was taxation achieved through coercion (i.e. forceful, even violent extraction of revenues) 
or through bargaining? If through the latter, did this resemble explicit agreements or 
implicit agreements in the form of mutual behavioural adjustments? Did the bargaining 
lead to increased local government accountability? If not, which obstacles stood in the 
way? 
 
Section 8.4 of this chapter again compares the evidence of the cases and then addresses 
the secondary questions of interest, which comprise first, whether the tax type influences 
the taxation – accountability link and why; second, which obstacles stand in the way of 
the relationship; third, to what extent reverse causality is present in the relationship; and 
fourth, whether a tax bargain is more likely in a context of more established state-society 
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relations. While Chapter 7 covered the first two but not the third and fourth, this chapter 
covers the latter three but not the first. This is because no further tax types apart from the 
property tax featured among this chapter’s municipalities’ revenue raising strategies so 
there is nothing further to add on that point. Instead, having presented all the cases, a 
comparison is possible across the two groups to answer the questions about the context. 
This section draws from the evidence presented in previous sections and presents further 
evidence, including from confirmatory case. The final section concludes. 
 
 
8.1 Aguascalientes: High compliance, no re-
election 
 
The Municipality of Aguascalientes lies in the state of the same name. Aguascalientes 
means “hot waters” after is named after its many hot springs. It is a small state of 5500 
km2 and only one million inhabitants (700,000 in the capital) and with few municipalities 
(only 10, compared to 60 in Tlaxcala, which has a similar surface area and number of 
inhabitants). Located in the middle of the country at the crossroads between Mexico City 
and several other cities in the north, it is a centre of trade and commerce. It has recently 
attracted a large amount of foreign investment. Nissan for instance is currently building a 
second massive industrial park. It is clean, relatively safe and services are run 
comparatively well.  “The good conditions bring investors in” (interview 28). The current 
municipal president was a member of the PRI party and has been in power since 2010.  
 
In this case, the strategy to increase tax revenues was to increase the property tax intake. 
Efforts were made to continue a cadastral modernisation programme that had been 
started by the previous administration. The tax rate was increased and taxpayers were 
encouraged to pay through motivational discounts, lotteries and a variety of payment 
points. Taxpayers in default and arrears were vigorously pursued.  No explicit bargaining 
was observed, except between individuals and the municipality for a reduction of the 
individual’s tax obligation. Possible implicit bargaining existed in that the local 
government took steps to increase accountability alongside calls for greater tax 
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compliance. Strong efforts were made to maintain a positive image of transparency and 
efficient management and to pursue popular projects that benefited large parts of the 
population. 
 
Figure 24 Map of Municipality of Aguascalientes in the State of Aguascalientes 
 
Source: INAFED, 2014 
 
Strategy to increase tax revenue 
 
To increase tax revenue, the municipality’s main strategy was to help the state to update 
all cadastral information as the cadastre in Aguascalientes is run by the state finance 
secretariat. This involved matching property valuations to more recent records of 
transactions and verifying that all plots were included with their current construction and 
other characteristics.  
 
Regular meetings were held between the state cadastre and the municipality (interviews 
15, 16).  Previously, an estimated 80% of land plots had outdated values (interview 28). 
In 2010 the government revised the cadastral values to reflect higher market values, 
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based on corrected dimensions and characteristics of properties, in order to raise 
property tax revenues.  
 
Furthermore, the tax rate was increased by 0.05% from 1.05 to 1.10 per mil.11  However, 
the administration did not raise the figure on property owners’ tax bills to the new full 
amount right away. Instead, the tax obligation owed by any taxpayer was only to increase 
by a maximum of 25% from one year to the next. The tax revenue director explained that, 
“otherwise it would be too harsh on the people” (interview 28). 
 
Several methods were applied to encourage residents to pay their property tax bills. First, 
financial incentives were granted to taxpayers. A raffle or lottery was announced; if 
people paid their entire year’s property tax in one lump sum between January and March, 
their receipt entered a lottery. The prize was a car or a future property tax amnesty. 
Discounts were also applied: if residents paid their entire year’s property tax in January 
or February, they receive a discount of 50% and in March a discount of 30%.  
 
Second, the municipal government ran a publicity campaign in the media (television, 
radio, and the press). The objective, according to the revenue director was “to sensitise 
citizens with regard to the tax and to help them to understand that it was something 
necessary and had been necessary for a long time” (interview 25). The finance director 
recalled that he spoke in daily press conferences during the three month at the beginning 
of the year when lump-sum payments are encouraged and most payments are made, as 
that is when the discounts applied. They tried to be open and frank with people to 
encourage understanding and compliance with, rather than resistance to, the annual 
increase in taxes (interview 25).  
 
Third, they increased the methods of payment in order to make it easier for residents to 
pay. They first sent receipts to the property owners’ homes. It has already been possible 
for people to pay in all the main banks and since this year (2012) also at Oxxo, a chain 
grocery store. Plus, since 2011, it was possible for residents to make tax payments online. 
                                                             
11 This is the amount of tax per thousand currency units of property value.  
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Finally, they actively pursued noncompliant residents, consistently applying a strict 
sanctions procedure against those who haven’t paid their taxes.  
 
Alongside these revenue raising efforts, the mayor opened a citizen observatory to serve 
as a link between NGO’s and citizens on one hand and the municipal government on the 
other. The observatory conducted training for public officials on transparency, 
maintained a computerised complaints system and also received complaints, and 
suggestions from residents in person. The website outlines its purpose as helping to 
observe the quality of municipal management. 
 
The creation of the observatory was not a response to demands from residents, but a 
unilateral move by the mayor to try to exude an image of transparency, citizen 
engagement and citizen influence. According to the head of the citizen relations 
department of the citizen observatory herself, “The idea to create this observatory comes 
from the mayor, not from the citizens”. She added that “citizen participation is still not 
properly taken up in the culture here. The common perception is that the term ‘citizen 
participation’ refers to voter participation. […] Few people use the mechanisms available 
for citizen participation. There is no awareness about it” (interview 24). According to a 
deputy director in the participatory planning department, the citizen observatory is more 
for the government to achieve legitimacy for what they have already planned to do than 
to genuinely ask the opinion of citizens or grant decision-making power to citizens. “The 
mayor created the observatory. It is not the citizens who asked for it. The head is 
appointed by the mayor. The citizen observatory is “citizen” in name only” (interview 26).  
 
The mayor made it her goal to rise in the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness’ (IMCO’s) 
transparency ranking. And she succeeded: the previous administration ranked 70th out of 
around 300 municipalities. Hers came in 36th in 2011 and 5th in 2012. The mayor made 
clear efforts at creating an image of transparency and engagement with the residents. But 
was this done with tax revenue in mind?  According to one informant in the public works 
sector of the municipality, “I don’t believe that tax revenues were a direct motivator. I 
think it has to do with the personal aspirations of a leader trying to demonstrate her 
political will” (interview 26). Another informant at an NGO believes that the mayor has 
the will and motivation to improve transparency and citizen participation because her 
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political career has not yet ended and she has ambitions for higher office. She wants to 
demonstrate her capacity to achieve what she has set out to do.  
 
The informant also said that he doesn’t think that the revenues obtained through local tax 
collection make a big difference to residents. What really makes a difference to the city is 
when leaders find resources at the international and federal level to realize more projects 
and programmes that truly benefit the citizens (interview 27).  
 
His point that the local government is constrained by limited resources and powers to 
respond to citizen needs and to carry out large projects that make a significant difference 
to the wellbeing of the residents stands. This appears to be a serious constraint in the 
ability to negotiate on the part of the local government and incentives to negotiate with 
the local government on the part of the residents. While revenue from tax collection may 
not be able to make a large difference in the budget compared to larger national projects, 
having to raise taxes may make a difference in terms of the incentive effects for the 
government and how they target the revenues they do obtain, which is the main 
hypothesis of the taxation-accountability theory. This is especially so given that the tax 
revenue raised is matched with additional federal transfers as a reward for tax effort. In 
addition, local governments may go a long way in promoting a positive business climate 
and attracting large projects to their jurisdiction. In sum, while the revenues may make a 
difference to incentives, there are constraints in the extent and range of changes local 
governments make in the municipality in order to respond to specific local demands or 
offer concessions in tax bargaining with the residents. 
Outcomes 
Tax compliance remained high at around 87% despite a rise in property valuations and a 
broader base of taxpayers following a cadastral update. The revenue director proudly 
claimed, “There has been a good response to the higher values and to increases in 
property tax. It has been a success” (interview 28).  By mid-July they had already 
collected 92% of the property tax that they had estimated to receive over the entire year. 
They also reduced the backlog of tax arrears from 160 million in 2010 to 114 million in 
July 2013 (interview 25).    
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No evidence of coercion was found. There appeared to be superior tax collecting capacity 
that made evasion more difficult. The only evidence of explicit bargaining was between 
local residents and the individuals concerning individual tax bills. While this mainly had 
an outcome of reducing the individual’s tax obligation, if granted, there may also have 
been further outcomes consistent with an increase in accountability. When asked 
whether residents see a link between paying taxes and receiving services, the director of 
the property tax, who deals with taxpayers on a daily basis answered, “Definitely yes. 
People come complaining, ‘why are you taxing me if I don’t have proper services?’” 
(interview 15). It is thus a mechanism in which the government can find out about 
complaints and deficiencies: a way in which the government and residents engage. I could 
not find direct evidence that the information the municipality received through tax bill 
negotiations actually led to changes in accountability, for instance by improving services 
in response to complaints.  
 
In addition to better administrative capacity, the high compliance may be the result of 
implicit bargaining between the residents and local government in which residents agree 
to pay taxes in response to accountable governance. The municipal director of property 
taxes gave two reasons for the high compliance with property taxes. First, a procedure for 
enforcing sanctions on those who did pay the tax, which was introduced by the state level 
administration, was a contributing factor. But she also gave a second reason: that people 
obey the government because the current mayor is very intent on providing more and 
better services. She listed, among other examples, a nearly-completed project to 
rehabilitate neglected localities in less affluent areas with a “green corridor” of parks and 
bicycle paths (interview 15).  
 
When I asked the municipal tax revenue director the same question, he also claimed that 
the good performance of the government helped explain why people accept the higher tax 
obligations. He explained that the city was well planned and growth and expansion had 
also been well managed. “There is no accumulation of garbage, there is public lighting 
everywhere… things are working” (interview 28).  
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When asked whether they believed it was necessary for municipal governments to have a 
good image as a transparent and accountable government in order to ensure tax 
compliance, the answer was: “More than improving their image, they must prove to the 
citizens that their work has an impact and favours the citizens. If the citizens are 
convinced of this, they will be more willing to pay since they see it reflected in their tax 
payments (interview 15). 
 
Municipal elections were held in July 2013. The PRI party that had supposedly performed 
so well and raised a lot of revenue was not re-elected.  When asked why, informants in the 
finance directorate said that they did not have a strong PRI candidate this time around 
and he was not from Aguascalientes. Also, while the PRI candidate for mayor did not win, 
the PRI candidate for congress did, so voters did not entirely reject the party. He also 
added that the candidate who won was populist and promised two things. First, he would 
lower the property tax. Second, he would get rid of the speed camera fines. The outgoing 
administration had mounted speed cameras around the city in December 2012. “The 
speeding fines were not even introduced to raise revenues. Well below a million pesos 
was collected since their introduction. The main point was to reduce traffic accidents 
through speeding” (interview 22).  With respect to the property tax revenue increase, the 
revenue director concluded that “the risk was taken and now we are suffering for it. You 
lose the sympathy of the taxpayers. I’m not saying that this was the predominant factor 
but it could very well be among the factors. Nonetheless, the valuations were updated and 
people paid their higher bills. They responded appropriately to the rise. Compliance is at 
almost 90%” (interview 22). He sees the compliance rate as evidence that the residents 
generally accepted the rise in property tax demands. 
 
Why did Aguascalientes manage to modernise and update the cadastre while other 
municipalities have not? The property tax director of the municipality said the fact that 
there was a cadastral modernisation and that they could continue to consistently update 
the cadastre had a lot to do with whether the municipal government gets along with those 
at the cadastre, which belongs to the finance secretariat of the state government. “It helps 
a lot that they [the municipal leader and the state leader] belong to the same party” 
(interview 15). The cadastre in Aguascalientes is managed by the state government (the 
Mexican Constitution allows municipalities to enter into agreements with the state in 
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order for the latter to manage the cadastre, despite principally allocating cadastral 
functions to the municipalities).  
 
This was corroborated by the staff at the Cadastral Institute of the State of Aguascalientes. 
When asked why the Municipality of Aguascalientes was able to follow through with 
modernizing the cadastre, I was told, “It has a lot to do with who the bosses are and what 
party they belong to” (interview 16).  They recounted that several municipalities have 
been filing for revaluations and updates of the cadastre for ten years yet changes have not 
been made. Aguascalientes had entered numerous requests for changes yet these were 
consistently ignored or rejected by the Cadastral Institute before a PRI governor came to 
power at the state level in 2010 (See Table 34 for a clarification of which party was in 
power at which point at the municipal and state levels). “Since the parties have aligned 
again, the requests are being answered” (interview 16). 
 
Table 34 Parties in power at state and municipal level in Aguascalientes, 2004-
2012 
 
Municipal level State level 
2004 PAN PAN 
2005 PAN PAN 
2006 PAN PAN 
2007 PRI PAN 
2008 PRI PAN 
2009 PRI PAN 
2010 PRI PRI 
2011 PRI PRI 
2012 PRI PRI 
 
 
Updating the cadastre requires a large upfront investment but the returns are realised 
only in the longer term (interview 79). Given that municipal government term periods 
only last three years, the current administration carries the cost but the next 
administration receives the benefit. So what motivated the past PRI administration to 
take on this project? The revenue director, who had held his position across the last two 
administrations, conceded that the short term periods of municipal governments are a 
problem. There is no continuity and little regard for what was done before. However, the 
current party had been in power for six years now. This means that they have had six 
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years to continuously work on the project of modernising the cadastre to later receive 
increased revenues. And an important factor was that the momentum of politics was such 
that they knew from the start that they would be re-elected for a second three year term. 
That is, the party was highly popular and gaining popularity compared to the opposition. 
“This played a big role [in deciding to modernize the cadastre]” (interview 25).  
Concluding remarks 
In Aguascalientes, the strategy was to increase the property tax intake through 
modernisation of the cadastre, ardent pursuit of arrears, and a steady rise in the tax rate. 
There were upper limits on how much an individual’s tax bill could rise from one year to 
the next and there was still the possibility of challenging the tax bill in the municipal 
offices. This did not amount to coercive taxation and was not violent or extortive. It did 
appear more difficult for residents to evade taxes than in the municipalities of Chapter 7 
whose administrative capacity was less developed. In Aguascalientes, information about 
properties was plentiful and far more complete and collection procedures were clear and 
highly organised in comparison. The municipality had also undergone a cadastral 
modernisation and consistent updates of cadastral information to keep cadastral values 
close to the market values of the properties, something that had begun in the previous 
administration. The municipality did not run into obstacles, such as intergovernmental 
rivalries (as the same party was in power at the state and municipal government level) or 
poor incentives due to short term limits (because the political momentum was such that 
the prior administration felt that the party would be re-elected for a second term).  
 
The only evidence of explicit bargaining found was over individual tax bills. While the 
outcomes of such negotiations do not appear to bring any direct benefit beyond the 
individual’s reduced payment, it is a mechanism through which the municipal 
government can learn about deficiencies or needs of the population. However, whether 
the municipal government acted on the information gained through such exchanges by, 
for instance, responding to needs it learned of could not be determined.  
 
Better tax capacity was part of the reason for success in raising the tax intake, but there 
may have also been a higher willingness to pay by the residents because of generally 
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sound municipal management, in an implicit bargain between taxpayers and local 
government. The revenue director (of that administration) claimed there was. The 
municipality was generally well managed and the mayor took steps to increase citizen 
participation and transparency. She also completed well-received projects beyond her 
mandate with the creation of the “green corridor”.   
 
However, a populist mayor who promised to abolish property tax altogether was later 
elected by the residents to succeed that mayor. This may contradict what the revenue 
director said and show that residents were in fact not happy with the taxation-
accountability equilibrium. Or they may not see any link between their tax payments and 
the maintenance of high quality services. It is also possible that they simply voted for 
some dimension other than taxation and accountability this time.   In sum, while efforts to 
increase tax revenue may have led to efforts at increasing accountability in the short run 
(through the citizen observatory and efforts to climb the ranks in transparency rankings), 
the link of high taxation and high accountability was disrupted in the medium-term when 
voters elected an administration that abolished taxation, thereby likely moving the 
taxation-accountability equilibrium to a lower one. 
 
 
8.2 Mérida: Good government, bad government 
 
Mérida lies along the Rivera Maya on Yucatán peninsula. It lies inland, has a picturesque 
historic centre dotted with parks, stately French colonial pastel-coloured mansions, 
bustling markets, ice-cream shops, bars and restaurants where you can enjoy local dishes 
like poc chuc, panuchos, and salbutes. Mérida has a population of 800,000 and an 
additional floating population of 200,000 tourists and seasonal workers who also 
consume municipal services. The municipal government is a PAN administration led by 
Rénan Barrera Concha who has been in power since 1 September 2012.   
 
While no coercion or explicit tax bargaining was observed, this is a case in which a clear 
correlation between tax payments and local government accountability was found: 
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evidence of implicit bargaining. This is seen when comparing the tax intake of the 
municipal administration in power at the time of interview in 2013 and that of its 
predecessor.  
 
Figure 25 Map of Mérida in Yucatán 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
Strategy to increase tax revenues 
Mérida’s strategy to raise revenue was to increase property tax revenue by  updating 
cadastral values and matching the tax bills accordingly. Mérida has had its own cadastre 
since 2000 (as do another eight of the larger municipalities in the state of Yucatán; the 
rest are managed by a state-controlled cadastre).  
 
Two administrations ago in 2008, the government of Mérida had signed on to a 
programme with Banobras, the national development bank, to modernise its cadastre. 
This involved taking aerial photographs and field visits (conducted in 2010). 94,000 land 
plots that had not been registered were identified. This opened up a far larger tax base.  
 
According to the director of the cadastre, the new valuation was never linked up to the 
valuation used by the treasury of the municipality. The higher valuations were thus not 
used as the base for determining tax obligations and thus did not translate into higher tax 
revenue. When asked why this was the case, he explained that, “In the past, all 
secretariats had their own databases.” A resident would go to one secretariat, for example 
to the finance secretariat, to declare that he had bought a new property. That secretariat 
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would create a new account for him that was not linked to any of the other registries, like 
the cadastre or the database used by the social development secretariat. If he wanted to 
pay his taxes and went to the cadastre, he would find that he wasn’t even registered as the 
new owner” (interview 43). They had proposed merging the property registry with the 
cadastre since 2008, but this was consistently rejected “for political reasons: it is a very 
simple thing to merge these systems – we all have computers. But the more bureaucratic 
steps there are, the more control the government officials have. […] If they simplify things, 
they lose control and opportunities to collect bribes” (interview 43). An agreement was 
only signed in the current administration for all the computer systems to link up to a 
unified platform and to be adjust tax obligations to the updated property values.  
 
To help raise revenue, current administration also pushed a strong campaign in the media 
to prepare residents for the forthcoming rise of their property tax bills and to convince 
them to pay. In addition to this, they tried to lure taxpayers with discounts for early 
payments (20% in January, 10% in February and 8% in March). This had been done in 
previous years so this was not a new strategy in Mérida, but they also added a raffle for 
those who paid in the first months, with prizes including two cars, ten laptops and 25 
televisions. They also opened more payment points to facilitate tax payments. The next 
subsection examines the outcome in terms of any tax bargaining. 
Outcomes  
No coercive taxation was witnessed in Mérida and there appeared to be a greater ease of 
evasion than in Aguascalientes, with less ardent pursuit of non-complying taxpayers.  
No explicit bargaining was observed between individual taxpayers and local government 
but that may only be because the time of research did not fall into the property tax early 
payment “season” where discounts are granted (January until March) and when such 
negotiations are most frequent and most visible. No evidence of explicit bargaining 
between the local government and any larger group of taxpayers was found either.  
 
There was evidence of implicit bargaining, however, in which the government and 
residents mutually adjusted their behaviour. The government’s tax collecting behaviour 
and the extent of its accountability appeared to always match the taxpayer’s compliance 
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with payments, showing that they were mutually adjusting their behaviour.  This could be 
seen through a comparison across administrations in Mérida.  
 
There had recently been a break in the seemingly consistently accountable governance in 
Mérida. The National Action Party (PAN) had ruled for 20 years (from 1991). Then the 
PRI came  to power in 2010, when a break in accountability occurred, and the PAN came 
back into power in 2013 the PAN is back in power (see Table 35).  
 
Table 35 Municipal leaders in Mérida, 2004-2015 
 
Municipal level party Municipal leader 
2004 PAN 
Fuentes Alcocer 2005 PAN 
2006 PAN 
2007 PAN 
Bojórquez Zapata 2008 PAN 
2009 PAN 
2010 PRI 
Araujo Lara 
2011 PRI 
2012 PRI Lara Pacheco 
2013 PAN 
Barrera Concha 2014 PAN 
2015 PAN 
 
 
The director of the Municipal Public Access to Information Unit maintains that the culture 
of transparency was particularly poor during the previous (PRI) administration. He had 
audited the transactions of that administration in his past position as State Auditing 
Director and told of numerous irregularities (interview 38).  
 
He also recounts that the Access to Public information Unit of the past administration (his 
predecessors in his current position) also made it more difficult for citizens to obtain 
information. Anyone can request public information and the unit then has 12 days to 
respond. The previous government made it necessary for people to come in personally if 
they wanted information and charged for it. The governments before it as well as the 
current government try to handle everything electronically so that people don’t have to 
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come in and they don’t need to pay to request transparency and accountability (interview 
38). 
 
The staff at the State Institute for Access to Public Information (INAIP), which checks that 
municipalities comply with the transparency laws, spoke along similar lines. Yucatán’s 
State Transparency Law was signed in 2004 and entered into force in 2005, obliging all 
106 of Yucatán’s municipalities to publish certain information, in particular on their use 
of public resources. It also required municipalities to set up their transparency 
directorates and comply with certain minimal standards of publishing public information. 
Mérida has had solid compliance with these laws and has even gone beyond what is 
required by the law. For example, receipts of purchases are published online. “They 
identified a necessity of the people. Now no one dares to withdraw it. That would have a 
high political cost” (interview 42). Also, each month the treasury of the municipality 
publishes the municipal government revenues and expenditures as well as salaries in the 
newspaper with the mayor’s signature. He said that this had always been the policy in 
Mérida. But this wasn’t done by the PRI government during their term period from 2010 
to 2012 (interview 42).  
 
The staff at the finance office of the Municipal Government also corroborated this story, 
as did those workers that had been employed in the office across administrations and 
were not members of the PAN. During the 20 years of the PAN administration at the 
municipal level in Mérida, financial management was solid. But from 2010 to 2012, “the 
PRI administration destroyed all the work and good practices that the treasury had built 
up over the years” (interview 40). In response to the question of whether this may have 
been simply due to lack of experience, given that the PRI had not been in power for 
decades, the response was, “No, it was because they were too experienced. They 
manipulated the system and very intentionally neglected to follow the good practice that 
had been established during previous years” (interview 40). The good practices include 
contracting services through transparent public auctioning processes. The PRI 
administration allegedly ignored these procedures and contracted directly. The current 
administration now doesn’t have any clarity on who was contracted and which payments 
were agreed. 
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Workers at the municipal finance office complain that suppliers now come to the new 
administration with bills and demand payment, but the previous administration had left 
no backup of this or any information on the contract. “It didn’t appear in the accounts as 
liabilities. They didn’t follow proper accounting practices. […] They also didn’t follow the 
processes set up for handing over the administration to the next one. They left us no 
information; they left us completely in the dark” (interview 41). Official documents 
contained a certain debt figure. But the incoming administration later found, after a 
thorough review, that there was M$ 99.3 million pesos in debt completely unaccounted 
for. Again, in response to the question of whether this may have been because the 
previous administration did not know what they were doing, the answer was “No, it is 
because they knew too much about what they were doing. The corruption was systemic” 
(interview 39).   
 
There is some continuity of expert staff in the municipal finance office. It is only the 
directors and deputy directors that change from administration to administration. So if 
there is a relatively permanent bureaucracy in this case, how could this happen? 
According to the staff, the directors of the PRI government did not involve anyone else in 
the office. They kept to themselves and left the rest of the staff with nothing to do. They 
were not interested in following the established processes despite being urged to do so 
repeatedly by the rest of the staff (interviews 40, 41).  
 
Administrative costs had skyrocketed. For instance, the previous PAN administration had 
paid M$500,000 pesos for collecting taxes and hired three firms to assist the 
administration. The PRI administration claimed to have spent M$2 million pesos more on 
this, hiring eight firms, but results did not improve; instead, they worsened. The main 
firm hired was called Hermes. The revenue director believes that they might have 
invented this firm as he has found no record of its existence. 
 
The media also reported that the mayor of the previous (PRI) administration, Ms. 
Angelica Araujo Lara, was perceived as thoroughly corrupt. She reportedly diverted 
public funds to organise a Shakira concert in Mérida for the 15th birthday of her daughter 
(Universal, 2011).  She then resigned before her three year term ended in order to run for 
senator and many suspect that she diverted municipal funds towards her campaign. Her 
271 
 
cousin Omar Lara Pacheco (also the cousin of the former governor of Yucatán, Ortega 
Pacheco) became interim mayor until the term ended. Municipal funds disappeared and 
the PRI stopped paying the garbage company, who then stopped collecting garbage. 
Residents would try to leave their garbage in front of the mayor’s house in protest 
(though police heavily guarded it) (Yucatan, 2012).   
 
The PRI had also caused outrage over the issue of public lighting. They had replaced all 
light bulbs with supposedly more environmentally friendly ones that are meant to save 
40% in energy costs for the municipality. A firm called ABC Leasing won the auction after 
a short advertising period that did not meet public procurement rules. “The previous 
lights had worked fine and the municipality even received a prize for this service. The 
best indicator was that people didn’t complain. Yet the new bulbs don’t work properly 
and streets are now dark, creating a zebra effect when driving through them” (interview 
39). Again, fraud is suspected (interview 40, 41). “The working methodology here for all 
public services was solid and Mérida won several national prizes for its good results. But 
the PRI government simply didn’t adopt these. […] One sees that money was stolen and 
not spent on the services. […] The rumour is that it was used for the mayor’s campaign” 
(interview 87).   
 
Figure 26 Mérida’s Property Tax Revenues, 2005-2013 
 
Source: Mexican Ministry of Finance (UCEF-SHCP) 
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Figure 27 Property tax compliance (amount paid/amount owed), percentage, 2009-
2013 
 
Source: Municipal Government of Mérida 
 
It was thus established that the previous government had been an outlier in the sense 
that it showed extremely poor accountability compared to the other municipal 
administrations in Mérida. How did revenues perform over these administrations and 
why? The final year of the un-accountable PRI administration, 2012, saw a very unusual 
dip in property tax revenues, just as the population was feeling outraged with the mayor 
and the PRI government. Collections then reverted to trend after the current government 
came to power in autumn of 2012. The drop in property tax revenue in 2012 and 
subsequent rise in 2013 can be seen in the revenue data in Figure 26. Figure 27 shows a 
similar fall and rise in tax compliance, measured as total property tax amount paid over 
the amount owed.  
 
In the current administration, according to the director of the cadastre, “despite the 
revaluation, people paid their taxes. People appear satisfied and in agreement [with the 
current government and its tax policy]” (interview 43). The revenue director also believes 
that there is far more trust in the current government than in the previous one and that 
this is reflected in people’s willingness to pay property taxes. He further claims that 
“people are more willing to pay their taxes if there is transparency” (interview 39).  
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Yet the drop in revenues may also be due to lax collection efforts on the part of the PRI 
government. Some in the finance directorate agreed that “the PRI didn’t make an effort to 
collect taxes as they did not want to hassle people. They didn’t want people to get even 
more upset at them than they already were” (interview 41). It is therefore likely to be a 
two-way process of mutual adjustments: residents are less willing to pay and the local 
government knows that it cannot demand more taxes from an already outraged 
population. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The strategy to raise revenues was to mark a return of accountability and transparency in 
local government and to convince residents of the need to balance the budget after the 
previous administration’s financial mismanagement alongside increasing property tax 
obligations.  
 
While no coercive taxation or explicit tax bargaining were observed, evidence was found 
of implicit tax bargaining between residents and the local government, especially when 
comparing across the last two administrations in Mérida. Implicit bargaining involved 
behavioural adjustments of both parties. First, when the residents were unhappy with the 
government and perceived it as corrupt and unaccountable, they withheld their tax 
payments. They then paid once a new, seemingly more trustworthy administration was in 
power. Second, when the government sensed that it was unpopular and had angered the 
residents, it refrained from collecting taxes and issuing sanctions. When the new 
administration showed that it had brought transparency and accountability back, it dared 
to increase the tax effort, including through increasing people’s tax obligations following 
higher property valuation.  
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8.3 Saltillo: Tax discount for employment 
 
Saltillo lies in the northern desert state of Coahuila. It is close to Monterrey, the main 
commercial and intellectual hub of the north. Saltillo itself is one of the most important 
manufacturing centres in the country with a large automobile sector and at the same time 
offers high living standards (IMCO, 2012a). Its prime location just south of the United 
States makes it convenient to transport goods across the border to its northern neighbour 
via roadways. The Financial Times evaluated Saltillo as one of the 10 best cities (of 422 in 
the Americas) in the areas of cost effectiveness and economic potential, judging it as an 
excellent place for investing (MBW, 2013). Its Mayor Jerico Abramo Masso received the 
Prize for Good Municipal Governance 2013 from the National Federation of Mexican 
Municipalities (FENAMM) for his contributions to sustainable development. His 
photograph was displayed in every room, on seemingly every wall of the municipal 
government building. It was clear that this ambitious young mayor does not regard 
himself to be at the end of his career path. Mayor Jerico Abramo Masso of the PRI came to 
power in 2010 and his administration and would finish at the end of 2013.  
 
Figure 28 Map of Saltillo in Coahuila 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
 
275 
 
In this municipality, again, no coercive taxation was observed, but explicit bargaining was 
carried out with firms: concessions for tax discounts were granted by the municipal 
government if firms hired above a certain number of employees in the municipality. 
There was also evidence consistent with the existence of an implicit agreement: taxpayers 
and the local government mutually adjusted their behaviour to reach equilibrium 
between the level of tax payment and the level of accountability. On one hand, the 
municipality maintained high standards of services and the approval rating of the mayor 
was high. On the other hand, tax compliance was high at 70% despite regular upward 
adjustments to the tax bills. 
 
Strategy to increase tax revenues 
 
The strategy taken was similar to that of the other municipalities. The main prerogative 
was to step up efforts at increasing property tax revenues. To do this, discounts were 
granted to taxpayers who paid early, as was done in other municipalities (15% in January, 
10% in February and 5% in March). In 2011 the government also introduced a scheme to 
grant people insurance against fire and floods if they paid early (in January) or if they self-
declared a rise in their property value.  
 
The local government also facilitated payments for the taxpayers. Since 2011 taxpayers 
have had various options for paying their property taxes: online, in banks or at Oxxo (a 
widespread convenience chain store). Further payment points were opened in 
supermarkets and elsewhere where residents could pay, needing only a printout of their 
tax receipt which they could obtain online. In January and February of this year, the local 
government distributed coffee and hot chocolate to people who came to the municipality 
and stood in line to pay their taxes. Many (particularly elderly residents) still preferred to 
travel to the municipal building rather than making use of the more convenient online or 
other payment options. 
 
The last aerial photography and field visits were conducted as far back as 2004. No 
further major updates or modernization of the cadastre were planned by the municipal 
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administration, yet over the years there had been consistent updates to the cadastral 
valuations in line with inflation and to align them to market values (through comparison 
with sales prices and other data) , which in turn raised the amount of tax owed by 
property owners and the amount received by the municipality.  
 
The revenue directorate said that he was simply told to continue his efforts and not to 
ease up with tax and fee collections, even during the electoral campaign period running 
up to the municipal elections in July 2013. Relaxing tax collection efforts in the run-up to 
elections is considered a widespread practice all over the country, as tax directors in the 
municipalities of Villahermosa, Colima, and Villa de Alvarez confirmed (interviews 44, 80, 
76). Yet, even during the campaign period, this Saltillo mayor continued pressurising his 
staff to keep tax payments rising by continuing to update values, continuing to remind 
taxpayers to make their payments, follow up on arrears, and not to let anyone off the 
hook through exemptions or pardons. “We were told to continue our efforts just as 
strongly as always” (interviews 71, 73). The local councillor who focused on treasury 
affairs corroborated this, saying that the mayor’s message was, “Same strong effort as 
always. Don’t lax off, even though elections are coming up” (interview 72). It appeared 
that it was more important for the mayor to end his term with a zero deficit than to make 
exemptions for taxpayers ahead of the municipal elections.  
Outcomes 
No coercion was observed. Explicit tax bargaining was carried out between the 
Municipality of Saltillo and private firms. Yet rather than this being bargaining about tax 
payments in exchange for improved services or other benefits, the arrangement was a 
partial or full exemption for companies if they employed a lot of local residents. The 
director of the cadastre claimed that the local government uses tax exemptions to 
motivate employment generation (interview 71). Discount tables were published in the 
municipality’s revenue law (Saltillo Revenue Law, 2012) and are reproduced in Table 36. 
These reveal that the greater the number of employees a firm hires during the year, the 
higher its discount will be with respect to the property tax: this can even reach full 
exemption if the firm employs over 1000 people. The law required that the firms sign 
specific contracts to this end with the municipality. Such an arrangement did not exist in 
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the other municipalities researched. Property tax powers are thus used as an instrument 
by the municipal government to lure investors and encourage growth and employment in 
the municipality. This was not a recent proposal but continued from previous 
administrations.  
 
There was also some evidence of implicit bargaining. First, Saltillo’s property tax 
revenues consistently increased in real terms throughout the administration’s term from 
2010 to 2012 (See Figure 29 further below). The director of the cadastre estimated that 
170 million pesos would be collected during 2012, with an even greater increase to come. 
At the same time, compliance remained high at around 70%, despite regular upward 
adjustments to tax bills to meet inflation and market values. Saltillo thus managed to 
collect far more taxes and has also been granted awards for the high quality of municipal 
service provision and city management. This may be because taxes motivated local 
councillors or put them under more severe pressure to provide better services. It may 
also be consistent with the idea that residents were more willing to pay taxes if they were 
content with local governance.  
 
Table 36 Discount granted to firms based on employment generated in 2012 
Number of direct employees 
generated through the firm 
Percentage of discount Applied to year 
10 to 50 10 2012 
51 to 150 25 2012 
151 to 250 35 2012 
251 to 500 50 2012 
501 to 1000 75 2012 
1001 and above 100 2012 
Source: Saltillo Revenue Law, 2012 
 
Yet there may also be other reasons for this. First, higher compliance may simply be a 
result of better capacity of the tax administration, making evasion more difficult, 
independent of the accountability or satisfaction of residents. Tax reliance may have 
motived better taxing capacity but this is still different from the accountability theory put 
forth in this thesis. Second, the high compliance and high revenues may be the result of a 
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different tax paying culture.  The secretary of finance of the neighbouring state of 
Chihuahua has a theory about the tax paying culture in the north, which he revealed to me 
in a meeting. He said that since the population had always been sparse and living 
conditions harsh, people were more hard-working and more dependent on one another 
and thus more honest, trusting, obedient, and law-abiding compared to people in the 
south of Mexico. He added that the border with the United States could also have brought 
the influence of a different ethic to comply with rules and tax obligations (interview 88).  
 
Evidence against the second argument is that other similar municipalities in the same 
state do not follow suit with Saltillo in terms of accountability or revenue collection. 
Saltillo is the top tax collector within the state. A common comparator is the municipality 
of Torreon in the same state. It has a similarly high budget and population and is even 
slightly larger in terms of surface area with more land plots, but collects far less in 
property tax revenue. There are also large differences in accountability between the two 
cities. Saltillo received a perfect score in the parameters for financial accountability set 
out by the state auditing body, while no other municipality in the state did (Auditoria, 
2011). The mayor in Torreon had an approval rating of 40% compared to Saltillo’s of 75% 
according to a poll by Consulta Mitofsky. This shows that, despite the fact that both are in 
the north, one has high tax compliance and high accountability while a nearby one has 
low tax collection and low accountability, indicating that it is not only about the tax 
paying culture in the north of Mexico. 
 
Still, I tried to investigate whether there was any causal link running from taxation to 
accountability. It was clear that the municipal government did what it could to maintain 
the mayor’s positive image of performing well for the residents and succeeded in 
maintaining his approval. Yet when asked whether the government manages its revenue 
more prudently and efficiently than other municipalities because they have a greater 
proportion of own revenues, both the revenue director and local councillor responsible 
for public finance answered that the government doesn’t differentiate between revenue 
that come from local taxes and that which comes from the federation (interviews 72, 73). 
“After all, transfers also partly consist of payments by Saltillo’s residents for national or 
state taxes. We handle all public resources with great care” (interview 72).  
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While this appeared an obvious response by a government official in defence of his 
government, the revenue director claimed that residents tend to withhold their payments 
if they are unhappy with the administration and then pay later when someone is in power 
that they prefer. “The amount of property tax revenues we received rose a lot once the 
new mayor came to power”, he said (interview 71). Data I was given from the revenue 
directorate showed that it had increased from 107,471,000 to 141,690,000 pesos (and I 
was twice assured that these were real values) between 2009 when the last 
administration was in power and 2010 when Mayor Jericó Abramo Massa came to power, 
which was a marked discontinuity in the previous trend (See Figure 29 below). “People 
expected a lot from the new mayor [who has been in power since January of 2010]” 
(interview 75). He further explained that they had high expectations from him in 
managing the city well and were willing to trust him with their tax payments. They 
withheld tax payments to the previous government and waited until this mayor came to 
power in order to make their payment. While some of the drop in revenues during the last 
year of the previous government could have been from relaxing their tax collection 
efforts, the revenue director maintained that the spike in the following year showed that 
it could not have been purely from lax collection but instead from residents first 
withholding their payments and then finally paying the following year. It is difficult to 
know from the data if it really is as the revenue director claimed, but it corroborates the 
story told in Mérida.  
 
Figure 29 Property Tax revenues in Saltillo, 2007-2012, pesos (real values) 
 
Source: Municipal Government of Saltillo 
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Similar to Aguascalientes, the PRI administration in Saltillo that was successful in raising 
tax revenues and maintaining high tax compliance subsequently lost the next election. 
The PAN defeated the PRI in Saltillo during the July 2013 elections. It is doubtful, 
however, if this is due to resistance against the property tax as it was in Aguascalientes. 
Given that the same mayor could not run again consecutively for the same position, the 
voters may have simply decided against the new candidate running for the PRI in favour 
of an individual of a different party. According to a former municipal treasury director, 
“Here people fixate on the person - the candidate, not the party” (interview 74). Jericó 
Abramo Masso in fact ended his term with a 79% approval rating (Morán, 2013), a 
liquidated debt and was highly applauded by representatives of various sectors for 
improving Saltillo through a row of achievements in security, economic development, 
rural development, public works, social development, public services, public finance and 
transparency (De Kosta, 2013; Diario, 2013; Jime nez, 2013; Milenio, 2013). And, unlike in 
Aguascalientes, the mayor-elect did not promise to abolish or diminish property taxes.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The strategy of the Municipality of Saltillo in raising tax revenues was to maintain the 
mayor’s image of performing well for the residents and maintaining a high tax collection 
effort by chasing up non-compliant taxpayers, allegedly even during the electoral 
campaign period, which appeared to be something of an anomaly. No coercive taxation 
was observed. Instead, as in the other municipalities, taxpayers were motivated to pay 
their taxes through incentives such as discounts, prizes, convenient payment options, and 
even offering coffee and hot chocolate to taxpayers who stood in line to pay their taxes at 
the municipal palace. 
 
Explicit agreements around taxes were made with firms giving them exemptions on their 
payments for creating employment. Yet this tax arrangement did not lead to an increase 
in local government accountability to, for instance, improve public services or offer active 
programs that would help business directly. Instead the concession on the part of the 
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local government was the tax exemption itself, though it may have encouraged increased 
employment for other residents. It may have contributed to creating a friendly business 
climate, thus bringing in investors to Saltillo who may have otherwise gone elsewhere.  I 
was unable to find any evidence of special exemptions between the local government and 
individual taxpayers regarding their tax payment, but I was also not present in the 
municipal palace during the main taxpaying season when most residents pay their taxes, 
i.e. when the discounts apply (January-March), so it may have occurred just the same.  
 
There appeared to be implicit bargaining in the sense that Saltillo manages the 
municipality well with high standards of service provision and solid financial 
accountability compared to other municipalities and the population is therefore willing to 
comply with comparably high property tax bills. The evidence was consistent with this 
idea that residents are happy to comply with their tax obligations as long as they observe 
a well-managed municipality.  
 
One could argue that the high compliance even with regular upward adjustments to the 
property tax bills has to do with a general culture of compliance in northern Mexico 
compared to other regions. However, this explanation is contradicted by the fact that in 
the neighbouring municipality of Torreon, compliance with property tax payments is far 
lower. While there appeared to be evidence to support the revenue director’s claim that 
residents withhold their tax payments until an administration is in power that they 
prefer, I was unable to find evidence that revenue needs pushed the government to be 
accountable to residents in the first place.   
 
 
8.4 Case comparisons 
In this section I compare the findings of the three cases presented in this section. Was 
coercive taxation observed? Was tax bargaining observed? Did these take the form of 
explicit bargains or implicit agreements? I also compare the three cases presented in this 
chapter to the first three cases presented in Chapter 7 and address the secondary 
research questions regarding the context of a priori state-society relations, reverse 
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causality and the obstacles that may be preventing tax bargaining from leading to 
increases in local government accountability.  
 
Strategy to raise tax revenues: coercion would compromise 
popularity 
 
The strategies taken by the three municipal governments all involved increasing property 
tax intake. In both Mérida and Aguascalientes modernisations to the cadastre had already 
been initiated by previous administrations. In Mérida, what remained to be done was to 
link the raised cadastral values to the tax bills and the government was in the process of 
merging this data. In Saltillo, there hadn’t been a cadastral update but the tax bill figures 
were regularly upwardly adjusted with inflation. In Aguascalientes, the local government 
also raised the tax rate. 
 
Just as in the first three cases, no coercive taxation was observed in these three cases 
either. Again, it seemed unlikely that the government was using any coercive methods as 
they were aware of the political costs of taxing, especially by way of the property tax. This 
is consistent with the literature on property taxation that has often highlighted that the 
property tax is particularly unpopular among taxpayers (and local leaders thus reluctant 
to collect it) as it is usually paid in the form of an annual lump sum, making it a highly 
visible, direct and salient tax (Bird, 2011; Cabral & Hoxby, 2012). Even if the real tax owed 
remains the same, just nominal differences are noticed and create resentment among 
taxpayers. Even though the property tax is an important tax handle for local governments 
in many countries, local governments are reluctant to exploit it (E. Ahmad et al., 2015; see 
also Chapter 3).  
 
The municipal leaders had at least one eye on higher office, especially the ambitious 
young mayors in Mérida and Saltillo, and were very intent on maintaining their 
popularity. In the case of the mayor of Saltillo, however, they mayor appeared to feel that 
his popularity would be more greatly maintained if he was able to fulfil his promise of 
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achieving a zero deficit by the end of his term, even if this meant continuing to hassle 
residents with taxes and sending out warrants for arrears. 
 
However, they did not appear far as cautious in their tax efforts as the local governments 
in Chapter 7. For instance, the revenue directors in Centro and La Paz in Chapter 7 
repeatedly stressed that they were not raising the tax rate, only urging for more 
compliance and reducing omissions. By contrast, Aguascalientes was vocal about its strict 
procedures in the case of non-compliance that ended in black listing those in default for 
other municipal services and, further down the line, property confiscations. I was told 
that everywhere municipal governments tended to relax such efforts in the run-up to 
elections, but the mayor in Saltillo demanded that warrants would continue to be sent out 
and procedures continued even in the campaign period in order to keep tax revenues 
coming in.  Administrative capacity for taxing was thus stronger and enforcement higher, 
making evasion more difficult. But it still did not amount to coercion.  
 
Explicit bargains: Negotiating discounts with individuals and 
firms 
 
Revenue needs did not tend to spark any explicit negotiations with any groups. The only 
explicit bargaining for which I found evidence were between the local government and 
individual persons and firms. In Aguascalientes, for instance, individuals would come to 
the office of the municipal revenue directors in order to challenge their personal tax 
obligation in hopes of negotiating down the amount. In doing so, residents often 
complained about a lack of services, as the director of the property tax attested, who was 
receiving residents to this end on a daily basis in her office. She had remarked that people 
often complained about receiving poor services when negotiating their tax obligation or 
their fines for arrears. While this may be an excuse, it may also imply that they hold the 
local government to a higher standard, given that they are paying it directly, than they 
would if the local government were financed indirectly through their federal taxes and 
the transfer system. Either way, the tax bills motivated the local residents to come to the 
municipal palace and bring shortcomings in service provision to the attention of the local 
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government. Taxation therefore motivated engagement between residents and the local 
government that may not occur so regularly without local taxation. What is further 
required to support the taxation-accountability theory, however, is that the information 
attained by the property tax staff about needs and deficiencies in the municipality is 
channelled to the appropriate local officials and acted upon to make changes.   Whether 
the complaints actually led to the local government acting on them, however, could not be 
shown. 
 
In Saltillo, explicit contracts were signed between the municipal government and firms 
that granted the firms a discount on their property tax bills if they hired large numbers of 
employees from the municipality. The government did not, however, offer any other types 
of concessions such as greater transparency, instruments for greater citizen participation 
or any services that would benefit the taxpayers or a larger group of residents. It may 
have, however, helped to lure investors into the municipality, thus effectively raising tax 
intake in the long-run (amounting to a benefit to the municipal government) and 
providing employment and increased business, resulting in a benefit to a larger group of 
residents of the municipality. 
 
One of the obstacles, as one informant in Aguascalientes had pointed out, is that the local 
government does not have the power or resources to enact massive projects in the 
municipality that would make a difference to the municipality. The local government does 
have constraints in how it responds to citizen demands in a potential bargaining process. 
In this respect, a local government’s bargaining power is more constrained than that of, 
for instance, the federal government.  
 
Implicit agreements: mutual behavioural adjustments 
 
There was evidence of implicit agreements between the local governments and the 
residents surrounding taxation. First, there seemed to be a correlation between the level 
of accountability and the level of tax payments. Several pieces of evidence were consistent 
with this. First, the more accountable cases had higher tax compliance rates compared to 
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the less accountable ones. Surely, this may be for reasons of tax capacity. But there is also 
evidence within some of the municipalities over time that further support the idea that 
residents were less compliant if the local government was relatively unaccountable.  
 
According to several interviewees in municipal treasuries, taxpayers tended to withhold 
their tax payments if the government was perceived as unaccountable until a more 
favourable government came to power. Revenue data from Saltillo and especially from 
Mérida (see and Figure 29 and Figure 26 respectively) appeared to support this. In 
Mérida, the predecessor administration broke with a tradition of following established 
norms and procedures that guaranteed transparency, sound financial management and 
accountability and the mayor was accused of embezzling funds. Many taxpayers appeared 
to have therefor withheld their property tax payments and revenues dropped. When a 
new administration took office, revenues rose again.  
 
On the other side of the coin, the local governments appeared to would show more tax 
effort if they were poplar and less so if they felt that the residents were upset and 
distrusted them. They were more likely to maintain a strong tax effort if they were 
popular and had high approval ratings. As already mentioned, the mayor of Saltillo 
maintained high tax effort even in the wake of electoral campaign as he felt that this 
would not compromise his popularity. And he ended his administration with a high 
approval rating.  
 
The leaders of the different municipalities generally sensed or forecast how far they could 
go in raising taxes, updating property values or pursuing tax arrears. They contended to 
be aware that if they upheld a positive image and enjoyed citizen satisfaction through 
accountable governance, they could go further in demanding tax payments as residents 
would comply. By contrast, if they performed poorly, there would be more evasion and 
tax revenues would diminish.  
 
The question is whether this awareness stimulated outcomes in the form of increased 
accountability. As in the Chapter 7 cases, the local governments appeared to take pre-
emptive steps to show it was transparent, accountable and trustworthy alongside its 
revenue raising efforts. An increase of accountability thus occurred prior to or 
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simultaneously with increased demands of taxes, consistent with the theory of a short 
path to accountability. For instance, in Aguascalientes, the mayor set up a “citizen 
observatory” for citizens to scrutinise the quality of municipal management and to create 
a closer link between the municipal government and the residents. In Mérida, too, the 
mayor reintroduced norms and procedures to increase transparency and accountability 
and sound financial management. This is consistent with the short path to accountability.  
 
However as with the first three cases, in each of the cases presented in this chapter, the 
respective mayor may have taken steps to portray an image of trustworthiness and 
accountability anyway, however, to seek a positive image and popularity, as each had at 
least one eye on higher office. It was not entirely discernible whether they deemed it 
necessary in view of raising revenues (rather than simply helping), let alone whether the 
need for increased tax revenues sparked these policies. More generally, while their fear of 
the political cost of taxation may be regarded as evidence that local leaders anticipate 
protest, revolt or, especially, judgement at the ballot box or by their political party, it is 
more likely that this fear simply leads to a demise of tax effort when they are unpopular 
rather than a positive motivation to increase accountability. 
 
No evidence of accountability attained through the long path was found. Resistance by the 
taxpayers took the form of evasion or seeking discounts on their personal tax obligation. 
  
Context of a prior state-society relations and reverse causality 
 
How did the first group (with weaker a priori state-society relations, proxied by higher 
rankings in terms of transparency and accountability) fare compared to the second 
group? First of all, it cannot be said that coercive taxation is more likely if state-society 
relations are strong. Coercive taxation was not witnessed in either group. If anything, 
where there was more accountability and transparency, there also tended to be better 
administrative capacity for tax collection and less ability to evade taxes with impunity. 
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The previous chapter established in section 7.4 that the three municipalities that had a 
priori low accountability had more problems in raising tax revenues. This occurred for 
different reasons, not necessarily because of its low accountability and transparency. In 
Acapulco, drug traffickers prevented a modernisation of the cadastre, in La Paz 
intergovernmental rivalries prevented the introduction of new laws and changes to some 
of the tax rates concerning other tax handles (though it did not prevent them from 
starting a cadastral modernisation program). Only in the case of Centro was the low tax 
compliance culture blamed on a deep distrust of local government generally. Yet the low 
compliance may have also been the result of oil wealth: residents feel that the 
government should have plenty of money from oil revenue even if they do not pay taxes. 
It has often been argued in the literature on the ‘natural resource curse’ as discussed in 
Chapter 1 that governments with abundant natural resource wealth have trouble 
collecting taxes. Citizens find it more difficult to understand why they should be taxed and 
the government finds it even more difficult politically to demand taxes when it receives 
large inflows of non-tax revenues from natural resources.  
 
By contrast, those municipalities that were more accountable did not list any problems in 
increasing their tax intake. This was largely due to superior administrative capacity but 
also, as discussed above in the subsection on implicit tax agreements, residents appeared 
to be more likely to pay if the government is accountable and but governments that were 
perceived as unaccountable did not bother further angering residents with tax payments.  
 
The data received from the municipality, from UCEF and from INEGI all varies greatly. The 
discrepancies are such that comparisons of the numbers do not seem worthwhile, 
especially for the less transparent and accountable municipalities. Comparisons of 
revenue levels can have a lot to do with immigration, GDP, valuation of the property and 
several other factors. I therefore judged their success by their own parameters. While 
Centro, La Paz and Acapulco were not taking in what they hoped to, Aguascalientes and 
Saltillo very proudly boasted that they were taking in more than expected. In Mérida, it 
was still early to tell, but tax revenue continued to rise.  
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Table 37 Tax compliance rates: number of accounts registered/number of accounts 
paid, 2012 
Municipality Compliance rate Municipality  Compliance rate 
Acapulco 60% Aguascalientes 89% 
Centro 30% Mérida 70% 
La Paz 50% Saltillo 75% 
Average 47% Average 78% 
Source: Data obtained from respective municipalities 
Note: Compliance rate is calculated as actually paid property tax payments over total owed 
property tax payments 
 
Obstacles to revenue raising, to tax bargaining, and to 
accountability 
There was little interference of third parties that stood in the way of tax revenue raising 
efforts, as was the case in Acapulco and La Paz. However, in Aguascalientes I learned 
about two potential obstacles that that had prevented revenue raising efforts and, by 
extension, tax bargains from occurring. Intergovernmental rivalries do pose problems for 
other municipalities in the state of Aguascalientes and had posed problems for the 
municipality of Aguascalientes in the past. It made a difference whether the parties at the 
state and municipal level were aligned or not in order to be able to pull through and 
cooperate in terms increasing the municipal tax intake. When the state and municipal 
governments were of the same party, the state approved the municipality’s proposals to 
update the cadastre and to pass modifications that would expand and increase the tax bill 
for taxpayers. When they were of rival parties, the state blocked these efforts, thus 
nipping any processes that would lead to bargaining processes and greater accountability 
in the bud. 
 
Another obstacle I learned about was that the short term limits of municipal governments 
in Mexico, compounded with electoral competition, were an obstacle to raising tax 
revenues. This means that local governments have little incentive to embark on an 
investment like updating property values to raise property tax revenues, as the benefits 
will not accrue until the next administration is in power. This also means that by the time 
the additional tax money has been received, the government that asked for the tax 
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increase would no longer be in office to reward the taxpayers with any demanded 
expenditures. This obstacle was prevented in Aguascalientes only because the momentum 
of politics was such that it was clear that the PRI was going to be in power for at least two 
administrations: the predecessor administration thus embarked on the long term 
investment of a cadastral modernisation. 
 
Again, a mismatch between local government performance and the residents’ perception 
of accountability may be an obstacle for taxpayers to adjust their behaviour according to 
the level of local accountability. For the taxation-accountability link to take hold, residents 
need to be able to judge whether their local government has performed responsibly and 
in their interest or not. It appeared that through opaque accounting, many municipalities 
in Mexico passed the consequences of poor financial management to the next 
administration without their residents noticing. The extent of the financial mayhem was 
usually revealed only after the next elections had taken place and the successor 
administration was in power to review the accounts. This was indirectly noted from 
information on administrations in power prior to the ones interviewed, such as in Mérida 
as described in Section 8.2, but also appeared to happen across Mexico according to 
newspaper reports (Romero, 2012) and interviews with UCEF, the coordinating office of 
federal entities and municipalities of the federal ministry of finance (interview 10), as 
well with INDETEC, the institute for the technical development of public treasuries 
(interview 9).   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented three further case studies: Aguascalientes, Mérida and Saltillo, 
which I used as examples of relatively better a priori state-society relations, as each 
scored particularly highly in terms of accountability and transparency on various 
rankings.  
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The strategies involved increasing the property tax intake. This involved positive 
incentives to motivate taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations, but no coercion. 
Few instances of explicit bargaining were found: the only evidence was when individuals 
challenged their tax obligation in the municipal palaces, which occurs in all municipalities, 
as witnessed most blatantly in Centro, and when, in Saltillo, the local government signed 
agreements with firms to grant them discounts if they hired a certain number of 
employees from the municipality.   
 
What I did find were indirect implicit tax agreements. When residents were dissatisfied 
with the local government’s performance or perceived it as corrupt or unresponsive, they 
withheld their tax payments. They deferred payments until a seemingly more trustworthy 
administration was in power. This was seen in Mérida as well as in Saltillo. Implicit 
agreements were more common than explicit bargaining and perhaps what one should 
expect at the local government level: an equilibrium in which residents adjust their tax 
payments according to their view of the government and its performance (especially the 
perception of corruption versus relative effectiveness). 
 
Corroborating this, a comparison with the municipalities in Chapter 7 indicated that the 
more accountable municipalities in Chapter 8 (with stronger a priori state-society 
relations) appeared to be able to go further in pursuing arrears and maintaining tax 
collection efforts. Both in Aguascalientes and Saltillo, the local government appeared 
relatively popular even by the end of its term. In Mérida, the mayor was also popular 
though he had not yet reached the final year of his term. The local governments of this 
chapter were also more successful in attaining tax compliance. In some of the 
municipalities of Chapter 7, compliance was low and the local governments felt that they 
would be perceived as too harsh or unpopular if they took further steps. Instead, 
exceptions and further discounts to tax obligations were granted retrospectively.  
 
The chapter that follows summarises the finding of the municipalities in Chapters 7 and 8, 
compares these, and also compares them to the findings of the quantitative chapters (4 
and 5). It then draws conclusions for theory and practice. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
The objective of this thesis was to explore the relationship between taxation and 
accountability at the local government level in Mexico. It responds to the renewed 
attention scholars have given to taxation-accountability linkages, broadly termed as such: 
if governments are dependent on taxation, they will become more accountable to citizens 
and less corrupt; a tax bargain will arise with mutually beneficial outcomes: citizens agree 
to comply with tax payments in return for more accountable governance (Bräutigam, 
2008b; Bräutigam et al., 2008; Di John, 2011; Everest-Phillips, 2010; Moore, 2004, 
forthcoming). .    
 
This thesis has explored taxation-accountability linkages in the Mexican local government 
context, bringing to light the different obstacles that stand in the way of this link at the 
local government level.  Chapter 3 described the institutional context surrounding 
Mexican municipalities and, subsumed under the theoretical foundations laid out in 
chapter 2, showed that there was reason to believe that this causal relationship would 
run into problems. In Chapters 4 and 5, the relationship was tested empirically through 
regression analysis. The results corroborated the fact that the relationship is not 
straightforward and depended on the tax type. While positive correlations were found, 
identifying causality proved more difficult and problems of data and method could not be 
overcome to rule out reverse causality and endogeneity problems.  
 
The quantitative econometric methods were unable to tell us how the link worked when 
it did and what obstacles precluded it when it did not. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 thus explored 
the relationship further through qualitative case study analysis of six municipalities: 
Acapulco, Centro, La Paz, Aguascalientes, Mérida, and Saltillo. While explicit tax bargains 
were occasionally observed around some local taxes when the taxpayers comprised a 
narrow group with common interests that the local government could usefully approach, 
more common were implicit agreements in which the local government and the local 
residents adjusted their behaviour in response to the other. However, several obstacles 
were found that stood in the way of taxation leading to either a tax bargain or increased 
accountability.  
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The first two sections of this chapter evaluate the empirical evidence found in view of the 
theoretical framework. It integrates the findings of both the quantitative and qualitative 
research conducted. Section 9.1 evaluates the existence of causal linkages and the causal 
mechanisms involved. Section 9.2 evaluates the obstacles that stand in the way of those 
linkages. It draws from the empirical evidence found in the qualitative analysis and from 
the Mexican context laid out in the background chapter (Chapter 3). Finally, section 9.3 
summarises the research contribution this thesis makes to the theory and draws 
implications from what we have learned for development policy.  
 
 
9.1 Evaluation of local taxation-accountability 
linkages and causal mechanisms in Mexico 
 
In this section and the next, I bring together the various conclusions of this thesis and 
review the evidence. I reconcile the findings of both the quantitative and the qualitative 
analysis in order to respond to each of the sub-questions introduced in Chapter 1. This 
section deals with the main questions concerning the relationship between taxation and 
accountability: whether or not there is a causal relationship running from taxation 
(operationalised as greater tax revenues to total revenues and greater pressure to 
increase tax revenues) to increased accountability in the Mexican local government 
context. In doing so, it also addresses reverse causality and possible feedback loops. It 
also draws conclusions about the mechanisms through which this works.  
Is there a causal relationship leading from taxation to greater 
accountability among Mexican municipalities?  
 
The evidence of both quantitative and qualitative analyses showed that taxation did not 
always lead to increased accountability in the Mexican context. The results of the 
quantitative econometric analysis using nation-wide data of all Mexican municipalities 
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(that is, all for which data were available for the years tested) did accord with the 
taxation-accountability theory for the property tax, but causal relationships could not be 
found using all local taxes and fees. The qualitative analysis showed evidence of tax 
bargaining and increased accountability along-side revenue raising efforts and processes 
were sparked that were consistent with the taxation-accountable theory. However, in 
many municipalities several obstacles stood in the way of those processes, preventing a 
completion of the chain from greater taxation to greater accountability.  
 
Beginning with the quantitative analysis, results of cross-sectional regression analysis 
showed positive correlations between taxation (comprising all local taxes and fees) and 
accountability. The more tax revenues in a municipality’s overall revenues, the more it is 
likely it was to be transparent, provide basic services for large proportions of its 
population, and have electoral competition. However, when using panel regression 
analysis, the results were no longer statistically significant and therefore did not support 
the existence of a causal relationship between taxation and accountability. This makes it 
conceivable that the taxation and accountability variables are simply highly correlated for 
other reasons, different from the causal mechanisms laid out in the taxation-
accountability theory.  The cross-sectional results may have been driven by spurious 
correlations or reverse causality.  
 
When repeating the regressions looking only at the effect of property taxes (versus all 
local taxes and fees among municipalities’ total revenues), however, positive and 
significant coefficients were observed even using panel regression that held constant time 
and municipality invariant covariates as well as other control variables.  
 
The quantitative methodology used at identifying causality of the relationship improved 
on attempts in previous studies (given the use of time series data as opposed to pure 
cross-sections and within-country as opposed to cross-country analysis), yet problems 
remained. The possibility of spurious causality and reverse causality may have yielded 
erring results due to endogeneity problems. The results need to be regarded with caution. 
While attempts were made to isolate the effects of taxation and rule out other possible 
causal explanations through lagged variables and controls, such as for level of 
development and administrative capacity, the controls may not have been adequate. 
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While the cross-sectional regressions were unable to control for all municipality-
invariant factors, it was not possible to add the development controls to the panel 
regressions. The variable on which the tax variable showed to have the strongest positive 
relationship in the cross-sectional regressions (Transparency) could not be tested using 
fixed effects as data was not available across multiple years for this proxy. There were 
also problems with the data due to a lack of harmonised accounting and controls. The 
large discrepancies I detected between fiscal data that I came across at the local level and 
that reported to the national level makes creative accounting appear viable. 
 
In sum, the results of the econometric regressions, while appearing to show causality 
between taxation and accountability for the property tax (if not all local taxes and fees), 
were insufficient in ruling out different mechanisms and theories about the relationship. 
Further evidence was needed to explore the link in order to see if these findings reflected 
the reality of the relationship or again showed spurious correlations. The fact that reverse 
causality is expected alongside the expected route of causality, with feedback loops 
between the two creating virtuous (or vicious) cycles, one can simply conclude that the 
results support and do not contradict (but do not prove) causality from taxation to 
accountability.  
 
I thus went on to explore the relationship qualitatively through in-depth analysis of a 
smaller selection of municipalities. I chose six urban municipalities that were under 
particularly high pressure to increase their local tax revenues. These six were also among 
the highest tax collecting municipalities in the country, so taxation represented a high 
proportion of government revenue and could be expected to make a difference to local 
government incentives. The qualitative analysis showed that, while pressure to increase 
tax revenue sometimes led to intermediate steps in the causal pathway (different tax 
raising strategies and tax bargaining), rarely did it lead to a longer term increase in 
accountability. This was due to a variety of obstacles which will be discussed further 
below.   
 
If there was an increase in accountability, it was most often in the form of an increase in 
transparency and the creation of platforms for citizen participation alongside property 
tax revenue raising efforts. This is a quick, inexpensive and therefore easily achievable 
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method for the local government to gain confidence from the residents and was done in 
Acapulco, La Paz, Aguascalientes, and Mérida. It was more difficult for local governments 
to achieve accountability through public service delivery or expenditure on public works 
and services due to budgetary restrictions, unionised workers, and institutional 
constraints discussed further below in this chapter. This is supported by the quantitative 
regression results as the effect of taxation on Transparency was consistently positive and 
significant (though the arguably methodologically superior panel regressions were not 
possible due to limited data availability).  
 
While it was clear from the field research interviews that local leaders recognised that 
they could collect more taxes if perceived as more transparent and accountable, it was 
uncertain whether taxation sparked the steps taken to foster an image of transparency 
and accountability or if they would have taken them anyway as a means to further their 
political popularity and careers.   
 
Also, while increased accountability was often perceived in the immediate short-term, it 
was also shown to not always hold beyond the end of the administration: in 
Aguascalientes, the residents elected a new government that promised to abolish the 
property tax altogether, thus disabling any virtuous cycles of increased taxation and 
increased accountability. 
 
For other taxes with an incidence on a specific interest group with common goals, such as 
the street vendors in Centro, the tax revenue needs did spark tax bargaining processes 
that were consistent with increases in greater local government accountability vis-à-vis 
that group of residents. The local government acted cooperatively rather than 
aggressively towards the street vendors and agreed to tolerate them rather than harass 
them and destroy their market stands. There were also negotiations to provide services 
such as cleaning and lighting in return for street vendor fees.     
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What processes are sparked and through which mechanisms 
does the casual relationship work?  
 
According to the theory laid out in Chapter 2, taxation will lead, first, to either coercive 
taxation, tax bargaining, or neither. If tax bargaining is achieved, this may take the form of 
either an explicit or implicit agreement. The tax bargaining may then lead to greater 
accountability or it may not.  
 
Did tax revenue dependence lead to coercive taxation? 
 
No coercive taxation was observed in any of the cases studied. Raising tax revenue was 
widely viewed as a last best option involving a high risk of “political death”, as one of the 
interviewees put it. The context of electoral competition and judgement not just at the 
ballot box but the more general fear of becoming unpopular (particularly as this could 
hinder their career trajectories) made mayors highly reluctant to tax in any way that was 
a very noticeable increase in the tax obligation and/or perceived as unfair  by the 
residents. 
 
In the municipalities visited, the local governments raised the tax intake through several 
methods short of actually raising the tax rate or the tax bills. Instead, methods focused on 
positively motivating people to pay who normally evaded, including through economic 
incentives such as raffles, discounts and promises to pardon fines for past arrears; 
facilitating tax payments for the residents by increasing payment points and setting up 
online payment options; and making tax payments more comfortable by offering coffee 
and hot chocolate to those queueing to make their payment. Tackling tax arrears or 
omissions in the property registry was the next step. More stark methods like updating 
property values to coincide with market values or raising the tax rate were rarely 
considered. The latter were regarded as far more politically sensitive, leading to 
dissatisfaction and anger among the residents, and were preferred to be avoided.  
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Did taxation lead to greater accountability through explicit agreements? 
 
Regarding the property tax, few explicit tax bargaining was observed that led to an 
outcome of improved local government accountability. The direct explicit bargaining 
observed with (potential) taxpayers predominantly involved bargaining over the amount 
of the tax to be paid: individuals would come to the office of the municipal revenue 
directors in order to negotiate a lowering of their personal tax obligation. In one 
municipality, agreements were signed between the municipal government and firms in 
which firms could be granted discounts if they hired large numbers of employees from 
the municipality. The government did not, however, offer any other types of concessions 
such as greater transparency, instruments for greater citizen participation or any services 
that would benefit the taxpayers or a larger group of residents. 
  
The instances observed where the government did explicitly bargain with a group of 
potential taxpayers with a likely outcome of concessions that would be responsive to a 
wider group were mostly instances involving different types of taxes. For instance, in 
Centro, local officials approached the leaders of the street vendors, improved relations 
and started a dialogue with a view to collecting street vendor fees from them. At the time 
of interview, the street vendors and the government were in the midst of negotiations 
with a potentially mutually beneficial outcome: in return for floor fee payments, the 
municipal government showed willingness to assist the vendors in cleaning their selling 
areas and upgrading their stands. Additionally, they already mended relations, 
heightened their dialogue and respectful treatment considerably in the run-up to 
negotiations. In La Paz, the municipal government and local bus drivers negotiated an 
exchange as well: a rise in transport fees in exchange for government projects to improve 
transport services.  
 
Did taxation lead to greater accountability through implicit tax agreements? 
 
There were also indications of implicit tax agreements. The local governments appeared 
to take pre-emptive actions to ease acceptance among taxpayers of the increase in tax 
effort. Many of the municipal leaders paralleled their tax raising efforts with a vocal 
campaign of transparency and accountability to the taxpayers. For instance, in 
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Aguascalientes, the Mayor set up a “citizen observatory” for citizens to scrutinise the 
quality of municipal management and to create a closer link between the municipal 
government and the residents. In Acapulco, the mayor vehemently warned against 
corruption among public workers and published revenue and expenditure data in the 
media every three months, which no mayor had done in his city before him. In La Paz a 
“zero-corruption” agenda was enforced. The leaders of the different municipalities 
generally sensed or forecasted how far they could go in raising taxes, updating property 
values or pursuing tax arrears. They contended to be aware that if they upheld a positive 
image and enjoyed citizen satisfaction through accountable governance, they could go 
further in demanding tax payments as residents would comply. By contrast, if they 
performed poorly, there would be more evasion and tax revenues would diminish. An 
increase of accountability thus occurred prior to or simultaneously with increased 
demands of taxes. 
  
Yet in each of these cases, the respective Mayor may have taken steps anyway to seek a 
positive image and popularity, as each had at least one eye on higher office. It was not 
entirely discernible whether they deemed it necessary or important in view of raising 
revenues, let alone if the need for increased tax revenues sparked these policies. More 
generally, while their fear of the political cost of taxation may be regarded as evidence 
that local leaders anticipate protest, revolt or, especially, judgement at the ballot box or 
by their political party, it is more likely that this fear simply leads to a demise of tax effort 
when they are unpopular rather than a motivation to increase accountability. There is 
thus a positive correlation between tax collection efforts and accountability but no causal 
link in which tax revenue needs spark increased accountability.  
 
Turning now to the citizens, there was no collective mobilisation in any of the cases in 
response to the municipal government scaling up its property tax effort. As already 
mentioned individual citizens tried to seek reductions in their own payments on a 
personal level. Requests for personal favours and concessions, but no collective action or 
demands for public benefits, were observed.  
 
One case where citizens did mobilise was when the people of Tierra Amarillo colony 
organised a protest in front of Centro’s Municipal Palace. However, this popular 
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mobilisation did not occur in reaction to the government’s tax policy. Instead, the citizens 
voluntarily paid property taxes without being legally obliged to, as they believed that this 
would win them bargaining power and strengthen their case for obtaining a delegate to 
represent them in the municipality and have municipal services extended to their colony. 
At the time of interview it was still unclear whether they would obtain the concession 
they demanded and whether their paying property taxes was sufficient to convince the 
government to grant them any right to representation.  
 
Several cases revealed that residents resist taxes through tax evasion when they are 
dissatisfied with the government. In Mérida, when corruption scandals and deterioration 
in service delivery became apparent in the previous administration, residents withheld 
their property tax payments. Once the new government came to power, which exerted 
more trust, payments swiftly resumed. This is particularly feasible when compliance is 
not immediately sanctioned or when it is easily pardoned, as is the case in most 
municipalities in Mexico (Morones Hernández, 2012).  
 
One may thus regard this as an implicit bargain or exchange. Taxpayers only pay the 
equivalent of what they deem the government deserves, according to the level of local 
government accountability.  And local governments only demand as much as they feel 
they can get away with considering their level of accountability. Yet such a bargain does 
not lead to increased accountability unless awareness of the loss in revenues that follows 
poor performance motivates local government officials to actively strive for accountable 
governance. As mentioned above, the local government officials were very clear about the 
fact that they could gain compliance only if they were popular and maintained 
satisfactory public management and service delivery, while if people become 
disillusioned, they would not achieve tax compliance. Yet it was difficult to discern how 
important of a motivator tax compliance was next to other motives when local 
governments made efforts to demonstrate accountability alongside their tax collection 
efforts. 
 
Did taxation lead to accountability via the short or long path? 
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On the rare occasions that taxation did lead to accountability, this tended to occur via the 
short path through implicit agreements. The government acted first, trying to show it was 
accountable before or as it attempted to increase the tax intake in anticipation of 
resistance or continued evasion by the residents. On the fewer occasions where explicit 
bargaining was observed, the local government tended to initiate it: it would approach 
the leaders of a specific taxpayer group first and offer concessions before collecting the 
(higher) tax, as seen in Centro with the street vendors and in La Paz with the transport 
sector. The quantitative evidence is consistent with this: the regressions with no lag 
yielded stronger positive relationships than the regressions with a lag of 2-3 years on the 
tax variable. However, as explained, these results are also consistent with the possibility 
that the effect of reverse causality is stronger. What  is certain is that the long path, while 
the dominating narrative of how the taxation-accountability theory works, was not 
observed.  
 
 
9.2 Evaluation of obstacles and context  
 
In the last section I stated that while greater taxation seemed capable of sparking greater 
accountability, many times obstacles stood in the way. In this section I summarise the 
obstacles that prevented tax bargaining and increased accountability in the cases studied. 
I also answer the other sub-questions of the research: was there a stronger relationship in 
the context of democracy? And how did the property tax fare compared to other taxes in 
sparking the processes consistent with the taxation-accountability theory and why? 
 
What obstacles to tax bargaining at the local government level? 
 
In Chapter 6, I set up a framework that looks at the causal mechanism as a multi-step 
process. The first chain of the link, following revenue pressure, was a strategy to raise tax 
revenue. This would lead to either tax bargaining, coercive taxation or neither. In order 
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for the taxation-accountability theory to take hold, it would have to lead to tax bargaining. 
Yet several obstacles already appeared here, causing neither to occur; that is, there were 
obstacles to raising revenues.  
1. One obstacle to raising tax revenue were third party interests that interfered with 
efforts to raise tax revenues. Drug traffickers proved to have a profound interest 
in property tax registry and preventing updating of the cadastre. They allegedly 
used the property tax registry to collect extortion money and they also had 
interests in maintaining low cadastral values and using sales to launder drug 
money. This posed a problem in Acapulco, where the director of the cadastre and 
his data manager were murdered by drug traffickers. It was given as the reason 
for the Municipality of Acapulco dropping all efforts to update the cadastre and 
increase property tax revenue. 
 
2. Another obstacle to raising tax revenue was the local government’s limited tax 
powers coupled with intergovernmental political rivalry in Mexico’s three-tiered 
federation. Mexico governments require consent by the state congress both to 
introduce new taxes and to change the tax rate. Municipal governments in Mexico 
complain that state governments often reject municipal proposals if they are of a 
different political party. This was most evident in La Paz where the state congress 
delayed and finally rejected proposals to charge a fee selling garbage to a 
recycling company and a proposal to raise local transport fees. Evidence of this 
was also found in Aguascalientes, where the reason cited for why the 
administrations could raise property values and update the cadastre was that it 
was of the same party as the state, which meant that there was cooperation 
between the local government and the state run cadastral institute. While 
updating the cadastre and raising property tax rates had posed an obstacle in the 
past, when parties were not aligned, it no longer did since the two parties did 
align.  
 
3. A third obstacle is that municipal government term limits end after only three 
years in most municipalities and consecutive re-election of municipal leaders is 
forbidden by the Mexican Constitution, especially in connection with the high 
turnover of local officials in municipal governments. This means that local 
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governments have little incentive to embark on an investment like updating 
property values to raise property tax revenues, as the benefits will not accrue 
until the next administration is in power. This is a great disincentive that makes 
large increases in tax revenue unviable. 
 
4. Finally, local taxation, especially of the salient property tax is unpopular. This 
point, combined with electoral competition and a lack of complete need for it, 
meant that tax collection efforts were unlikely to be as strong as they could have 
been, even in a context of considerable revenue raising pressure. Evidence from 
the municipalities visited as well as secondary evidence indicates that municipal 
leaders in fact tried to exhaust all alternative sources of revenues before even 
taxing at all, including both ordinary and extraordinary transfers from the federal 
government or loans from private banks or international institutions (interview 
95) (Ponce, 2012). Only when this failed were tax revenue raising options 
considered (interview 69). The unit in the Mexican Ministry of Finance in charge 
of coordination with the federal entities complains that subnational leaders are 
incessantly asking it for money while leaving their tax powers unexploited 
(interview 95). Many municipal governments simply cut down on spending, 
defaulted on their liabilities (including personnel payments) or dug themselves 
further into debt (Romero, 2012). In Mérida, for instance, the predecessor 
administration illegitimately passed on debt and liabilities to its successor 
through crafty accounting methods. These are all ways to circumvent unpopular 
tax collection despite substantial revenue pressure.  
Even when local governments did increase efforts to raise tax revenue, this did not always 
lead to tax bargaining. The following obstacles were encountered: 
 
1. One obstacle was the little power municipal governments have compared to the 
national or state government to noticeably improve the lives of a large part of the 
population, respond to the demands of their residents, or to use their tax 
revenues for new projects demanded in a bargaining process.  Many local 
governments have only few competencies and little decision-making power. In 
Mexico as elsewhere, a large proportion of local funds are earmarked to purposes 
decided on by the central government, and tax revenues may be used to cover 
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previous liabilities passed on from the former administration, such as for a large 
payroll of unionised workers (as seen in Centro and La Paz). This leaves local 
governments little manoeuvring power to improve services or invest in new ideas 
in an effort to show residents that they are using their tax money effectively (Díaz-
Cayeros & Martínez-Uriarte, 1997; Sánchez, 2013).  
 
2. Furthermore, as the decentralization literature has often argued, local 
performance may easily be confused with successes and failures of the state or 
national government (Faguet, 2012; Garcia-Escribano & Ahmad, 2006). In Centro, 
scandals at the state government level seemed to create a distrust of all levels of 
government generally. As elsewhere, municipal leaders are quick to blame higher 
government levels of government (rightly as when the State Congress blocked 
initiatives in La Paz or wrongly) for any short-comings and take credit for their 
achievements.  
 
3. Regarding property tax, some of the characteristics of the tax posed an obstacle to 
tax bargaining. Taxpayers for this tax tended to be a heterogeneous group. Even 
those with the highest property values tended to be disbursed across the 
municipality but did not form homogenous groups with interests between them. 
The only concession that the local government tended to think of was granting 
some kind of discount in order to positively motivate any payment at all.  
 
Finally, even when there was tax bargaining, this did not always lead to greater 
accountability due to the following: 
 
1. As mentioned already, municipal efforts to raise local transport fees were blocked 
by higher levels of government in La Paz. This had been attempted after a bargain 
had been struck with the local transport owners to invest in and improve 
transport services. Give that the tax could  not be increased, the concession of 
improved transport services, which would have benefited a large portion of the 
population, was not realised.  
 
304 
 
2. There was much explicit tax bargaining over individual’s specific tax obligation. It 
appeared that there was also little understanding or social solidarity among the 
local citizens. Individual gains rather than broader gains to the community were 
sought. Also, in both Saltillo and Aguascalientes, revenue directors said that it was 
usually wealthier citizens who asked for exemptions and exceptions to their tax 
obligations while poorer residents were more compliant. The revenue directors 
blamed this on a culture of entitlement or of feeling above the average or being 
able to ride the system and a culture of timidity towards local government 
officials on the part of poorer residents.  
 
Is the link stronger in a context of democracy? 
While the Mexican case provided a specific context in which to explore taxation-
accountability linkages, I also probed whether, within Mexico, the linkages might be 
stronger in a context of greater democracy. The hypothesis that the relationship would be 
stronger in a context of democracy was not strongly supported by the either the 
quantitative or the qualitative evidence.  
 
Beginning with the quantitative results, the coefficient on the interaction term created 
between democracy and taxation was not statistically significant in a way that would 
suggest that the relationship between taxation and accountability would be stronger in a 
context of greater democracy. While this was only tested for one of the three proxies for 
accountability (Drainage coverage), I draw the conclusion that the context of democracy 
did not make relationships between tax dependence and accountability any stronger. 
 
What did we learn from the case studies? This was examined in a different way in the 
qualitative analysis. Since electoral competition is now widespread across Mexican 
municipalities, especially urban ones, I decided that electoral competition no longer 
served as a workable proxy for a measure of democracy. I thus instead compared, from 
the pool of structurally similar urban municipalities, three that were consistently ranked 
relatively low in terms of transparency and accountability in national rankings and three 
305 
 
that ranked particularly high, as an analogous measure of the strength of state-society 
relations and relative democracy compared to the other.  
 
Coercive taxation was not witnessed in either of the two groups. With regard to the tax 
revenue collecting strategies, in both groups efforts were made to improve the image of 
the local government alongside revenue raising efforts. It should be noted that the 
differences in levels of democracy, state-society relations, taxation and accountability 
among the urban case studies was not as great as may  have been the case if one were to 
compare these to remote, rural municipalities deep in the authoritarian enclaves.  Yet 
some differences were found. 
 
The main difference was that each of the municipalities that ranked low ran into 
problems in raising their tax revenues, preventing any further processes along the chain 
that would galvanise greater accountability. In Acapulco, drug traffickers prevented the 
municipality from modernising and updating the property registry in order to increase 
their property tax payments. In La Paz the opposition party in power at the state 
government level prevented the municipal government from raising taxes or introducing 
new taxes. In Centro there was a low tax compliance culture which was said be due to 
distrust of the government yet it may also have been a result of oil wealth that made 
residents feel that the government did not need tax revenues as it should already have 
had sufficient revenues through the oil production. 
 
By contrast, those municipalities that ranked high did not list any problems in increasing 
their tax take and residents appeared to be more accepting to pay taxes, though this was 
difficult to compare across municipalities. The context of greater transparency and 
accountability may have contributed to greater seeming compliance but may also go hand 
in hand with greater institutionalisation of procedures, a more advanced bureaucracy, 
and greater control and authority over the jurisdiction, especially compared to rival 
powers like narcotics traffickers. This made tax revenue collecting more stable and 
problem-free, thus making it more likely that processes such as tax bargaining could 
follow. The multi-step process described in Figure 17 in Chapter 6 was thus extinguished 
at the first stage.  
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The general context of electoral competition led local governments not to tax coercively 
but not to want to tax at all. For instance, in Centro, the local governments all 
remembered how unpopular a former mayor became who had tried to raise property 
values to their market values, despite relatively mild year-on-year increases. The more 
electoral competition there was, the more the need to be popular and not to tax. This was 
clear in the Municipality of Aguascalientes where I was told that the reason why the 
predecessor PRI government there had embarked on an ambitious modernisation 
programme of the cadastre was because it did not feel great competition from other 
parties; that is, the political momentum was such that they were certain that the party 
would win again in the following term.  
What can be expected of the property tax compared to other 
taxes and why? 
 
In the quantitative analysis, positive and statistically significant associations were found 
between the property tax variable and the accountability measures, both in the cross-
sections and in the panel regressions. However, it is important to be cautious with these 
results given that endogeneity problems from reverse causality may have affected the 
results. For instance, more transparent municipalities are also more likely to have 
transparent and well working property registries and thus collect more property tax for 
that reason. It was difficult to isolate these effects in the quantitative analysis. There may 
also have been spurious causality: in particular, property tax collection involves 
administering an organised cadastre and gathering information about the residents. This 
increased information and administrative capacity could, in turn, be conducive for greater 
transparency and responsiveness.  
 
It could be confirmed that, even though the property tax is an important tax handle for 
local governments in many countries, local governments are thus reluctant to exploit it. 
The reasons for this were explained in the previous chapters and are consistent with the 
literature on the property tax that has often highlighted its unpopularity among taxpayers 
and among local leaders who are thus reluctant to collect it.  The municipal leaders had at 
least one eye on higher office, especially the ambitious young mayors in Mérida and 
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Saltillo, and were very intent on maintaining their popularity. In the case of the mayor of 
Saltillo, however, they mayor appeared to feel that his popularity would be more greatly 
maintained if he was able to fulfil his promise of zero deficit by the end of the term period, 
even if this meant continuing to bother residents with taxes and sending out warrants for 
arrears.  
 
The case studies showed that explicit tax bargaining for mutually beneficial governance 
outcomes was observed only with taxes different from the property tax. This is likely due 
to the tax incidence and prior organisational strength of the taxpayers: those taxes paid 
by a narrow group with special interests, such as street vendors or the transport union, 
both of which have common, clearly defined needs and demands and leaders who 
represent them vis-à-vis the government, were the taxes around which explicit tax 
bargains were observed. The local government could easily approach the leaders of these 
groups and lure them to pay taxes with clearly defined concessions.  
 
As mentioned above in the subsections on obstacles, the property tax, however, did not 
appear to be conducive for direct explicit bargaining initiated by the local government. 
Concessions were very general and difficult to target to specific property owners (except 
concessions on their actual tax obligation). This is because the (major) property 
taxpayers did not tend to form a homogenous group with common interests and 
representatives. It is imaginable that if a specific residential area or colony does not 
receive adequate services, it could group together and boycott property tax payments, but 
this was not observed or heard of in any of the cases studied.  
 
One interesting, though probably unusual, exception was when residents of a colony that 
officially pertained to neighbouring municipality of Centro protested and actively paid 
property tax to the Municipality of Centro in order to motivate that municipal 
government to grant them a delegate to represent them and to extend municipal services 
to their colony. 
 
There were, however, implicit agreements and these may have led to the seeming causal 
relationship observed in the quantitative analysis between property taxation and 
accountability. Residents were willing to pay more property tax when the local 
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government was regarded as accountable, but withheld their property tax payments 
when the government was regarded as corrupt or performed inadequately. On the side of 
the governments, these made greater efforts to collect property taxes when they enjoyed 
a reputation as being accountable but dropped all efforts when public discontent, 
particularly due to corruption scandals such as during the PRI government in Merida, 
threatened their popularity.  
 
The seeming causal relationship in the quantitative analysis may also have been observed 
because of another causal relationship, different from that of tax bargaining. This is 
because maintaining a property cadastre requires administrative capacity and 
development and information gathering about the residents. It also brings greater legal 
security of property and trust. These factors, which could not be controlled for, show that 
property taxation may  be leading to greater accountability, but not through tax 
bargaining. 
 
 
9.3 Implications for theory and practice 
 
This thesis has responded to several gaps in the literature. First, few studies have 
explored taxation-accountability linkages in developing countries empirically and even 
fewer have examined it at the local level. The thesis has thus added to the otherwise 
scarce literature on taxation-accountability linkages at the local level, yet focusing on a 
different country and a different context from those previously studied. While the 
research findings need to be considered within their context and limitations, theoretical 
implications that derive from the findings are also relevant for the debate in the wider 
literature. This section summarises how the findings corroborate, qualify and/or 
contradict the existing literature through some of its key insights. It also discusses the 
methods to be used for further research in this area and draws lessons for development 
policy. 
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New case, different approach 
 
Besides adding further evidence, this thesis has improved on previous attempts to study 
these linkages by being the first, to my knowledge, to combine within-country large-N 
analysis with qualitative small-N case studies in a mixed methods research design or Q2 
approach. This not only has several advantages that increase the validity of the findings 
and the confidence in the conclusions, but it has also allowed me to address the 
contradictory evidence on this issue in the literature stemming from the qualitative 
research camp on one hand and the quantitative camp on the other.  
 
The mixed methods research approach applied here provides a number of advantages 
over the existing studies that fall into either one of the two categories (quantitative or 
qualitative research) alone. Small-N studies are able to identify causal processes and 
analyse precise institutional dynamics more deeply with greater attention and nuance to 
each of its specificities. Yet they are but single examples, making it difficult to generalise 
beyond the few cases they examine (Faguet, 2012). Large-N studies, on the other hand, 
benefit from being replicable and more transparent, using consistent and relatively 
unbiased indicators and categories, as well as from a higher degree of generalisability. 
However, it is difficult to categorise and quantify complex dynamics and concepts, it is 
difficult to specify models adequately, given a potential multitude of influencing and 
interacting factors in complex social processes, and problems of identifying causal 
mechanisms (Gerring:3-4).  
 
Blending the two is key for an analysis of taxation-accountability linkages. While the 
large-N analysis could look for general trends, only through more detailed field research 
of a few specific cases could data be gathered and in-depth knowledge gained about how 
the causal pathways worked, if A was really leading to B, and through which mechanism. 
 
The combination of small-N case studies combined with a within-country large-N analysis 
was also useful because the two methods complemented one another at different stages 
of the analysis throughout the research. For instance, the qualitative analysis informed 
which variables needed to be controlled for in the quantitative analysis. It particularly 
highlighted the need to control for municipality invariant variables through panel 
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regression as levels in tax revenue and accountability were largely dependent on 
structural factors and other municipality specific characteristics, such as administrative 
capacity, the quality of the cadastre, the proportion of rural land plots, the level of 
sophistication of the municipal government bureaucracy, etc. This information, acquired 
in the field research, thus guided the choice of controls in the quantitative analysis. It also 
enabled a better understanding of results obtained from the econometric regressions.  
 
Resolving the contradiction in the literature between methodological camps 
 
The contradictory findings between the two camps of literature particularly highlight the 
importance of the mixed methods approach and allowed me to address this contradiction. 
In Chapter 1, a review of the literature showed that, on the one hand, there is a small body 
of quantitative large-N statistical literature that, for the most part, supports that the 
taxation-accountability theory works at the subnational level in developing countries 
(Gadenne, 2013; Gervasoni, 2010; Hoffman & Gibson, 2005). On the other hand, there is 
also a small body of qualitative case study literature that illustrates a different picture. 
The case studies at the local government level were conducted in China (Bernstein & Lü, 
2003, 2008), East Africa (Fjeldstad, 2001a; Fjeldstad & Therkildsen, 2008), and Senegal 
(Juul, 2006) and have shown that increased pressure to raise tax revenues tended to lead 
to coercive tax collection methods, “often characterised by violent and extortive forms of 
taxation” (Fjeldstad, 2001b;302) or no taxation, rather than to any agreement to increase 
accountability, therefore countering the taxation-accountability theory. 
 
How has the evidence found here helped to further the knowledge and/or reconcile this 
seeming contradiction? The previous large-N literature has found positive relationships 
between taxation and accountability in support of their causal argument. In this study, the 
large-N regression results support the idea that taxation and accountability are positively 
associated, even controlling for various factors like development, size of the overall 
budget, and political, geographic and cultural factors. However, proving causality posed 
problems as revealed by more sophisticated panel regressions with fixed effects and time 
lags.  Spurious correlations or reverse causality may have driven the correlations and 
endogeneity problems are likely to have affected results. These problems are also likely to 
have affected results in existing studies, especially those using only cross-sectional 
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regressions. Problems of method and data would also affected results in other studies, 
especially those comparing cross-country data that cannot soundly be compared. Another 
problem was that of adequately capturing the concepts. Unlike previous studies, this 
analysis included more than one or two proxies for the multi-dimensional concept of 
accountability as dependent variables in separate regression models, but the problem 
remains. It is thus possible that wrong conclusions about causal arguments were drawn 
from simple correlations and that data and specification problems affected attempts at 
showing causation.  
 
The existing small-N study literature, by contrast, found that taxation usually did not lead 
to tax bargaining or greater accountability, just like this thesis, but for different reasons. 
In the existing literature, the reason was that the local context led to coercive taxation 
rather than tax bargaining. In this research, no coercive taxation was observed. Instead, 
other obstacles broke the chain and either prevented tax bargaining from occurring at all 
or prevented tax bargaining from leading to increased accountability. 
 
The apparent contradiction in findings between camps of literature and between the two 
approaches taken in this dissertation can therefore be traced back to two factors. First, 
the divergent conclusions between the different methodologies can be partly explained 
by the fact that the quantitative models are not always properly specified to isolate the 
effects of taxation, solve endogeneity problems, and adequately prove causality, implying 
that the relationships found may be based on spurious correlations or reverse causality 
and/or data problems. While the recent within-country studies are already superior to 
the more frequently found cross-national statistical tests, this needs to be tested in 
further contexts. Gadenne (2012) and Gervasoni (2010) have made strides to overcome 
endogeneity problems through instrumental variable regression. Yet best would be to 
complement such attempts this with qualitative case study research in a mixed methods 
approach, for the reasons described at the beginning of this section. 
 
A second explanation for the disparities between the bodies of existing literature is that 
the linkages simply hold in some contexts but not in others. The within-country statistical 
studies and the case studies have all been conducted in different countries. While the 
recent theoretical literature has already established that outcomes are highly contingent 
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on contextual factors and circumstances (Levi, 1999; Moore, 2008; Prichard, 2009, 
2010b), this thesis has explored the linkages in a new context (that of Mexico with its 
specific characteristics and institutional framework) but has looked at different contexts 
within Mexico. It has shown that different contexts provide different obstacles that may 
hinder an otherwise predictable course of events.  
 
Resolving the contradictions with other small-N literature 
 
The previous studies on local taxation and accountability where coercive taxation was 
found have been based on examples from China and Sub-Saharan Africa. Part of the 
explanation for this is that in agrarian societies, local governments tax immobile assets 
which local residents cannot escape. Yet the Mexican case also involved the taxation of an 
immobile base (property) and no coercion was observed. 
 
There are at least three major differences in the context that can explain this. One lies in 
the intergovernmental power structure. In the Chinese example, local governments were 
under considerable pressure to raise tax revenues from higher levels of government, but 
were free to impose new taxes and higher tax rates with little control, leading to arbitrary 
new taxes, duplicate taxing of revenue bases and other forms of what was considered 
overly harsh taxation, often using (threats of) coercive measures. In Mexico, local 
governments are restricted from imposing new taxes or raising rates without the consent 
of the state congress, thereby generally precluding arbitrary taxes and overly harsh rates.  
 
A further difference is the context of electoral competition. In Mexico, highly competitive 
elections and the importance of property tax policy as one of the only ways for candidates 
to differentiate between one another, that made it unlikely for coercive taxation to occur.  
Given that local authorities were very conscious of the political cost of taxation to their 
future election or career path, they did not attempt to tax in any way that would be 
deemed unfair or overly harsh.  
 
Another difference is that the case studies in this thesis have focused on urban local 
governments. The situation may be different in the more isolated backwaters in which 
authoritarian enclaves thrive and survive, where information does not flow as freely, and 
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where pressure for accountability and democracy may not be as strong. Given that the 
majority of the population lives in urban local governments and that is also where the 
bulk of local taxes are collected, it is particularly important to study the urban context and 
not to conclude from the existing studies that all local taxation is prone to coercive 
practices rather than tax bargaining.  
 
Corroboration and contestation on the context and circumstances 
 
This thesis has corroborated the theoretical literature in that the context of taxation is 
crucial for its effects on accountability. As mentioned above, results of revenue pressures 
were different from those in rural agrarian settings, mostly likely because of the 
intergovernmental framework, electoral competition and urbanisation. This thesis has 
also shown that results are contingent on the tax type. According to the quantitative 
results, the property tax appeared particularly conducive to sparking accountability 
compared with other municipal taxes and fees. This corroborates the idea that taxes 
which are broad based, adhere to the benefit principle, and are visible, felt and salient 
(which the property tax is), are more likely to spark accountability than those tax types 
that are not. However, the qualitative analysis showed that direct explicit tax bargaining 
was unlikely around the property tax. Because property owners didn’t make up a small, 
homogenous group that the government could easily approach with specific concessions, 
tax bargaining around specific issues was not considered. There may have been implicit 
agreements to be more transparent and accountable (though this was hard to prove). Yet 
it is also likely that the quantitative results were due to spurious causality and that the 
causal mechanism was instead that increasing property tax revenue necessitates creating 
greater administrative capacity (gathering information on the population, maintaining an 
updated and organised property tax registry), all of which facilitate transparency and 
responsiveness to residents’ needs.  
 
Policy implications 
 
Can increased local taxation and pressure to raise tax revenues at the local level bring 
about greater local accountability? This is an important policy question for development 
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policy as many local governments in developing countries suffer from poor governance 
and a lack of accountability. At the same time, more expenditure power and 
administrative functions are being passed to local level governments. Additionally, rapid 
urbanisation has turned many urban municipal governments into extremely important 
players in terms of promoting development for a large amount of people. While some 
local leaders use their term periods effectively, working with and for its population, 
others use it to empty the government coffers without making any effort to respond to the 
residents’ needs and demands. If increased dependence on taxation can help to turn the 
second group into the first, then this should be promoted as a policy.  
 
The evidence presented in this thesis leads us to several considerations about tax 
decentralisation. While in general, evidence of the mechanism from local taxation 
(operationalised as revenue raising pressure or importance of tax revenues in the budget) 
to accountability was found, various obstacles stood in the way. The following 
considerations should thus be taken into account. 
 
First, the Mexican case shows that decentralising tax powers to subnational governments 
does not imply that subnational governments will make use of these, develop any 
dependence on taxation, or feel genuinely pressured to raise tax revenue. However, the 
Mexican case also shows that (a) imposing a hard budget constraint through a stricter 
policy on financial rescues and (b) introducing a transfer formula that effectively rewards 
tax effort with a greater share of central government transfers can help uphold revenue 
pressure to some degree.  
 
For the taxation-accountability link to take hold, local governments need to be dependent 
on taxation. Unless there is a high degree of dependence on the taxpayers for revenues, 
the local government will have little incentives to engage in tax bargaining with its 
residents. Strong dependence on taxation is difficult to attain at the local government 
level. Since local tax revenue usually doesn’t suffice to pay for all of their expenditure 
responsibilities, local governments tend to be financed through some combination of 
transfers, taxes, credit, and other revenue sources. When transfers from the central 
government abound, when municipalities can easily borrow on the market with no 
accountability, when they can pass their debts on to the next administration with 
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impunity, and when they can expect a bailout from the central government following 
fiscal mismanagement, there is little dependence on taxation. While own revenues give 
local governments independence from the centre, they are also more costly to collect, 
both economically and politically (the latter particularly if the local leaders are popularly 
elected or if they hope to be elected for other positions in future), and local governments 
will prefer to rely on alternative revenue sources.  
 
Possible solutions to increasing dependence on taxation by local government therefore 
include: a) rewarding marginal increases in tax effort with greater transfers and 
designing transfer formulas in a way that the gain is obvious and substantial to the 
municipalities; b) making local governments accountable to credit institutions for loans 
rather than having central government bail them out if they do not comply with 
repayments (i.e. allow local governments to fail and suffer the consequences for poor 
management); c) improving transparency around accounting so that municipalities 
cannot so easily hide money and pass the buck to the next administration.  
 
Limited power to decide on expenditures (and to affect real changes in the municipality) 
and on local tax policy (e.g. to introduce new laws or change the tax rate) has proven to be 
an obstacle to tax bargaining. If local governments do not have the power to exact 
changes that affect local residents and are not able to take full responsibility for their 
local policies, this precludes negotiations around taxation and opportunities for mutually 
beneficial agreements between the local government and local residents.  
 
It would thus be beneficial to tax bargaining if local governments were to have more 
control over tax rates and bases and over expenditure decisions in order to have greater 
bargaining power and a wider choice of concessions to make for residents. The fear that 
municipalities in Mexico would drastically raise tax rates and impose a row of new taxes 
has proven entirely unwarranted in the context of electoral competition as municipal 
governments in any case fear the political costs associated with taxation. To prevent 
coercive taxation, a tax rate range could be introduced, with both a minimum rate (to 
prevent dropping tax revenues altogether like the elected candidate in Aguascalientes did 
with the property tax) and a maximum to prevent abusive overtaxing. 
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Regarding expenditure powers, there is a trade-off between allowing local governments 
greater decision-making power to respond to specific needs and demands of their 
localities (but also allowing them greater freedom to fail) on one hand, and losing central 
or state government control over governance (including preventing them from failing 
their residents). Earmarked transfers, conditionality, higher level approval requirements, 
and also short term periods, limit the freedom of what local governments can do to 
respond to specific demands to increase accountability following tax bargaining.  As 
Ahmad and Brosio (2008) write, “subjecting local governments to strict conditionality is 
still considered in Latin America as a necessary instrument of good governance to ensure 
better targeted social spending. [This] reduce[s] the scope of decision-making by 
subnational officials, and also their accountability.”  
 
Regarding the short time horizon of local governments due to high staff turnover, short 
term periods for local government leaders and no consecutive re-election. Consecutive re-
election (which will soon come into force in Mexico) and longer term limits may slightly 
increase the time horizon of local politicians, as would a more stable bureaucracy with 
less frequent staff turnover. Nevertheless, even where there is consecutive re-election, 
political time horizons sadly do not tend to reach beyond the next elections. And while 
one administration may change course over another in terms of its policies on 
transparency and accountability, there tends to be consistency in these over time.  
Expectations are set and it is difficult to justify taking away good practices that have been 
established by previous administrations.  
 
Finally, there is much scope among local governments in communicating a greater link 
between taxation and its benefits to the population and increasing transparency. If the 
benefits of taxation are made clearer and are linked to specific benefits to residents, this 
is not only likely to foster tax compliance but also to create greater accountability. 
 
Decentralising taxation from higher to more local levels of government does not 
automatically imply increasing the overall tax burden on the individual resident. Yet what 
about going beyond this and expanding the tax burden? It is not uncontroversial to 
promote taxation in developing countries and among poor populations. Why make lives 
even more difficult for poor people by demanding taxes?  
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Putting these principles into practice requires judgement calls and knowledge of the 
specific contexts at hand. It requires weighing the pros and cons of its wider effects, 
something that is beyond the scope of this thesis. For example, property taxation usually 
requires extensive information-gathering and high skills and technical capacity to 
maintain an updated property cadastre. This may have high administrative costs that 
channel funds away from other purposes. Yet at the same time, the property tax is 
generally progressive and may help redistribute quickly growing concentrations of 
wealth among small parts of increasingly unequal societies witnessed in many developing 
countries, especially in urban areas. The administrative tasks are also likely to improve 
the overall administrative capacity of local government, making it more capable of 
responding to local residents’ needs. Finally, a property registry provides greater legal 
certainty to residents and makes money laundering more difficult which in turn bolsters a 
sense of security among local residents and fosters business and investment. Such pros 
and cons need to be weighed in each case. 
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Annex A: Additional regression tables 
 
Annex table 1 Effect of Tax/total on Transparency with State, linear, time lag, 2008 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Tax/total 3.195*** 1.856*** 1.385*** 1.435*** 1.416*** 1.390*** 1.351*** 
 
(.259) (.316) (.325) (.336) (.338) (.337) (.322) 
Development 
 
2.677*** 2.048*** 1.958*** 1.905*** 1.573** .665 
  
(.446) (.467) (.517) (.538) (.533) (.475) 
Rural 
  
-.031*** -.023** -.014 -.015 -.016 
   
(.007) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.008) 
Budget 
   
-.000* -.000** -.000*** -.000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.008 .001 .099* 
     
(.044) (.044) (.047) 
North 
     
.203** 
 
      
(.064) 
 Baja California 
      
-.447* 
       
(.215) 
Baja California Sur 
      
-.899** 
       
(.341) 
344 
 
Campeche 
      
-.508** 
       
(.188) 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 
      
-.336* 
       
(.138) 
Colima  
      
-.828*** 
       
(.224) 
Chiapas 
      
-1.030*** 
       
(.140) 
Chihuahua 
      
.028 
       
(.124) 
Durango 
      
-.737*** 
       
(.148) 
Guanajuato 
      
-.599** 
       
(.191) 
Guerrero 
      
-1.595*** 
       
(.169) 
Hidalgo 
      
-.795*** 
       
(.141) 
Jalisco 
      
-.852*** 
       
(.127) 
México 
      
-.584*** 
345 
 
       
(.131) 
Michoacán de Ocampo 
      
-.811*** 
       
(.129) 
Morelos 
      
-.433* 
       
(.188) 
Nayarit 
      
-.369 
       
(.192) 
Nuevo León 
      
-1.205*** 
       
(.169) 
Oaxaca 
      
-1.458*** 
       
(.145) 
Puebla 
      
-.823*** 
       
(.128) 
Querétaro 
      
-.266 
       
(.238) 
Quintana Roo 
      
.145 
       
(.216) 
San Luis Potosí 
      
-.737*** 
       
(.169) 
Sinaloa 
      
-.102 
       
(.174) 
346 
 
Sonora 
      
-.878*** 
       
(.156) 
Tabasco 
      
.036 
       
(.165) 
Tamaulipas 
      
-.369* 
       
(.170) 
Tlaxcala 
      
-.636*** 
       
(.132) 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave 
      
-.968*** 
       
(.130) 
Yucatán 
      
-.525*** 
       
(.131) 
Zacatecas 
      
-.509*** 
        (.140) 
Constant -.040 -1.990*** -1.264*** -1.134** -1.084* -.825 .624 
 
(.026) (.327) (.370) (.410) (.427) (.423) (.396) 
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1511 1394 1394 1394 
R-squared .088 .112 .122 .115 .098 .105 .262 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex table 2 Effect of Tax/total on Drainage coverage with State, time lag, quadratic, 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Tax/total 3.191*** .909*** .916*** .937*** .942*** .946*** .214 
 
(.167) (.139) (.149) (.152) (.151) (.151) (.143) 
Tax squared -6.163*** -2.351*** -2.361*** -2.439*** -2.439*** -2.418*** -.902** 
 
(.575) (.392) (.402) (.412) (.407) (.404) (.336) 
Development 
 
2.217*** 2.221*** 2.176*** 2.168*** 2.321*** 2.554*** 
  
(.078) (.083) (.087) (.088) (.091) (.088) 
Rural 
  
.000 -.001 -.001 -.000 -.002 
   
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
Budget 
   
.000* .000* .000*** .000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.014 -.012 -.002 
     
(.008) (.007) (.007) 
North 
     
-.093*** 
 
      
(.011) 
 Baja California 
      
-.231*** 
       
(.033) 
Baja California Sur 
      
-.285*** 
       
(.040) 
Campeche 
      
-.290*** 
348 
 
       
(.045) 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 
      
-.204*** 
       
(.031) 
Colima  
      
-.069 
       
(.039) 
Chiapas 
      
.024 
       
(.030) 
Chihuahua 
      
-.192*** 
       
(.028) 
Durango 
      
-.182*** 
       
(.028) 
Guanajuato 
      
-.120*** 
       
(.027) 
Guerrero 
      
-.222*** 
       
(.031) 
Hidalgo 
      
-.126*** 
       
(.026) 
Jalisco 
      
-.017 
       
(.025) 
México 
      
-.118*** 
       
(.025) 
349 
 
Michoacán de Ocampo 
      
-.059* 
       
(.026) 
Morelos 
      
-.122*** 
       
(.030) 
Nayarit 
      
-.083** 
       
(.030) 
Nuevo León 
      
-.194*** 
       
(.028) 
Oaxaca 
      
.000 
       
(.) 
Puebla 
      
-.077** 
       
(.026) 
Querétaro 
      
-.104** 
       
(.033) 
Quintana Roo 
      
-.225*** 
       
(.035) 
San Luis Potosí 
      
-.289*** 
       
(.032) 
Sinaloa 
      
-.180*** 
       
(.031) 
Sonora 
      
-.189*** 
350 
 
       
(.028) 
Tabasco 
      
.000 
       
(.030) 
Tamaulipas 
      
-.351*** 
       
(.040) 
Tlaxcala 
      
-.052 
       
(.027) 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave 
      
-.117*** 
       
(.027) 
Yucatán 
      
-.340*** 
       
(.029) 
Zacatecas 
      
-.104*** 
        (.026) 
Constant .594*** -.991*** -.996*** -.968*** -.956*** -1.077*** -1.097*** 
 
(.009) (.058) (.067) (.069) (.070) (.072) (.073) 
Observations 1726 1726 1726 1693 1693 1693 1693 
R-squared .282 .502 .502 .500 .501 .520 .664 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex table 3 Effect of Tax/total on Electoral competition with State, linear, time lag, 1998 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Tax/total 8.917*** 4.702*** 2.737* 3.768*** -.163 3.714** 1.632 
 
(1.030) (1.064) (1.075) (1.143) (1.221) (1.132) (1.339) 
Development 
 
9.713*** 7.031*** 4.422*** 5.004** 4.128*** 5.362** 
  
(1.062) (1.094) (1.243) (1.654) (1.254) (1.741) 
Rural 
  
-.251*** -.284*** -.194*** -.287*** -.090** 
   
(.039) (.040) (.046) (.040) (.034) 
Budget 
   
.002*** -.000 .002*** -.001* 
    
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.516* 
 
-1.188*** 
     
(.256) 
 
(.308) 
North 
     
.549 
 
      
(.321) 
 Baja California 
      
.000 
       
(.) 
Baja California Sur 
      
.000 
       
(.) 
Campeche 
      
-.999 
       
(1.315) 
352 
 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 
      
-1.865* 
       
(.921) 
Colima  
      
.000 
       
(.) 
Chiapas 
      
-.243 
       
(.964) 
Chihuahua 
      
-.341 
       
(1.053) 
Durango 
      
.310 
       
(1.262) 
Guanajuato 
      
-4.881*** 
       
(.843) 
Guerrero 
      
-.589 
       
(.839) 
Hidalgo 
      
-2.344** 
       
(.781) 
Jalisco 
      
.041 
       
(1.034) 
México 
      
.754 
       
(1.023) 
Michoacán de Ocampo 
      
-.165 
353 
 
       
(.950) 
Morelos 
      
-.805 
       
(1.050) 
Nayarit 
      
-1.798 
       
(1.123) 
Nuevo León 
      
-1.345 
       
(.857) 
Oaxaca 
      
-2.564** 
       
(.784) 
Puebla 
      
-1.976** 
       
(.759) 
Querétaro 
      
-.137 
       
(1.289) 
Quintana Roo 
      
-3.101** 
       
(1.084) 
San Luis Potosí 
      
.000 
       
(.) 
Sinaloa 
      
-.730 
       
(1.276) 
Sonora 
      
-.687 
       
(.863) 
354 
 
Tabasco 
      
-.292 
       
(1.283) 
Tamaulipas 
      
-2.614** 
       
(.823) 
Tlaxcala 
      
-.733 
       
(.963) 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave 
      
.086 
       
(.834) 
Yucatán 
      
-2.709** 
       
(.825) 
Zacatecas 
      
.000 
 
      (.) 
Constant .939*** -5.443*** -1.294 .262 1.044 .506 1.170 
 
(.097) (.698) (.886) (.960) (1.293) (.972) (1.538) 
Observations 1874 1858 1858 1858 1685 1858 1623 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex table 4 Pathway: cross-section, Effects of Tax/total on Transparency, no lag, 1998 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tax/Total 3.708*** 2.532*** 2.532*** 1.832*** 1.850*** 1.586*** 
 
(.325) (.408) (.408) (.407) (.404) (.405) 
Development 
 
2.306*** 2.306*** 1.510** 1.612*** 1.412** 
  
(.455) (.455) (.467) (.475) (.523) 
Rural 
   
-.040*** -.036*** -.020* 
    
(.008) (.008) (.008) 
Budget 
    
-.000 -.000** 
     
(.000) (.000) 
Governor 
     
-.023 
      
(.044) 
North 
     
.201** 
       (.065) 
Constant -.095*** -1.780*** -1.780*** -.845* -.898* -.719 
 
(.028) (.332) (.332) (.370) (.374) (.412) 
Observations 1731 1729 1729 1729 1729 1476 
R-squared .098 .114 .114 .129 .131 .103 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex table 5 Pathway: cross-section, Effects of Tax/total on Drainage coverage, no lag, 2005 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Tax/Total Development Rural Budget Gov North 
Tax/Total 2.996*** .911*** .901*** .921*** .915*** 1.005*** 
 
(.158) (.128) (.134) (.135) (.134) (.129) 
Tax/Total squared -4.946*** -1.898*** -1.886*** -1.939*** -1.922*** -2.094*** 
 
(.509) (.314) (.319) (.324) (.319) (.301) 
Development 
 
2.133*** 2.126*** 2.096*** 2.094*** 2.260*** 
  
(.080) (.084) (.087) (.087) (.089) 
Rural 
  
-.000 -.001 -.001 -.000 
   
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Budget 
   
.000 .000 .000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.016* -.012 
     
(.007) (.007) 
North 
     
-.114*** 
  
     
(.010) 
Constant .579*** -.936*** -.927*** -.910*** -.900*** -1.040*** 
 
(.009) (.058) (.066) (.068) (.068) (.069) 
Observations 1771 1771 1771 1771 1771 1771 
R-squared .312 .506 .506 .506 .507 .536 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
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Annex table 6 Pathway: cross-section, Effects of Tax/total on Electoral competition, no lag, 1998 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tax/total 20.036*** 16.985*** 11.864*** 12.524*** 1.623 1.607 
 
(1.822) (1.939) (2.037) (2.093) (2.586) (2.584) 
Development 
 
4.344*** 1.952 1.256 5.160** 5.127** 
  
(1.088) (1.127) (1.225) (1.959) (1.971) 
Rural 
  
-.279*** -.287*** -.128** -.129** 
   
(.037) (.038) (.049) (.049) 
Budget 
   
.000 -.000 -.000 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.930** -.932** 
     
(.284) (.284) 
North 
     
.072 
  
     
(.345) 
Constant .582*** -2.503** 1.896* 2.338* .735 .767 
 
(.088) (.775) (.931) (.985) (1.559) (1.571) 
Observations 2063 2063 2063 2057 1789 1789 
Pseudo R-squared .110 .119 .160 .162 .080 .080 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex table 7 Pathway: panel, Effects on Drainage, no lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax/total .043* .043* .038 .038 
 
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) 
year=1990 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
year=1995 .137*** .137*** .136*** .136*** 
 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
year=2000 .201*** .201*** .194*** .194*** 
 
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
year=2005 .359*** .360*** .346*** .347*** 
 
(.004) (.004) (.006) (.006) 
Governor 
 
.002 
 
.003 
  
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
Budget 
  
.000** .000** 
      (.000) (.000) 
Constant .381*** .380*** .381*** .380*** 
 
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004) 
Observations 6700 6666 6699 6665 
R-squared .732 .732 .732 .733 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex table 8 Pathway: panel, Effects on Electoral competition, no lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax/total -.479 -.529 -.117 -.185 
 
(.515) (.521) (.533) (.535) 
T1 (1989-1991) 
-5.581*** -5.441*** -5.434*** -5.310*** 
 
(.158) (.164) (.221) (.225) 
T2 (1992-1994) 
-4.468*** -4.322*** -4.227*** -4.120*** 
 
(.099) (.108) (.148) (.155) 
T3 (1995-1997) 
-2.600*** -2.502*** -2.338*** -2.288*** 
 
(.090) (.096) (.138) (.143) 
T4 (1998-2000) 
-1.214*** -1.097*** -.973*** -.910*** 
 
(.091) (.097) (.128) (.132) 
T5 (2001-2003) 
.153 .375** .332* .492*** 
 
(.120) (.134) (.134) (.144) 
Governor 
 
-.538*** 
 
-.477*** 
  
(.085) 
 
(.086) 
Budget 
  
.000** .000* 
      (.000) (.000) 
Observations 14783 14517 14538 14288 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex table 9 Property tax: cross-section, Effects on Transparency, time lag, 2008 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Property tax/total 4.767*** 2.585*** 1.945*** 2.015*** 2.168*** 2.052*** 
 
(.481) (.502) (.491) (.515) (.500) (.496) 
Development 
 
2.987*** 2.104*** 2.070*** 1.737** 1.498** 
  
(.425) (.462) (.521) (.543) (.537) 
Rural 
  
-.036*** -.028** -.017 -.018* 
   
(.007) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
Budget 
   
-.000** -.000*** -.000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.013 -.002 
     
(.045) (.045) 
North 
     
.175** 
       (.065) 
Constant .016 -2.187*** -1.242*** -1.144** -.879* -.690 
 
(.025) (.316) (.374) (.422) (.440) (.435) 
Observations 1631 1631 1631 1469 1334 1334 
R-squared .076 .109 .123 .118 .094 .099 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex table 10 Property tax: cross-section, Effects on Transparency, no lag, 2008 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Property tax/total 5.369*** 3.474*** 2.468*** 2.548*** 2.441*** 2.203*** 
 
(.542) (.634) (.613) (.611) (.614) (.626) 
Development 
 
2.715*** 1.591** 1.690*** 1.286* 1.114* 
  
(.457) (.484) (.490) (.547) (.539) 
Rural 
  
-.047*** -.042*** -.021* -.022* 
   
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) 
Budget 
   
-.000 -.000** -.000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.025 -.016 
     
(.044) (.044) 
North 
     
.159* 
       (.066) 
Constant -.049 -2.058*** -.828* -.877* -.541 -.396 
 
(.027) (.337) (.390) (.393) (.438) (.433) 
Observations 1656 1654 1654 1654 1367 1367 
R-squared .089 .114 .136 .138 .089 .093 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex table 11 Property tax: cross-section, Effects on Drainage coverage, time lag, 2005 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Property tax/total 4.802*** 1.105*** 1.039*** 1.058*** 1.057*** 1.229*** 
 
(.307) (.230) (.243) (.249) (.249) (.244) 
Property tax/total Squared -14.235*** -4.805*** -4.653*** -4.806*** -4.781*** -5.293*** 
 
(1.788) (1.053) (1.069) (1.113) (1.118) (1.074) 
Development 
 
2.297*** 2.261*** 2.223*** 2.219*** 2.349*** 
  
(.080) (.085) (.089) (.089) (.093) 
Rural 
  
-.002 -.002 -.003 -.002 
   
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Budget 
   
.000 .000* .000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.011 -.010 
     
(.008) (.008) 
North 
     
-.094*** 
       (.011) 
Constant .623*** -1.041*** -1.002*** -.978*** -.970*** -1.080*** 
 
(.009) (.060) (.069) (.071) (.072) (.074) 
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1649 1649 1649 
R-squared .238 .491 .491 .491 .492 .511 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex table 12 Property tax: cross-section, Effects on Drainage coverage, no lag, 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Property tax/total 4.138*** .950*** .866*** .883*** .877*** 1.198*** 
 
(.209) (.169) (.176) (.177) (.177) (.191) 
Property tax/total squared -9.798*** -3.173*** -3.016*** -3.095*** -3.062*** -3.778*** 
 
(.921) (.541) (.546) (.552) (.553) (.639) 
Development 
 
2.310*** 2.243*** 2.219*** 2.214*** 2.355*** 
  
(.078) (.085) (.088) (.088) (.091) 
Rural 
  
-.003* -.003* -.003* -.002 
   
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Budget 
   
.000 .000 .000*** 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
    
-.013 -.008 
     
(.008) (.007) 
North 
     
-.117*** 
       (.011) 
Constant .621*** -1.059*** -.986*** -.972*** -.962*** -1.091*** 
 
(.008) (.058) (.069) (.070) (.071) (.073) 
Observations 1634 1634 1634 1634 1634 1634 
R-squared .249 .490 .491 .492 .493 .525 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex table 13 Property tax: cross-section, Effects on Electoral competition, lag, 1998 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Property tax/total 14.708*** 8.479*** 2.776 3.342 3.342 2.271 
 
(1.756) (1.808) (1.854) (1.970) (1.970) (1.957) 
Development 
 
8.517*** 3.817*** 3.130** 3.130** 3.021* 
  
(1.033) (1.102) (1.207) (1.207) (1.244) 
Rural 
  
-.369*** -.350*** -.350*** -.354*** 
   
(.037) (.038) (.038) (.039) 
Budget 
   
-.000 -.000 -.000 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
North 
     
1.586*** 
       (.342) 
Constant .725*** -5.378*** 1.494 1.906 1.906 2.108* 
 
(.079) (.740) (.934) (1.006) (1.006) (1.037) 
Observations 1982 1982 1982 1888 1888 1888 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001" 
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Annex table 14 Property tax: cross-section, Effects on Electoral competition, no lag, 1998 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Property tax/total 31.686*** 26.107*** 17.384*** 17.678*** 17.678*** -1.106 16.009*** 
 
(3.019) (3.196) (3.343) (3.383) (3.383) (3.888) (3.356) 
Development 
 
4.717*** 1.263 1.129 1.129 4.658* .952 
  
(1.071) (1.130) (1.193) (1.193) (2.063) (1.239) 
Rural 
  
-.332*** -.334*** -.334*** -.184*** -.341*** 
   
(.038) (.038) (.038) (.054) (.038) 
Budget 
   
.000 .000 -.000* -.000 
    
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Governor 
     
-1.143*** 
 
      
(.311) 
 North 
     
.417 1.862*** 
       (.415) (.381) 
Constant .544*** -2.829*** 2.804** 2.881** 2.881** 1.930 3.190** 
 
(.080) (.768) (.947) (.980) (.980) (1.692) (1.019) 
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1922 1922 1602 1922 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex Table 15 Property tax: Effects n Drainage coverage, panel, lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property tax/total .067 .119** .136** .137** 
 
(.038) (.041) (.043) (.043) 
Lagged drainage coverage .253*** .124*** .010 .013 
     year=1995 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
year=2000 .029*** .047*** .057*** .056*** 
 
(.003) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
year=2005 .174*** .199*** .212*** .211*** 
 
(.006) (.007) (.009) (.009) 
year=2010 .195*** .254*** 
  
 
(.009) (.011) 
  Governor 
 
-.003 
 
-.002 
  
(.003) 
 
(.003) 
Budget 
  
.000* .000* 
   
(.000) (.000) 
Constant .418*** .461*** .506*** .506*** 
 
(.010) (.011) (.012) (.012) 
Observations 6289 5322 4696 4684 
R-squared .694 .665 .628 .629 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex table 16 Property tax: panel, effects on Drainage coverage with right-hand side drainage variable panel no lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property tax/total .174*** .168*** .165*** .159** 
 
(.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) 
Lagged drainage coverage .007 .010 .007 .010 
 
(.031) (.031) (.030) (.031) 
year=1995 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
year=2000 .074*** .073*** .067*** .066*** 
 
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
year=2005 .229*** .228*** .214*** .213*** 
 
(.007) (.007) (.008) (.008) 
Governor 
 
-.002 
 
-.002 
  
(.004) 
 
(.004) 
Budget 
  
.000** .000** 
      (.000) (.000) 
Constant .503*** .504*** .502*** .503*** 
 
(.014) (.014) (.013) (.014) 
Observations 4438 4426 4438 4426 
R-squared .643 .643 .645 .645 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
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Annex Table 17 Property Tax: panel, effects on Drainage coverage* panel lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property/total .380*** .325*** .142 .146 
 
(.089) (.094) (.087) (.088) 
year=1995 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
year=2000 .084*** .074*** .052*** .051*** 
 
(.005) (.005) (.008) (.008) 
year=2005 .182*** .161*** .108*** .105*** 
 
(.009) (.010) (.015) (.016) 
year=2010 .430*** .402*** 
  
 
(.009) (.014) 
  Governor 
 
.000 
 
-.003 
  
(.009) 
 
(.006) 
Budget 
  
.000 .000 
      (.000) (.000) 
Constant .265*** .208*** .133*** .135*** 
 
(.009) (.011) (.005) (.006) 
Observations 2297 1386 802 798 
R-squared .859 .808 .492 .492 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex Table 18 Property tax: panel, effects on Drainage coverage* panel no lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property tax/total -.004 .002 -.002 .004 
 
(.052) (.052) (.052) (.052) 
year=1990 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
year=1995 .040*** .040*** .039*** .039*** 
 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
year=2000 .087*** .087*** .083*** .082*** 
 
(.004) (.004) (.006) (.006) 
year=2005 .146*** .145*** .138*** .134*** 
 
(.007) (.008) (.012) (.012) 
Governor 
 
-.005 
 
-.005 
  
(.005) 
 
(.005) 
Budget 
  
.000 .000 
      (.000) (.000) 
Constant .130*** .135*** .130*** .134*** 
 
(.002) (.005) (.002) (.005) 
Observations 1453 1435 1453 1435 
R-squared .531 .530 .532 .531 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex table 19 Property tax: panel, effects on Electoral competition, no lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property tax/total .195** .187* .222** .213** 
 
(.069) (.077) (.069) (.077) 
T1 (1989-1991) -.363*** -.365*** -.324*** -.305*** 
 
(.016) (.016) (.017) (.018) 
T2 (1992-1994) -.300*** -.301*** -.248*** -.237*** 
 
(.010) (.011) (.011) (.012) 
T3 (1995-1997) -.127*** -.135*** -.078*** -.075*** 
 
(.007) (.007) (.008) (.009) 
T4 (1998-2000) -.054*** -.053*** -.013* -.003 
 
(.004) (.005) (.006) (.007) 
T5 (2001-2003) -.011*** -.005* .012*** .025*** 
 
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.004) 
Governor 
 
-.041*** 
 
-.039*** 
  
(.004) 
 
(.004) 
Budget 
  
.000*** .000*** 
      (.000) (.000) 
Constant .870*** .987*** .813*** .916*** 
 
(.003) (.005) (.007) (.009) 
Observations 36312 32602 35817 32107 
R-squared .199 .217 .201 .219 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex table 20 Property tax: panel, effects on Electoral competition, lag 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property tax/total 2.349* 2.696** 2.808** 3.149** 
 
(.964) (.979) (.997) (1.011) 
T1 (1989-1991) -9.041*** -8.379*** -7.817*** -7.435*** 
 
(.262) (.266) (.364) (.371) 
T2 (1992-1994) -7.378*** -6.842*** -6.252*** -5.963*** 
 
(.209) (.213) (.301) (.310) 
T3 (1995-1997) -5.227*** -4.829*** -4.140*** -3.969*** 
 
(.201) (.205) (.288) (.296) 
T4 (1998-2000) -3.766*** -3.489*** -2.847*** -2.761*** 
 
(.199) (.204) (.263) (.270) 
T5 (2001-2003) -1.820*** -1.601*** -1.281*** -1.177*** 
 
(.209) (.219) (.234) (.242) 
Governor 
 
-1.557*** 
 
-1.496*** 
  
(.135) 
 
(.138) 
Budget 
  
.000*** .000*** 
      (.000) (.000) 
Observations 13150 13032 12869 12776 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Annex B: Interview list 
Available upon request 
